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Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
Dec 22 2004
EU-Turkey Membership Deal, Subject to De Facto Recognition of Greek
Cyprus
Theme: This report examines the historic agreement taken by European
Union leaders at their 16-17 December summit in Brussels to begin
accession talks with Turkey after 41 years in Europe's ante-room. The
process will begin on 3 October, 2005 provided Turkey has by then
tacitly recognised Cyprus, which joined the EU in May. Turkey invaded
the island in 1974 and it has been divided since then. Both the
previous Popular Party government (1996-2004) and the current
Socialist administration have been among the most active supporters
of Turkey's membership.
Summary: EU leaders endorsed the European Commission's momentous
recommendation on 6 October to open accession talks with Turkey (see
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/587.asp). But they added a
condition which threatened to end the marriage before the two sides
got to the altar. The negotiations almost broke down as a result of
the demand that Ankara formally recognise Cyprus. The situation is
surreal because Turkey is set to join a club one of whose members it
does not formally recognise. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Prime
Minister, rejected the EU's first proposal and threatened to abandon
the summit, apparently backed by the chief of the Turkish armed
forces.
Erdogan's brinkmanship paid off. A compromise was reached under which
Turkey agreed to extend its customs union (as of 1996) to include
Cyprus before October. This allowed Erdogan to save face at home,
particularly among the powerful military, by maintaining that Turkey
was not formally recognising Cyprus but making a gesture of goodwill
tantamount to recognition (see box below).
Other EU entry terms included open-ended talks, no guarantee of full
membership if conditions are not met and the possibility of some
safeguards remaining over the migration of workers from Turkey.
The protracted process for membership during which Turkey has to
harmonise its laws with EU legislation will last at least 10 years
and could be compounded by Austrian and French pledges to hold
referendums on Turkish entry at some point in the future. Every EU
country has the right to veto the accession of a new member. A 1972
poll in France saw two-thirds of voters backing the UK's accession to
the EU.
As a large (with a population of more than 70 million), poor (with a
per capita income of 27% of the EU-25) and Muslim country, Turkey's
membership is in a special category of its own with far-reaching
implications for the country and for the Union as a whole.
-The Cyprus Issue:Cyprus is one of the world's longest unresolved
disputes. In July 1974 the Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios, a
Greek Cypriot, was deposed in a coup backed by Greece's military
junta. Turkey, fearing that its traditional enemy would annexe the
island, responded by invading it and enforcing a partition between
the north and south of the island. In 1983 the Turkish-held area
declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is
recognised only by Turkey.
Turkey won sympathy in March 2004 from the international community
because Turkish-Cypriots in the northern part endorsed the UN drafted
reunification plan with a 65% majority while more than three-quarters
of Greek-Cypriots in the south, already granted EU membership,
rejected it. As a result, and to the immense frustration of the UN
and the EU over the historic missed opportunity, only the southern
part joined the EU on May 1 as both sides had to approve the
reunification plan.
Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots, in a volte face, bent over backwards for
a power-sharing deal and also opened the border for the first time in
30 years.
But Greek-Cypriots stubbornly resisted any change. Tassos
Papadopoulos, the island's president, threatened in October, ahead of
the Brussels summit, to veto Turkey's EU entry if Turkey did not
reduce its 36,000 soldiers in the northern part, allow
Cypriot-registered vessels to dock at Turkish ports and end its veto
of the island's bid to join international bodies such as the OECD and
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Greek
Cypriot government scuppered the European Commission's bid in October
to end the economic isolation of northern Cyprus by allowing
Turkish-Cypriots to trade freely with the world. The Greek Cypriot
'No' infuriated the European Commission, which wanted to bring the
Turkish community into the economic mainstream.
