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Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 22, 2004, Wednesday
KARABAKH SLIP
SOURCE: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 20, 2004, p. 12
by Vladimir Kazimirov
Between 1992 and 1996, Ambassador Vladimir Nikolayevich Kazimirov was
the head of the Russian intermediary mission, presidential envoy to
Karabakh, and Russian chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group.
All expectations notwithstanding, 2004 failed to become a
breakthrough year in the Karabakh conflict settlement. Contours of
the peace process remain indistinct. Moreover, there is nothing
anymore to which to ascribe the failure of slack negotiations,
neither elections in Azerbaijan and Armenia, nor the complexity of
domestic political situations in these countries.
There were 9 Armenian-Azerbaijani meetings this year, 3 between the
presidents and 6 between foreign ministers. Baku, Yerevan, and
Stepanakert claim to view settlement as the ultimate priority, but
these are only words. In fact, interims between the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict are filled with a Cold War attitude,
information warfare, and frequently disinformation. Azerbaijan and
Armenia's stands remain mutually exclusive, the situation is worse
than it was even under Heidar Aliyev. Heidar Aliyev only demanded
liberation of the territories beyond Karabakh, which the Armenians
occupied during the war. His son, Ilham Aliyev, calls Karabakh itself
an occupied territory. Propaganda breeds tension in the Azerbaijani
and Armenian society. Anything goes, even calls for another war.
Instead of preparing their respective societies for mutual
concessions, ruling elites cultivate intolerance towards compromises
as such. All of that leaves the impression that Baku and Yerevan
merely feign negotiations.
To a certain extent, Baku diplomacy succeeded in the last several
months to switch attention from the matter of Karabakh's status to
the problem of occupation of Azerbaijani lands. Satisfied with the
status quo dating back to the end of the war of 1992-1994, Yerevan
missed the fact that after a decade of peaceful occupation of
Azerbaijan, the territories beyond Karabakh look like an anomaly,
particularly to whoever does not know its history. Another anomaly,
absence of the status of Karabakh, is not that irritating anymore. In
short, Azerbaijan managed to have the UN General Assembly discuss the
situation in the occupied lands. It even succeeded in prodding the
Parliamentary Assembly into action. They will listen to a report on
Karabakh in January 2005.
Official Baku constantly refers to four resolutions of the UN
Security Council passed in 1993. The documents demand an immediate
cease-fire and withdrawal of the Armenians from the occupied
territories. It is not without risk, however, because the
international community remembers how Azerbaijan was the first to
kill fulfillment of resolutions of the UN Security Council.
Azerbaijan then was bent on settling the conflict by sheer strength
of arms. Ducking all and any peace initiatives, Baku ignored
resolutions of the UN Security Council for over a year. The truce is
not a result of these resolutions; it is a consequence of
Azerbaijan's military failures.
These days, Yerevan is making use of Azerbaijan's past neglect of UN
resolutions and refuses to withdraw, demanding a comprehensive
solution to the problem of Karabakh. The Armenians also use the fact
that the demand of unconditional withdrawal disappeared from the last
two UN resolutions (resolutions 874 and 884 - and Baku has only
itself to blame). This too has been a subject of numerous
Armenian-Azerbaijani consultations and talks.
There are different opinions on Azerbaijan's latest tactical moves.
Aliyev hails them as masterful, the Armenians argue among themselves,
and official Yerevan threatens that should the UN General Assembly
pass a pro-Baku resolution, it will terminate all bilateral contacts,
and begins insisting on Stepanakert's return to negotiations as a
third party. In the meantime, the words of both sides certainly
differ from deeds. Baku no longer insists on adoption of the UN
resolution as soon as possible. Yerevan already agreed to meetings of
two ministers in Sofia and Brussels.
Sure, diplomatic activeness is better than saber-rattling, but the
activities in question should be used for the purpose of searching
for compromises and not the purpose of aggravating confrontation.
Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group find it counterproductive. Instead
of making progress, it complicated the situation and makes transition
to efficient negotiations all the more difficult. It is the height of
naivete to believe that Baku and Yerevan will honor recommendations
from the UN General Assembly or Parliamentary Assembly when they
disregard demands from the UN Security Council.
Does it help to involve in the Karabakh affair the structures that do
not know the first thing about the problem? It is common knowledge
that every involved party will use any deviation from the previous
approach to promote its own interests. Deployment of new structures
merely indicates who finds political-propagandistic exercises more
important than conflict management. Take the draft report of the
Parliamentary Assembly, for example. It is clearly biased and full of
factual errors. The cease-fire in Karabakh accomplished with Russia's
help is mentioned as an accomplishment of the OSCE.
There is no saying even now if 2005 is going to bring peace in
Karabakh any closer. It is only clear that this is a sheer
impossibility without abandonment of mutual sincerity, and a mutual
search for compromises. It will not hurt for international
intermediaries to become more active, instead of restricting their
activities to arrangement of meetings between presidents and
ministers. After all, a new meeting on the level of presidents or
ministers cannot be regarded as a smashing success.
The Karabakh slips we are witnessing leave the impression that
intermediaries should demand from both parties that they honor
decisions of the Budapest OSCE summit and resume negotiations in all
earnest.
