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Armenia: The Crush of Global Pressures
December 28, 2004 1815 GMT
Summary
The former Soviet republic of Armenia, located at the crushing center
of a series of geopolitical tectonic plates, is on the cusp of a
massive change. But unlike many of the other former Soviet republics
that are choosing between Russia and the West, Armenia's choice is not
nearly as clear-cut -- and its future will be free of the decisive
paths that may be available to other states.
Analysis
Armenia is a former Soviet republic in trouble. Its economy holds
little prospect, its people are leaving in droves and its geopolitical
space is under siege. The one factor that has helped it keep its head
above water to date is Russian sponsorship. But, as Russia racks up
geopolitical defeats, that too could soon give way.
The South Caucasus that Armenians call home is where the Russian,
Turkish and Iranian geopolitical plates converge, putting the small
states there under enormous -- and continuous -- pressure. Georgia and
Azerbaijan have opted to look not just to Turkey next door, but also
to Europe and the United States. Such connections make Iran --
clerical regime or not -- hostile to both states, a factor that is
only enflamed when one considers that nearly a quarter of Iran's
population is actually of Azerbaijani ethnicity.
Armenia, for reasons of war, history, and the 1915 Armenian Genocide
by the Turks, naturally looks to Iran, and especially similarly
Orthodox Christian Russia to counterbalance itself against its hostile
eastern and western neighbors.
Under the Soviet system, Armenia received its oil from Azerbaijan and
traded (as part of the Soviet Union) with Turkey. As the Soviet era
ended, however, Armenia became embroiled in a war with Azerbaijan over
the fate of Nogorno-Karabakh, a majority Armenian enclave within
Azerbaijani territory. Armenia -- or if you believe Yerevan's public
relations, Armenian volunteers supporting the Karabakh Armenians --
won the war and continues to control a large western slice of
Azerbaijani territory contingent to it. But Turks, who consider
Azerbaijanis their ethnic kin based on historical, ethnic and
linguistic grounds, slapped on a near-total embargo, limiting
Armenia's trade options to only Georgia to the north and Iran to the
south.
Armenia has refused to negotiate down from this untenable geopolitical
position. After winning the Nogorno-Karabakh war, Armenian leaders --
backed by a fiery nationalism that is quite popular among Armenians
within both the country and the diaspora -- have refused to seriously
negotiate a peace agreement with Azerbaijan that might end the
military standoff.
To be fair, the Azerbaijanis have not exactly been extending olive
branches either, but Baku believes that ultimately its oil and natural
gas revenues will allow it to build up a military force capable of
recapturing its lost territory. It likely is correct. Armenia, on the
other hand, is an economic basket case dependent upon diaspora support
for one-fifth of its gross domestic product. Nearly one-third of
Armenians have emigrated abroad to look for better opportunities since
independence in 1991, the sharpest population decline anywhere in the
world. Only three million remain. There are eight million Azerbaijanis
and 69 million Turks.
To sustain its political and military positions, Armenia largely is
dependent upon Russia, as the source of nearly all of its energy and
its de facto security guarantor. Russia's commitment to the Armenian
relationship will soon begin to falter, and with it, quite possibly
Armenia's chances for survival.
The dawning problem is one that Armenian President Robert Kocharian
has foreseen. In October 1999 there was a paramilitary attack against
the Armenian Parliament that resulted in the deaths of several members
of the country's mostly pro-Russian political faction; Russia took
advantage of the situation to send special forces troops in and cement
its political influence in the small country. The attack and Moscow's
reaction to it shook Kocharian's view of the Russians as a dependable
ally. After all, if the Russians could not prevent its most ardent
supporters from harm, and would take advantage of Armenian instability
to strengthen its grip, was Russian protection really worth it?
Kocharian, always a moderate on the issue of Russia, began quietly
reaching out to other potential power centers in an attempt to balance
foreign interests in Yerevan.
But the coming crisis has little to do with Armenian desires of
balance, and everything to do with a new world being forced upon the
small country. In 2005 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline will
activate, and within two years its sister project, the Shah Deniz
natural gas pipeline, will most likely also enter operation. The two
parallel lines will transport Azerbaijani energy west through Georgia
and Turkey and then on to global markets. Azerbaijan and Georgia will
then be getting all of their energy needs from the two projects and
will no longer need to import any energy from Russia's Caucasian
network.
Once that happens, Armenia will no longer be able to depend upon
Russian deliveries. On one hand, the economics of maintaining the
network of supplying Armenia -- which does not even border Russia --
are questionable unless Russia can also ship petroleum to Azerbaijan
and Georgia. Economies of scale and all that.
More importantly, the Georgians are not particularly fond of Russians.
Once they have a reliable alternative to the purchase of Russian
natural gas, they are very likely -- just as the Moldovans,
Ukrainians, Belarusians and Transdnesiterians have done before them --
to siphon supplies bound for elsewhere (i.e. Armenia) from the Russian
supply line that crosses their territory. That will put Russia in the
awkward position of either subsidizing a geopolitical foe, or cutting
off supplies to Armenia to spite Georgia.
Even worse than the energy issue, Georgia may soon be causing problems
for Russia's military deployment in Armenia. Already Georgian
authorities -- with full Western support -- are blocking Russia from
resupplying and rotating new troops into its Georgian military base in
Akhalkalaki near the Armenian border. Once the Russians are forced out
of Akhalkalaki, as seems likely, it will become an open question
whether Tbilisi will impinge upon Russia's ability to keep its
Armenian forces supplied.
Either way Russia's most significant contributions to Armenian
security are about to fall into jeopardy, and, fate in the Caucasus
being a fickle thing, the Armenians must plan accordingly.
Armenia is preparing for a possible future without Russian sponsorship
in two ways. First, it is looking to its other traditional backer,
Iran, to fill the gap. The Armenians and the Iranians already are
putting together an alternative natural gas supply line to keep the
lights on in Yerevan. Unlike Russia, Iran actually borders Armenia, so
maintaining a new network is not an overburdening expense. Unlike the
massive trans-Caucasus network that connects Armenia to Russia, the
Iranian-Armenian project only requires a mere $30 million, 26-mile
pipe linking the countries' networks together.
But Iran can never be Russia: their cultures are too dissimilar and,
unlike Russia, Iran lacks the ability to project power in a way that
might dissuade Azerbaijan or Turkey from working against Armenia. Iran
favors Armenia over its Shiite compatriots in Azerbaijan because it is
concerned about maintaining supremacy over the Turkic minority within
its own country and as a lever to keep Azerbaijan and Turkey
physically separated. It is a relationship based upon mutual interest,
but unlike Azerbaijan and its Turkish sponsor, the two are not willing
to sacrifice anything -- certainly not blood -- for each other. Even
if they wanted to, their military projection capabilities are
questionable to say the least.
Military intimidation in the Caspian is something that has already
backfired horrendously on the Iranians. In 2001, Iran fired warning
shots at Baku-based ships prospecting near the Iranian-Azerbaijani sea
border. Turkey responded by helping Azerbaijan host military
exercises. When it was over, several advanced fighter jets, complete
with Turkish pilots, remained behind.
Undercutting the commitment of the gas line, Iran is even working to
pipe some Turkmen gas to the Armenian market so that should Armenia
default on its energy debts -- as it has in the past -- Iran will be
left holding the transit fees, but Turkmenistan the energy bill.
Second, Armenia is extending Washington a tentative hand, and what
better way to do it than to support the current administration's
primary international project? On Dec. 4, the Armenian Parliament
voted to empower Kocharian to send a small team -- 46 support
personnel -- to participate in the Iraqi occupation coalition. The
contingent will not be seeing any combat, and the entire affair has
been carefully orchestrated (with the United States paying for the
whole thing).
This puts Armenia on the long list of former Soviet republics and
clients which have sought to trade the Kremlin for the West: Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia,
Serbia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and most recently -- and loudly --
Ukraine.
Unlike all of these states, however, Armenia cannot fully choose the
Western path.
Armenia, unlike the states aforementioned states, is not
geographically proximate to the Western states. And unlike Azerbaijan
and Georgia (who share this characteristic), Armenia has no oil
(unlike Azerbaijan) and has missed out on its chance to be a transit
route that could ship petroleum westward (unlike Georgia).
Moreover, for Armenia to truly make a go at Westernizing, it would
have to bury the hatchet with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which would mean,
at a minimum, withdrawing the bulk of its forces -- volunteers -- from
internationally-recognized Azerbaijani territory. In addition to that
being a non-starter at home, it would enrage the Armenian diaspora,
endangering the one international advantage that Armenia enjoys; the
diaspora's economic support is the only thing that keeps the Armenian
economy in its pseudo-functional shape.
This commits Armenia to strategic ambiguity out of circumstance rather
than design. Russia is being cut off, the West is for all practical
purposes out of reach, and Iran is so fundamentally different that
though Armenia can be a good neighbor it could never really be a
client. Winds of change are blowing in Armenia. Russia is more
strategically distant than ever, and the West's strategy of triggering
soft revolutions a la Georgia and Ukraine has proven reliable.
Armenia's next presidential elections are in 2006.
Winds of change are blowing in Armenia; it is not clear whether
Armenia will survive them.
Armenia: The Crush of Global Pressures
December 28, 2004 1815 GMT
Summary
The former Soviet republic of Armenia, located at the crushing center
of a series of geopolitical tectonic plates, is on the cusp of a
massive change. But unlike many of the other former Soviet republics
that are choosing between Russia and the West, Armenia's choice is not
nearly as clear-cut -- and its future will be free of the decisive
paths that may be available to other states.
Analysis
Armenia is a former Soviet republic in trouble. Its economy holds
little prospect, its people are leaving in droves and its geopolitical
space is under siege. The one factor that has helped it keep its head
above water to date is Russian sponsorship. But, as Russia racks up
geopolitical defeats, that too could soon give way.
The South Caucasus that Armenians call home is where the Russian,
Turkish and Iranian geopolitical plates converge, putting the small
states there under enormous -- and continuous -- pressure. Georgia and
Azerbaijan have opted to look not just to Turkey next door, but also
to Europe and the United States. Such connections make Iran --
clerical regime or not -- hostile to both states, a factor that is
only enflamed when one considers that nearly a quarter of Iran's
population is actually of Azerbaijani ethnicity.
Armenia, for reasons of war, history, and the 1915 Armenian Genocide
by the Turks, naturally looks to Iran, and especially similarly
Orthodox Christian Russia to counterbalance itself against its hostile
eastern and western neighbors.
Under the Soviet system, Armenia received its oil from Azerbaijan and
traded (as part of the Soviet Union) with Turkey. As the Soviet era
ended, however, Armenia became embroiled in a war with Azerbaijan over
the fate of Nogorno-Karabakh, a majority Armenian enclave within
Azerbaijani territory. Armenia -- or if you believe Yerevan's public
relations, Armenian volunteers supporting the Karabakh Armenians --
won the war and continues to control a large western slice of
Azerbaijani territory contingent to it. But Turks, who consider
Azerbaijanis their ethnic kin based on historical, ethnic and
linguistic grounds, slapped on a near-total embargo, limiting
Armenia's trade options to only Georgia to the north and Iran to the
south.
Armenia has refused to negotiate down from this untenable geopolitical
position. After winning the Nogorno-Karabakh war, Armenian leaders --
backed by a fiery nationalism that is quite popular among Armenians
within both the country and the diaspora -- have refused to seriously
negotiate a peace agreement with Azerbaijan that might end the
military standoff.
To be fair, the Azerbaijanis have not exactly been extending olive
branches either, but Baku believes that ultimately its oil and natural
gas revenues will allow it to build up a military force capable of
recapturing its lost territory. It likely is correct. Armenia, on the
other hand, is an economic basket case dependent upon diaspora support
for one-fifth of its gross domestic product. Nearly one-third of
Armenians have emigrated abroad to look for better opportunities since
independence in 1991, the sharpest population decline anywhere in the
world. Only three million remain. There are eight million Azerbaijanis
and 69 million Turks.
To sustain its political and military positions, Armenia largely is
dependent upon Russia, as the source of nearly all of its energy and
its de facto security guarantor. Russia's commitment to the Armenian
relationship will soon begin to falter, and with it, quite possibly
Armenia's chances for survival.
The dawning problem is one that Armenian President Robert Kocharian
has foreseen. In October 1999 there was a paramilitary attack against
the Armenian Parliament that resulted in the deaths of several members
of the country's mostly pro-Russian political faction; Russia took
advantage of the situation to send special forces troops in and cement
its political influence in the small country. The attack and Moscow's
reaction to it shook Kocharian's view of the Russians as a dependable
ally. After all, if the Russians could not prevent its most ardent
supporters from harm, and would take advantage of Armenian instability
to strengthen its grip, was Russian protection really worth it?
Kocharian, always a moderate on the issue of Russia, began quietly
reaching out to other potential power centers in an attempt to balance
foreign interests in Yerevan.
But the coming crisis has little to do with Armenian desires of
balance, and everything to do with a new world being forced upon the
small country. In 2005 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline will
activate, and within two years its sister project, the Shah Deniz
natural gas pipeline, will most likely also enter operation. The two
parallel lines will transport Azerbaijani energy west through Georgia
and Turkey and then on to global markets. Azerbaijan and Georgia will
then be getting all of their energy needs from the two projects and
will no longer need to import any energy from Russia's Caucasian
network.
Once that happens, Armenia will no longer be able to depend upon
Russian deliveries. On one hand, the economics of maintaining the
network of supplying Armenia -- which does not even border Russia --
are questionable unless Russia can also ship petroleum to Azerbaijan
and Georgia. Economies of scale and all that.
More importantly, the Georgians are not particularly fond of Russians.
Once they have a reliable alternative to the purchase of Russian
natural gas, they are very likely -- just as the Moldovans,
Ukrainians, Belarusians and Transdnesiterians have done before them --
to siphon supplies bound for elsewhere (i.e. Armenia) from the Russian
supply line that crosses their territory. That will put Russia in the
awkward position of either subsidizing a geopolitical foe, or cutting
off supplies to Armenia to spite Georgia.
Even worse than the energy issue, Georgia may soon be causing problems
for Russia's military deployment in Armenia. Already Georgian
authorities -- with full Western support -- are blocking Russia from
resupplying and rotating new troops into its Georgian military base in
Akhalkalaki near the Armenian border. Once the Russians are forced out
of Akhalkalaki, as seems likely, it will become an open question
whether Tbilisi will impinge upon Russia's ability to keep its
Armenian forces supplied.
Either way Russia's most significant contributions to Armenian
security are about to fall into jeopardy, and, fate in the Caucasus
being a fickle thing, the Armenians must plan accordingly.
Armenia is preparing for a possible future without Russian sponsorship
in two ways. First, it is looking to its other traditional backer,
Iran, to fill the gap. The Armenians and the Iranians already are
putting together an alternative natural gas supply line to keep the
lights on in Yerevan. Unlike Russia, Iran actually borders Armenia, so
maintaining a new network is not an overburdening expense. Unlike the
massive trans-Caucasus network that connects Armenia to Russia, the
Iranian-Armenian project only requires a mere $30 million, 26-mile
pipe linking the countries' networks together.
But Iran can never be Russia: their cultures are too dissimilar and,
unlike Russia, Iran lacks the ability to project power in a way that
might dissuade Azerbaijan or Turkey from working against Armenia. Iran
favors Armenia over its Shiite compatriots in Azerbaijan because it is
concerned about maintaining supremacy over the Turkic minority within
its own country and as a lever to keep Azerbaijan and Turkey
physically separated. It is a relationship based upon mutual interest,
but unlike Azerbaijan and its Turkish sponsor, the two are not willing
to sacrifice anything -- certainly not blood -- for each other. Even
if they wanted to, their military projection capabilities are
questionable to say the least.
Military intimidation in the Caspian is something that has already
backfired horrendously on the Iranians. In 2001, Iran fired warning
shots at Baku-based ships prospecting near the Iranian-Azerbaijani sea
border. Turkey responded by helping Azerbaijan host military
exercises. When it was over, several advanced fighter jets, complete
with Turkish pilots, remained behind.
Undercutting the commitment of the gas line, Iran is even working to
pipe some Turkmen gas to the Armenian market so that should Armenia
default on its energy debts -- as it has in the past -- Iran will be
left holding the transit fees, but Turkmenistan the energy bill.
Second, Armenia is extending Washington a tentative hand, and what
better way to do it than to support the current administration's
primary international project? On Dec. 4, the Armenian Parliament
voted to empower Kocharian to send a small team -- 46 support
personnel -- to participate in the Iraqi occupation coalition. The
contingent will not be seeing any combat, and the entire affair has
been carefully orchestrated (with the United States paying for the
whole thing).
This puts Armenia on the long list of former Soviet republics and
clients which have sought to trade the Kremlin for the West: Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia,
Serbia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and most recently -- and loudly --
Ukraine.
Unlike all of these states, however, Armenia cannot fully choose the
Western path.
Armenia, unlike the states aforementioned states, is not
geographically proximate to the Western states. And unlike Azerbaijan
and Georgia (who share this characteristic), Armenia has no oil
(unlike Azerbaijan) and has missed out on its chance to be a transit
route that could ship petroleum westward (unlike Georgia).
Moreover, for Armenia to truly make a go at Westernizing, it would
have to bury the hatchet with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which would mean,
at a minimum, withdrawing the bulk of its forces -- volunteers -- from
internationally-recognized Azerbaijani territory. In addition to that
being a non-starter at home, it would enrage the Armenian diaspora,
endangering the one international advantage that Armenia enjoys; the
diaspora's economic support is the only thing that keeps the Armenian
economy in its pseudo-functional shape.
This commits Armenia to strategic ambiguity out of circumstance rather
than design. Russia is being cut off, the West is for all practical
purposes out of reach, and Iran is so fundamentally different that
though Armenia can be a good neighbor it could never really be a
client. Winds of change are blowing in Armenia. Russia is more
strategically distant than ever, and the West's strategy of triggering
soft revolutions a la Georgia and Ukraine has proven reliable.
Armenia's next presidential elections are in 2006.
Winds of change are blowing in Armenia; it is not clear whether
Armenia will survive them.