Erdogan was justifiably angry at Cyprus' tactics, but was not in a
position to turn his back on the issue as Cyprus might then have
exercised its right to veto Turkey's EU entry which needed the
approval of all 25 EU countries. Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder and
Jacques Chirac brokered a way out of the impasse. Diplomatic
recognition is the trump card which Ankara has yet to play in its
push to find a permanent solution to the anomalous situation. Turkey
is still pressing for the UN plan to be implemented but another
formula may have to be found.-
Analysis: By postponing the start of accession talks until October,
despite the decision taken at the December 2002 Copenhagen summit to
open them "without delay" once the European Council gave the green
light, the EU bowed to a French demand. President Jacques Chirac, a
strong supporter of Turkey despite fierce opposition within his UMP
party, had called for the talks to start after his country's
referendum on the new European Constitution (expected before the end
of June), fearing the 'no' campaign could harness public opposition
to Turkish membership of the EU. 'If there is a link between Turkey
and the constitution, we will lose the referendum', said Michel
Barnier, French foreign minister.
The constitution has to be approved by all 25 EU countries in
referendums or parliamentary votes. Spain will be the first EU
country to hold a referendum on 20 February. The prospects for a
French 'yes' now look greater, particularly as 59% of Socialist Party
members who voted in an internal ballot backed the treaty, giving a
big boost to the European debate.
The EU's decision to open the door to Turkey was taken against a
backdrop of rising hostility to Turkey's membership in some countries
including Spain. In the latest Elcano barometer carried out with CIS,
only 44% of those surveyed were in favour of Turkey's membership,
compared with 56% in May. According to the latest Eurobarometer
opinion poll, 53% of EU citizens are in favour of further
enlargement, but support falls to just over one third in France and
Germany. Only 39% of those polled in France and 36% in Germany said
they wanted the EU-25 to be expanded. At 28%, support was at its
lowest in Austria. The go-ahead for Turkey, however, was preceded by
a vote in the European Parliament in favour of accession talks (407
to 262 with 29 abstentions).
Erdogan laid down several red lines, particularly on not extending
diplomatic recognition to Cyprus. His political opponents have long
been accused him of being soft on the issue and criticised him after
the summit for paying too high a price for membership talks.
According to the Turkish press, Erdogan told Jan Peter Balkenende,
the Dutch prime minister and current holder of the EU's presidency,
in an angry exchange during the summit: 'You are choosing 600,000
Greek Cypriots over 70 million Turks. I have nothing to reproach them
for, but I cannot justify this to my people'. The other red lines
were:
- Negotiations must have Turkey's complete membership as the final
aim.
- The decision to start talks must not be conditional on later
decisions by EU leaders.
- There should be no special conditions imposed permanently on
Turkey.
The other contentious country issue –Armenia– did not raise its head,
but will have to be dealt with at some point if only because a
country cannot join the EU if it does not have 'normal' relations
with all its neighbours. The border with Armenia has been closed
since 1993 due to the Karabag conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia
and other issues including historic tensions arising from the 1915-16
massacre (or 'genocide') by Turkey of Armenians. Michel Barnier, the
French foreign minister, spoke to his country's gallery before the
summit when he urged Turkey to recognise the 'genocide'. Turkey does
not recognise that it was 'genocide' and would like an independent
commission of historians to examine all the archives and pronounce on
the issue.
Erdogan could claim a substantial but not a complete victory, still
sufficient, however, to justify being named European of the Year at
the European Voice awards shortly before the summit. Erdogan was also
nominated as non-European Union citizen of the year. The government
pulled out the stops as much as it could before the summit in order
to impress the EU. For example, it opened up its national security
council, the secretive institution long regarded as Turkey's main
decision-making body. The council briefed diplomats and the media on
its operations in an unprecedented display of transparency.
The idea of offering a second-class 'privileged partnership' for
Turkey, as opposed to the prospect of full membership, demanded by
opponents in the run-up to the summit, particularly Germany's
opposition Christian Democrats, did not see the light of day. Erdogan
made it very clear that it was all or nothing. EU leaders agreed a
form of words which stressed that the aim of Turkey's accession talks
would be full membership, but if that was not possible the country
'must be anchored in European structures'. This wording is more
ambiguous than a reference to 'privileged partnership'. However, a
key phrase about establishing 'permanent safeguards' on allowing
Turkish workers to settle anywhere in the EU was kept in the text.
