Tweet
1919 A SUMMER OF INSURGENCY
The Sounds of August
General Corey dared no longer risk the safety of his agents. Plowden had
recently been the victim of Halil Bey's taunts. Rawlinson had beern recalled
from Erzerum, and Prosser had failed in efforts to arrange a modus vivendi
at Kars. Prosser, in his last reports to division headquarters, described
the Armenians as so distressed that they tried to prevent his departure; it
was only with much difficulty that he obtained transportation on the evening
of August 30. His evaluation of the situation was grim. All available
Armenian troops had been dispatched to Sarikamish and Kaghisman, and many
wounded were being carried back from those fronts. Civilians had been
forbidden to evacuate Kars, but some were fleeing by night. Prosser added: "
The Armenians are undoubtedly depressed at the withdrawal of the British to
whom in spite of frequent assurances to the contrary they had looked to the
last for assistance on behalf of the Allies. They talk about fighting to the
death, etc., but I think most of the fight in them went out with our
departure." He ended with the following ominous prediction: "Taken all round
the position of the Armenians in Kars province is not a happy one at the
present moment.. They are surrounded by a hostile population and with the
advent of the Turk, Kars as a portion of Armenia will most likely cease to
exist."
Colonel Plowden, taking leave of a tearful Armenian premier, departed from
Erevan on August 28 as instructed. His final appraisal reflected the views
of most British officers involved with the Armenians. Describing the tragic
state of affairs, Plowden suggested that part of the trouble was the
dominance of the Dashnaksutiun's Bureau, which prevailed over the moderates
in government. The Dashnakists had led the bloody struggle for Armenian
freedom and "as soldiers and patriots no praise is too high for them, but as
politicians and administrators, they are grotesque and responsible for the
hopeless condition of Armenian foreign and internal politics today." The
educated and wealthy bourgeois classes of Baku, Tiflis, Rostov-on-Don, and
other regions of the former Russian Empire were scarcely represented because
of financial disorder, incessant warfare, and political pressure tactics.
The people, weary and hungry, would welcome anybody who could bring peace
and return them to their fields.
A major source of Armenia's agony, wrote Plowden, was "the hope that some
at least of all the outstanding promises that have been made her by the
Allies, before, and since the war will be fulfilled." President Wilson's
"self-determination" had given the Armenians reason to believe that the
Allies, especially the United states, would send aid required to make their
dreams become reality. Plowden felt that the Armenians were so desperate
that they would have to sign a treaty with a nearby power, even if it meant
the loss of their hard-won-independence, or else disappear.
Only Armenia, Plowden continued, had remained loyal to the Allied cause,
suffering terribly, whereas Azerbaijan had embraced the Turks and Georgia
has assumed a pro-German and anti-Allied stance in 1918. These irrefutable
facts made it all the more difficult for the Armenians to comprehend why
they were not accorded equal treatment, since British regiments remained in
Tiflis and Baku even as Erevan was being strangled. It was common knowledge
that the Turks were supplying the insurgents with officers and arms, yet
then British refused to provide the Armenians with rifles and ammunition for
self-defense. And the award of Karabagh to Azerbaijan was the hardest blow
of all; "Karabagh means more to the Armenians than their religion even,
being the cradle of their race, and their traditional last sanctuary when
their country has been invaded. It is Armenian in every particular and the
strongest part of Armenia, both financially, militarily, and socially."
In contrast with Rawlinson's denigration of the Armenian army, Colonel
Plowden's description was glowing: "The morale of the troops is wonderful.
Although practically completely without boots, no suitable clothing, no
ammunition and no bayonets, they have fought against very considerably
superior numbers, better fed, better clothed and with unlimited S.A.A.
