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Baku Balances the Ukrainian Revolution
By Anar Valiyev
Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
Dec 24 2004
For the last month, the presidential elections in Ukraine captivated
the attention of the world's Mass Media. The stalemate in Kiev
divided the CIS into two camps. While Russia and its satellites
Armenia and Belarus acknowledged Viktor Yanukovich as president,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova took a "wait-and-see" position.
Azerbaijan in particular became a hostage of the differing stances
of Western countries and Russia. Supporting either side in Ukraine
would aggravate Azerbaijan's foreign policy situation. Meanwhile,
the Azerbaijani ruling elite fears a revival of a strong opposition
within the country, which could result in increased pressure for
democratization.
BACKGROUND: The Georgian "rose revolution" made official Baku
uneasy. At the culmination of the Georgian events, Ilham Aliyev's
government sided with president Eduard Shevarnadze, officially
supporting him. Shevarnadze's resignation and his opponent's
triumph was an embarrassment to official Baku, temporarily obscuring
Azerbaijani-Georgian relations.
On the eve of the Ukrainian elections, President Aliyev as well
as the presidents of Belarus and Russia attended the sixtieth
anniversary of Ukraine's liberation from Nazi German occupation. The
event, orchestrated by Russian president Vladimir Putin, was an
indirect support of the Kremlin candidate Ukrainian Prime Minister
Yanukovich. Seeing the financial and administrative resources
controlled by Yanukovich, Aliyev's government expected the victory
of the Kremlin's candidate. After the second round of elections,
it became obvious that Yanukovich would not become president that
easily. Widespread fraud, cheating, and deceptions in the Ukrainian
elections led to a strong disapproval from the the United States and
the European Union. Yet on November 24, the Kremlin acknowledged
Yanukovich as president. Russia's allies in the CIS – Belarus,
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia – recognized Yanukovich as well.
Uzbekistan initially followed suit, though it qualified its stance
subsequently, blaming Russia of intervening in Ukraine's affairs.
Azerbaijan's government decided not to rush with recognition. On
the other hand, the Azerbaijani opposition tried to take advantage
of the Ukrainian revolution. The Musavat party leader Isa Gambar
made a blitz visit to Kiev to support Yushchenko. Upon his return,
Gambar stated that the elections in Ukraine were not just a change
of power. 'This is a new era in the post-Soviet space. The events
in Ukraine will impact all regimes in post-soviet republics.' Gambar
believes in an inevitable collapse of all authoritarian regimes in
the former USSR. The leader of the Azerbaijan National Independence
Party Etibar Mamedov also expressed his assurance that Azerbaijan
would be 'the next country that embraces democracy after Ukraine'.
IMPLICATIONS: Ilham Aliyev is in a difficult position. For the
Azerbaijani president, supporting Yanukovich could have a detrimental
effect. For the last five years, Azerbaijan has established its own
balanced system of strategic relations with the West including the
NATO and the EU. At the same time, Ukraine Azerbaijan's strategic
ally in GUUAM, and has permanently supported the Azerbaijani cause in
international organizations. By allying himself with Russia, Aliyev
would have lost support from the EU, NATO and the United States while
it would have weakened Azerbaijan's respect in the world's democratic
community. In the case of a Yushchenko victory, such a decision could
damage Azerbaijani-Ukrainian relations too. Since 2000, Azerbaijan
has built good and positive relations with Russia. This process has
been strengthened lately. Before the Ukrainian elections, Aliyev's
team thought that it was possible to have good relations with Russia
while being loyal to the West at the same time. But the Ukrainian
elections required Azerbaijan to make a crucial decision. Despite
increased pressure from Russia, Baku decided to wait for the end of
the standoff in Ukraine.
The Ukrainian "orange revolution" has implications for Azerbaijan's
domestic affairs as well. Since October 16, 2003, the opposition
parties remain in an amorphous condition. In the last year, the
activities of major opposition parties have shrunk. But the Ukrainian
wind of change woke up the Azerbaijani opposition from its slumber.
