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What the Papers Say. Part B (Russia)
July 9, 2004, Friday
NATO: MOVING FROM THE BALTIC STATES TO THE CAUCASUS
SOURCE: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 25, July 9-15, 2004, pp.
1, 3
by Colonel Anatoly Tsyganok, Professor of the Academy of Military
Sciences
The latest NATO summit ended in Istanbul on June 29. The major issues
on the agenda were as follows: Iraq (how efforts can be pooled),
Afghanistan (how military might can be boosted), the Balkans (how to
have the European Union take over), and the preliminary results of
NATO expansion. The Russia-NATO Council met within the framework of
the summit. The meeting but enumerated the problems accumulated
between the partners without so much as an attempts to solve them.
Solution to the problem was postponed. The problems will be handled
on a different level at a different time.
As for Iraq, Washington and London demanded deployment of NATO troops
there. Leaders of France, Germany, and Turkey refused to have the
issue phrased in this manner, and participation in the coalition in
Iraq was left up to the individual countries, something every NATO
member state is to decide for itself. Neither did the summit support
the United States in the matter of training specialists for the Iraqi
army. In other words, tension and discord within the Alliance
remained a hard fact of life.
The summit voted to increase the NATO contingent in Afghanistan from
6,500 to 10,000. There are additional reports, however, indicating
that Washington intends to up its contingents attached to Central
Asian bases by 12,000 servicemen who are to be withdrawn from South
Korea.
The summit supported the assumption that NATO leaders still regard
Russia as a sort of "truncated USSR" even despite the almost 11 years
since the "Russian bourgeois revolution" of October 1993. The
impression is that documents for every new summit are prepared on the
basis of hopelessly outdated instructions.
NATO neophytes - the Baltic states particularly - are fast learners
and as such get the message. That is why Russia's suggestions
concerning the adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
were not noticed by NATO leaders. On the other hand, had the Duma
ratified the document, say, half a year before the summit and not on
the eve of it, it would have enabled Russia to maneuver before the
summit and given it an ace for negotiations at the summit itself.
NATO leaders were quite tough and adamant on the subject of
withdrawing Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova. Moscow was
strongly recommended to keep its promises to the OSCE summit in
Istanbul. Moreover, ratification of the modified Treaty on
Conventional Arms in Europe was tied in with Russian withdrawal
commitments. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called this approach
incorrect because "political agreements did not set the deadline."
Moreover, these days there are new threats and challenges on the
southern borders of the Russian Federation, the ones that were absent
in the past. The matter concerns the possibility of missile launches
from the Iranian direction and expansion of the Islamic terrorism.
That is why interests of national security in the direction of the
Caucasus require Russian military presence in the region and a
considerable reinforcement of the antiaircraft defense component.
Deployment of new antiaircraft defense units in Armenia became the
first step in this direction.
It should be noted that the speech of President Mikhail Saakashvili
of Georgia at the summit was quite composed. Georgia (and other
countries of the Caucasus, it stands to reason to assume) understands
that in a potential conflict with Iran Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku
will find their only and powerful ally precisely in Russia.
Moscow confirmed its participation in counter-terrorism operation
Active Effort in the Mediterranean where it will be presented by two
or three ships of the Black Sea Fleet.
The summit decided to begin preparations to the membership of the
Balkans countries in the Alliance and to pay more attention to the
countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia where cooperation and
contacts were to be advanced. "Countries of the region strive for
rapprochement with the Euroatlantic structures," NATO General
Secretary Jaap de Hoof Scheffer said. "Still, doing something behind
the back of Russia, our closest partner, will be stupid and unfair."
In fact, similar statements were made in Brussels once when the
Alliance was preparing its expansion into the Baltic states. It
doesn't take a genius therefore to guess what degree of importance
Moscow attaches to statements of this sort. "NATO still relies on
instructions concerning defense of its members more than on real
joint estimates of security in this or that region," Lavrov said.