The decision to open accession talks followed the recommendation of
the European Commission. The main points of its report justifying the
start of talks were:
- Conclusion: 'Turkey has achieved significant legislative progress
in many areas... Important progress was made on implementation of
political reforms, but these need to be further consolidated and
broadened'.
- Political reforms: 'Political reforms, in line with the priorities
in the Accession Partnership, have been introduced by... a series of
constitutional and legislative changes adopted over a period of three
years (2001-2004)'.
- Economic reforms: 'Economic stability and predictability have been
substantially improved since the 2001 economic crisis. Previously
high inflation has come down to historic lows, political interference
reduced and the institutional and regulatory framework has been
brought closer to international standards'.
- Military reforms: 'The government has increasingly asserted its
control over the military. Although the process of aligning
civil-military relations with EU practice is underway, the armed
forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence through a series of
informal channels'.
- Judicial reforms: 'The independence and efficiency of the judiciary
were strengthened'.
- Human rights: 'Concerning... the respect of human rights and the
exercise of fundamental freedoms, Turkey has acceded to most relevant
international and European conventions'.
- Torture: 'The authorities have adopted a zero tolerance policy
towards torture and a number of perpetrators have been punished.
Torture is no longer systematic, but numerous cases of ill-treatment,
including torture, still continue to occur and further efforts will
be required to eradicate such practices'.
- Women's rights: 'The situation of women is still unsatisfactory;
discrimination and violence against women, including "honour
killings", remain a major problem'.
- Children's rights: 'Children's rights were strengthened, but child
labour remains an issue of serious concern'.
- Minority rights: 'The OSCE [Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe] High Commissioner on National Minorities
could play a valuable role in assisting Turkey to move towards full
compliance with modern international standards on the treatment of
minorities, including the Kurds'.
- Freedom of religion: 'Although freedom of religious belief is
guaranteed by the constitution... non-Muslim religious communities
continue to experience problems'.
- Freedom of the press: 'Notable progress has been made, (but)...
journalists, writers and publishers continue to be sentenced for
reasons that contravene the standards of the European Court of Human
Rights'.
Between this report and the summit the debate on Turkey among
opponents and supporters became very intense. The greatest
controversy was caused by Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the former French
president and president of the European Convention, who once again
took up the cudgels against Turkey. It was Giscard who said in 2002
that Turkey was 'not a European country' and its membership would
spell 'the end of Europe' and he followed this up less than a month
before the Brussels summit by saying that the proposed new European
Constitution (whose drafting he presided over) was 'not designed to
accommodate a power the size of Turkey'.(1) 'Accession by Turkey,
whenever it took place, would make the country the major
decision-maker in the European Union, and would change the nature of
the European project'.
Giscard's remarks provoked many comments, including a letter
published in the Financial Times by Ana de Palacio, a former Spanish
Foreign Minister and a member of the Praesidium of the European
Convention. She criticised Giscard for failing 'to bring much reason
to the debate over Turkey' and suggested that he might have had in
mind the problems that the double-majority issue would cause for
Turkey when he wrote it into the new constitution.
Under a key provision of the new constitution (which has to be
approved by all countries in referendums or parliamentary votes),
known as double-majority voting, Turkey would automatically be
accorded a strong position in EU decision-making. Under the
constitution all decisions that do not need to be made unanimously
–many matters, especially foreign policy and taxation, still do– must
be backed by at least 65% of the EU's population and 55% of member
states. Put another way, any country would need support from 35% of
the EU population and 45% of member states to block a proposal it did
not like. Turkey's population (80 million in 2015, the earliest date
when it would join the EU assuming all goes well, roughly the same as
Germany's) gives it considerable power, but even if it is the most
populous country it would not be able to block any decisions alone;
it would need the populations of at least two other big countries to
meet the required 35% mark.
