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[15-07-2004 'Karabagh Conflict']
------------------------------------------------- ---------------------
WHAT TO TALK ABOUT?
Source : "Golos Armenii" newspaper (Armenia)
Author: Ruben Margarian
The `Dialogue of Civilizations' Falls Flat
It is a fact that despite the absence of tangible results in
diplomatic settlement of Mountainous Karabagh conflict, still there
are certain principles the international community thinks binding for
the sides, principles that are viewed by the mediators as a sort of
tools for working out the formula of settlement. First, these are the
requirements of the peaceful resolution of disputes and non-resumption
of military operations. Second comes understanding of the necessity
for mutual compromise on the way to settlement. Third, there is to be
understanding that the main formula of agreement should be reached by
the parties to the conflict themselves: the mediators may become
guarantors of the agreement, help organizing the negotiation process
or working out corresponding documents, but they should not be
expected to impose their decision. This third principle presupposes
presence of certain atmosphere of trust among the parties to the
conflict without which there can be no consensus.
At first sight, the parties to the conflict undertook the obligation
of meeting these principles because otherwise settlement is really out
of the question. However, it is only at first sight. At a closer look
it becomes clear that even in these issues the sides keep to
diametrically different approaches. Let's consider them in order.
Through Peaceful Settlement
With their accession to the Council of Europe both Armenia and
Azerbaijan undertook such an obligation. Moreover, this obligation was
one of the main conditions for CE membership.
It is common knowledge that Europeans do not like to accept the
membership of the countries that are carriers of potential threat of
military operations and regional conflicts. By the way, it may be put
the other way: the membership of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Council
of Europe was conditioned by the intention of preventing resumption of
military operations in the region (we should not forget Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline, the investments and strategic programs related to it). The
cease-fire agreement, to which Armenia, Azerbaijan and MKR are
signatories, is still in force but the approaches of the sides differ
considerably.
The Armenian side, represented by both Armenia and MKR, repeatedly
emphasized its adherence to the cease-fire regime, its intention of
preserving the truce and even declared that in case of resuming
military operations, it is the initiating side that will be
defeated. To a certain extent, it may be considered a sort of an
obligation for not being the first to violate the cease-fire regime.
Official Baku has a different stance. Its representatives, up to the
Minister of Defense and President of the country repeatedly stated
that in case the negotiation process does not yield favorable results
for Baku, Azerbaijan reserves to itself the right for a military
resolution of the conflict. In fact, Azerbaijan rejects the
commitments to the Council of Europe. These statements should not be
viewed in internal perspective. There is no sense for Azerbaijani
authorities to threaten the people with a new war. These statements
are rather intended for external audience and do not pursue the goal
of killing two birds with one stone: blackmail of the international
community with the menace of war resumption and regional
destabilization, including public opinion poll in case Azerbaijan
really resorts to restarting military operations. In the second case,
the leadership of official Baku was repeatedly notified on the highest
level about all the consequences that might ensue for Azerbaijan with
the war resumed. However stating that constant blackmail leaves no
consequences is hardly the right way to go.
Willingness for Compromise
Herein as well no identical approaches may be considered. The position
of the Armenian side is obvious. President Kocharian in person stated
many times that the Armenian side in Key West was ready for the
greatest concession Yerevan and Stepanakert might afford:
reconsideration of the results of military operations between
Azerbaijan and MKR in 1992-1994, that is ceding to Azerbaijan a number
of territories presently controlled by the Armenian side. The
willingness of the Armenian side for return of Azerbaijani refugees
and other `trifles' of similar kind is also evident. It is clear that
the Armenian share of `mutual compromise' notion is defined by
official Yerevan quite unambiguously despite negative response of
public opinion towards this approach. At least the recent press
publications of the polls confirmed the latter.
However, it is quite difficult to understand what the Azerbaijani side
means by `mutual compromise'. Ilham Aliev speaks only of the
necessity for restoring territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, meaning
the borders of Soviet Azerbaijan and the Armenian terrorism. Thus it
may be assumed that the notion of `mutual compromise' is simply not
perceived by Azerbaijan: Baku does not intend to cede anything since
the promise for reactivating Baku-Nakhichevan rail route or the
promise for providing the Armenian side with additional guarantees for
non-resumption of military operations cannot be taken
seriously. Obviously, it is not the promises of Baku but the armed
forces of RA and MKR that are main peace guarantees for the Armenian
side.