[small arms ammunition] against troops trenched behind wall and trenches,
with a bravery equal to the best European troops." Given ammunition and
equipment, "Armenia could hold off the Turks and Tartars until winter makes
fighting impossible." The officers, he continued, "have behaved with great
gallantry all through the operations, sacrificing themselves for their men
in a manner up to the best traditions of any army." Any country willing to
supply Armenia with critically needed armaments, transport facilities, and
medical supplies "would make a friend who in time may be a sufficiently
powerful one." But time was running short. A Turkish advance would be
accompanied by organized massacres, and even without that disaster thousands
of refugees would die during the coming winter if housing were not found for
them. Plowden concluded that the Armenians should abandon their hopes for a
large state and turn from the Dashnaksutiun to the sound leadership offered
by the cultured elements in Armenian intellectual and commercial centers in
the former Russian Empire. "I consider that as a Nation they are much
maligned. Given a good Government, the country will develop very quickly.
The people are industrious and good farmers and very docile, and the
soldiers are really fine material."
Protests and Appeals
In seeking to attenuate the disappointment of Armenian officials, Colonel
Plowden had explained that Great Britain, although never an enthusiastic
proponent of self-determination, was the only world power to have the
principle applicable to many regions. Britain alone had sent troops to the
Caucasus, an enormously expensive operation, and had assisted the local
governments: "I compared this with the other Nations who had come into the
war late; had forwarded their theories and ideals, but had taken no steps
whatever to send troops to help the small nations, but had, on the contrary,
demobilized their troops first of all and had declined further
responsibility." Plowden's jibe was aimed at the Americans, who deplored the
British retreat yet were unwilling to send their own troops to the Caucasus.
In hundreds of messages, American consular, relief, and intelligence
officials stressed the crisis in Armenia: a Turco-Tartar campaign was
underway to annihilate Armenia and continue wartime massacres; it was
questionable whether Armenian survivors could endure another winter; relief
efforts without adequate military protection were futile; the Armenian army
was denied weapons to defend the Republic while enemy forces were being
armed to the teeth; the indecision of the Allies and the peace conference
had emboldened conspiratorial elements and prevented the industrious
Armenians from concentrating on reconstruction; the abrupt British
withdrawal from Kars and Nakhichevan could not be justified either
politically or militarily; the Armenians had become pawns in the designs of
imperial powers which coveted lands with quickly exploitable economic wealth
and which courted so-called Muslim opinion by showing partiality to
Azerbaijan and declining to enforce the armistice terms in Anatolia and
Transcuacasia.
While the Armenians in Transcaucasia waited in vain for a satisfactory
response from Washington, a loud dissenting voice was heard from
Constantinople. Acting Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, senior American
representative in the Ottoman capital, expressed vehement opposition to the
formation of a united Armenian state and to American political involvement
with the Armenians in communications to naval colleagues, government
departments, the American peace delegation, and to businessmen,
philanthropists, missionaries, and politicians of many hues. Bristol,
scornful of all minorities, hoped to reeducate responsible Americans who had
been taken in by the popular portrayal of the "terrible Turk" and the
torments suffered by the Oriental Christians. He protested to the naval
adviser of the American delegation: "There is no doubt in my mind of an
influence continually exerted to involve America with Armenia and divert our
attention from the big question of the whole Near East." The Armenians had
brought many of their woes upon themselves, and the encouragement of the
British authorities and American missionary-relief interests had emboldened
the unscrupulous Armenian leaders to employ aggressive tactics. The United
States should not let itself be maneuvered into Armenia. "England should be
compelled to remain in the Caucasus. She went to the Caucasus for selfish
reasons and she is leaving now for selfish reasons." Bristol denied being
pro-Turkish: "I do not believe I am pro-anything except what I believe is
absolutely right and I try to follow that road and not give a damn for
anybody else that don't agree with me. If I am considered pro-Turk because I
believe there are 20 million of Moslems out there that should be helped to
gain modern civilization as well as 2 millions or so Armenians, I would like
this fact to be known and then I am willing to stand on that basis. The Turk
has been a devilish brute and he has not changed his spots, but you cannot
change his spots by making a martyr of him, whereas, you can do something
for him by giving a proper assistance."