In another letter in the FT, Stephen Wall, Tony Blair's former EU
adviser, took Giscard to task for saying in his article that all
Turkey was offered in its 1963 associate member agreement with the
European Community was membership of the Common Market. This was
incorrect, he said, and cited the text of the agreement: 'As soon as
the operation of the agreement has advanced far enough to justify
envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out
of the treaty establishing the Community, the contracting parties
shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the
Community'. Giscard conveniently forgot this.
EU membership is of huge importance for the economy for three main
reasons. First, it will make the Customs Union (as of 1996)
irreversible because as long as Turkey remains outside the EU bloc,
it can be reversed by either party. Far from wiping out some Turkish
businesses, as they feared at the onset, the Customs Union has been
very good for Turkish exports and companies have stood their ground
in the face of increased imports. For example, exports of automotive
components have risen from US$155 million in 1995 to around US$5
billion. Secondly, the risk premium on public debt will fall (this
has already started), both easing the pressure on public finances and
improving the performance of the economy. Thirdly, inflows of foreign
direct investment will probably surge from their current very low
levels, leading to higher growth rates and lower unemployment.
Turkey's stock of investment is lower today than it was in the 1980s;
annual inflows have rarely reached more than US$1 billion (Spain and
Ireland both attracted over US$25 billion in 2003). The Istanbul
Stock Exchange hit a record high the day the EU made its
announcement.
Some analysts ambitiously forecast that Turkey's per capita income
could increase over the next 10 years from around €4,000 to €14,000
in purchasing power parity terms, spurred by the country's clearer
horizon.
The Turkish economy has been something of a star in the last year
after recovering from its 2001 crisis. The economy is by far the
fastest growing in Europe and the inflation rate has fallen to single
figures for the first time since 1972. The IMF recognised Turkey's
progress two days before the start of the Brussels EU summit when it
announced a new three-year US$10 billion stand-by agreement which,
according to Rodrigo Rato, the IMF's managing director, 'should allow
Turkey to exit from further IMF financial support'.
As a result of finally getting inflation under control, on 1 January
Turkey will remove six noughts from the face value of the lira: one
unit of the local currency will then be worth what one million are
now (€0.53), welcome news for tourists and foreign investors who have
to mentally wrestle with strings of zeros and carry wads of notes.
Yet the economy remains vulnerable. Turkey has massive debts
including US$23 billion owed to the IMF and billions borrowed via the
international bond markets. At around 80% of GDP, Turkey's gross debt
is double that of the new EU member status. Turkey's debts have
largely arisen from its efforts to push through banking reform after
a run on the banks in 2001 caused the country's devastating
recession.
Spain, with its experience of having spent eight years negotiating
its much easier EU membership (between 1978 and 1986), worked behind
the scenes to encourage Turkish politicians to keep their cool in the
face of those countries, like Cyprus, using the summit as an open
agenda to settle old scores and stay focused on the overriding goal
of membership.
Spain could well be a useful model for Turkey when the talks start.
The same fears about impoverished workers flooding the European
labour market existed about Spain 20 years ago as are now being made
about Turkey. An often overlooked point in the debate about a
possible surge in Turkish immigrants to the EU is that, like Spain,
Turkey will itself become a magnet for immigrants when it is a full
EU member. Just as no one in Spain could have predicted 20 years ago
that today there would be an estimated more than one million North
Africans in Spain, so too it is quite likely that a richer Turkey
will attract workers from Iran, Iraq, Syria and other poorer
countries with whom it shares a border.
Conclusion: Turkey has achieved impressive reforms on all fronts
since it was declared an EU candidate in 1999. The long and uncertain
process that now opens will be more wrenching.
Notes:
(1)See his article 'A better European bridge to Turkey' (Financial
Times, 24 November, 2004).
