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The Journal of Turkish Weekly
Dec 15 2004
Turkey's EU Membeship' Possible Impacts on the Caucasus
View: Dr. Sedat LACINER
There are relatively three small countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and
Armenia) and three large countries (Russia, Turkey, and Iran) in the
Caucasus. With the collapse of the USSR, Turkey does not have common
boundaries with Russia anymore. Turkey has been one of the first
countries to recognize the newly independent states.
Oil has a special role in the importance of the region. Especially
the Azerbaijani oil makes the region very vital. In addition, in the
transportation of Central Asian oil and natural gas, the Caucasus is
an important route. In the post-Cold War era, it can be said that
three approaches in the region have competed for ascendancy: the
Iranian approach, Russia' unwillingness to retreat, and Turkey's
desire for integration with the West.
The Iranian approach is related more with Azerbaijan and wishes for
the establishment of a form of government in this country similar to
that in Iran. As with Georgia and Armenia, Iran stays close to
Russia's position and endeavors to keep the US and Israel out of the
region.
Russia, in addition to its cooperation with Iran, wants to maintain
its influence in the region. From the insurgency in Abkhazia to the
invasion of Karabakh, there is no ethnic conflict in the region in
which Russia has no part. As a matter of fact, both Georgia and
Azerbaijan blame Russia for instigating ethnic secession in the
region. During the tension that mounted in Ossetia in August 2004, it
is no coincidence for Georgian officials to state that `This is a
conflict between Russia and Georgia. War with Russia is imminent.' In
addition, Russia is internally occupied with Chechnya and a bloody
war is going on there for a decade. In short, be it Russia as a state
or some elements in Russia who are fuelling instability in the
Caucasus, or even if this is only a perception, it can be said that
Russia will not act as a locomotive in efforts to consolidate
regional stability and cohesion.
In this respect, Georgia and Azerbaijan seek to improve their
relations with Turkey, the US, and NATO and have demonstrated their
intention on various occasions. Expressing their desire to enter NATO
and the EU repeatedly, these countries see Western institutions as
the guarantee for their survival and Turkey as a gateway to the West.
Indeed, relations with Turkey go further back than is normally
thought. During Ottoman times, Georgians and Azerbaijanis asked the
Ottomans for help to ensure their safety against outside powers and
were met with reception. In a sense, today's convergence can be
viewed as continuity. In the framework of the cooperation in
question, the Turkish military trains the Georgian and Azerbaijani
militaries. Numerous Turkish companies operate in these countries.
Another area that strikes attention is education. In addition to the
thousands of Georgians and Azerbaijanis attending Turkish
universities, relations are further improved with the opening of
primary, secondary, and higher education facilities in these
countries by Turkish private enterprise. The event that perfects
these developments is the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The energy
pipeline starting in Azerbaijan, passing through Georgia and ending
in Turkey's southern shores closely knits the three countries to each
other. This route also connects the Caucasus to the Mediterranean,
that is, to Europe. Lately, the subject that is paid close attention
to is to attach more tightly the region to the Black Sea, the
Mediterranean, and Europe by railways, roads, and seaways and all
directions pass through Turkey.
While talking about Turkish-Caucasian relations, the subject of
ethnic ties cannot be overlooked. Today, some 100,000 Armenians and
millions of Georgians and Azerbaijanis live in Turkey. In addition to
Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis who are Turkish citizens, there
are some 100,000 workers are known to be in Turkey, legally or
illegally. Moreover, of the minorities that constitute Georgia's
populace, a sizeable number lives in Turkey. These groups also
maintain their ties with the Caucasus. This is to such an extent that
when clashes erupt between Georgians and Abkhazians, both groups try
to muster the support of Turkish public opinion. It is a blessing
that the Caucasian groups that are in dispute do not take their
problems into the Turkish political scene.
To summarize, Turkey has the dynamics to maintain the balance among
the region's great powers. This is not to suggest that there is a
Turkish model against Russia and Iran and one that aims to oust the
two countries from the region. On the contrary, the Turkish model is
inclusive as well as supportive of integration. Turkey's approach is
in conformity not only with Russia's and Iran's aims, but also with
those of NATO, the EU, and the US.
Following the approaches of the global and the region's great powers,
when analyzing the cognition of the region's relatively small states,
Georgia and Azerbaijan seem to be in close collaboration with Turkey.
The two states also think of NATO and the EU very pleasantly and
desire to become a member in both institutions while both have
fostered close military ties with the US. Most importantly, both
countries hope that Turkey will carry them to the Western system.
During the latest NATO summit that took place in Istanbul in 2004 a
meeting was held between the foreign ministers of Turkey, Armenia,
and Azerbaijan. Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian stated that
Turkey had a sincere intention to improve relations with Armenia and
that the current government was much more eager for that end than
previous governments. Oskanian also said that they welcomed Turkey's
leadership regarding regional dialogue and underscored Turkey's role
in the region once again. The three countries' representatives all
unanimously agreed that the EU and NATO sought a new strategy in
Southern Caucasus and that regional actors had to help this search.
The representatives argued that with the inclusion of Georgia, this
strategy had to be shaped by the region's countries and be given its
last form by the EU and NATO and that Turkey had a special role in
this strategy and in bringing the region closer to Europe. In short,
Turkey's EU membership will both hasten the region's direction
towards Europe and at the same time enable the EU to act as a
significant actor in the region with a strong and applicable vision.