Obviously, the revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia are very attractive
for Azerbaijani opposition parties, which failed to do the same in
October 2003. The last opposition activities show that the opposing
parties are considering various possibilities to use Georgia's
and Ukraine's experience in Azerbaijan. Despite the ruling elite's
reluctance to support Yanukovich, it is unsettled by democratic changes
in neighboring countries. The current government of Azerbaijan would
rather prefer somebody like Yanukovich rather than any leader who
came to power on a revolutionary wave. The current elite is still
cautious toward the new regime in Georgia. In particular, the ruling
elite fears the establishment of a youth opposition movement like
the Georgian Kmara or the Ukrainian Pora. President Aliyev recently
commented on the Azerbaijani opposition's contacts with Yushchenko:
"They join demonstrations in foreign countries with ribbons on their
neck. Let them do the same here. If someone is brave enough, he could
tie a ribbon or something else on the neck and stage a demonstration
here." On December 3, Ziyafet Askerov, vice-speaker of the Azerbaijani
parliament, accused Ali Kerimli, the leader of the Popular Front Party
of Azerbaijan of attempting a coup d'etat. He stated that according
to intelligence information, the Ukrainian youth organization Pora
finances Kerimli's party in order to repeat the Georgian and Ukrainian
scenario in Azerbaijan. Kerimli denied these accusations. Instead,
he argued that Askerov and the elite to understand that they cannot
always falsify the elections. "Our fight will result in a democratic
change of regime," Kerimli claimed, "Askerov and other members of
the ruling team understand it and therefore worry."
CONCLUSIONS: Ilham Aliyev soberly understood that putting himself in
the same boat with such odious leaders as Lukashenko, Nazarbayev
and Putin would not strengthen his regime nor help Azerbaijan
internationally. In fact, given the relative pluralism in Azerbaijan,
it would increase the risk of making Azerbaijan the next candidate
for revolution.
Hence the president of Azerbaijan began to play the role of
democratic leader in order to insure himself from further pressure
from the Council of Europe, the EU and the United States. By refusing
to recognize Yanukovich, Aliyev sent a persuasive signal to the
West that he was not a member of the club of pro-Russian dictators.
Despite the confrontation between the opposition and the ruling elite,
both sides worked for the benefit and positive image of Azerbaijan. The
Ukrainian opposition will remember the reluctance of Azerbaijan
to acknowledge Yanukovich as president if they come to power. Even
if Yanukovich would come out on top, it will not negatively affect
Azerbaijani-Ukrainian relations. The future Ukrainian president will
not have absolute power and will need to share it with a democratic
parliament. The only negative effect from the Ukrainian standoff
might be a possible deterioration of Azerbaijani relations with
Russia. Aliyev's defiance to follow Putin's policies definitely
annoyed the Russian establishment.
AUTHOR'S BIO Anar Valiyev currently is a Ph.D. student at University
of Louisville, School of Urban and Public Affairs. He holds an MA in
history from Baku State University and an MPA from Indiana University
Bloomington.
--Boundary_(ID_IHjb9UYep0/CVngt8aDPpw)--
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Anar Valiyev
Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
Dec 24 2004
For the last month, the presidential elections in Ukraine captivated
the attention of the world's Mass Media. The stalemate in Kiev
divided the CIS into two camps. While Russia and its satellites
Armenia and Belarus acknowledged Viktor Yanukovich as president,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova took a "wait-and-see" position.
Azerbaijan in particular became a hostage of the differing stances
of Western countries and Russia. Supporting either side in Ukraine
would aggravate Azerbaijan's foreign policy situation. Meanwhile,
the Azerbaijani ruling elite fears a revival of a strong opposition
within the country, which could result in increased pressure for
democratization.
BACKGROUND: The Georgian "rose revolution" made official Baku
uneasy. At the culmination of the Georgian events, Ilham Aliyev's
government sided with president Eduard Shevarnadze, officially
supporting him. Shevarnadze's resignation and his opponent's
triumph was an embarrassment to official Baku, temporarily obscuring
Azerbaijani-Georgian relations.
On the eve of the Ukrainian elections, President Aliyev as well
as the presidents of Belarus and Russia attended the sixtieth
anniversary of Ukraine's liberation from Nazi German occupation. The
event, orchestrated by Russian president Vladimir Putin, was an
indirect support of the Kremlin candidate Ukrainian Prime Minister
Yanukovich. Seeing the financial and administrative resources
controlled by Yanukovich, Aliyev's government expected the victory
of the Kremlin's candidate. After the second round of elections,
it became obvious that Yanukovich would not become president that
easily. Widespread fraud, cheating, and deceptions in the Ukrainian
elections led to a strong disapproval from the the United States and
the European Union. Yet on November 24, the Kremlin acknowledged
Yanukovich as president. Russia's allies in the CIS – Belarus,
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Armenia – recognized Yanukovich as well.
Uzbekistan initially followed suit, though it qualified its stance
subsequently, blaming Russia of intervening in Ukraine's affairs.
Azerbaijan's government decided not to rush with recognition. On
the other hand, the Azerbaijani opposition tried to take advantage
of the Ukrainian revolution. The Musavat party leader Isa Gambar
made a blitz visit to Kiev to support Yushchenko. Upon his return,
Gambar stated that the elections in Ukraine were not just a change
of power. 'This is a new era in the post-Soviet space. The events
in Ukraine will impact all regimes in post-soviet republics.' Gambar
believes in an inevitable collapse of all authoritarian regimes in
the former USSR. The leader of the Azerbaijan National Independence
Party Etibar Mamedov also expressed his assurance that Azerbaijan
would be 'the next country that embraces democracy after Ukraine'.