It is reasonable to assume that in the Caucasus and Central Asia the
Alliance will follow the scenario already tested in the Baltic
states. Prior to expansion into the Baltic states, NATO built three
radars there and linked the installations to the existing air control
system. It enabled NATO to monitor craft and launches in north-west
Russia. That done, the Alliance modernized the airfield near Siauliaj
in Lithuania. These days, it is the base of four Danish aircraft
patrolling borders of the Baltic states. Now that Scheffer mentioned
construction of "three bridges" (in the Mediterranean region,
Caucasus, Central Asia), it stands to reason to expect appearance of
several radar installations on the territories of these countries.
AWACS flights are not to be ruled out either - "for air corridor
protection," of course.
It is clear that the Alliance needs all these "bridge-building" to
consolidate its military presence and, also importantly, to protect
its economic presence in the mentioned regions. This is NATO's way of
showing to its future members (whose leaders attended the Istanbul
summit as guests) that their interests will be protected in the
course of preparations for membership.
Russia suggested closer cooperation between NATO and the Organization
of the CIS Collective Security Treaty and a collective security
concept for the Persian Gulf. In fact, it could have done better than
that. For example, it could have suggested a joint operation against
drugs in Afghanistan (within the framework of the counter-terrorism
operation there) and Central Asia to destroy poppy fields,
laboratories, and storage facilities there. Particularly since the
US-NATO contingents control the territory in Afghanistan
approximately equalling what the Soviet Army controlled in the 1980s.
Left to their own devices, neither NATO nor the Americans alone can
handle the worst threat to Europe and the world - production and
export of heavy drugs like heroin. Most poppy fields are in the
northern and central Afghanistan, the regions that do not recognize
the authorities in Kabul and where there are no foreign military
contingents. Scheffer says that more helicopters are needed for the
contingent in Afghanistan. The threat posed by drugs may be abated
only by joint effort of Russia, the United States, NATO, and their
allies in the anti-Taliban coalition.
What the Papers Say. Part B (Russia)
July 9, 2004, Friday
NATO: MOVING FROM THE BALTIC STATES TO THE CAUCASUS
SOURCE: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 25, July 9-15, 2004, pp.
1, 3
by Colonel Anatoly Tsyganok, Professor of the Academy of Military
Sciences
The latest NATO summit ended in Istanbul on June 29. The major issues
on the agenda were as follows: Iraq (how efforts can be pooled),
Afghanistan (how military might can be boosted), the Balkans (how to
have the European Union take over), and the preliminary results of
NATO expansion. The Russia-NATO Council met within the framework of
the summit. The meeting but enumerated the problems accumulated
between the partners without so much as an attempts to solve them.
Solution to the problem was postponed. The problems will be handled
on a different level at a different time.
As for Iraq, Washington and London demanded deployment of NATO troops
there. Leaders of France, Germany, and Turkey refused to have the
issue phrased in this manner, and participation in the coalition in
Iraq was left up to the individual countries, something every NATO
member state is to decide for itself. Neither did the summit support
the United States in the matter of training specialists for the Iraqi
army. In other words, tension and discord within the Alliance
remained a hard fact of life.
The summit voted to increase the NATO contingent in Afghanistan from
6,500 to 10,000. There are additional reports, however, indicating
that Washington intends to up its contingents attached to Central
Asian bases by 12,000 servicemen who are to be withdrawn from South
Korea.
The summit supported the assumption that NATO leaders still regard
Russia as a sort of "truncated USSR" even despite the almost 11 years
since the "Russian bourgeois revolution" of October 1993. The
impression is that documents for every new summit are prepared on the
basis of hopelessly outdated instructions.
NATO neophytes - the Baltic states particularly - are fast learners
and as such get the message. That is why Russia's suggestions
concerning the adapted Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
were not noticed by NATO leaders. On the other hand, had the Duma
ratified the document, say, half a year before the summit and not on
the eve of it, it would have enabled Russia to maneuver before the
summit and given it an ace for negotiations at the summit itself.