--Boundary_(ID_W5hHqaZhyB3GKQeA+ZdtMw)--
Dec 22 2004
EU-Turkey Membership Deal, Subject to De Facto Recognition of Greek
Cyprus
Theme: This report examines the historic agreement taken by European
Union leaders at their 16-17 December summit in Brussels to begin
accession talks with Turkey after 41 years in Europe's ante-room. The
process will begin on 3 October, 2005 provided Turkey has by then
tacitly recognised Cyprus, which joined the EU in May. Turkey invaded
the island in 1974 and it has been divided since then. Both the
previous Popular Party government (1996-2004) and the current
Socialist administration have been among the most active supporters
of Turkey's membership.
Summary: EU leaders endorsed the European Commission's momentous
recommendation on 6 October to open accession talks with Turkey (see
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/587.asp). But they added a
condition which threatened to end the marriage before the two sides
got to the altar. The negotiations almost broke down as a result of
the demand that Ankara formally recognise Cyprus. The situation is
surreal because Turkey is set to join a club one of whose members it
does not formally recognise. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Turkish Prime
Minister, rejected the EU's first proposal and threatened to abandon
the summit, apparently backed by the chief of the Turkish armed
forces.
Erdogan's brinkmanship paid off. A compromise was reached under which
Turkey agreed to extend its customs union (as of 1996) to include
Cyprus before October. This allowed Erdogan to save face at home,
particularly among the powerful military, by maintaining that Turkey
was not formally recognising Cyprus but making a gesture of goodwill
tantamount to recognition (see box below).
Other EU entry terms included open-ended talks, no guarantee of full
membership if conditions are not met and the possibility of some
safeguards remaining over the migration of workers from Turkey.
The protracted process for membership during which Turkey has to
harmonise its laws with EU legislation will last at least 10 years
and could be compounded by Austrian and French pledges to hold
referendums on Turkish entry at some point in the future. Every EU
country has the right to veto the accession of a new member. A 1972
poll in France saw two-thirds of voters backing the UK's accession to
the EU.
As a large (with a population of more than 70 million), poor (with a
per capita income of 27% of the EU-25) and Muslim country, Turkey's
membership is in a special category of its own with far-reaching
implications for the country and for the Union as a whole.
-The Cyprus Issue:Cyprus is one of the world's longest unresolved
disputes. In July 1974 the Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios, a
Greek Cypriot, was deposed in a coup backed by Greece's military
junta. Turkey, fearing that its traditional enemy would annexe the
island, responded by invading it and enforcing a partition between
the north and south of the island. In 1983 the Turkish-held area
declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It is
recognised only by Turkey.
Turkey won sympathy in March 2004 from the international community
because Turkish-Cypriots in the northern part endorsed the UN drafted
reunification plan with a 65% majority while more than three-quarters
of Greek-Cypriots in the south, already granted EU membership,
rejected it. As a result, and to the immense frustration of the UN
and the EU over the historic missed opportunity, only the southern
part joined the EU on May 1 as both sides had to approve the
reunification plan.
Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots, in a volte face, bent over backwards for
a power-sharing deal and also opened the border for the first time in
30 years.
But Greek-Cypriots stubbornly resisted any change. Tassos
Papadopoulos, the island's president, threatened in October, ahead of
the Brussels summit, to veto Turkey's EU entry if Turkey did not
reduce its 36,000 soldiers in the northern part, allow
Cypriot-registered vessels to dock at Turkish ports and end its veto
of the island's bid to join international bodies such as the OECD and
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The Greek
Cypriot government scuppered the European Commission's bid in October
to end the economic isolation of northern Cyprus by allowing
Turkish-Cypriots to trade freely with the world. The Greek Cypriot
'No' infuriated the European Commission, which wanted to bring the
Turkish community into the economic mainstream.