IMPLICATIONS: Ilham Aliyev is in a difficult position. For the
Azerbaijani president, supporting Yanukovich could have a detrimental
effect. For the last five years, Azerbaijan has established its own
balanced system of strategic relations with the West including the
NATO and the EU. At the same time, Ukraine Azerbaijan's strategic
ally in GUUAM, and has permanently supported the Azerbaijani cause in
international organizations. By allying himself with Russia, Aliyev
would have lost support from the EU, NATO and the United States while
it would have weakened Azerbaijan's respect in the world's democratic
community. In the case of a Yushchenko victory, such a decision could
damage Azerbaijani-Ukrainian relations too. Since 2000, Azerbaijan
has built good and positive relations with Russia. This process has
been strengthened lately. Before the Ukrainian elections, Aliyev's
team thought that it was possible to have good relations with Russia
while being loyal to the West at the same time. But the Ukrainian
elections required Azerbaijan to make a crucial decision. Despite
increased pressure from Russia, Baku decided to wait for the end of
the standoff in Ukraine.
The Ukrainian "orange revolution" has implications for Azerbaijan's
domestic affairs as well. Since October 16, 2003, the opposition
parties remain in an amorphous condition. In the last year, the
activities of major opposition parties have shrunk. But the Ukrainian
wind of change woke up the Azerbaijani opposition from its slumber.
Obviously, the revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia are very attractive
for Azerbaijani opposition parties, which failed to do the same in
October 2003. The last opposition activities show that the opposing
parties are considering various possibilities to use Georgia's
and Ukraine's experience in Azerbaijan. Despite the ruling elite's
reluctance to support Yanukovich, it is unsettled by democratic changes
in neighboring countries. The current government of Azerbaijan would
rather prefer somebody like Yanukovich rather than any leader who
came to power on a revolutionary wave. The current elite is still
cautious toward the new regime in Georgia. In particular, the ruling
elite fears the establishment of a youth opposition movement like
the Georgian Kmara or the Ukrainian Pora. President Aliyev recently
commented on the Azerbaijani opposition's contacts with Yushchenko:
"They join demonstrations in foreign countries with ribbons on their
neck. Let them do the same here. If someone is brave enough, he could
tie a ribbon or something else on the neck and stage a demonstration
here." On December 3, Ziyafet Askerov, vice-speaker of the Azerbaijani
parliament, accused Ali Kerimli, the leader of the Popular Front Party
of Azerbaijan of attempting a coup d'etat. He stated that according
to intelligence information, the Ukrainian youth organization Pora
finances Kerimli's party in order to repeat the Georgian and Ukrainian
scenario in Azerbaijan. Kerimli denied these accusations. Instead,
he argued that Askerov and the elite to understand that they cannot
always falsify the elections. "Our fight will result in a democratic
change of regime," Kerimli claimed, "Askerov and other members of
the ruling team understand it and therefore worry."
CONCLUSIONS: Ilham Aliyev soberly understood that putting himself in
the same boat with such odious leaders as Lukashenko, Nazarbayev
and Putin would not strengthen his regime nor help Azerbaijan
internationally. In fact, given the relative pluralism in Azerbaijan,
it would increase the risk of making Azerbaijan the next candidate
for revolution.
Hence the president of Azerbaijan began to play the role of
democratic leader in order to insure himself from further pressure
from the Council of Europe, the EU and the United States. By refusing
to recognize Yanukovich, Aliyev sent a persuasive signal to the
West that he was not a member of the club of pro-Russian dictators.
Despite the confrontation between the opposition and the ruling elite,
both sides worked for the benefit and positive image of Azerbaijan. The
Ukrainian opposition will remember the reluctance of Azerbaijan
to acknowledge Yanukovich as president if they come to power. Even
if Yanukovich would come out on top, it will not negatively affect
Azerbaijani-Ukrainian relations. The future Ukrainian president will
not have absolute power and will need to share it with a democratic
parliament. The only negative effect from the Ukrainian standoff
might be a possible deterioration of Azerbaijani relations with
Russia. Aliyev's defiance to follow Putin's policies definitely
annoyed the Russian establishment.
AUTHOR'S BIO Anar Valiyev currently is a Ph.D. student at University
of Louisville, School of Urban and Public Affairs. He holds an MA in
history from Baku State University and an MPA from Indiana University
Bloomington.
--Boundary_(ID_IHjb9UYep0/CVngt8aDPpw)--
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress