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Cyprus Press and Information Office - Turkish Cypriot Press Review
June 9 2004
Degrading statements by the Ambassador of Sweden to Turkey for the
Cypriots and their President who are under the yoke of the brutal
Turkish occupation for 30-years. Reference to Russia and the Arab
countries
Turkish Daily News (08.06.04) publishes an article, which according
to the editorīs note, is a contribution to the paper by the
Ambassador of Sweden, Mr Henrik Liljegren.
The article, under the title "Waiting for the NATO summit" is
insulting for the President and the people of Cyprus who were forced
by the Turkish troops to abandon their homes and properties and are
deprived of all their fundamental human rights by 40,000 heavily
equipped Turkish troops which keep northern Cyprus under their
control.
The article, is as follows:
"President George W. Bush looked noticeably relieved the other day as
he commented on the establishment of an interim government in Iraq at
a press conference. Here was a man who seemed to say to himself, "
OK, we created a big mess in Iraq, but, by God, now we are getting
out of it and others will have to deal with it."
"A free Iraq will be a game changer, an agent of change," said Bush.
These words revealed what the administration probably considered to
be the most important motive for attacking Iraq. The neo-conservative
hawks, who dominated the foreign policy agenda in Washington after
9/11, believed that a successful war against Iraq would create a
"shock and awe" effect in the whole region. It would make the rogue
states stop supporting terrorists and prepare the ground for the
democratization of the authoritarian Arab regimes. "It would change
the game," as the president said.
Instead, the war and occupation has led to intensified terrorism both
inside and outside of Iraq. In addition, relations between the United
States and its allies have been severely strained and
anti-Americanism has risen to previously unimaginable heights all
over the world. The credibility of U.S. intelligence services has
been badly damaged; with the conflict between the Israelis and the
Palestinians becoming more violent than ever.
This is the bad news; but the good news is that there are signs that
many people in the greater Middle East have recently seen the need
for democratic reform. Moreover, it seems that some regimes have
concluded that it is dangerous to tolerate or aid terrorists or to
attempt to build or sell nuclear weapons. More importantly, Iraq
could, in spite of everything, eventually turn out to be a more
stable place once the transition to a sovereign Iraqi government has
been completed. At least one should not totally exclude such a
scenario in the long-term; the game may change and developments
become more benign than anybody can foresee today.
Right now the best news is that the Bush administration is adjusting
to the realities on the ground in a pragmatic spirit. As Winston
Churchill once said, "The Americans always do the right thing after
they have exhausted all the alternatives."
The Clinton administration learned the lesson in the Balkans that it
had to be prepared to back up diplomacy with military action. The
Bush administration has learnt the lesson in Iraq that military
action must be backed up by diplomacy. It is now trying to repair
relations with its allies and to involve the United Nations in the
future of Iraq. I think we can safely assume that the United States
will not start a preventive war against another country in the near
future. Last but not least, it seems that the U.S. intelligence
community will undergo a much-needed overhaul.
How the readjusted foreign policy of the Bush administration will
play out in the context of NATO will be interesting to observe at the
NATO summit in Istanbul on June 28-29. Turkey not only has to take
the responsibility for the nightmarish organizational and security
problems of the summit, it must also act diplomatically in advance of
the summit in the hope that NATO comes up with policies for the
region that are beneficial, rather than detrimental, to the security
of Turkey.
In connection with a conference arranged by the Istanbul Policy
Center in the summer of 2002, we were told by a participant, a short
time after 9/11, that planning had begun to move about a third of
U.S. forces in Europe to the Black Sea region and beyond, and that
the Pentagon regarded this area as the "new central front" in the
fight against terrorism. The planning included establishing "forward
operating sites" in what were termed "vulnerable battle ground
states" in Central Asia. It also foresaw helping these states
strengthen their own security against terrorists.
While the United States recently began to consult with its NATO
allies about this plan, the plan was gradually revealed to the
public. Michael R. Gordon, in The New York Times on June 4, wrote of
"the most significant rearrangement of American military around the
world since the beginning of the cold war." The same article says
that Secretary of State Colin Powell thought it "unlikely that the
Turks would agree to allow the United States to operate freely from
Turkish bases."
My guess is that Turkey is already discreetly taking creative
diplomatic action in the relevant capitals. The role and intentions
of Russia might be a matter of concern to some at the summit.