NATO leaders were quite tough and adamant on the subject of
withdrawing Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova. Moscow was
strongly recommended to keep its promises to the OSCE summit in
Istanbul. Moreover, ratification of the modified Treaty on
Conventional Arms in Europe was tied in with Russian withdrawal
commitments. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called this approach
incorrect because "political agreements did not set the deadline."
Moreover, these days there are new threats and challenges on the
southern borders of the Russian Federation, the ones that were absent
in the past. The matter concerns the possibility of missile launches
from the Iranian direction and expansion of the Islamic terrorism.
That is why interests of national security in the direction of the
Caucasus require Russian military presence in the region and a
considerable reinforcement of the antiaircraft defense component.
Deployment of new antiaircraft defense units in Armenia became the
first step in this direction.
It should be noted that the speech of President Mikhail Saakashvili
of Georgia at the summit was quite composed. Georgia (and other
countries of the Caucasus, it stands to reason to assume) understands
that in a potential conflict with Iran Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku
will find their only and powerful ally precisely in Russia.
Moscow confirmed its participation in counter-terrorism operation
Active Effort in the Mediterranean where it will be presented by two
or three ships of the Black Sea Fleet.
The summit decided to begin preparations to the membership of the
Balkans countries in the Alliance and to pay more attention to the
countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia where cooperation and
contacts were to be advanced. "Countries of the region strive for
rapprochement with the Euroatlantic structures," NATO General
Secretary Jaap de Hoof Scheffer said. "Still, doing something behind
the back of Russia, our closest partner, will be stupid and unfair."
In fact, similar statements were made in Brussels once when the
Alliance was preparing its expansion into the Baltic states. It
doesn't take a genius therefore to guess what degree of importance
Moscow attaches to statements of this sort. "NATO still relies on
instructions concerning defense of its members more than on real
joint estimates of security in this or that region," Lavrov said.
It is reasonable to assume that in the Caucasus and Central Asia the
Alliance will follow the scenario already tested in the Baltic
states. Prior to expansion into the Baltic states, NATO built three
radars there and linked the installations to the existing air control
system. It enabled NATO to monitor craft and launches in north-west
Russia. That done, the Alliance modernized the airfield near Siauliaj
in Lithuania. These days, it is the base of four Danish aircraft
patrolling borders of the Baltic states. Now that Scheffer mentioned
construction of "three bridges" (in the Mediterranean region,
Caucasus, Central Asia), it stands to reason to expect appearance of
several radar installations on the territories of these countries.
AWACS flights are not to be ruled out either - "for air corridor
protection," of course.
It is clear that the Alliance needs all these "bridge-building" to
consolidate its military presence and, also importantly, to protect
its economic presence in the mentioned regions. This is NATO's way of
showing to its future members (whose leaders attended the Istanbul
summit as guests) that their interests will be protected in the
course of preparations for membership.
Russia suggested closer cooperation between NATO and the Organization
of the CIS Collective Security Treaty and a collective security
concept for the Persian Gulf. In fact, it could have done better than
that. For example, it could have suggested a joint operation against
drugs in Afghanistan (within the framework of the counter-terrorism
operation there) and Central Asia to destroy poppy fields,
laboratories, and storage facilities there. Particularly since the
US-NATO contingents control the territory in Afghanistan
approximately equalling what the Soviet Army controlled in the 1980s.
Left to their own devices, neither NATO nor the Americans alone can
handle the worst threat to Europe and the world - production and
export of heavy drugs like heroin. Most poppy fields are in the
northern and central Afghanistan, the regions that do not recognize
the authorities in Kabul and where there are no foreign military
contingents. Scheffer says that more helicopters are needed for the
contingent in Afghanistan. The threat posed by drugs may be abated
only by joint effort of Russia, the United States, NATO, and their
allies in the anti-Taliban coalition.