Formula of Settlement - the Result of Mutual Efforts
Joint productive and effective work on the package of future agreement
is possible only with mutual aspiration of the sides for the
atmosphere of trust among the parties to the conflict. Moreover, it is
the peoples of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Mountainous Karabagh and not
the Foreign Ministers or personal representatives of Presidents that
are meant by the parties of the conflict. Herein, the positions of the
sides are again diametrically controversial.
If the Armenian side and official Yerevan in the first place take all
effort for development of regional cooperation, Baku is persistent in
reducing to minimum all possible contacts of its citizens with not
only MKR but Armenia as well. In case such contacts are inevitable,
they are used by official Baku to one aim: to smear Armenia and MKR by
all means possible and to impede the progress of the two countries by
urging not only `brother' Turkey but also public, economic and
political structures of other countries to impose blockade on Armenia
and MKR.
Apparently, there is no room for optimism. Despite the lobby talks
about the progress in the meetings of Foreign Ministers and
Presidents, such objective factors promoting settlement as the
exploitation of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in the coming year or the
forthcoming discussions about possible EU membership of Turkey,
despite all of this it is clear that even in the stage of diplomatic
settlement, the parties to the conflict demonstrate such different
approaches that the notorious `dialogue of civilizations' becomes a
failure. The parties to the conflict are guided by different value
systems, different outlooks. So different that it is hardly possible
to talk about real prospects for settlement.
Editor's Note: Dear readers, the next update of MediaDialogue will be
made in early Septmeber.
[15-07-2004 'Region']
----------------------------------------------------------------------
RUSSIA, GEORGIA SEEK TO KEEP GOOD TIES AMID CRISIS
Source : "Turkish Daily News" newspaper (Turkey) Author: Reuters
Russia and Georgia should not allow a mounting crisis over Georgia's
breakaway region of South Ossetia to derail improving bilateral ties,
top officials from both states were quoted as saying.
The two states have engaged in an angry war of words after Georgia's
nationalist President Mikhail Saakashvili -- who recently subdued
another independent-minded region, Adzhara -- launched the latest
drive to restore control over South Ossetia.
Russia accuses Georgia of violating a peace deal, which ended bloody
conflict in South Ossetia in 1992, and trying to trigger a military
confrontation. Georgia in turn accuses Russian peacekeepers in the
region of siding with separatists.
"Unfortunately, the conflict has become part of our relations, thought
not the central part," Itar-Tass news agency quoted Gela Bezhuashvili,
secretary of Saakashvili's advisory Security Council as saying.
"We should not become hostages to the conflict situation,"
Bezhuashvili told his Russian opposite number, Igor Ivanov, ahead of
trilateral talks scheduled for Wednesday in Moscow.
Long list of complaints
Russia and Georgia have prepared long lists of complaints to discuss
at the talks, which Ossetian officials will also attend.
Moscow has accused Tbilisi of covertly sending hundreds of troops to
the conflict zone in violation of the peace deal and provoking clashes
with separatists.
Georgia in turn blames Russia for supplying separatists with weapons
and giving them political support. It also accuses Russia of turning a
blind eye to hundreds of armed volunteers pouring in from its
territory to assist the Ossetians.
The situation came close to a climax last weekend when Russians said
peacekeepers in the area had the right to use force to impose peace
and Georgians said they were prepared to use arms to repel a Russian
aggression.
Ivanov said he hoped Wednesday's talks would ease the confrontation.
"In the past months relations between Georgia and Russia have become
increasingly dynamic," Interfax news agency quoted him as telling
Bezhuashvili. "This creates good grounds to solve problems, which
have been mounting for years."
Saakashvili, now on a visit to Britain to drum up support for his
drive to restore control over South Ossetia and another breakaway
region, Abkhazia, said he is counting on Putin to personally
intervene.
