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  • Democracy in the Former Soviet Union: 1991-2004

    PINR - The Power and Interest News Report
    Dec 28 2004

    ''Democracy in the Former Soviet Union: 1991-2004''

    Over the last decade and a half, an unprecedented initiative has
    taken place in the Former Soviet Union (F.S.U.). In all 15 republics
    that made up the U.S.S.R., the introduction of Western-style liberal
    democracy and its principles became the dominant political modus
    operandi since 1991. Today, it is useful to assess the initial
    results of this important development, and draw conclusions in order
    to gauge the significance of such a profound change. The overall
    outcome of democracy's introduction has been very mixed, and although
    a few success stories exist, the rest of the process has quickly
    fallen prey to old habits that refuse to part with the past.

    Democracy as a Political Tool

    The introduction of democracy to the F.S.U. itself has taken place in
    an unprecedented environment of unipolarity, with the dominant
    Western democratic United States as the most powerful state in the
    world -- politically, economically and militarily. Never before in
    known history has there been a single state that could wield such an
    incredible amount of power, nor has there ever been a state that was
    so secure geopolitically in its preeminent place among the world's
    nations. Even the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a
    limited dampening effect on the United States, as its economy and
    society rebounded within a year after the strikes.

    U.S. actions since 1991 can be characterized as the logical course of
    action in a unipolar world, moving from a mix of unilateral and
    multilateral approaches towards a more unilateral stance on issues
    that involved the safety and security of the country. While the
    United States could consider itself safer in a new unipolar world
    than ever before, it still required the absence of potentially
    threatening political/military entities. Ensuring that states shared
    Western norms and values became one of the main U.S. policies in the
    post-1991 world. The spread of democracy in the newly independent
    states of the F.S.U. was a key way to counter any potential
    neo-Soviet entity from emerging and challenging America. The key
    belief underlying the policy that promotes democracy is the notion
    that liberal democratic states do not threaten each other the way
    pairs of non-liberal states do. Historically, since the early 19th
    century, democratic states enjoyed pacific, fruitful and secure
    relations.

    This has certainly been the case between the United States and its
    European and Asian allies during the Cold War. The demise of the
    Soviet Union presented Washington with an unprecedented opportunity
    -- to introduce the concept of democracy and a market economy to its
    former enemy. Such a policy worked once before, when the United
    States fostered and built Western liberal democracies in defeated
    Germany and Japan after WWII. At present these nations are U.S.
    allies and trade partners, though they can still disagree on certain
    political and economic issues.

    In 1991, U.S. policymakers considered an option that if all 15 states
    of the F.S.U. were to become democratic, then the only possible
    threat they could present to the United States would be in economic
    terms, and not military/ideological ones. If democracy were to take
    root in these countries, then the U.S. position around the world
    would be further solidified as the leader of the market-oriented,
    pacific liberal democracy.

    In hindsight, such a concept made political and economic sense.
    Soviet people, starved for political freedom, eagerly embraced
    democratic values in the first years after the fall of the U.S.S.R.
    The majority of the population had vague concepts of how democracy
    should really work, but there was hope that once the democratic
    "flood gates" would open, the ensuing flow of political freedoms
    would usher in a new order of the day.

    What did not happen from the start, and what is only now slowly
    becoming apparent, is that civil society in the F.S.U. lacked proper
    education on even basic democratic principles. Newly found political
    freedom roughly translated into free elections for the majority of
    the people, but they knew next to nothing about other principles that
    are so crucial to a vibrant, working democracy. The importance of
    properly prepared civil society was demonstrated repeatedly in U.S.
    and U.N. efforts at establishing the rule of law in post conflict
    societies around the world after 1991. In countries as diverse as
    East Timor and Bosnia, properly prepared civil society was the
    keystone that determined the success or failure of a given
    international mission. Its importance was crucial to the F.S.U. as
    well, but there, democracy became a process that was largely
    instituted from the top-down, with the masses sidelined in crucial
    decision-making or policy-setting agendas.

    Almost all of the former Soviet states had a long and rich history of
    autocratic executive rule. The notion of parliamentary-style
    democracy, with checks and balances on the executive, legislative and
    judicial branches of government, was a totally foreign and unfamiliar
    concept. While many Soviet people for decades secretly wished for
    their authoritarian Communist government to either fall or change,
    most had no idea what would be able to effectively replace it. The
    ephemeral concept of free elections, proportionate representation and
    a leadership responsible to the people was just that -- a desired
    notion with no real grounding in the immediate post-Soviet reality.

    Soviet people were used to the mass showcasing of their collective
    desires, as millions would take to the streets in
    government-organized demonstrations during Soviet rule. Many tapped
    into that "training" during the democratic protests in 1991 and 1993,
    when reactionary political challenges threatened the slowly emerging
    democratic societies. Yet, one of the key concepts of Western
    democracy was not properly introduced -- that of the elected
    leadership's responsibility to its electorate. Used to trusting and
    relying on non-elected Communist officials for decades, millions of
    former Soviet people carried this "trust" with them into the new and
    unknown post-1991 era. Thus, the F.S.U.-style mix of new
    "democracies" that emerged on the international arena are as
    different from each other as they are from the Western world.