President Vladimir Putin, in his recent state of the nation speech,
talked of Russia's "vital interests." His new and smooth foreign
minister, Lavrov, in an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal
explained that for Russia "the territory of the former USSR is a
sphere of vital interests, prompted by its entire history." Lavrov
added, "By vital interests we do not mean some kind of right to bring
pressure on our neighbors."
But if history is any guide, that is exactly what it does mean. As
for the Russian military, it still thinks in terms of the Cold War,
regrets the expansion of NATO and would like to resurrect Russia as a
superpower as soon as possible. When speaking to his domestic
audience, Putin has to take the attitude of the nationalistic forces
within the military and the Duma into account.
One thing is clear: Just like in the good old days of the Cold War,
the United States and Russia are competing for geopolitical
influence, this time in countries in the neighborhood of Russia and,
in some cases, Turkey. Nowadays this competition is tempered by the
fact that the United States and Russia have an overriding common
interest in cooperating with each other in the fight against
terrorism.
Since the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
conference in Istanbul, both NATO and the OSCE have expressed concern
that Russia has failed to fulfill its 1999 commitments to withdraw
forces from Georgia and Moldova. Russian diplomacy would now like
NATO to ratify the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
without demands to fulfill its Istanbul commitments.
By saying that he will not attend the NATO summit, Putin presumably
wants to put pressure on the West to accept Russia's demands. Turkey
has tried to contribute to stability to the west and south of its
borders, and by its diplomacy regarding Cyprus, and has consequently
received many favorable comments in the international media.
The same cannot be said for the Greek Cypriots. In one of his weekly
electronic letters, Carl Bildt, the former prime minister of Sweden,
writes that Greek nationalistic forces carry the main responsibility
for the failure to solve the issue. Bildt talks of "the almost
hateful rhetoric of the Greek-Orthodox Church and the blatantly
cynical way that the Greek Cypriot president Papadopoulos played on
prejudice and fear in order to stop the peace plan. Bildt continues:
"That he belonged to the Greek support troops for Milosevic is hardly
surprising. The methods of agitation are recognizable." I really hope
that the other leaders of the European Union will distance themselves
from Papadopoulos and treat him with the icy coldness that he
deserves." Bildt predicts that various measures will be taken to
"ease the restrictions against the Turkish Cypriot part of the
island."
To the extent that Bildt's views are representative of views within
the EU, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots should in principle benefit
from the general goodwill that their support for the Annan plan has
generated. Eventually it might lead to some level of recognition of
the Turkish Cypriot state. Outside the EU the only important state
that supports the Greek Cypriots seems to be Russia.
Since the EU does not wish to import border disputes when admitting
new members, it has also encouraged Turkish diplomatic activity
regarding Turkish relations with Armenia. In this context the 2003
Regular Report of the EU Commission mentions grassroots civil society
initiatives with a view to promoting closer cooperation between
Turkey and Armenia.
The other day I was invited to attend a meeting of a select group of
prominent Turkish and Armenian media representatives. Under the
chairmanship of the managing editor of the Turkish Daily News, Yusuf
Kanli, the group discussed how the media in their respective
countries could deal with the sensitive subjects that prevent
reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia, and did so in a
dispassionate and objective manner.
"We are not out to solve any of the outstanding issues, but to
prepare the ground for the dealing of them by politicians, if and
when they choose to do so. We are simply trying to 'clarify' the
respective terminologies and help create a better understanding,"
said Mr Kanli, who also explained that the meeting was a follow-up to
a series of meetings sponsored by the American University in
Washington since May 2001.
Such initiatives are important as confidence-building measures could
inspire the Turkish and Armenian governments to make progress in
their diplomatic relations. However, they also require tact and
discretion since Russia casts a long shadow over Armenia, and, it is
not obvious that Russia finds friendship between Armenia and Turkey
desirable. The group that Mr Kanli has brought together is making a
laudable effort in a way that is in the best interests of their
respective nations. Who knows, maybe the NATO summit can bring new
momentum to these efforts by meetings at both the levels of
government and civil society.
The NATO summit will, in fact, bring more clarity to many important
issues of global security that are now shrouded in uncertainty.
Hopefully the run-up to the summit will be an occasion for
exceptionally creative diplomacy. It is sorely needed."
