Tweet
Eurasianet Organization
July 12 2004
RUSSIA: THE CAUCASUS' FRIEND IN NEED?
Igor Torbakov: 7/12/04
A EurasiaNet commentary
Amidst the ongoing standoff with Georgia over South Ossetia, Russian
analysts have begun pushing for a policy that presents Moscow as the
guarantor of peace and stability in the Caucasus.
The June `8-'9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in
Istanbul has fueled the campaign for a transformation of Russian
strategy in the region. [For background see the EurasiaNet Insight
archive]. Nearly `3 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
most Russian analysts believe that the Kremlin has failed in its
struggle to maintain its influence throughout the former USSR. With
NATO now having expressed a clear interest in both the Caucasus and
Central Asia, that loss of influence could pose a longer-term
strategic threat, the thinking goes.
With the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania now all
members of NATO, the alliance's military infrastructure already
touches Russia's northern flank. That leaves Central Asia, an area
that has recently begun to show its willingness to entertain Russian
overtures, and the Caucasus, a region where, according to one recent
commentary published in Noviye Izvestia, a "bitter rivalry" between
East and West is already taking place.
Given its past as the region's overlord, both in Soviet and tsarist
times, Russia is determined to prevent the Western security
collective from gaining a geopolitical foothold in a territory it has
long considered its "soft underbelly."
Yet rather than attempting to preserve the post-Soviet status quo,
the Kremlin's strategists appear to have begun to favor a policy that
looks on Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia as sovereign neighbors and
potential partners and allies. That strategy has most recently been
put to work with Georgia, where Russia played a leading role in
securing the resignation of Ajarian strongman Aslan Abashidze, a key
goal of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. [For background see
the EurasiaNet Insight archive]. Additional signs of this policy of
engagement have occurred with promises to increase Russian investment
in Georgia. Initially, the strategy appeared to have worked: Russia
has been asked to advise on changes to Georgia's tax code and the
appointment of Kakha Bendukidze, a Georgian-born Russian "oligarch,"
as Georgia's economics minister has emphasized those trade links
still further.
Given Russia's own status as a former Soviet republic trying to
identify its national mission, the argument goes, it is better
equipped than NATO or the European Union to understand the needs of
newly formed countries in the Caucasus and throughout the Collective
of Independent States. To reinforce this connection, some Russian
analysts have emphasized that these countries in any case will not be
likely candidates for EU or NATO membership for at least two more
generations. Still others have presented NATO as failed peacekeepers
in Afghanistan and Iraq - a reason, they say, for CIS countries to
pay little heed to the alliance's overtures to secure peace and
security.
How events will unfold in response to the recent crisis over South
Ossetia will present a critical test for this new policy, however.
[For background see the EurasiaNet Insight archive].While dialogue is
being held with the Kremlin to find a resolution to the stand-off,
the Georgian government has also asked US Secretary of State Colin
Powell to act as a mediator for the conflict. [For background see the
EurasiaNet Insight archive].
Such a role no doubt will only underline to Russian security and
defense analysts the need to retain Moscow's two military facilities
in Georgia for as long as possible. In their eyes, Georgia is the key
to the entire Black Sea and South Caucasus region. The bases'
advantage, however, is primarily political. With the bases in Batumi
and Akhalkalaki as a "rear guard," Russia can "restrain the push of
new [geopolitical] rivals into the post-Soviet space," Sergei
Kazennov, a researcher at the Institute of World Economy and
International relations, argued in a recent commentary posted on the
Politcom.ru Web site.
For that reason, close attention is also being paid to recently
announced plans for a railroad that will provide - for the first time
in five years - a direct link between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The
railway, which would run from Baku to Kars via Tbilisi, will skirt
Russia's base at Akhalkalaki. If Russia withdraws from its bases, the
thinking goes, the way would be clear for Turkey to begin shipping
military hardware to Georgia and Azerbaijan via the rail route.
Given these concerns, chances are few that the Kremlin will withdraw
from these installations. At the NATO summit in Istanbul, Russia
firmly rejected pressure to remove its troops from both Georgia and
Moldova, under the terms of a `999 agreement. "These demands are not
legally correct as agreements on settling things with the bases in
Georgia and the pullout of Russia military equipment from the
Dniester region [in Moldova] were of a political rather than legal
nature," Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told the Russia-NATO Council.
Nor is an offer by alliance member states to ratify the modified
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) - a `990
agreement between the US and the USSR to slash troops and weapons
stockpiles in Europe recently ratified by Russia - sufficient
incentive for such a move. "It would be stupid to swap the withdrawal
of troops [from Georgia and Moldova] for the ratification of an
outdated treaty," argued Kazennov. "It's not an equal exchange."
Ironically, despite the push to treat CIS countries as strong players
in their own right, this decision is predicated on Russia's relations
with the US, rather than on ties with Georgia itself. The Russian
political class clearly sees Washington as the locomotive for NATO's
eastward expansion, a move that is reckoned as "a continuation of the
tug-of-war between Moscow and Washington for the control over the
former Soviet republics," according to one commentator.
So far, in the opinion of most Russian analysts, the Kremlin has come
out as the loser in the struggle with the US for dominance in the
Caucasus and beyond. With Georgia's recent announcement that it
expects to join NATO within four years, it is a game of geopolitical
chess that Russia is increasingly determined to win.
Editor's Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher
who specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History
from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of
Sciences. He was Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian
History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; a Visiting Scholar at
the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Washington DC; a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University,
New York; and a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University. He is now
based in Istanbul, Turkey.