Erdogan was justifiably angry at Cyprus' tactics, but was not in a
position to turn his back on the issue as Cyprus might then have
exercised its right to veto Turkey's EU entry which needed the
approval of all 25 EU countries. Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder and
Jacques Chirac brokered a way out of the impasse. Diplomatic
recognition is the trump card which Ankara has yet to play in its
push to find a permanent solution to the anomalous situation. Turkey
is still pressing for the UN plan to be implemented but another
formula may have to be found.-
Analysis: By postponing the start of accession talks until October,
despite the decision taken at the December 2002 Copenhagen summit to
open them "without delay" once the European Council gave the green
light, the EU bowed to a French demand. President Jacques Chirac, a
strong supporter of Turkey despite fierce opposition within his UMP
party, had called for the talks to start after his country's
referendum on the new European Constitution (expected before the end
of June), fearing the 'no' campaign could harness public opposition
to Turkish membership of the EU. 'If there is a link between Turkey
and the constitution, we will lose the referendum', said Michel
Barnier, French foreign minister.
The constitution has to be approved by all 25 EU countries in
referendums or parliamentary votes. Spain will be the first EU
country to hold a referendum on 20 February. The prospects for a
French 'yes' now look greater, particularly as 59% of Socialist Party
members who voted in an internal ballot backed the treaty, giving a
big boost to the European debate.
The EU's decision to open the door to Turkey was taken against a
backdrop of rising hostility to Turkey's membership in some countries
including Spain. In the latest Elcano barometer carried out with CIS,
only 44% of those surveyed were in favour of Turkey's membership,
compared with 56% in May. According to the latest Eurobarometer
opinion poll, 53% of EU citizens are in favour of further
enlargement, but support falls to just over one third in France and
Germany. Only 39% of those polled in France and 36% in Germany said
they wanted the EU-25 to be expanded. At 28%, support was at its
lowest in Austria. The go-ahead for Turkey, however, was preceded by
a vote in the European Parliament in favour of accession talks (407
to 262 with 29 abstentions).
Erdogan laid down several red lines, particularly on not extending
diplomatic recognition to Cyprus. His political opponents have long
been accused him of being soft on the issue and criticised him after
the summit for paying too high a price for membership talks.
According to the Turkish press, Erdogan told Jan Peter Balkenende,
the Dutch prime minister and current holder of the EU's presidency,
in an angry exchange during the summit: 'You are choosing 600,000
Greek Cypriots over 70 million Turks. I have nothing to reproach them
for, but I cannot justify this to my people'. The other red lines
were:
- Negotiations must have Turkey's complete membership as the final
aim.
- The decision to start talks must not be conditional on later
decisions by EU leaders.
- There should be no special conditions imposed permanently on
Turkey.
The other contentious country issue –Armenia– did not raise its head,
but will have to be dealt with at some point if only because a
country cannot join the EU if it does not have 'normal' relations
with all its neighbours. The border with Armenia has been closed
since 1993 due to the Karabag conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia
and other issues including historic tensions arising from the 1915-16
massacre (or 'genocide') by Turkey of Armenians. Michel Barnier, the
French foreign minister, spoke to his country's gallery before the
summit when he urged Turkey to recognise the 'genocide'. Turkey does
not recognise that it was 'genocide' and would like an independent
commission of historians to examine all the archives and pronounce on
the issue.
Erdogan could claim a substantial but not a complete victory, still
sufficient, however, to justify being named European of the Year at
the European Voice awards shortly before the summit. Erdogan was also
nominated as non-European Union citizen of the year. The government
pulled out the stops as much as it could before the summit in order
to impress the EU. For example, it opened up its national security
council, the secretive institution long regarded as Turkey's main
decision-making body. The council briefed diplomats and the media on
its operations in an unprecedented display of transparency.
The idea of offering a second-class 'privileged partnership' for
Turkey, as opposed to the prospect of full membership, demanded by
opponents in the run-up to the summit, particularly Germany's
opposition Christian Democrats, did not see the light of day. Erdogan
made it very clear that it was all or nothing. EU leaders agreed a
form of words which stressed that the aim of Turkey's accession talks
would be full membership, but if that was not possible the country
'must be anchored in European structures'. This wording is more
ambiguous than a reference to 'privileged partnership'. However, a
key phrase about establishing 'permanent safeguards' on allowing
Turkish workers to settle anywhere in the EU was kept in the text.