June 9 2004
Degrading statements by the Ambassador of Sweden to Turkey for the
Cypriots and their President who are under the yoke of the brutal
Turkish occupation for 30-years. Reference to Russia and the Arab
countries
Turkish Daily News (08.06.04) publishes an article, which according
to the editorīs note, is a contribution to the paper by the
Ambassador of Sweden, Mr Henrik Liljegren.
The article, under the title "Waiting for the NATO summit" is
insulting for the President and the people of Cyprus who were forced
by the Turkish troops to abandon their homes and properties and are
deprived of all their fundamental human rights by 40,000 heavily
equipped Turkish troops which keep northern Cyprus under their
control.
The article, is as follows:
"President George W. Bush looked noticeably relieved the other day as
he commented on the establishment of an interim government in Iraq at
a press conference. Here was a man who seemed to say to himself, "
OK, we created a big mess in Iraq, but, by God, now we are getting
out of it and others will have to deal with it."
"A free Iraq will be a game changer, an agent of change," said Bush.
These words revealed what the administration probably considered to
be the most important motive for attacking Iraq. The neo-conservative
hawks, who dominated the foreign policy agenda in Washington after
9/11, believed that a successful war against Iraq would create a
"shock and awe" effect in the whole region. It would make the rogue
states stop supporting terrorists and prepare the ground for the
democratization of the authoritarian Arab regimes. "It would change
the game," as the president said.
Instead, the war and occupation has led to intensified terrorism both
inside and outside of Iraq. In addition, relations between the United
States and its allies have been severely strained and
anti-Americanism has risen to previously unimaginable heights all
over the world. The credibility of U.S. intelligence services has
been badly damaged; with the conflict between the Israelis and the
Palestinians becoming more violent than ever.
This is the bad news; but the good news is that there are signs that
many people in the greater Middle East have recently seen the need
for democratic reform. Moreover, it seems that some regimes have
concluded that it is dangerous to tolerate or aid terrorists or to
attempt to build or sell nuclear weapons. More importantly, Iraq
could, in spite of everything, eventually turn out to be a more
stable place once the transition to a sovereign Iraqi government has
been completed. At least one should not totally exclude such a
scenario in the long-term; the game may change and developments
become more benign than anybody can foresee today.
Right now the best news is that the Bush administration is adjusting
to the realities on the ground in a pragmatic spirit. As Winston
Churchill once said, "The Americans always do the right thing after
they have exhausted all the alternatives."
The Clinton administration learned the lesson in the Balkans that it
had to be prepared to back up diplomacy with military action. The
Bush administration has learnt the lesson in Iraq that military
action must be backed up by diplomacy. It is now trying to repair
relations with its allies and to involve the United Nations in the
future of Iraq. I think we can safely assume that the United States
will not start a preventive war against another country in the near
future. Last but not least, it seems that the U.S. intelligence
community will undergo a much-needed overhaul.
How the readjusted foreign policy of the Bush administration will
play out in the context of NATO will be interesting to observe at the
NATO summit in Istanbul on June 28-29. Turkey not only has to take
the responsibility for the nightmarish organizational and security
problems of the summit, it must also act diplomatically in advance of
the summit in the hope that NATO comes up with policies for the
region that are beneficial, rather than detrimental, to the security
of Turkey.
In connection with a conference arranged by the Istanbul Policy
Center in the summer of 2002, we were told by a participant, a short
time after 9/11, that planning had begun to move about a third of
U.S. forces in Europe to the Black Sea region and beyond, and that
the Pentagon regarded this area as the "new central front" in the
fight against terrorism. The planning included establishing "forward
operating sites" in what were termed "vulnerable battle ground
states" in Central Asia. It also foresaw helping these states
strengthen their own security against terrorists.
While the United States recently began to consult with its NATO
allies about this plan, the plan was gradually revealed to the
public. Michael R. Gordon, in The New York Times on June 4, wrote of
"the most significant rearrangement of American military around the
world since the beginning of the cold war." The same article says
that Secretary of State Colin Powell thought it "unlikely that the
Turks would agree to allow the United States to operate freely from
Turkish bases."
My guess is that Turkey is already discreetly taking creative
diplomatic action in the relevant capitals. The role and intentions
of Russia might be a matter of concern to some at the summit.
