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South Ossetia: Activism of the Georgian Government Tests International Efforts
by Jaba Devdariani / 2004-06-17 16:25:33
Civil Georgia
June 17 2004
Reposted from Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst
Breakaway region needs a complex of social
and economic rehabilitation projects.
The Georgian government has taken decisive steps to address some of
the most pressing political and economic problems related to the
post-conflict area of South Ossetia and proposes revision of the
current peacekeeping mandate.
Recent developments in South Ossetia have shown the inadequacy of the
current peacekeeping arrangements to the complex state-building and
conflict resolution tasks that the new Georgian administration
pursues. Pro-active economic rehabilitation and social assistance
programs that are offered to South Ossetian residents hold promise
for boosting the political negotiations, but also a risk for a
militant backlash.
Somewhat paradoxically, the international organizations involved in
conflict resolution could prove the least ready to catch up with the
new developments.
Background: The conflict in South Ossetia, leading to the death of
ca. 1,000 and the displacement of some 60,000 persons ended in a
ceasefire in July 1992. A somewhat unorthodox ceasefire arrangement
introduced a joint peacekeeping force (JPKF) composed of Georgian,
South Ossetian and Russian elements.
Russia took the factual, as well as the legal lead of the military
operation. The OSCE has been the most actively involved international
institution in the political aspect of conflict settlement, but a
quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) involving Georgia, South
Ossetia, Russia as well as Russia's North Ossetia Republic became the
main political discussion forum. The OSCE acts as a JCC participant,
while UNHCR and EU involvement in the process has varied over times
and is by now rudimentary.
Although the OSCE drafted a settlement proposal in August 1994,
Russian mediation (with OSCE participation) proved more fruitful in
moving the political dialogue forward. Meetings between the South
Ossetian and Georgian presidents Lyudvig Chibirov and Eduard
Shevardnadze in 1996-98 led to a general détente in the conflict
area.
By the end of the 1990s, road communications between Tskhinvali and
neighboring Georgian provinces were restored, and the region became a
booming hub for largely illegal trade between Georgia and Russia.
While economic détente was apparent, a political settlement proved
evasive. In July 2000, the conflicting parties agreed through OSCE
mediation on demilitarization, joint economic projects, elaboration
of the legislative base for repatriation of displaced persons, and
even on joint law enforcement activities.
Yet hopes for eventual political settlement were dashed in December
2001 with the election of Eduard Kokoev as South Ossetia's president.
Kokoev, a Russian businessman, has reportedly monopolized the illegal
trade and squeezed the previous leadership out of the political
arena, accusing them of pro-Georgian sentiments. Kokoev also presided
over a massive acceptance of Russian citizenship by South Ossetian
residents.
South Ossetia became a tangible economic security threat to Georgia.
Goods smuggled via Ossetia, such as petrol and flour, reportedly
capture up to 30% of the Georgian market. The "war economy" in South
Ossetia has also involved the Georgian and South Ossetian law
enforcers, as well as the peacekeepers, in smuggling and corruption.
In late May 2004, President Mikheil Saakashvili ordered interior
troops to crack down on smuggling. These moves harmed the interests
of the South Ossetian political elite, and apparently upset the
Russian peacekeeping commander, resulting in a standoff between
Georgian special services and the Russian and South Ossetian
peacekeepers.
In addition to these measures, Saakashvili proposed a complex of
social and economic rehabilitation projects in South Ossetia,
pledging to extend the Georgian government's protection to its
Ossetian citizens. For the first time, the Georgian leadership took
the initiative in South Ossetia and made some reconciliatory moves,
albeit carefully backed by credible force.
The reaction of foreign players has been rather perplexed. Russia has
reacted with warnings to Georgia against a resumption of hostilities.
The OSCE has made no official reaction apart from expressing general
concern. However, State Minister for Conflict Resolution Giorgi
Khaindrava has indicated that the Georgian government will propose a
revision of the peacekeeping mandate in South Ossetia.
Implications: Georgia's economic concerns are real. However, it is
impossible to effectively address these concerns in the current
format of peacekeeping, and OSCE diplomats seem to grudgingly agree
that the current format, which concentrated on the separation of
warring forces, has outlived its usefulness.
Effective anti-smuggling operations by Georgia put a stranglehold on
the South Ossetian leadership and may push them towards militarism if
political solutions are lagging. The domination of the Russian and
Ossetian components in the JPKF also seems to end as Georgia brings
its peacekeeping battalion to full strength in personnel and
equipment, and concentrates well-trained troops and heavy equipment
in adjacent Georgian provinces.