Sedat LACINER: IR Lecturer and Director, ISRO, Ankara
[email protected] or [email protected]
Dec 15 2004
Turkey's EU Membeship' Possible Impacts on the Caucasus
View: Dr. Sedat LACINER
There are relatively three small countries (Georgia, Azerbaijan, and
Armenia) and three large countries (Russia, Turkey, and Iran) in the
Caucasus. With the collapse of the USSR, Turkey does not have common
boundaries with Russia anymore. Turkey has been one of the first
countries to recognize the newly independent states.
Oil has a special role in the importance of the region. Especially
the Azerbaijani oil makes the region very vital. In addition, in the
transportation of Central Asian oil and natural gas, the Caucasus is
an important route. In the post-Cold War era, it can be said that
three approaches in the region have competed for ascendancy: the
Iranian approach, Russia' unwillingness to retreat, and Turkey's
desire for integration with the West.
The Iranian approach is related more with Azerbaijan and wishes for
the establishment of a form of government in this country similar to
that in Iran. As with Georgia and Armenia, Iran stays close to
Russia's position and endeavors to keep the US and Israel out of the
region.
Russia, in addition to its cooperation with Iran, wants to maintain
its influence in the region. From the insurgency in Abkhazia to the
invasion of Karabakh, there is no ethnic conflict in the region in
which Russia has no part. As a matter of fact, both Georgia and
Azerbaijan blame Russia for instigating ethnic secession in the
region. During the tension that mounted in Ossetia in August 2004, it
is no coincidence for Georgian officials to state that `This is a
conflict between Russia and Georgia. War with Russia is imminent.' In
addition, Russia is internally occupied with Chechnya and a bloody
war is going on there for a decade. In short, be it Russia as a state
or some elements in Russia who are fuelling instability in the
Caucasus, or even if this is only a perception, it can be said that
Russia will not act as a locomotive in efforts to consolidate
regional stability and cohesion.
In this respect, Georgia and Azerbaijan seek to improve their
relations with Turkey, the US, and NATO and have demonstrated their
intention on various occasions. Expressing their desire to enter NATO
and the EU repeatedly, these countries see Western institutions as
the guarantee for their survival and Turkey as a gateway to the West.
Indeed, relations with Turkey go further back than is normally
thought. During Ottoman times, Georgians and Azerbaijanis asked the
Ottomans for help to ensure their safety against outside powers and
were met with reception. In a sense, today's convergence can be
viewed as continuity. In the framework of the cooperation in
question, the Turkish military trains the Georgian and Azerbaijani
militaries. Numerous Turkish companies operate in these countries.
Another area that strikes attention is education. In addition to the
thousands of Georgians and Azerbaijanis attending Turkish
universities, relations are further improved with the opening of
primary, secondary, and higher education facilities in these
countries by Turkish private enterprise. The event that perfects
these developments is the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline. The energy
pipeline starting in Azerbaijan, passing through Georgia and ending
in Turkey's southern shores closely knits the three countries to each
other. This route also connects the Caucasus to the Mediterranean,
that is, to Europe. Lately, the subject that is paid close attention
to is to attach more tightly the region to the Black Sea, the
Mediterranean, and Europe by railways, roads, and seaways and all
directions pass through Turkey.
While talking about Turkish-Caucasian relations, the subject of
ethnic ties cannot be overlooked. Today, some 100,000 Armenians and
millions of Georgians and Azerbaijanis live in Turkey. In addition to
Armenians, Georgians and Azerbaijanis who are Turkish citizens, there
are some 100,000 workers are known to be in Turkey, legally or
illegally. Moreover, of the minorities that constitute Georgia's
populace, a sizeable number lives in Turkey. These groups also
maintain their ties with the Caucasus. This is to such an extent that
when clashes erupt between Georgians and Abkhazians, both groups try
to muster the support of Turkish public opinion. It is a blessing
that the Caucasian groups that are in dispute do not take their
problems into the Turkish political scene.
To summarize, Turkey has the dynamics to maintain the balance among
the region's great powers. This is not to suggest that there is a
Turkish model against Russia and Iran and one that aims to oust the
two countries from the region. On the contrary, the Turkish model is
inclusive as well as supportive of integration. Turkey's approach is
in conformity not only with Russia's and Iran's aims, but also with
those of NATO, the EU, and the US.
Following the approaches of the global and the region's great powers,
when analyzing the cognition of the region's relatively small states,
Georgia and Azerbaijan seem to be in close collaboration with Turkey.
The two states also think of NATO and the EU very pleasantly and
desire to become a member in both institutions while both have
fostered close military ties with the US. Most importantly, both
countries hope that Turkey will carry them to the Western system.
During the latest NATO summit that took place in Istanbul in 2004 a
meeting was held between the foreign ministers of Turkey, Armenia,
and Azerbaijan. Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian stated that
Turkey had a sincere intention to improve relations with Armenia and
that the current government was much more eager for that end than
previous governments. Oskanian also said that they welcomed Turkey's
leadership regarding regional dialogue and underscored Turkey's role
in the region once again. The three countries' representatives all
unanimously agreed that the EU and NATO sought a new strategy in
Southern Caucasus and that regional actors had to help this search.
The representatives argued that with the inclusion of Georgia, this
strategy had to be shaped by the region's countries and be given its
last form by the EU and NATO and that Turkey had a special role in
this strategy and in bringing the region closer to Europe. In short,
Turkey's EU membership will both hasten the region's direction
towards Europe and at the same time enable the EU to act as a
significant actor in the region with a strong and applicable vision.
Sedat LACINER: IR Lecturer and Director, ISRO, Ankara
[email protected] or [email protected]