President Vladimir Putin, in his recent state of the nation speech,
talked of Russia's "vital interests." His new and smooth foreign
minister, Lavrov, in an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal
explained that for Russia "the territory of the former USSR is a
sphere of vital interests, prompted by its entire history." Lavrov
added, "By vital interests we do not mean some kind of right to bring
pressure on our neighbors."
But if history is any guide, that is exactly what it does mean. As
for the Russian military, it still thinks in terms of the Cold War,
regrets the expansion of NATO and would like to resurrect Russia as a
superpower as soon as possible. When speaking to his domestic
audience, Putin has to take the attitude of the nationalistic forces
within the military and the Duma into account.
One thing is clear: Just like in the good old days of the Cold War,
the United States and Russia are competing for geopolitical
influence, this time in countries in the neighborhood of Russia and,
in some cases, Turkey. Nowadays this competition is tempered by the
fact that the United States and Russia have an overriding common
interest in cooperating with each other in the fight against
terrorism.
Since the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
conference in Istanbul, both NATO and the OSCE have expressed concern
that Russia has failed to fulfill its 1999 commitments to withdraw
forces from Georgia and Moldova. Russian diplomacy would now like
NATO to ratify the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
without demands to fulfill its Istanbul commitments.
By saying that he will not attend the NATO summit, Putin presumably
wants to put pressure on the West to accept Russia's demands. Turkey
has tried to contribute to stability to the west and south of its
borders, and by its diplomacy regarding Cyprus, and has consequently
received many favorable comments in the international media.
The same cannot be said for the Greek Cypriots. In one of his weekly
electronic letters, Carl Bildt, the former prime minister of Sweden,
writes that Greek nationalistic forces carry the main responsibility
for the failure to solve the issue. Bildt talks of "the almost
hateful rhetoric of the Greek-Orthodox Church and the blatantly
cynical way that the Greek Cypriot president Papadopoulos played on
prejudice and fear in order to stop the peace plan. Bildt continues:
"That he belonged to the Greek support troops for Milosevic is hardly
surprising. The methods of agitation are recognizable." I really hope
that the other leaders of the European Union will distance themselves
from Papadopoulos and treat him with the icy coldness that he
deserves." Bildt predicts that various measures will be taken to
"ease the restrictions against the Turkish Cypriot part of the
island."
To the extent that Bildt's views are representative of views within
the EU, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots should in principle benefit
from the general goodwill that their support for the Annan plan has
generated. Eventually it might lead to some level of recognition of
the Turkish Cypriot state. Outside the EU the only important state
that supports the Greek Cypriots seems to be Russia.
Since the EU does not wish to import border disputes when admitting
new members, it has also encouraged Turkish diplomatic activity
regarding Turkish relations with Armenia. In this context the 2003
Regular Report of the EU Commission mentions grassroots civil society
initiatives with a view to promoting closer cooperation between
Turkey and Armenia.
The other day I was invited to attend a meeting of a select group of
prominent Turkish and Armenian media representatives. Under the
chairmanship of the managing editor of the Turkish Daily News, Yusuf
Kanli, the group discussed how the media in their respective
countries could deal with the sensitive subjects that prevent
reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia, and did so in a
dispassionate and objective manner.
"We are not out to solve any of the outstanding issues, but to
prepare the ground for the dealing of them by politicians, if and
when they choose to do so. We are simply trying to 'clarify' the
respective terminologies and help create a better understanding,"
said Mr Kanli, who also explained that the meeting was a follow-up to
a series of meetings sponsored by the American University in
Washington since May 2001.
Such initiatives are important as confidence-building measures could
inspire the Turkish and Armenian governments to make progress in
their diplomatic relations. However, they also require tact and
discretion since Russia casts a long shadow over Armenia, and, it is
not obvious that Russia finds friendship between Armenia and Turkey
desirable. The group that Mr Kanli has brought together is making a
laudable effort in a way that is in the best interests of their
respective nations. Who knows, maybe the NATO summit can bring new
momentum to these efforts by meetings at both the levels of
government and civil society.
The NATO summit will, in fact, bring more clarity to many important
issues of global security that are now shrouded in uncertainty.
Hopefully the run-up to the summit will be an occasion for
exceptionally creative diplomacy. It is sorely needed."