"I count on the pragmatism and reasonable approach of President
Putin," he told a news conference in London.
Last November Putin sent Ivanov to Tbilisi to persuade veteran
President Eduard Shevardnadze to leave peacefully in the face of a
coup staged by Saakashvili and his supporters.
In May Ivanov flew on Putin's orders to the Adzhara region, which
Moscow had backed, to persuade regional strongman Aslan Abashidze to
resign. Abashidze fled to Moscow on Ivanov's plane.
But analysts predict Putin may find it harder to compromise on South
Ossetia. More than half of ethnic Ossetians -- who form the majority
of the population -- have Russian passports and relatives living in
the Russian province of North Ossetia.
[12-07-2004 'Karabagh Conflict']
----------------------------------------------------------------------
ARMENIA WILL NOT CEDE US A SINGLE REGION
Source : "Zerkalo" newspaper (Azerbaijan)
Author: M. Yasharoglu
Political scientist Vafa Guluzade thinks it absurd to discuss the
application of the Cyprus option to Karabagh problem resolution.
Today both Azerbaijani and international political scientists are
engaged in a hot discussion of the possibility for applying the Cyprus
issue to the settlement of Mountainous Karabagh conflict provoked by
Armenian occupation of 20% of Azerbaijani territories. Media also pay
adequate attention to the discussion of this issue. In the
conversation with `Zerkalo' correspondent vice state advisor,
political scientist Vafa Guluzade noted that despite numerous
discussions in the media, nobody explained to the society what lies
under Cyprus option.
- From Turkish perspective, Kofi Annan's plan on joint accession of
the two Cyprus communities in the European Union has failed. If Turkey
has accepted this option, it means a failure for the latter as
well. The Turks were humiliated by the accession of only the Greek
part of the island to the EU. In case of implementation of Kofi
Annan's plan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would cease to
exist, Turkey would lose its military presence on the island and the
Turkish population would be in the minority. Turkey itself is not a
part of EU and nobody is going to let it in.
Thus, it turned out that both Cyprus and Greece would be EU members
and Turkey would not gain any advantage. It is a no less significant
factor that Europe promised to lift the blockade of Northern Cyprus
and allegedly intended to allocate financial assistance for its
development amounting to 260 million Euros. However, subsequent events
showed that nobody intended to lift the embargo of Northern Cyprus and
the discussion on the mentioned sum proved to be empty talk.
- What does that option mean for Azerbaijan?
- It might imply joint annexation of Mountainous Karabagh and Lachin
to Armenia and return of Azerbaijani `minority', reduced to this
plight by the Soviet authorities, to Mountainous Karabagh. That is,
Azerbaijanis of Mountainous Karabagh will get some autonomy as a part
of Armenia. There can be no other interpretation of the Cyprus option.
Thus application of the Cyprus option to Azerbaijan is simply
absurd. We may only consider liberation of Karabagh territories from
Armenian occupation and return of Mountainous Karabagh to the
sovereignty of Azerbaijan. Any other proposals for settling the
conflict using Cyprus, Maldiv or Folkland options are all absurd.
- Will Azerbaijani authorities be able to stand firm on this issue in
the face of Western pressure whose demands for more concessions on our
part increase daily?
- The current authorities of Azerbaijan should have it clear that in
case of ceding the Azerbaijani territories to Armenia, all our
population will be against it. I don't think the authorities will be
able to resist their own people. The power representatives are also a
part of the people.
There is an on-going fuss for over 10 years, particularly increasing
since 1999 - what dressing should be provided for the return of
Azerbaijani territories to Armenia? It is also called liberation of 9
regions. What does that mean? What 9 regions? Will Shushi region also
be liberated? What they mean is liberation of occupied territories
around Mountainous Karabagh in exchange for its annexation to Armenia,
including Lachin as well. We need to ask directly - Does Azerbaijani
people accept it? In case of its agreement, it is a
possibility. However, I am confident that no single Azerbaijani will
accept it.