The need for a new level of political mediation is urgent, but
international actors seem hesitant to take risks and accept that
function. The OSCE has the longest history in handling this
particular conflict. However, its political decision-making is
burdened by consensus voting in Vienna, which would render the
organization incapable in case of Russia's opposition.
OSCE-Russia interaction failed to produce results in 2003, when a
Transdniestria peace plan strongly influenced by Russian interests
was met with opposition in Western capitals and eventually failed,
spurring heated criticisms towards the OSCE, which the organization
may see as an obstacle in addressing South Ossetia.
The EU has crucial tools at its disposal that may come into play if
initial political consultations on South Ossetia are successful. The
EU has generated significant experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina by
running the police mission (EUPM) tasked with reconciliation and
synchronization of the hostile ethnic groups within a single police
force and also rendered significant assistance to improvement of the
border controls there.
In South Ossetia, the interoperability of local police with Georgian
counterparts would be crucial in ensuring joint anti-smuggling
efforts and precluding an armed standoff similar to that of May 31,
2004.
South Ossetia has historically been overshadowed by the conflicts in
Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The interest and involvement of the
international organizations and foreign powers, except Russia, has
been very weak.
However, at present the Georgian government is determined to first
"unfreeze" and then resolve the conflict, and is choosing a
long-term, economics-based approach coupled with a "hearts and minds"
campaign to achieve this goal. Together with a relatively low degree
of inter-community tension, South Ossetia has the chance of becoming
a one-of-a-kind conflict resolution success in the post-Soviet space
and likely set a precedent.
There is a fierce battle among international organizations for
political know-how, donor attention and finite funding. The
organization or state that puts stakes in South Ossetia conflict
resolution is likely to rip significant political benefits, while the
consequences of failure are unlikely to be catastrophic.
Conclusions: Current actions of the Georgian government to articulate
new policies towards South Ossetia provide a good background for
productive political mediation by third parties. The international
organizations present in the South Caucasus such as the OSCE and the
EU have comparative advantages to take up this role. Georgia's recent
détente with Russia allows for positively involving the Kremlin in
this process.
It would take decades to amass the political will for peaceful
resolution comparable to the current mood in Tbilisi. Unless the
international organizations overcome their lethargy towards the
relatively low profile of South Ossetia to see the region-wide
benefits of successful conflict resolution, promising developments
may go in vain, leaving the scene to the "parties of war" on both
sides of the conflict.
by Jaba Devdariani / 2004-06-17 16:25:33
Civil Georgia
June 17 2004
Reposted from Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst
Breakaway region needs a complex of social
and economic rehabilitation projects.
The Georgian government has taken decisive steps to address some of
the most pressing political and economic problems related to the
post-conflict area of South Ossetia and proposes revision of the
current peacekeeping mandate.
Recent developments in South Ossetia have shown the inadequacy of the
current peacekeeping arrangements to the complex state-building and
conflict resolution tasks that the new Georgian administration
pursues. Pro-active economic rehabilitation and social assistance
programs that are offered to South Ossetian residents hold promise
for boosting the political negotiations, but also a risk for a
militant backlash.
Somewhat paradoxically, the international organizations involved in
conflict resolution could prove the least ready to catch up with the
new developments.
Background: The conflict in South Ossetia, leading to the death of
ca. 1,000 and the displacement of some 60,000 persons ended in a
ceasefire in July 1992. A somewhat unorthodox ceasefire arrangement
introduced a joint peacekeeping force (JPKF) composed of Georgian,
South Ossetian and Russian elements.
Russia took the factual, as well as the legal lead of the military
operation. The OSCE has been the most actively involved international
institution in the political aspect of conflict settlement, but a
quadripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) involving Georgia, South
Ossetia, Russia as well as Russia's North Ossetia Republic became the
main political discussion forum. The OSCE acts as a JCC participant,
while UNHCR and EU involvement in the process has varied over times
and is by now rudimentary.
Although the OSCE drafted a settlement proposal in August 1994,
Russian mediation (with OSCE participation) proved more fruitful in
moving the political dialogue forward. Meetings between the South
Ossetian and Georgian presidents Lyudvig Chibirov and Eduard
Shevardnadze in 1996-98 led to a general détente in the conflict
area.
By the end of the 1990s, road communications between Tskhinvali and
neighboring Georgian provinces were restored, and the region became a
booming hub for largely illegal trade between Georgia and Russia.
While economic détente was apparent, a political settlement proved
evasive. In July 2000, the conflicting parties agreed through OSCE
mediation on demilitarization, joint economic projects, elaboration
of the legislative base for repatriation of displaced persons, and
even on joint law enforcement activities.