    Present Political Picture

    Three of the most Western-leaning states in the F.S.U. were the
    fastest to shed their Soviet "skin" to launch the process of
    democratic reorganization. Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania spent the
    least amount of time in the U.S.S.R., as the three states were
    absorbed by Moscow only in 1940. While five decades of Soviet rule
    had a tremendous effect, these Baltic states were part and parcel of
    Northern Europe, itself a democratic area for a long time.

    Even during Soviet rule, these three states stood apart from the rest
    of the republics socially, economically and historically. And while
    numerous post-Soviet problems still remain to be solved, these states
    have been more successful at becoming Westernized. Their refusal to
    associate with the past is exemplified by their desire not to be part
    of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a loose political
    affiliation of the former Soviet republics with Russia at its center.

    Consequently, countries with culturally engrained importance of
    authority had the most difficult time making the transition to fully
    functioning Western-style democracy. Central Asian republics
    exemplify this trend -- only one out of the five states has elected a
    new head of state after 1991. Three of them -- Kazakhstan,
    Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan -- are headed by the men who were in
    charge of these republics in Soviet times. Having changed their
    titles from the first secretary of the communist party to prime
    minister/president was largely the extent of democracy in these
    states.

    Tajikistan experienced a vicious civil war from 1992-1996, and Russia
    is effectively keeping the country together with economic and
    military influence. Only Kyrgyzstan has experienced a relatively fair
    and peaceful transition to democratic rule. The power of the
    executive in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is
    disproportionately stronger vis-à-vis real or perceived opposition.
    There, ruling communist parties and functionaries, in charge of the
    state's economy and finances, quickly reorganized themselves,
    assuming new titles draped in nationalistic flags. "New" political
    entities appeared virtually overnight. Yet, whatever civil groups and
    political opposition that slowly developed in the last decade of
    Soviet rule quickly found itself sidelined and incapacitated,
    existing as a showcase of a "multi-party" political system.

    Historically, autocratic rulers have governed the lands of Central
    Asia. Tribal and clan connections still play a significant role in
    the political, social and economic interactions amongst the
    populations, but are now effectively utilized to maintain the ruling
    elite in power, not to successfully mobilize any significant
    opposition. Turkmenistan stands apart even amongst other Central
    Asian republics in the degree to which the executive has a dominant
    role in the country. Its leader has cultivated a Stalin-like cult of
    personality, wiping out any hint of opposition to his autocratic
    rule. According to Turkmenistan's leadership, the people are not yet
    ready for real democratic reforms, and will be potentially granted
    that opportunity in the yet-to-be-determined future.

    While neighboring countries point to the near-extreme situation in
    Turkmenistan, no real opposition can successfully challenge the
    executive in those states either. In Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the
    executive branch has overwhelming power that maintains a nominal
    existence of opposition that is capable of mounting only limited
    political challenges.

    Belarus is closer on the authoritarian scale to Turkmenistan than any
    other post-Soviet state. Its leader retains a firm hold on the
    political, social and economic life of the country. Just recently,
    Belorussians "freely" voted the government of President Alexander
    Lukashenka in for the third consecutive term. Much can be said about
    a country where the security apparatus is still called the K.G.B., as
    it was during the Soviet days, and where opposition is silenced
    through physical intimidation.

    While Lukashenka himself was elected to office democratically in the
    first years of post-1991 political freedoms, he has since done
    everything possible to not allow real democratic reforms and
    principles to take root. While the people can hold small-scale
    protests against the government, they can do little else against a
    strong security apparatus with carte blanche from the capital. A
    similar situation exists in Armenia, where a democratically elected
    executive allows for opposition to exercise its rights, yet retains a
    firm hold on the country's political, economic and military
    decision-making. While Armenia does have a capable civil society, it
    is many years away from achieving its full potential that would be
    able to effectively mount a challenge to the wide-reaching
    presidential powers.

    Azerbaijan and Moldova have also experienced a limited amount of
    democratic freedoms, but there the changes have been handed from the
    top down, and no capable challenge can be mounted to the executive
    powers. In Azerbaijan, power recently passed from Aliyev-senior, in
    charge of the republic in Soviet times, to his son, Aliyev-younger,
    in one of the few such power transfers around the world. This type of
    regime change can hardly be characterized as democratic, and yet
    Azerbaijan is considered a multi-party democracy.

    Profits from oil sales strengthen Aliyev's hold on power, a situation
    not likely to be challenged in the near future. Azeri opposition is
    also kept in check, even as it tries to vocalize its discontent for
    the ruling elite. Moldova remains split between the secessionist,
    Russian-speaking, authoritarian Trans-Dniester region and the rest of
    the country. Democracy did not usher in a peaceful post-Soviet
    transition -- in fact, a secessionist civil war started as soon as
    the country became independent from the Soviet Union and embarked on
    the process of Westernization. While there are attempts to finally
    unify the country, the process has stalled time and time again due to
    mistrust that both sides -- especially non-Western Trans-Dniester --
    feel for each other.

    Future Trendsetters?