I hold that Americans are absolutely unaware of Karabagh problem,
similarly to Western Europeans. They think Azerbaijan does not lose
much in ceding these territories to Armenia and that we should do that
by all means. Why should Azerbaijan cede its legal territories is not
in any way explained, even on our part. No one raises this issue. It
is only various options that are discussed. There can be no options in
this case. Either we restore our sovereignty or say farewell to
Mountainous Karabagh and Lachin for the sake of liberating six
territories.
Unlike us, Armenians have a clear stance. When discussing the
Mountainous Karabagh status, it may be interpreted in the following
way - granting independence to Mountainous Karabagh or annexation of
these territories to Armenia. They do not accept a high level of
autonomy so profoundly discussed by ex-President of Azerbaijan. This
fact needs to be explained to everybody. It might be much better if
media addressed a concrete issue instead of articles on empty options
and solutions. It is not options but our territories that we need.
You see, when in office as a state adviser we discussed all the
options. All of them were initially still-born. From the very outset
they were rejected by us because they implied ceding Mountainous
Karabagh. We mean all the previously proposed options.
- What do you think, will we have to freeze the conflict and stop
negotiations before reaching the decision to win our territories back?
- We should voice our clear position all over the world that we will
never reconcile with losing Mountainous Karabagh by any reason. All
are to know that we will strive for restoring our sovereignty over
Mountainous Karabagh. It should be emphasized as well that it is
Russia that raised either Karabagh, Abkhaz, Ajar or all similar
problems on post-Soviet space. We should always have them remember it.
USA should also understand that we will not accept any option of
unfair settlement of the conflict even if this will meet the oil
interests of the White House. Such an attempt for settlement will
destabilize the situation in the region and will threaten American
interests. Americans, reluctant to get deeper into anything and
viewing themselves as power, should be informed about it somehow. The
notions of truth and justice should be driven in their brains.
--
Yerevan Press Club of Armenia, 'Yeni Nesil' Journalists' Union of
Azerbaijan and Association of Diplomacy Correspondents of Turkey
present 'Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey: Journalist Initiative-2002'
Project. As a part of the project www.mediadialogue.org web site has
been designed, featuring the most interesting publications from the
press of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey on issues of mutual
concern. The latest updates on the site are weekly delivered to the
subscribers.
------------------------------------------------- ---------------------
WHAT TO TALK ABOUT?
Source : "Golos Armenii" newspaper (Armenia)
Author: Ruben Margarian
The `Dialogue of Civilizations' Falls Flat
It is a fact that despite the absence of tangible results in
diplomatic settlement of Mountainous Karabagh conflict, still there
are certain principles the international community thinks binding for
the sides, principles that are viewed by the mediators as a sort of
tools for working out the formula of settlement. First, these are the
requirements of the peaceful resolution of disputes and non-resumption
of military operations. Second comes understanding of the necessity
for mutual compromise on the way to settlement. Third, there is to be
understanding that the main formula of agreement should be reached by
the parties to the conflict themselves: the mediators may become
guarantors of the agreement, help organizing the negotiation process
or working out corresponding documents, but they should not be
expected to impose their decision. This third principle presupposes
presence of certain atmosphere of trust among the parties to the
conflict without which there can be no consensus.
At first sight, the parties to the conflict undertook the obligation
of meeting these principles because otherwise settlement is really out
of the question. However, it is only at first sight. At a closer look
it becomes clear that even in these issues the sides keep to
diametrically different approaches. Let's consider them in order.
Through Peaceful Settlement
With their accession to the Council of Europe both Armenia and
Azerbaijan undertook such an obligation. Moreover, this obligation was
one of the main conditions for CE membership.
It is common knowledge that Europeans do not like to accept the
membership of the countries that are carriers of potential threat of
military operations and regional conflicts. By the way, it may be put
the other way: the membership of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Council
of Europe was conditioned by the intention of preventing resumption of
military operations in the region (we should not forget Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline, the investments and strategic programs related to it). The
cease-fire agreement, to which Armenia, Azerbaijan and MKR are
signatories, is still in force but the approaches of the sides differ
considerably.
The Armenian side, represented by both Armenia and MKR, repeatedly
emphasized its adherence to the cease-fire regime, its intention of
preserving the truce and even declared that in case of resuming
military operations, it is the initiating side that will be
defeated. To a certain extent, it may be considered a sort of an
obligation for not being the first to violate the cease-fire regime.
