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  • In-depth analysis shows Caspian oil's potential

    In-depth analysis shows Caspian oil's potential

    World Oil
    Monday, March 1, 2004
    Volume 225; Issue 3
    ISSN: 0043-8790

    An in-depth analysis shows Caspian oil's potential: whether one talks
    about exploration, field projects or pipeline construction, the
    Caspian Sea region is destined to influence global energy and
    geopolitics for years to come.

    (Supply And Demand)

    By Collum, Randall, Jr., Gregorek, Adrian J., Sondhi, Amit, and
    Economides, Michael J.

    As new sources of hydrocarbons, particularly from non-OPEC countries,
    become increasingly important to the world, the Caspian Sea region has
    the potential to become one of the major oil- and gas-producing
    areas. The region is thought to hold the world's third-largest oil and
    gas reserves behind the Middle East and Russia. New oil discoveries in
    the northern Caspian Sea have underlined the region's
    importance. Kashagan field, off the northern shore of the Caspian Sea,
    is expected to be the second-largest petroleum deposit in the world,
    following Saudi Arabia's Ghawar field. It is the largest new oil field
    found over the last 30 years. By 2010, the Caspian region is expected
    to produce 3 million bopd, doubling current output of about 1.5
    million bopd.

    Most of the Caspian discoveries are in Kazakhstan, although by 2010 a
    significant amount of oil should come from Azerbaijan, predicted to
    account for almost one-third of the region.

    In December 2003, Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbaev stated,
    "Global experts consider the nervousness of Arab countries and all of
    OPEC's (members) comes not only from the massiveness of the Caspian
    reserves, but also because the region's states do not enter OPEC." He
    further suggested that the countries surrounding the Caspian should
    create an OPEC-like oil cartel, to support oil prices and reassure
    OPEC, itself.

    Until recently, Russia controlled oil exports from the area, with the
    main export pipelines for Caspian oil passing through its
    territory. The US government supports alternative routes that bypass
    Russia, which is not pleased that the new pipelines will give the West
    access to Caspian oil and gas, without Russian control.

    The geopolitics associated with the region have been a major influence
    on the Caspian petroleum industry. The US has blatantly thrown its
    clout behind the American petroleum companies involved.

    Transportation of Caspian oil and gas does not only involve
    Russia. Conflicts over land ownership and the US' bad relationship
    with Iran have played important roles in establishing potential
    pipeline routes. Also, the division of reserves located in the Caspian
    Sea has been an ongoing dispute, with Iran and Turkmenistan in
    disagreement with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Russia on how the Caspian
    Sea should be divided.

    An example of hostility that surrounds this issue is what happened to
    BP in 2001. While a BP research vessel was in a presumably Azerbaijani
    sector of the Caspian Sea disputed by Iran, an Iranian gunboat chased
    it out of those waters. This event prompted BP to suspend its work in
    that Caspian oil field for a period of time.

    The US has played an important role in influencing the Caspian
    pipeline situation by endorsing five pipelines in the region, three of
    which originate in Baku. (1) These three pipelines consist of the two
    already exporting oil, plus the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline
    that is under construction. Construction associated with the BTC
    pipeline is shown in Fig. 1. (2)

    [FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

    For now, the pipeline routes seem to be accepted by most
    countries. Russia has accepted construction of the BTC pipeline, and
    there are questions as to whether Iran would have transported
    Azerbaijan's oil through its territory. The route to ship oil through
    Iran would have been the cheapest, by far.

    AZERBAIJAN

    Of the estimated 3 million bopd to be produced from the Caspian by
    2010, about one third would come from Azerbaijan. (3,4) In 2002,
    Azerbaijan's oil production was 22% of total Caspian Sea output. If
    Azerbaijan's political situation continues to favor investment by
    foreign companies, and the geopolitical state of affairs can be
    resolved between the Caspian Sea's surrounding countries, then
    Azerbaijan's potential is even greater.