Excerpted from "The Republic of Armenia"
Volume ll
>From Versailles to London
1919-1920
Richard G. Hovannisian
Copyright 1982
The Sounds of August
General Corey dared no longer risk the safety of his agents. Plowden had
recently been the victim of Halil Bey's taunts. Rawlinson had beern recalled
from Erzerum, and Prosser had failed in efforts to arrange a modus vivendi
at Kars. Prosser, in his last reports to division headquarters, described
the Armenians as so distressed that they tried to prevent his departure; it
was only with much difficulty that he obtained transportation on the evening
of August 30. His evaluation of the situation was grim. All available
Armenian troops had been dispatched to Sarikamish and Kaghisman, and many
wounded were being carried back from those fronts. Civilians had been
forbidden to evacuate Kars, but some were fleeing by night. Prosser added: "
The Armenians are undoubtedly depressed at the withdrawal of the British to
whom in spite of frequent assurances to the contrary they had looked to the
last for assistance on behalf of the Allies. They talk about fighting to the
death, etc., but I think most of the fight in them went out with our
departure." He ended with the following ominous prediction: "Taken all round
the position of the Armenians in Kars province is not a happy one at the
present moment.. They are surrounded by a hostile population and with the
advent of the Turk, Kars as a portion of Armenia will most likely cease to
exist."
Colonel Plowden, taking leave of a tearful Armenian premier, departed from
Erevan on August 28 as instructed. His final appraisal reflected the views
of most British officers involved with the Armenians. Describing the tragic
state of affairs, Plowden suggested that part of the trouble was the
dominance of the Dashnaksutiun's Bureau, which prevailed over the moderates
in government. The Dashnakists had led the bloody struggle for Armenian
freedom and "as soldiers and patriots no praise is too high for them, but as
politicians and administrators, they are grotesque and responsible for the
hopeless condition of Armenian foreign and internal politics today." The
educated and wealthy bourgeois classes of Baku, Tiflis, Rostov-on-Don, and
other regions of the former Russian Empire were scarcely represented because
of financial disorder, incessant warfare, and political pressure tactics.
The people, weary and hungry, would welcome anybody who could bring peace
and return them to their fields.
A major source of Armenia's agony, wrote Plowden, was "the hope that some
at least of all the outstanding promises that have been made her by the
Allies, before, and since the war will be fulfilled." President Wilson's
"self-determination" had given the Armenians reason to believe that the
Allies, especially the United states, would send aid required to make their
dreams become reality. Plowden felt that the Armenians were so desperate
that they would have to sign a treaty with a nearby power, even if it meant
the loss of their hard-won-independence, or else disappear.
Only Armenia, Plowden continued, had remained loyal to the Allied cause,
suffering terribly, whereas Azerbaijan had embraced the Turks and Georgia
has assumed a pro-German and anti-Allied stance in 1918. These irrefutable
facts made it all the more difficult for the Armenians to comprehend why
they were not accorded equal treatment, since British regiments remained in
Tiflis and Baku even as Erevan was being strangled. It was common knowledge
that the Turks were supplying the insurgents with officers and arms, yet
then British refused to provide the Armenians with rifles and ammunition for
self-defense. And the award of Karabagh to Azerbaijan was the hardest blow
of all; "Karabagh means more to the Armenians than their religion even,
being the cradle of their race, and their traditional last sanctuary when
their country has been invaded. It is Armenian in every particular and the
strongest part of Armenia, both financially, militarily, and socially."
In contrast with Rawlinson's denigration of the Armenian army, Colonel
Plowden's description was glowing: "The morale of the troops is wonderful.
Although practically completely without boots, no suitable clothing, no
ammunition and no bayonets, they have fought against very considerably
superior numbers, better fed, better clothed and with unlimited S.A.A.