Official Baku has a different stance. Its representatives, up to the
Minister of Defense and President of the country repeatedly stated
that in case the negotiation process does not yield favorable results
for Baku, Azerbaijan reserves to itself the right for a military
resolution of the conflict. In fact, Azerbaijan rejects the
commitments to the Council of Europe. These statements should not be
viewed in internal perspective. There is no sense for Azerbaijani
authorities to threaten the people with a new war. These statements
are rather intended for external audience and do not pursue the goal
of killing two birds with one stone: blackmail of the international
community with the menace of war resumption and regional
destabilization, including public opinion poll in case Azerbaijan
really resorts to restarting military operations. In the second case,
the leadership of official Baku was repeatedly notified on the highest
level about all the consequences that might ensue for Azerbaijan with
the war resumed. However stating that constant blackmail leaves no
consequences is hardly the right way to go.
Willingness for Compromise
Herein as well no identical approaches may be considered. The position
of the Armenian side is obvious. President Kocharian in person stated
many times that the Armenian side in Key West was ready for the
greatest concession Yerevan and Stepanakert might afford:
reconsideration of the results of military operations between
Azerbaijan and MKR in 1992-1994, that is ceding to Azerbaijan a number
of territories presently controlled by the Armenian side. The
willingness of the Armenian side for return of Azerbaijani refugees
and other `trifles' of similar kind is also evident. It is clear that
the Armenian share of `mutual compromise' notion is defined by
official Yerevan quite unambiguously despite negative response of
public opinion towards this approach. At least the recent press
publications of the polls confirmed the latter.
However, it is quite difficult to understand what the Azerbaijani side
means by `mutual compromise'. Ilham Aliev speaks only of the
necessity for restoring territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, meaning
the borders of Soviet Azerbaijan and the Armenian terrorism. Thus it
may be assumed that the notion of `mutual compromise' is simply not
perceived by Azerbaijan: Baku does not intend to cede anything since
the promise for reactivating Baku-Nakhichevan rail route or the
promise for providing the Armenian side with additional guarantees for
non-resumption of military operations cannot be taken
seriously. Obviously, it is not the promises of Baku but the armed
forces of RA and MKR that are main peace guarantees for the Armenian
side.
Formula of Settlement - the Result of Mutual Efforts
Joint productive and effective work on the package of future agreement
is possible only with mutual aspiration of the sides for the
atmosphere of trust among the parties to the conflict. Moreover, it is
the peoples of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Mountainous Karabagh and not
the Foreign Ministers or personal representatives of Presidents that
are meant by the parties of the conflict. Herein, the positions of the
sides are again diametrically controversial.
If the Armenian side and official Yerevan in the first place take all
effort for development of regional cooperation, Baku is persistent in
reducing to minimum all possible contacts of its citizens with not
only MKR but Armenia as well. In case such contacts are inevitable,
they are used by official Baku to one aim: to smear Armenia and MKR by
all means possible and to impede the progress of the two countries by
urging not only `brother' Turkey but also public, economic and
political structures of other countries to impose blockade on Armenia
and MKR.
Apparently, there is no room for optimism. Despite the lobby talks
about the progress in the meetings of Foreign Ministers and
Presidents, such objective factors promoting settlement as the
exploitation of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in the coming year or the
forthcoming discussions about possible EU membership of Turkey,
despite all of this it is clear that even in the stage of diplomatic
settlement, the parties to the conflict demonstrate such different
approaches that the notorious `dialogue of civilizations' becomes a
failure. The parties to the conflict are guided by different value
systems, different outlooks. So different that it is hardly possible
to talk about real prospects for settlement.
Editor's Note: Dear readers, the next update of MediaDialogue will be
made in early Septmeber.
[15-07-2004 'Region']
----------------------------------------------------------------------
RUSSIA, GEORGIA SEEK TO KEEP GOOD TIES AMID CRISIS
Source : "Turkish Daily News" newspaper (Turkey) Author: Reuters
Russia and Georgia should not allow a mounting crisis over Georgia's
breakaway region of South Ossetia to derail improving bilateral ties,
top officials from both states were quoted as saying.