    Azerbaijan has been an oil-producing province for a long
    time. According to some historians, it is supposed to be the site of
    the first purpose-drilled oil well in the world, drilled in 1848-1849,
    just south of Baku. Oil field exploitation began in the 1870s and
    continued until World War I. Azerbaijan became an independent republic
    after the demise of the Russian Empire in 1918 and was recognized as
    an independent country by Western nations in January 1920. Three
    months following this recognition (April 1920), the Russian Red Army
    took over this country, and it became part of the emerging Soviet
    Union (USSR).

    Azerbaijan's production peaked at over 500,000 bopd during World War
    II, but it has yet to reach that production level again. It was a
    strategic, potential oil supply that Nazi Germany targeted in World
    War II but was never able to acquire. Had the Germans achieved this,
    the balance of the war could have shifted from the Allies to the
    Germans. Azerbaijan stayed as a member of the USSR for most of the
    Twentieth Century, until it became an independent country for the
    second time in history, in August 1991.

    Azerbaijan's current promise of hydrocarbons lies in the Caspian Sea,
    to the country's east. In 2002, Azerbaijan's oil production was a
    little over 300,000 bpd. (5) Given the current development projects in
    the Caspian Sea, the country should surpass its historical oil
    production peak in the near future.

    From 1987 through 1995, Azerbaijan's oil production declined at a
    rate of 5.4%. (5) Thanks to the "Contract of the Century," this
    decline has ended. The contract, signed in 1994 between Azerbaijan and
    11 international companies, involves the development of Caspian Sea
    reserves in the Azeri, Chirag and

    Gunashli (ACG) fields. Through this contract, Azerbaijan International
    Oil Co. (AIOC) was created. Members include state oil company SOCAR
    and 11 international firms.

    After the contract was signed, oil production stabilized between 1995
    and 1997. It has been increasing at an average 10.2% since 1997. (5)
    If this rate (considered conservative, given the number of new
    projects slated) continues, Azerbaijan will surpass 500,000 bopd in
    2007. First oil from the BP-operated ACG fields was in 1997, and this
    has been the main reason for the country's production increase. In
    early 2004, the area produced 130,000 bopd. It is expected to produce
    400,000 bopd by 2005 and peak at 1 million bopd. (6) Production,
    consumption and exports of Azerbaijani oil since 1985 are shown in
    Fig. 2. (5)

    [FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

    The Contract of the Century paved the way for many more production
    sharing agreements. So far, these pacts have committed a total
    investment of more than $60 billion in Azerbaijan's oil
    development. (7) The prize that the international operators are
    chasing is proven oil reserves of between 7 billion bbl and 12.5
    billion bbl, with a potential for an additional 32 billion bbl.
    Proven natural gas reserves also total 30 Tcf. Potential exists for
    an additional 35 Tcf. (4) Although Azerbaijan has fewer reserves than
    Kazakhstan, the country's ability to cooperate with, and openness to,
    international investment has enticed such companies as BP, ExxonMobil,
    Statoil and others to invest heavily.

    Azerbaijan's economy. Azerbaijan's future economy depends greatly on
    the proper utilization of hydrocarbon revenues. The country is
    low-income, with a per capita income in 2002 of only $710. (8)
    Nonetheless, Azerbaijan's income has quadrupled since 1995, much of it
    due to the Contract of the Century. This increase compares to a GDP
    that decreased by 18.5% in 1995. (8) The projected GDP growth in 2004
    is 9.1%. (9) The economy is growing at a fast pace.

    With 64% of the population below the poverty line, the country is in a
    transitional economy. While the oil sector accounted for 90% of
    Azerbaijan's exports, it generated only 1% of all jobs. (10) The
    projected $60 billion of international investment in oilfield
    development should add plenty of employment.

    One sign that the government is attempting to diversify its economy
    and keep it growing far into the future is the creation of the State
    Oil Fund of the Republic of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ). SOFAZ was established
    in 1999 and created to put aside some of the country's oil-related
    revenue and manage it for future use. (11)

    Becoming a major player. Azerbaijan faces many of the problems common
    to other Caspian Sea nations in its quest to become a major player in
    hydrocarbon exports.