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
December 22, 2004, Wednesday
KARABAKH SLIP
SOURCE: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 20, 2004, p. 12
by Vladimir Kazimirov
Between 1992 and 1996, Ambassador Vladimir Nikolayevich Kazimirov was
the head of the Russian intermediary mission, presidential envoy to
Karabakh, and Russian chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group.
All expectations notwithstanding, 2004 failed to become a
breakthrough year in the Karabakh conflict settlement. Contours of
the peace process remain indistinct. Moreover, there is nothing
anymore to which to ascribe the failure of slack negotiations,
neither elections in Azerbaijan and Armenia, nor the complexity of
domestic political situations in these countries.
There were 9 Armenian-Azerbaijani meetings this year, 3 between the
presidents and 6 between foreign ministers. Baku, Yerevan, and
Stepanakert claim to view settlement as the ultimate priority, but
these are only words. In fact, interims between the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict are filled with a Cold War attitude,
information warfare, and frequently disinformation. Azerbaijan and
Armenia's stands remain mutually exclusive, the situation is worse
than it was even under Heidar Aliyev. Heidar Aliyev only demanded
liberation of the territories beyond Karabakh, which the Armenians
occupied during the war. His son, Ilham Aliyev, calls Karabakh itself
an occupied territory. Propaganda breeds tension in the Azerbaijani
and Armenian society. Anything goes, even calls for another war.
Instead of preparing their respective societies for mutual
concessions, ruling elites cultivate intolerance towards compromises
as such. All of that leaves the impression that Baku and Yerevan
merely feign negotiations.
To a certain extent, Baku diplomacy succeeded in the last several
months to switch attention from the matter of Karabakh's status to
the problem of occupation of Azerbaijani lands. Satisfied with the
status quo dating back to the end of the war of 1992-1994, Yerevan
missed the fact that after a decade of peaceful occupation of
Azerbaijan, the territories beyond Karabakh look like an anomaly,
particularly to whoever does not know its history. Another anomaly,
absence of the status of Karabakh, is not that irritating anymore. In
short, Azerbaijan managed to have the UN General Assembly discuss the
situation in the occupied lands. It even succeeded in prodding the
Parliamentary Assembly into action. They will listen to a report on
Karabakh in January 2005.
Official Baku constantly refers to four resolutions of the UN
Security Council passed in 1993. The documents demand an immediate
cease-fire and withdrawal of the Armenians from the occupied
territories. It is not without risk, however, because the
international community remembers how Azerbaijan was the first to
kill fulfillment of resolutions of the UN Security Council.
Azerbaijan then was bent on settling the conflict by sheer strength
of arms. Ducking all and any peace initiatives, Baku ignored
resolutions of the UN Security Council for over a year. The truce is
not a result of these resolutions; it is a consequence of
Azerbaijan's military failures.
These days, Yerevan is making use of Azerbaijan's past neglect of UN
resolutions and refuses to withdraw, demanding a comprehensive
solution to the problem of Karabakh. The Armenians also use the fact
that the demand of unconditional withdrawal disappeared from the last
two UN resolutions (resolutions 874 and 884 - and Baku has only
itself to blame). This too has been a subject of numerous
Armenian-Azerbaijani consultations and talks.
There are different opinions on Azerbaijan's latest tactical moves.
Aliyev hails them as masterful, the Armenians argue among themselves,
and official Yerevan threatens that should the UN General Assembly
pass a pro-Baku resolution, it will terminate all bilateral contacts,
and begins insisting on Stepanakert's return to negotiations as a
third party. In the meantime, the words of both sides certainly
differ from deeds. Baku no longer insists on adoption of the UN
resolution as soon as possible. Yerevan already agreed to meetings of
two ministers in Sofia and Brussels.
Sure, diplomatic activeness is better than saber-rattling, but the
activities in question should be used for the purpose of searching
for compromises and not the purpose of aggravating confrontation.
Chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group find it counterproductive. Instead
of making progress, it complicated the situation and makes transition
to efficient negotiations all the more difficult. It is the height of
naivete to believe that Baku and Yerevan will honor recommendations
from the UN General Assembly or Parliamentary Assembly when they
disregard demands from the UN Security Council.
Does it help to involve in the Karabakh affair the structures that do
not know the first thing about the problem? It is common knowledge
that every involved party will use any deviation from the previous
approach to promote its own interests. Deployment of new structures
merely indicates who finds political-propagandistic exercises more
important than conflict management. Take the draft report of the
Parliamentary Assembly, for example. It is clearly biased and full of
factual errors. The cease-fire in Karabakh accomplished with Russia's
help is mentioned as an accomplishment of the OSCE.
There is no saying even now if 2005 is going to bring peace in
Karabakh any closer. It is only clear that this is a sheer
impossibility without abandonment of mutual sincerity, and a mutual
search for compromises. It will not hurt for international
intermediaries to become more active, instead of restricting their
activities to arrangement of meetings between presidents and
ministers. After all, a new meeting on the level of presidents or
ministers cannot be regarded as a smashing success.
The Karabakh slips we are witnessing leave the impression that
intermediaries should demand from both parties that they honor
decisions of the Budapest OSCE summit and resume negotiations in all
earnest.