The two states have engaged in an angry war of words after Georgia's
nationalist President Mikhail Saakashvili -- who recently subdued
another independent-minded region, Adzhara -- launched the latest
drive to restore control over South Ossetia.
Russia accuses Georgia of violating a peace deal, which ended bloody
conflict in South Ossetia in 1992, and trying to trigger a military
confrontation. Georgia in turn accuses Russian peacekeepers in the
region of siding with separatists.
"Unfortunately, the conflict has become part of our relations, thought
not the central part," Itar-Tass news agency quoted Gela Bezhuashvili,
secretary of Saakashvili's advisory Security Council as saying.
"We should not become hostages to the conflict situation,"
Bezhuashvili told his Russian opposite number, Igor Ivanov, ahead of
trilateral talks scheduled for Wednesday in Moscow.
Long list of complaints
Russia and Georgia have prepared long lists of complaints to discuss
at the talks, which Ossetian officials will also attend.
Moscow has accused Tbilisi of covertly sending hundreds of troops to
the conflict zone in violation of the peace deal and provoking clashes
with separatists.
Georgia in turn blames Russia for supplying separatists with weapons
and giving them political support. It also accuses Russia of turning a
blind eye to hundreds of armed volunteers pouring in from its
territory to assist the Ossetians.
The situation came close to a climax last weekend when Russians said
peacekeepers in the area had the right to use force to impose peace
and Georgians said they were prepared to use arms to repel a Russian
aggression.
Ivanov said he hoped Wednesday's talks would ease the confrontation.
"In the past months relations between Georgia and Russia have become
increasingly dynamic," Interfax news agency quoted him as telling
Bezhuashvili. "This creates good grounds to solve problems, which
have been mounting for years."
Saakashvili, now on a visit to Britain to drum up support for his
drive to restore control over South Ossetia and another breakaway
region, Abkhazia, said he is counting on Putin to personally
intervene.
"I count on the pragmatism and reasonable approach of President
Putin," he told a news conference in London.
Last November Putin sent Ivanov to Tbilisi to persuade veteran
President Eduard Shevardnadze to leave peacefully in the face of a
coup staged by Saakashvili and his supporters.
In May Ivanov flew on Putin's orders to the Adzhara region, which
Moscow had backed, to persuade regional strongman Aslan Abashidze to
resign. Abashidze fled to Moscow on Ivanov's plane.
But analysts predict Putin may find it harder to compromise on South
Ossetia. More than half of ethnic Ossetians -- who form the majority
of the population -- have Russian passports and relatives living in
the Russian province of North Ossetia.
[12-07-2004 'Karabagh Conflict']
----------------------------------------------------------------------
ARMENIA WILL NOT CEDE US A SINGLE REGION
Source : "Zerkalo" newspaper (Azerbaijan)
Author: M. Yasharoglu
Political scientist Vafa Guluzade thinks it absurd to discuss the
application of the Cyprus option to Karabagh problem resolution.
Today both Azerbaijani and international political scientists are
engaged in a hot discussion of the possibility for applying the Cyprus
issue to the settlement of Mountainous Karabagh conflict provoked by
Armenian occupation of 20% of Azerbaijani territories. Media also pay
adequate attention to the discussion of this issue. In the
conversation with `Zerkalo' correspondent vice state advisor,
political scientist Vafa Guluzade noted that despite numerous
discussions in the media, nobody explained to the society what lies
under Cyprus option.
- From Turkish perspective, Kofi Annan's plan on joint accession of
the two Cyprus communities in the European Union has failed. If Turkey
has accepted this option, it means a failure for the latter as
well. The Turks were humiliated by the accession of only the Greek
part of the island to the EU. In case of implementation of Kofi
Annan's plan, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus would cease to
exist, Turkey would lose its military presence on the island and the
Turkish population would be in the minority. Turkey itself is not a
part of EU and nobody is going to let it in.