    While oil companies have lined tip to take part in Azerbaijan's
    hydrocarbon development, issues still stand in the way of delivering
    commercially viable hydrocarbons. Azerbaijan sits on the western coast
    of the Caspian Sea, and its neighbors include Iran to the south,
    Georgia and Armenia to the west, and Russia to the north.

    "Transportation of Azerbaijan's abundant reserves is a major
    problem. There is not enough pipeline capacity to export the amount of
    oil that can be produced. Also, as Azerbaijan in the past has been a
    gas importer, there are no export pipelines available for its
    potential gas output. New lines will be necessary for fields that will
    be coming onstream, such as Shah Deniz. As one of the largest
    gas/condensate fields in the world, it will begin exporting gas in
    2006.

    Pipelines are the only feasible way to transport oil and gas out of
    the Caspian Sea, where most of Azerbaijan's reserves are located.
    With the Caspian landlocked, there is no possibility of using tankers
    to ship oil to other locations. Therefore, new pipelines are being
    built, and more are contemplated for the future. With some of the
    future pipelines still under consideration, Azerbaijan's location and
    Western geopolitics are playing an important role in the location of
    these lines.

    With current and planned pipelines, Azerbaijan seems to be in
    reasonable shape regarding future capacity. Currently, Azerbaijan has
    two export pipelines. The "northern route" is the 100,000-bpd
    Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline, which sends oil to the Russian Black Sea
    coast. h began exporting oil in 1997. Under present plans, this
    pipeline's capacity will be upgraded to 300,000 bopd. (2) The "western
    route" is the 115,000-bpd Baku-Supsa pipeline, which sends oil to
    Georgia's Black Sea coast. It began exporting oil in 1999.

    Under construction since early 2003, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
    pipeline is expected to increase export capacity five-fold with its
    1-million-bopd capacity. This new pipeline is scheduled to begin
    exporting oil in early 2005, and it will cover 1,040 mi through
    Georgia and Turkey, bypassing the progressively busier Bosporus
    Straits. Another new pipeline will be built parallel to this, to
    transport natural gas. It will be called the Baku-Tbilisi- Erzurum
    pipeline and will handle 233 Bcf of natural gas per year. It should be
    finished in 2006, in time for Shah Deniz's first contracted gas
    exports. The locations of the existing, under construction and/or
    proposed pipelines in the region are shown in Fig. 3. (12)

    [FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

    Azerbaijan fully intends to become a major player and has tried to
    alleviate the region's geopolitical tensions. The one conflict that
    needs to be resolved is a dispute with Turkmenistan and Iran with
    regard to overlapping fields. Hopefully, this can be resolved
    peacefully.

    One troubling event to international observers is the recent election
    of Ilham Aliyev as president in October 2003. He is the previous
    president's son, and he won in a landslide election described as
    "falling short of international standards."

    GEORGIA

    Georgia is strategically located between the Black Sea and the
    oil-rich Caspian, and it has been a focus of potential conflict
    between the US, other Western nations and Russia, Fig. 4. (13,14)
    Although Georgia has limited hydrocarbon resources, it controls much
    of the Caucasus Mountains and the potential pipeline routes through
    them. Thus, it is emerging as a key transit country. (15,16,17)

    [FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

    Georgia was absorbed into the Russian Empire in the 19th
    century. Independent for three years (1918-1921) following the Russian
    revolution, it was forcibly incorporated into the USSR until the
    Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Ethnic separation in Abkhazia (18)
    and South Ossetia, plus poor governance and Russian military bases,
    deny the government effective control over all of the state's
    internationally recognized territory. There has been a discernible
    effort by Georgia to approach the West, often at the consternation and
    mistrust of Russia. (19)

    Widespread corruption in Georgia led to the storming of parliament in
    December 2003. Mikhail Saakashvili, a 35-year-old American-trained
    lawyer, organized and headed up the nearly month-long street
    demonstrations that led to President Eduard Shevardnadze's
    resignation. Georgian parliamentary and presidential elections were
    planned for January 2004.