[small arms ammunition] against troops trenched behind wall and trenches,
with a bravery equal to the best European troops." Given ammunition and
equipment, "Armenia could hold off the Turks and Tartars until winter makes
fighting impossible." The officers, he continued, "have behaved with great
gallantry all through the operations, sacrificing themselves for their men
in a manner up to the best traditions of any army." Any country willing to
supply Armenia with critically needed armaments, transport facilities, and
medical supplies "would make a friend who in time may be a sufficiently
powerful one." But time was running short. A Turkish advance would be
accompanied by organized massacres, and even without that disaster thousands
of refugees would die during the coming winter if housing were not found for
them. Plowden concluded that the Armenians should abandon their hopes for a
large state and turn from the Dashnaksutiun to the sound leadership offered
by the cultured elements in Armenian intellectual and commercial centers in
the former Russian Empire. "I consider that as a Nation they are much
maligned. Given a good Government, the country will develop very quickly.
The people are industrious and good farmers and very docile, and the
soldiers are really fine material."
Protests and Appeals
In seeking to attenuate the disappointment of Armenian officials, Colonel
Plowden had explained that Great Britain, although never an enthusiastic
proponent of self-determination, was the only world power to have the
principle applicable to many regions. Britain alone had sent troops to the
Caucasus, an enormously expensive operation, and had assisted the local
governments: "I compared this with the other Nations who had come into the
war late; had forwarded their theories and ideals, but had taken no steps
whatever to send troops to help the small nations, but had, on the contrary,
demobilized their troops first of all and had declined further
responsibility." Plowden's jibe was aimed at the Americans, who deplored the
British retreat yet were unwilling to send their own troops to the Caucasus.
In hundreds of messages, American consular, relief, and intelligence
officials stressed the crisis in Armenia: a Turco-Tartar campaign was
underway to annihilate Armenia and continue wartime massacres; it was
questionable whether Armenian survivors could endure another winter; relief
efforts without adequate military protection were futile; the Armenian army
was denied weapons to defend the Republic while enemy forces were being
armed to the teeth; the indecision of the Allies and the peace conference
had emboldened conspiratorial elements and prevented the industrious
Armenians from concentrating on reconstruction; the abrupt British
withdrawal from Kars and Nakhichevan could not be justified either
politically or militarily; the Armenians had become pawns in the designs of
imperial powers which coveted lands with quickly exploitable economic wealth
and which courted so-called Muslim opinion by showing partiality to
Azerbaijan and declining to enforce the armistice terms in Anatolia and
Transcuacasia.
While the Armenians in Transcaucasia waited in vain for a satisfactory
response from Washington, a loud dissenting voice was heard from
Constantinople. Acting Rear Admiral Mark L. Bristol, senior American
representative in the Ottoman capital, expressed vehement opposition to the
formation of a united Armenian state and to American political involvement
with the Armenians in communications to naval colleagues, government
departments, the American peace delegation, and to businessmen,
philanthropists, missionaries, and politicians of many hues. Bristol,
scornful of all minorities, hoped to reeducate responsible Americans who had
been taken in by the popular portrayal of the "terrible Turk" and the
torments suffered by the Oriental Christians. He protested to the naval
adviser of the American delegation: "There is no doubt in my mind of an
influence continually exerted to involve America with Armenia and divert our
attention from the big question of the whole Near East." The Armenians had
brought many of their woes upon themselves, and the encouragement of the
British authorities and American missionary-relief interests had emboldened
the unscrupulous Armenian leaders to employ aggressive tactics. The United
States should not let itself be maneuvered into Armenia. "England should be
compelled to remain in the Caucasus. She went to the Caucasus for selfish
reasons and she is leaving now for selfish reasons." Bristol denied being
pro-Turkish: "I do not believe I am pro-anything except what I believe is
absolutely right and I try to follow that road and not give a damn for
anybody else that don't agree with me. If I am considered pro-Turk because I
believe there are 20 million of Moslems out there that should be helped to
gain modern civilization as well as 2 millions or so Armenians, I would like
this fact to be known and then I am willing to stand on that basis. The Turk
has been a devilish brute and he has not changed his spots, but you cannot
change his spots by making a martyr of him, whereas, you can do something
for him by giving a proper assistance."
Excerpted from "The Republic of Armenia"
Volume ll
>From Versailles to London
1919-1920
Richard G. Hovannisian
Copyright 1982