Thus, it turned out that both Cyprus and Greece would be EU members
and Turkey would not gain any advantage. It is a no less significant
factor that Europe promised to lift the blockade of Northern Cyprus
and allegedly intended to allocate financial assistance for its
development amounting to 260 million Euros. However, subsequent events
showed that nobody intended to lift the embargo of Northern Cyprus and
the discussion on the mentioned sum proved to be empty talk.
- What does that option mean for Azerbaijan?
- It might imply joint annexation of Mountainous Karabagh and Lachin
to Armenia and return of Azerbaijani `minority', reduced to this
plight by the Soviet authorities, to Mountainous Karabagh. That is,
Azerbaijanis of Mountainous Karabagh will get some autonomy as a part
of Armenia. There can be no other interpretation of the Cyprus option.
Thus application of the Cyprus option to Azerbaijan is simply
absurd. We may only consider liberation of Karabagh territories from
Armenian occupation and return of Mountainous Karabagh to the
sovereignty of Azerbaijan. Any other proposals for settling the
conflict using Cyprus, Maldiv or Folkland options are all absurd.
- Will Azerbaijani authorities be able to stand firm on this issue in
the face of Western pressure whose demands for more concessions on our
part increase daily?
- The current authorities of Azerbaijan should have it clear that in
case of ceding the Azerbaijani territories to Armenia, all our
population will be against it. I don't think the authorities will be
able to resist their own people. The power representatives are also a
part of the people.
There is an on-going fuss for over 10 years, particularly increasing
since 1999 - what dressing should be provided for the return of
Azerbaijani territories to Armenia? It is also called liberation of 9
regions. What does that mean? What 9 regions? Will Shushi region also
be liberated? What they mean is liberation of occupied territories
around Mountainous Karabagh in exchange for its annexation to Armenia,
including Lachin as well. We need to ask directly - Does Azerbaijani
people accept it? In case of its agreement, it is a
possibility. However, I am confident that no single Azerbaijani will
accept it.
I hold that Americans are absolutely unaware of Karabagh problem,
similarly to Western Europeans. They think Azerbaijan does not lose
much in ceding these territories to Armenia and that we should do that
by all means. Why should Azerbaijan cede its legal territories is not
in any way explained, even on our part. No one raises this issue. It
is only various options that are discussed. There can be no options in
this case. Either we restore our sovereignty or say farewell to
Mountainous Karabagh and Lachin for the sake of liberating six
territories.
Unlike us, Armenians have a clear stance. When discussing the
Mountainous Karabagh status, it may be interpreted in the following
way - granting independence to Mountainous Karabagh or annexation of
these territories to Armenia. They do not accept a high level of
autonomy so profoundly discussed by ex-President of Azerbaijan. This
fact needs to be explained to everybody. It might be much better if
media addressed a concrete issue instead of articles on empty options
and solutions. It is not options but our territories that we need.
You see, when in office as a state adviser we discussed all the
options. All of them were initially still-born. From the very outset
they were rejected by us because they implied ceding Mountainous
Karabagh. We mean all the previously proposed options.
- What do you think, will we have to freeze the conflict and stop
negotiations before reaching the decision to win our territories back?
- We should voice our clear position all over the world that we will
never reconcile with losing Mountainous Karabagh by any reason. All
are to know that we will strive for restoring our sovereignty over
Mountainous Karabagh. It should be emphasized as well that it is
Russia that raised either Karabagh, Abkhaz, Ajar or all similar
problems on post-Soviet space. We should always have them remember it.
USA should also understand that we will not accept any option of
unfair settlement of the conflict even if this will meet the oil
interests of the White House. Such an attempt for settlement will
destabilize the situation in the region and will threaten American
interests. Americans, reluctant to get deeper into anything and
viewing themselves as power, should be informed about it somehow. The
notions of truth and justice should be driven in their brains.
--
Yerevan Press Club of Armenia, 'Yeni Nesil' Journalists' Union of
Azerbaijan and Association of Diplomacy Correspondents of Turkey
present 'Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey: Journalist Initiative-2002'
Project. As a part of the project www.mediadialogue.org web site has
been designed, featuring the most interesting publications from the
press of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey on issues of mutual
concern. The latest updates on the site are weekly delivered to the
subscribers.