    Georgian economy. The dissolution of the USSR precipitated a
    significant fall in the overall size of Georgia's economy. This was
    made worse by hyperinflation, and accompanied by an associated fall in
    standards of living. The Georgian economy reached a record low in
    1992-1994, although the country still enjoys a considerably higher
    per-capita GDP than Azerbaijan, at about $5,500. However, recent
    statistics suggest that more than half of Georgians are unemployed.

    The country risks financial collapse without immediate Western
    aid. The economy is in worse shape than is publicly known. Georgia's
    interim leaders are seeking help, not only in financing the new
    elections, but even more important, in rebuilding Georgia's
    dilapidated public infrastructure.

    Georgia vs. Russia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has expressed
    readiness for radical improvement of Russian-Georgian relations. Yet
    Georgia accuses Russia of being "barbaric" at the same time that it
    wants to improve relations. This is important, as the Georgian
    economy and energy needs depend so much on Russia.

    One of the main issues of conflict with Russia is the Georgian army's
    inability to deal with Chechen rebels, who have been embroiled in
    militant activities in Russia. The would-be, breakaway Russian
    republic of Chechnya is crucial for control of the rich oil supplies
    of the Caucuses. Georgia and Russia conflicted recently over the
    "Pankisi Gorge" on the border with Chechnya, after Tbilisi accused
    Moscow of aggression. Russia strongly denies the accusations and in
    turn, claims that Georgia has failed to act against Chechen rebels,
    who Moscow believes use the gorge as a shelter. Russian politicians
    are also angry at US support of the Georgian version of events. (20,
    21)

    Russia is very much interested in Georgia's political stability,
    because an unstable Georgia can mean hundreds of thousands of refugees
    crossing into Russian territory. Also, Georgia's territory could be
    taken by international terrorists, who might launch attacks on Russia
    from that site. Russia has long considered Georgia part of its sphere
    of influence and is uneasy seeing US troops deployed there.

    Georgia and the US. The relationship between Georgia and the US is
    growing stronger. The American influence and its role in the recent
    political drama is the most vivid example. Shortly after Eduard
    Shevardnadze resigned as president, his US-backed successors joined
    with US Secretary of State Colin Powell to publicly criticize Russia,
    and demand that it remove its troops from Georgia and another former
    Soviet republic, Moldova. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's
    visit in December 2003 was an additional show of US support. In
    return, Georgia has provided coalition troops in Iraq.

    Energy in Georgia. Shortages abound in the energy industry, which is
    the most corrupt sector in Georgia and has been for 10 years. Since
    1991, Georgia has faced an acute energy crisis. Russia and
    Turkmenistan (main exporters to Georgia) dramatically increased the
    prices of their energy supplies, and this caused a severe decline in
    Georgia's economy. The situation worsened with destruction of a
    stretch of the gas pipeline between southern Russia and Georgia in
    1992. It was exacerbated in 1994 by Georgia's inability to pay for gas
    imports. Currently, Georgia imports oil from Iran and continues to
    import electricity from Russia and Turkey.

    Georgia is important, because it is positioned to become an important
    corridor for oil and gas transportation between the Caspian Sea and
    Western markets. At least four pipelines are either operational or
    planned/under construction: (15,16,17)

    * Baku-Supsa Oil Pipeline. In 1999, the Baku-Supsa early oil pipeline
    was inaugurated at the Supsa terminal on the Black Sea coast,
    beginning the flow of Azeri oil across the Caucasus to market. The
    pipeline's 115,000-bopd capacity can be doubled with additional
    pipeline upgrades and facilities. The pipeline is owned by the AIOC
    consortium of" Western energy companies.