Yet hopes for eventual political settlement were dashed in December
2001 with the election of Eduard Kokoev as South Ossetia's president.
Kokoev, a Russian businessman, has reportedly monopolized the illegal
trade and squeezed the previous leadership out of the political
arena, accusing them of pro-Georgian sentiments. Kokoev also presided
over a massive acceptance of Russian citizenship by South Ossetian
residents.
South Ossetia became a tangible economic security threat to Georgia.
Goods smuggled via Ossetia, such as petrol and flour, reportedly
capture up to 30% of the Georgian market. The "war economy" in South
Ossetia has also involved the Georgian and South Ossetian law
enforcers, as well as the peacekeepers, in smuggling and corruption.
In late May 2004, President Mikheil Saakashvili ordered interior
troops to crack down on smuggling. These moves harmed the interests
of the South Ossetian political elite, and apparently upset the
Russian peacekeeping commander, resulting in a standoff between
Georgian special services and the Russian and South Ossetian
peacekeepers.
In addition to these measures, Saakashvili proposed a complex of
social and economic rehabilitation projects in South Ossetia,
pledging to extend the Georgian government's protection to its
Ossetian citizens. For the first time, the Georgian leadership took
the initiative in South Ossetia and made some reconciliatory moves,
albeit carefully backed by credible force.
The reaction of foreign players has been rather perplexed. Russia has
reacted with warnings to Georgia against a resumption of hostilities.
The OSCE has made no official reaction apart from expressing general
concern. However, State Minister for Conflict Resolution Giorgi
Khaindrava has indicated that the Georgian government will propose a
revision of the peacekeeping mandate in South Ossetia.
Implications: Georgia's economic concerns are real. However, it is
impossible to effectively address these concerns in the current
format of peacekeeping, and OSCE diplomats seem to grudgingly agree
that the current format, which concentrated on the separation of
warring forces, has outlived its usefulness.
Effective anti-smuggling operations by Georgia put a stranglehold on
the South Ossetian leadership and may push them towards militarism if
political solutions are lagging. The domination of the Russian and
Ossetian components in the JPKF also seems to end as Georgia brings
its peacekeeping battalion to full strength in personnel and
equipment, and concentrates well-trained troops and heavy equipment
in adjacent Georgian provinces.
The need for a new level of political mediation is urgent, but
international actors seem hesitant to take risks and accept that
function. The OSCE has the longest history in handling this
particular conflict. However, its political decision-making is
burdened by consensus voting in Vienna, which would render the
organization incapable in case of Russia's opposition.
OSCE-Russia interaction failed to produce results in 2003, when a
Transdniestria peace plan strongly influenced by Russian interests
was met with opposition in Western capitals and eventually failed,
spurring heated criticisms towards the OSCE, which the organization
may see as an obstacle in addressing South Ossetia.
The EU has crucial tools at its disposal that may come into play if
initial political consultations on South Ossetia are successful. The
EU has generated significant experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina by
running the police mission (EUPM) tasked with reconciliation and
synchronization of the hostile ethnic groups within a single police
force and also rendered significant assistance to improvement of the
border controls there.
In South Ossetia, the interoperability of local police with Georgian
counterparts would be crucial in ensuring joint anti-smuggling
efforts and precluding an armed standoff similar to that of May 31,
2004.
South Ossetia has historically been overshadowed by the conflicts in
Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. The interest and involvement of the
international organizations and foreign powers, except Russia, has
been very weak.
However, at present the Georgian government is determined to first
"unfreeze" and then resolve the conflict, and is choosing a
long-term, economics-based approach coupled with a "hearts and minds"
campaign to achieve this goal. Together with a relatively low degree
of inter-community tension, South Ossetia has the chance of becoming
a one-of-a-kind conflict resolution success in the post-Soviet space
and likely set a precedent.
There is a fierce battle among international organizations for
political know-how, donor attention and finite funding. The
organization or state that puts stakes in South Ossetia conflict
resolution is likely to rip significant political benefits, while the
consequences of failure are unlikely to be catastrophic.
Conclusions: Current actions of the Georgian government to articulate
new policies towards South Ossetia provide a good background for
productive political mediation by third parties. The international
organizations present in the South Caucasus such as the OSCE and the
EU have comparative advantages to take up this role. Georgia's recent
détente with Russia allows for positively involving the Kremlin in
this process.
It would take decades to amass the political will for peaceful
resolution comparable to the current mood in Tbilisi. Unless the
international organizations overcome their lethargy towards the
relatively low profile of South Ossetia to see the region-wide
benefits of successful conflict resolution, promising developments
may go in vain, leaving the scene to the "parties of war" on both
sides of the conflict.