July 12 2004
RUSSIA: THE CAUCASUS' FRIEND IN NEED?
Igor Torbakov: 7/12/04
A EurasiaNet commentary
Amidst the ongoing standoff with Georgia over South Ossetia, Russian
analysts have begun pushing for a policy that presents Moscow as the
guarantor of peace and stability in the Caucasus.
The June `8-'9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in
Istanbul has fueled the campaign for a transformation of Russian
strategy in the region. [For background see the EurasiaNet Insight
archive]. Nearly `3 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
most Russian analysts believe that the Kremlin has failed in its
struggle to maintain its influence throughout the former USSR. With
NATO now having expressed a clear interest in both the Caucasus and
Central Asia, that loss of influence could pose a longer-term
strategic threat, the thinking goes.
With the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania now all
members of NATO, the alliance's military infrastructure already
touches Russia's northern flank. That leaves Central Asia, an area
that has recently begun to show its willingness to entertain Russian
overtures, and the Caucasus, a region where, according to one recent
commentary published in Noviye Izvestia, a "bitter rivalry" between
East and West is already taking place.
Given its past as the region's overlord, both in Soviet and tsarist
times, Russia is determined to prevent the Western security
collective from gaining a geopolitical foothold in a territory it has
long considered its "soft underbelly."
Yet rather than attempting to preserve the post-Soviet status quo,
the Kremlin's strategists appear to have begun to favor a policy that
looks on Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia as sovereign neighbors and
potential partners and allies. That strategy has most recently been
put to work with Georgia, where Russia played a leading role in
securing the resignation of Ajarian strongman Aslan Abashidze, a key
goal of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. [For background see
the EurasiaNet Insight archive]. Additional signs of this policy of
engagement have occurred with promises to increase Russian investment
in Georgia. Initially, the strategy appeared to have worked: Russia
has been asked to advise on changes to Georgia's tax code and the
appointment of Kakha Bendukidze, a Georgian-born Russian "oligarch,"
as Georgia's economics minister has emphasized those trade links
still further.
Given Russia's own status as a former Soviet republic trying to
identify its national mission, the argument goes, it is better
equipped than NATO or the European Union to understand the needs of
newly formed countries in the Caucasus and throughout the Collective
of Independent States. To reinforce this connection, some Russian
analysts have emphasized that these countries in any case will not be
likely candidates for EU or NATO membership for at least two more
generations. Still others have presented NATO as failed peacekeepers
in Afghanistan and Iraq - a reason, they say, for CIS countries to
pay little heed to the alliance's overtures to secure peace and
security.
How events will unfold in response to the recent crisis over South
Ossetia will present a critical test for this new policy, however.
[For background see the EurasiaNet Insight archive].While dialogue is
being held with the Kremlin to find a resolution to the stand-off,
the Georgian government has also asked US Secretary of State Colin
Powell to act as a mediator for the conflict. [For background see the
EurasiaNet Insight archive].
Such a role no doubt will only underline to Russian security and
defense analysts the need to retain Moscow's two military facilities
in Georgia for as long as possible. In their eyes, Georgia is the key
to the entire Black Sea and South Caucasus region. The bases'
advantage, however, is primarily political. With the bases in Batumi
and Akhalkalaki as a "rear guard," Russia can "restrain the push of
new [geopolitical] rivals into the post-Soviet space," Sergei
Kazennov, a researcher at the Institute of World Economy and
International relations, argued in a recent commentary posted on the
Politcom.ru Web site.
For that reason, close attention is also being paid to recently
announced plans for a railroad that will provide - for the first time
in five years - a direct link between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The
railway, which would run from Baku to Kars via Tbilisi, will skirt
Russia's base at Akhalkalaki. If Russia withdraws from its bases, the
thinking goes, the way would be clear for Turkey to begin shipping
military hardware to Georgia and Azerbaijan via the rail route.
Given these concerns, chances are few that the Kremlin will withdraw
from these installations. At the NATO summit in Istanbul, Russia
firmly rejected pressure to remove its troops from both Georgia and
Moldova, under the terms of a `999 agreement. "These demands are not
legally correct as agreements on settling things with the bases in
Georgia and the pullout of Russia military equipment from the
Dniester region [in Moldova] were of a political rather than legal
nature," Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told the Russia-NATO Council.
Nor is an offer by alliance member states to ratify the modified
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) - a `990
agreement between the US and the USSR to slash troops and weapons
stockpiles in Europe recently ratified by Russia - sufficient
incentive for such a move. "It would be stupid to swap the withdrawal
of troops [from Georgia and Moldova] for the ratification of an
outdated treaty," argued Kazennov. "It's not an equal exchange."
Ironically, despite the push to treat CIS countries as strong players
in their own right, this decision is predicated on Russia's relations
with the US, rather than on ties with Georgia itself. The Russian
political class clearly sees Washington as the locomotive for NATO's
eastward expansion, a move that is reckoned as "a continuation of the
tug-of-war between Moscow and Washington for the control over the
former Soviet republics," according to one commentator.
So far, in the opinion of most Russian analysts, the Kremlin has come
out as the loser in the struggle with the US for dominance in the
Caucasus and beyond. With Georgia's recent announcement that it
expects to join NATO within four years, it is a game of geopolitical
chess that Russia is increasingly determined to win.
Editor's Note: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher
who specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History
from Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of
Sciences. He was Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian
History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; a Visiting Scholar at
the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Washington DC; a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University,
New York; and a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University. He is now
based in Istanbul, Turkey.