The decision to open accession talks followed the recommendation of
the European Commission. The main points of its report justifying the
start of talks were:
- Conclusion: 'Turkey has achieved significant legislative progress
in many areas... Important progress was made on implementation of
political reforms, but these need to be further consolidated and
broadened'.
- Political reforms: 'Political reforms, in line with the priorities
in the Accession Partnership, have been introduced by... a series of
constitutional and legislative changes adopted over a period of three
years (2001-2004)'.
- Economic reforms: 'Economic stability and predictability have been
substantially improved since the 2001 economic crisis. Previously
high inflation has come down to historic lows, political interference
reduced and the institutional and regulatory framework has been
brought closer to international standards'.
- Military reforms: 'The government has increasingly asserted its
control over the military. Although the process of aligning
civil-military relations with EU practice is underway, the armed
forces in Turkey continue to exercise influence through a series of
informal channels'.
- Judicial reforms: 'The independence and efficiency of the judiciary
were strengthened'.
- Human rights: 'Concerning... the respect of human rights and the
exercise of fundamental freedoms, Turkey has acceded to most relevant
international and European conventions'.
- Torture: 'The authorities have adopted a zero tolerance policy
towards torture and a number of perpetrators have been punished.
Torture is no longer systematic, but numerous cases of ill-treatment,
including torture, still continue to occur and further efforts will
be required to eradicate such practices'.
- Women's rights: 'The situation of women is still unsatisfactory;
discrimination and violence against women, including "honour
killings", remain a major problem'.
- Children's rights: 'Children's rights were strengthened, but child
labour remains an issue of serious concern'.
- Minority rights: 'The OSCE [Organisation for Security and
Co-operation in Europe] High Commissioner on National Minorities
could play a valuable role in assisting Turkey to move towards full
compliance with modern international standards on the treatment of
minorities, including the Kurds'.
- Freedom of religion: 'Although freedom of religious belief is
guaranteed by the constitution... non-Muslim religious communities
continue to experience problems'.
- Freedom of the press: 'Notable progress has been made, (but)...
journalists, writers and publishers continue to be sentenced for
reasons that contravene the standards of the European Court of Human
Rights'.
Between this report and the summit the debate on Turkey among
opponents and supporters became very intense. The greatest
controversy was caused by Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the former French
president and president of the European Convention, who once again
took up the cudgels against Turkey. It was Giscard who said in 2002
that Turkey was 'not a European country' and its membership would
spell 'the end of Europe' and he followed this up less than a month
before the Brussels summit by saying that the proposed new European
Constitution (whose drafting he presided over) was 'not designed to
accommodate a power the size of Turkey'.(1) 'Accession by Turkey,
whenever it took place, would make the country the major
decision-maker in the European Union, and would change the nature of
the European project'.
Giscard's remarks provoked many comments, including a letter
published in the Financial Times by Ana de Palacio, a former Spanish
Foreign Minister and a member of the Praesidium of the European
Convention. She criticised Giscard for failing 'to bring much reason
to the debate over Turkey' and suggested that he might have had in
mind the problems that the double-majority issue would cause for
Turkey when he wrote it into the new constitution.
Under a key provision of the new constitution (which has to be
approved by all countries in referendums or parliamentary votes),
known as double-majority voting, Turkey would automatically be
accorded a strong position in EU decision-making. Under the
constitution all decisions that do not need to be made unanimously
–many matters, especially foreign policy and taxation, still do– must
be backed by at least 65% of the EU's population and 55% of member
states. Put another way, any country would need support from 35% of
the EU population and 45% of member states to block a proposal it did
not like. Turkey's population (80 million in 2015, the earliest date
when it would join the EU assuming all goes well, roughly the same as
Germany's) gives it considerable power, but even if it is the most
populous country it would not be able to block any decisions alone;
it would need the populations of at least two other big countries to
meet the required 35% mark.