    The progress of democratic reforms in the last three post-Soviet
    states merits much closer attention, as these states are now setting
    the trend for the possible future course of post-Soviet democracy. In
    Russia, vibrant civil society exists, born in the Soviet times of
    political repression and reared in the last fifteen years of
    non-Communist rule. Numerous citizens' groups and political parties
    make themselves heard on a daily basis on a variety of issues. Some
    civil society groups have even thrown a gauntlet to the government,
    openly defying the military draft that sent soldiers into the
    prolonged and bloody Chechen conflict. Yet, currently, even such
    valiant efforts fall short of effecting real political change.

    Democratic reforms in the Russian Federation have gone to great
    lengths to strengthen the executive, first as a post-1991 safety
    alternative against resurgent communist and nationalist trends, then
    as the only viable option capable of holding the country together.
    Once-vibrant political opposition in Russia has seen its real power
    diminish over the last seven years. Pro-executive political parties
    now enjoy overwhelming support, with Russia becoming a one-party
    state where President Vladimir Putin controls the media, as well as
    economic, military and political processes. On the surface, Russia is
    perhaps the only state where political processes resemble those of
    Western Europe or the United States. In reality, Putin's political
    party enjoys the preponderance of power that is unlikely to be
    effectively challenged in the near future.

    At present, there are only two post-Soviet states where real
    democracy has a chance of limited success. At the end of 2003, the
    people of Georgia gave their government a strong vote of no
    confidence after a decade of corruption, crime, civil wars and
    declining living standards. Following mass non-violent protests, they
    peacefully forced the executive out of office in what came to be
    known as the "Rose Revolution." The new, young, Western-oriented
    leadership promised wide-ranging reforms aimed at reaching Georgia's
    full economic, political and social potential.

    Georgians exported their experience to Ukraine, where a repeat of
    2003 is currently taking place, with the third round of presidential
    elections most likely to usher in pro-Western Viktor Yuschenko as the
    new leader of the country. In Ukraine, people went out into the
    streets to protest the bitterly divisive presidential elections that
    were marred by massive voting irregularities in favor of the
    incumbent leadership aiming for closer ties to Russia. Ukrainian
    civil society showcased its persistence, with month-long protests
    taking place in Ukraine's major cities.

    As in Georgia, the democratic opposition was able to mobilize itself
    to the extent not seen in the post-Soviet republics since the August
    1991 hardliners' coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.
    While the third voting round will be able to bring the democratic
    opposition to power, it will be faced with the gargantuan task of
    unifying a country that was virtually split in half by somewhat
    diverse visions of Ukraine's future in the F.S.U. and the world.
    While Georgians and Ukrainians were capable of efficiently mobilizing
    and channeling their opposition fervor, it is unlikely that similar
    protests can be held in other former Soviet republics to remove the
    entrenched executives from positions of power.

    Conclusion

    The concept of democracy was introduced into the F.S.U. with
    extremely varying results. By 2004, some states became one-party
    autocratic systems with only a semblance of opposition. Such states
    have multi-party parliaments and revised constitutions, while the
    real power rests with former communist apparatchiks. Other states
    walk the thin line between a one-party state and potential
    multi-party democratic systems.

    Still, others have been able to make the transition and to
    approximate Western-style democracy as much as possible. These select
    few states experienced revolutions "from below," when the people rose
    in popular revolt against corrupt governments, challenging the
    "top-bottom" distribution of power and political freedom. All 15
    post-Soviet states are official democracies. Thus, the U.S. goal of
    democracy promotion in the F.S.U. can be considered successful, with
    major caveats to that explanation.

    While the U.S. was capable of steering certain democratic processes
    to their rightful conclusions -- such as offering support for
    opposition in Georgia, Ukraine and in 1991-1996 Russia -- the process
    of democratization was left to its own, local devices in many other
    newly independent states. American interests of the day dictated the
    course of action, such as the need for Central Asian military bases
    after 2001 or access to oil reserves, often moving the plight of
    democracy to the political background. As a result, the uneven spread
    of democracy in the F.S.U. created a collection of pacific states
    vis-à-vis their policies towards the United States. Nominally or
    fully democratic, they are in no position to challenge Washington
    effectively. On the other hand, they all can be courted or considered
    as allies, based on American foreign policy needs.

    The last decade and a half brought momentous changes to large parts
    of the globe. While many of these changes were positive, the U.S. has
    not been successful in fostering and aiding civil society capable of
    making educated and informed decisions in many former Soviet states.
    Instead, it acquiesced to "democratic" changes handed from the top by
    governments and executives associated with old and fallen regimes.
    Thus, a new brand of post-Soviet democracy was created. It is yet
    unclear how the future development of such democracy will unfold.
    However, it would be prudent of the U.S. government to take the
    lessons of post-Soviet political transitions into consideration as it
    continues to promote political processes in diverse regions of the
    Middle East and South Asia that are historically unprepared to bring
    the concept of democracy to Western-style fruition.

    Report Drafted By:
    Yevgeny Bendersky



    The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
    publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide
    insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around
    the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and
    interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This
    report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the
    written permission of [email protected]. All comments should be
    directed to [email protected].

    http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=249&la nguage_id=1

    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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