    * Kashuri-Batumi Pipeline. ChevronTexaco has been granted rights to
    utilize an existing, yet aging, pipeline from Kashuri (near Tbilisi)
    to Batumi (on the Black Sea coast).

    * Main Export Pipeline, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
    pipeline. Georgia is set to be the transit country for the Baku-Ceyhan
    main export pipeline. When completed, the project should deliver up to
    1.0 million bopd at its peak. This project is of regional
    significance, as it represents the first direct transportation link
    between the Caspian and the Mediterranean, thus avoiding the Bosporus
    Straits.

    The BTC pipeline should be completed by 2005. The Georgian section of
    the pipeline is 248 kin (154 mi) long and will generate substantial
    revenues for Georgia. Although BP owns 38% of the venture and ENI
    recently took a 5% share, all nine members must make final commitments
    to the 1,730-km (1,075 mi) project. Construction of the Georgian
    section began in April 2003.

    * Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline Project: Georgia is set to be one of the
    transit countries in the Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) project between
    Turkmenistan and Turkey. The line's capacity is expected to be 1.0 Tcf
    of gas per year, with about half consumed in Turkey and the remainder
    re-exported to Europe.

    KAZAKHSTAN

    Situated in central Asia, on the edge of the European and Asian
    continents, is the world's largest landlocked country Kazakhstan. It
    is four times the size of Texas and holds the largest recoverable
    crude oil reserves in the Caspian Sea region. Kazakhstan produces
    roughly 1.0 million bopd, or about two-thirds of the region's total
    production. (5)

    It is easy to see why, as foreign investment pours into the country's
    oil and gas sectors, that Kazakhstan is beginning to realize its
    enormous production potential. Such companies as ChevronTexaco (the
    first major Western oil company to enter the region in 1993) have made
    Kazakhstan their place to develop some of the world's largest oil
    fields. (22)

    In 2003, ChevronTexaco announced plans to invest $4 billion in
    Kazakhstan over the subsequent four to five years. (23) The funds will
    further develop the company's three regional projects, TengizChevroil,
    the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and the Karachaganak Integrated
    Organization. (24)

    Russia's LUKoil also made a similar announcement last December about
    investing $3 billion in the Dostyk Block. Comprising two fields, the
    block's reserves are estimated at "several hundreds of millions of
    tons of oil." (24) With sufficient export options in the near future,
    and with much infrastructure presently under development, these
    announcements, alone, would make Kazakhstan a major producer and
    exporter over the next decade.

    Kazakhstan consists of three ethnic groups; it is primarily Kazakh, at
    almost half of the population, followed by Russian and Ukrainian. The
    population is split almost evenly between the Muslim and Russian
    Orthodox religions. Although Kazakh is the official language, Russian
    is also spoken rather widely, primarily in business.

    After the USSR's demise, the newly created, independent Republic of
    Kazakhstan opened its doors to foreign business in 1991. Its economic
    growth in recent years has been driven not only by petroleum, but also
    by changes in its governing system. Its President, Nursultan
    Nazarbaev, a former leader of the Soviet Kazakhstan Communist Party
    since 1977, became the new republic's first interim president. He was
    then elected president in the country's first national elections in
    December 1991. Due to a 1995 referendum that extended his term,
    President Nazarbaev was re-elected in 1999. He will be up for
    re-election again in 2006. (25)

    Kazakhstan's economy. Kazakhstan holds Central Asia's largest
    economy. Because of its booming energy sector, economic 2reforms and
    foreign investment, Kazakhstan's GDP grew 9.5% in 2002 to an estimated
    $120 billion. This resulted in an estimated per-capita GDP of about
    $7,200. (25) This marked the first time that significant economic
    growth was observed over three consecutive years since Kazakhstan's
    independence in 1991.

    More than 55% of the country's revenue is dependent on oil and
    gas. The country's other exports include zinc, copper, titanium, gold,
    silver, machinery, coal and meat. Kazakhstan's industrial sector
    depends heavily on the recovery and processing of these natural
    resources, as well as on its growing machine fabrication sector that
    focuses on construction equipment, tractors, agricultural machinery
    and armaments.

    Kazakhstan's economy experienced a decline in the mid-1990s, as a
    direct result of the breakup of the USSR and the fall in demand for
    Kazakhstan's traditional heavy industry. The steepest annual decline
    was observed in 1994.

    Shortly following the decline, the pace of the governmental program of
    economic reform and privatization quickened, resulting in a
    significant shift of assets away from the state into the private
    sector. The 2001 opening of the Caspian Consortium pipeline, from
    Tengiz field to the Black Sea, has significantly raised export
    capacity while allowing for economic growth. However, despite the
    large petroleum sector, Kazakhstan has adopted an industrial policy
    designed to diversify the economy away from over-dependence on oil and
    gas by developing light industry. (25)

    Kazakhstan's energy sources. Kazakhstan controls a large portion of
    Caspian coastline and possesses this freshwater lake's largest known
    oil field (Kashagan). According, the country has absorbed $20 billion
    of foreign petroleum investment since the fall of communism. (26)

    Combined onshore and offshore proven reserves are estimated to be
    between 9.0 billion bbl and 18 billion bbl. This is comparable to the
    reserves of Algeria or Qatar. (4) Kazakhstan's 2002 oil production was
    just shy of 1 million bpd, of which about 130,000 bpd were consumed
    inside the country. (5) Kazakhstan's historical oil
    production/consumption trend is charted in Fig. 5. Although still a
    relatively minor oil exporter, Kazakhstan is on its way to becoming a
    significant player in the next 10 years. The country's proven natural
    gas reserves total 65 Tcf; mostly in western Kazakhstan's Karachaganak
    field. (4) These gas reserves rank roughly 20th in the world.
    However, despite the large gas reserves, Kazakhstan has only recently
    begun to produce more than it consumes, with current output around 0.4
    Tcf(1.1 Bcfd). (5)

    [FIGURE 5 OMITTED]

    Kazakhstan's oil production grew an average 16% annually between 1999
    and 2002, and output has nearly doubled since its independence in
    1991. In June 2003, the government announced a new offshore
    development program. Through this program, new offshore blocks will be
    auctioned off, starting as early as 2004. Kazakh officials hope that
    this effort will boost the country's production to approximately 2.4
    million bopd by 2010 and 3.6 million bopd by 2015. (27) This output is
    expected to come from the country's three largest fields--Tengiz,
    Karachaganak and Kashagan.

    Located onshore, just inland from the shores of the Caspian, Tengiz is
    considered to be the world's deepest super-giant oil field. (22)
    According to operator ChevronTexaco, its discovery in 1979 generated
    estimated reserves of 6 billion bbl to 9 billion bbl. The field has
    been developed by the Tengizchevroil (TCO) joint venture between
    ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, Kazmunaigaz and Luk-Arco. Tengiz produces
    about 285,000 bopd, or approximately one-third of national
    production. A new agreement between Kazakhstan and TCO has initiated a
    $3-billion expansion project that will increase the field's capacity
    to 450,000 bopd by 2006. (27)

    In northern Kazakhstan is Karachaganak onshore oil and gas/condensate
    field. It holds reserves comprising more than 2.3 billion bbl of oil
    and 16 Tcf of gas. It has a projected 40-year life span at the
    current output rate of about 100,000 bopd, with plans for
    expansion. (28)

    Kashagan field, although still being appraised, is expected to produce
    its first oil in 2005, at an initial rate of 100,000 bopd. (27) As
    stated earlier, the field is expected to be the second, most prolific
    deposit in the world, following Saudi Arabia's Ghawar Field. (29)
    Future production potential is very significant, but current
    difficulties that need to be resolved include Caspian ownership,
    export routes and infrastructure.

    Petroleum transportation. Kazakh oil is exported in three general
    directions-- westward, northward and southward. Oil heading west is
    transported via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium. Additional excess
    capacity is shipped on a barge through the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan.

    Oil transported north to Russia is shipped via a pipeline system or
    carried on the existing rail network. Finally, the oil shipped south
    is typically swapped with Iran. Because of its geographical location
    and access to ports on both the Black Sea and Persian Gulf; Kazakhstan
    is able to trade some of its oil on the world market. Because of the
    expected rapid growth of Kazakhstan's exports, many efforts are
    underway to expand infrastructure to allow a higher export capacity.

    One such project, which adds extra export capabilities and connects
    the area's oil deposits with Russia's Black Sea ports, is the Caspian
    Pipeline Consortium (CPC), overseen by the Russian, Kazakh and Omani
    governments in conjunction with various international companies. The
    pipeline opened in November 2001 at an initial capacity of" 560,000
    bopd. (27) CPC recently announced plans to more than double its annual
    capacity to 67 million t, or approximately 1.3 million bopd. (30)
    Prior to completion of the CPC, nearly all of Kazakhstan's oil exports
    were distributed though the Atyrau-Samara line, a northbound pipeline
    linking up to the Russian system.

    Many other pipelines have been reported under active or theoretical
    consideration. They include a highly ambitious, controversial pipeline
    heading eastward to what will be an ever more oil-demanding China, as
    well as a subsea pipeline across the Caspian Sea connecting to the
    Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project.

    Several natural gas pipeline projects are also under consideration or
    already in development. Although they are in their infancy, these
    lines have the potential to open up markets for Kazakh natural gas.
    Further, Kazakhstan could play an important regional role, given that
    it serves as a gas transit center for Turkmen and Uzbek gas piped to
    Russia and beyond, Fig. 6.

    [FIGURE 6 OMITTED]

    Kazakhstan-China connection. On its east, Kazakhstan borders China for
    approximately 1,000 mi. (25) As the Chinese demand for oil and gas
    increases, China has begun exploring options with its neighbor by
    making major investments within the Kazakh oil and gas sector. China's
    CNPC recently Joined the Kashagan field consortium. and the firm in
    1997 bought 60% of Kazakh oil company Aktobemunaigaz. (31,32) A
    pipeline is essential to export oil from Kazakhstan into
    China. Feasibility studies for route options are underway and should
    be completed by the fall of 2004. (32,33)

    Last October, Kazakhstan announced that work would begin in 2004 on
    this project, one of the world's longest pipelines. (34) Building the
    pipeline, however, will be a formidable task, with many physical and
    political problems looming. Many observers have warned that the
    Kazakhstan-China route could be very problematic, due to numerous
    obstacles associated with its 3,200-km length. One of the most
    important project issues is that China has asked Kazakhstan to deliver
    50 million t of oil annually via this pipeline. This is more than
    Kazakhstan's current, total production of 47 million t. The likelihood
    of Kazakhstan selling all of its oil to one customer is zero, given
    the country's ambitions for a world role. Initial hopes from several
    years ago to complete the entire Kazakhstan-China pipeline by 2005 are
    now unattainable.

    LITERATURE CITED

    (1) "Caspian sea oil and gas exploration update and hearing summary,"
    hearing testimony, 106th US Congress, May 16, 2000.

    (2) BTC website; BP plc, www.caspiandevelop-metuandexport.com.

    (3) Koerner, B., "What if the Caspian region was a major oil
    supplier," Worldlink magazine, World Economic Forum, January/February
    2002.

    (4) US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Caspian &a Region."
    Key Oil and Gas Statistics, August 2003.

    (5) BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2003.

    (6) BTC website, BP pie. www.casplandevelop-mentandexport.com,
    Azeri-Chirag- Gunashli fact sheet.

    (7) The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, December 2003.

    (8) Azerbaijan fact sheet, Development Data Group, World Bank.

    (9) Azerbaijan Country Analysis Brief, Energy Information
    Administration, June 2003.

    (10) United Nations Resident Coordinator's Annual Report for
    Azerbaijan, 2002.

    (11) "About the fun&" State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan website,
    http://www. oilfund.az.