In another letter in the FT, Stephen Wall, Tony Blair's former EU
adviser, took Giscard to task for saying in his article that all
Turkey was offered in its 1963 associate member agreement with the
European Community was membership of the Common Market. This was
incorrect, he said, and cited the text of the agreement: 'As soon as
the operation of the agreement has advanced far enough to justify
envisaging full acceptance by Turkey of the obligations arising out
of the treaty establishing the Community, the contracting parties
shall examine the possibility of the accession of Turkey to the
Community'. Giscard conveniently forgot this.
EU membership is of huge importance for the economy for three main
reasons. First, it will make the Customs Union (as of 1996)
irreversible because as long as Turkey remains outside the EU bloc,
it can be reversed by either party. Far from wiping out some Turkish
businesses, as they feared at the onset, the Customs Union has been
very good for Turkish exports and companies have stood their ground
in the face of increased imports. For example, exports of automotive
components have risen from US$155 million in 1995 to around US$5
billion. Secondly, the risk premium on public debt will fall (this
has already started), both easing the pressure on public finances and
improving the performance of the economy. Thirdly, inflows of foreign
direct investment will probably surge from their current very low
levels, leading to higher growth rates and lower unemployment.
Turkey's stock of investment is lower today than it was in the 1980s;
annual inflows have rarely reached more than US$1 billion (Spain and
Ireland both attracted over US$25 billion in 2003). The Istanbul
Stock Exchange hit a record high the day the EU made its
announcement.
Some analysts ambitiously forecast that Turkey's per capita income
could increase over the next 10 years from around €4,000 to €14,000
in purchasing power parity terms, spurred by the country's clearer
horizon.
The Turkish economy has been something of a star in the last year
after recovering from its 2001 crisis. The economy is by far the
fastest growing in Europe and the inflation rate has fallen to single
figures for the first time since 1972. The IMF recognised Turkey's
progress two days before the start of the Brussels EU summit when it
announced a new three-year US$10 billion stand-by agreement which,
according to Rodrigo Rato, the IMF's managing director, 'should allow
Turkey to exit from further IMF financial support'.
As a result of finally getting inflation under control, on 1 January
Turkey will remove six noughts from the face value of the lira: one
unit of the local currency will then be worth what one million are
now (€0.53), welcome news for tourists and foreign investors who have
to mentally wrestle with strings of zeros and carry wads of notes.
Yet the economy remains vulnerable. Turkey has massive debts
including US$23 billion owed to the IMF and billions borrowed via the
international bond markets. At around 80% of GDP, Turkey's gross debt
is double that of the new EU member status. Turkey's debts have
largely arisen from its efforts to push through banking reform after
a run on the banks in 2001 caused the country's devastating
recession.
Spain, with its experience of having spent eight years negotiating
its much easier EU membership (between 1978 and 1986), worked behind
the scenes to encourage Turkish politicians to keep their cool in the
face of those countries, like Cyprus, using the summit as an open
agenda to settle old scores and stay focused on the overriding goal
of membership.
Spain could well be a useful model for Turkey when the talks start.
The same fears about impoverished workers flooding the European
labour market existed about Spain 20 years ago as are now being made
about Turkey. An often overlooked point in the debate about a
possible surge in Turkish immigrants to the EU is that, like Spain,
Turkey will itself become a magnet for immigrants when it is a full
EU member. Just as no one in Spain could have predicted 20 years ago
that today there would be an estimated more than one million North
Africans in Spain, so too it is quite likely that a richer Turkey
will attract workers from Iran, Iraq, Syria and other poorer
countries with whom it shares a border.
Conclusion: Turkey has achieved impressive reforms on all fronts
since it was declared an EU candidate in 1999. The long and uncertain
process that now opens will be more wrenching.
Notes:
(1)See his article 'A better European bridge to Turkey' (Financial
Times, 24 November, 2004).
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