    (12) An energy overview of the Republic of Azerbaijan," US Dep't. of
    Energy, www.fe.doe.gov.

    (13) "Georgia's rose revolution: A made-in-America coup,"
    www.khila-fah.com, December 7, 2003.

    (14) Caspian development map and pipelines, BTC website, BP pie,
    www.caspiandevelopment-andexport.com.

    (15) "Georgia: Transit of Caspian Sea region oil and gas." US Energy
    Information Administration, April 2001.

    (16) "Pipeline projects in Georgia," US International Trade
    Administration www.ita.doc.gov.

    (17) "Oil & gas production, Georgia, 2000," US Energy Information
    Administration, www.eia.doc.gov.

    (18) The Republic of Abkhazia, www.abkhazia.org.

    (19) Central Intelligence Agency, Ibid.

    (20) Political news, Georgia, www.eurasianet.org.

    (21) Delisio, C., "A quiet battle in the Caucasus: Georgia between
    Russia and NATO, www.antiwar.com.

    (22) Kazakbstan Fact Sheet, Eurasia Operations, ChevronTexaco.

    (23) "CheveronTexaco to invest $4 Billion in Kazakhstan in next 4-5
    years," TASS Energy Service News Agency, November 26, 2003.

    (24) "LUKoil to develop Dostyk Block in Kazakhstan," NOVECON: Russian
    Energy Digest, December 8, 2003.

    (25) Central Intelligence Agency, Ibid.

    (26) "Kazakhstan seeks Caspian oil cartel," Reuters, Moscow, December
    28, 2003.

    (27) Kazakhstan Country Analysis Brief, US EIA, July 2003.

    (28) "Kazakhstan: Major oil and natural gas projects," US EIA, July
    2002.

    (29) Kazakh oil finds Confirm Caspian as world class," Energy Compass,
    November 25, 2003.

    (30) Caspian pipeline consortium to increase oil pipeline capacity,"
    Kazakhstan-Gateway, RBC, November 20, 2003,

    (31) Kazakhstan: China seeks oil investment with an eye on pipeline,"
    Radio Free Europe, March 2003.

    (32) "What's at stake for whom--China," World Press Review Online,
    www.worldpress.org.

    (33) "Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline study to be ready in 2004,"
    Interfax, October 2003.

    (34) "Work on mammoth Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline to start next
    year," Agence France-Presse, October 10, 2003.


    Randall Collum Jr. graduated from the University of Houston with a BS
    degree in chemical engineering in 2001 and is enrolled in the masters
    of petroleum engineering program at the same university. He has almost
    three years of experience with a major petroleum company and has had
    roles as both a production and reservoir engineer in the Gulf of
    Mexico Continental Shelf.

    Adrian J. Gregorek received a BS degree in mechanical engineering with
    honors from Texas A&M University in 2000. He has been employed by a
    major petroleum company as both a facilities and subsea engineer,
    within the firm's E&P operations His experience ranges from operations
    to project development and execution within Gulf of Mexico deepwater
    blocks. His current focus is on subseawork He is working on his
    masters in petroleum engineering degree from the University of Houston

    Amit Sondhi has just completed his masters degree in petroleum
    engineering at the University of Houston. He holds a BS degree in
    electronics engineering from North Maharashtra University in India.

    Michael J. Economides is a professor at the Cullen College of
    Engineering, University of Houston, and the chief technology officer
    of the Texas Energy Center Previously, he was the Samuel R. Noble
    professor of petroleum engineering at Texas A&M University and served
    as chief scientist of the Global Petroleum Research Institute
    (GPRI). Before that, Dr. Economides worked in a variety of senior
    technical and managerial positions with a major petroleum services
    company. His publications include authoring or co authoring 11
    professional textbooks and books, including The Color Of Oil, and
    almost 200 journal papers and articles. He does a wide range of
    industrial consulting, including major retainers by national oil
    companies at the country level and by Fortune 500 companies.


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