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ISN, Switzerland
June 28 2004
Mediators seek new formula for Karabakh 28.06.2004
Armenia insists on a "package" solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, while Azerbaijan is holding firm to a "step-by-step"
process that would first see a withdrawal of Armenian troops from the
occupied districts around the disputed republic. But the peace
process has become hostage to domestic politics as the president's
from both countries act first to save their careers from unpopular
decisions.
By Liz Fuller for RFE/RL
On 21 June, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the
French, Russian, and US co-chairmen of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group met for the third time
in 10 weeks to discuss approaches to resolving the Karabakh conflict.
Three days later, Russian co-chairman Yury Merzlyakov announced in
Moscow that the discussions focused on a new peace proposal that
would bridge the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the two
sides.
`Package deal' vs. `step-by-step' approach
Since 1998, Armenia has insisted on a "package" solution to the
conflict that would address and resolve all disputed issues in a
single agreement, without leaving any "loose ends", even if the
various provisions of that agreement were implemented not
simultaneously but consecutively, over time. Azerbaijan, by contrast,
favors a "step-by-step" approach, under which a series of separate
aspects of the problem would be addressed and resolved one at a time,
and the second problem or set of problems would be addressed only
after measures to implement the first had been successfully
completed. That approach would theoretically enable Azerbaijan to
demand a major concession from Armenia - such as the withdrawal of
Armenian forces from the regions that they currently control
bordering on the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic - without
making a concession of similar magnitude in return. That approach is
anathema to Yerevan, insofar as it entails the possible danger of
Armenia surrendering its biggest "bargaining chip" - the occupied
districts - without securing in return what it considers most
important, namely a cast-iron agreement that Nagorno-Karabakh should
not be vertically subordinated to the Azerbaijani central government.
Peace process hostage to political careers
US diplomats previously involved in the Minsk Group process say that
the "package" approach was the basis for the tentative agreements,
known as the "Paris principles", arrived at during the spring of 2001
during talks in Paris and Florida between Armenian President Robert
Kocharian and his Azeri counterpart Heidar Aliev. Aliev, however,
apparently subsequently realized that it would be more difficult than
he originally thought to persuade the Azerbaijani people to accept a
peace agreement that required a major concession from Baku.
(Precisely what status Nagorno-Karabakh was to have been granted
under the "Paris principles" remains a matter for conjecture. Aliev
rejected a proposal by the Minsk Group in late 1998 that Azerbaijan
and Nagorno-Karabakh should form a "common state".) The failure of
the "Paris Principles" underscores the degree to which the outcome of
any peace process is inevitably hostage to domestic political
considerations, specifically, the willingness or the reluctance of
national leaders to risk their careers by agreeing to concessions
that many voters consider not only politically unacceptable but an
insult to the memory of those who gave their lives fighting. While
success could be rewarded by a nomination for the Nobel Peace prize,
failure, or even badly judged timing, can spell the end of a
political career. One of the reasons for Armenian President Levon
Ter-Petrossian's forced resignation in February 1998 was his
readiness to accept a "step-by-step" peace plan unveiled by the Minsk
Group the previous September. Azerbaijan's current president, Ilham
Aliev, who hopes to win a second presidential term in 2008, has
little incentive to undermine his chances of doing so by making major
concessions before then, and indeed has said on several occasions
that he will "never" do so.
Speculation, disinformation, dangerous rumors
The conflict sides and the OSCE Minsk Group have a gentlemen's
agreement not to divulge either specific proposals under discussion
or the reactions of one side to statements by the other. That
insistence on the confidentiality of the negotiating process is
intended to preclude the leak of details that could destroy a tenuous
consensus reached in months or even years of talks by provoking a
domestic political backlash that might even endanger the stability of
one or both governments. But the lack of detailed information also
serves to engender any amount of speculation, disinformation, and
rumors concerning peace proposals that have no formal status - such
as that by EU rapporteur Per Gahrton early this year that Armenia
withdraw its forces from five occupied Azeri districts in return for
the resumption of rail communication between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Merzlyakov's Moscow disclosure suggests that there are indeed grounds
for cautious optimism that a solution to the conflict could be
reached. But Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov warned that it
would take time. The Azeri daily Ekho on 24 June quoted him as
comparing the negotiations to cooking, implying that for the best
results, neither process should be rushed. At the same time,
Mammadyarov expressed confidence that the final product will be both
"tasty" and "digestible" to everyone.
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/infoservice/secwatch/index.cfm?service=cwn&parent=detail&menu=8 &sNewsID`06
June 28 2004
Mediators seek new formula for Karabakh 28.06.2004
Armenia insists on a "package" solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, while Azerbaijan is holding firm to a "step-by-step"
process that would first see a withdrawal of Armenian troops from the
occupied districts around the disputed republic. But the peace
process has become hostage to domestic politics as the president's
from both countries act first to save their careers from unpopular
decisions.
By Liz Fuller for RFE/RL
On 21 June, the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the
French, Russian, and US co-chairmen of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group met for the third time
in 10 weeks to discuss approaches to resolving the Karabakh conflict.
Three days later, Russian co-chairman Yury Merzlyakov announced in
Moscow that the discussions focused on a new peace proposal that
would bridge the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the two
sides.
`Package deal' vs. `step-by-step' approach
Since 1998, Armenia has insisted on a "package" solution to the
conflict that would address and resolve all disputed issues in a
single agreement, without leaving any "loose ends", even if the
various provisions of that agreement were implemented not
simultaneously but consecutively, over time. Azerbaijan, by contrast,
favors a "step-by-step" approach, under which a series of separate
aspects of the problem would be addressed and resolved one at a time,
and the second problem or set of problems would be addressed only
after measures to implement the first had been successfully
completed. That approach would theoretically enable Azerbaijan to
demand a major concession from Armenia - such as the withdrawal of
Armenian forces from the regions that they currently control
bordering on the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic - without
making a concession of similar magnitude in return. That approach is
anathema to Yerevan, insofar as it entails the possible danger of
Armenia surrendering its biggest "bargaining chip" - the occupied
districts - without securing in return what it considers most
important, namely a cast-iron agreement that Nagorno-Karabakh should
not be vertically subordinated to the Azerbaijani central government.
Peace process hostage to political careers
US diplomats previously involved in the Minsk Group process say that
the "package" approach was the basis for the tentative agreements,
known as the "Paris principles", arrived at during the spring of 2001
during talks in Paris and Florida between Armenian President Robert
Kocharian and his Azeri counterpart Heidar Aliev. Aliev, however,
apparently subsequently realized that it would be more difficult than
he originally thought to persuade the Azerbaijani people to accept a
peace agreement that required a major concession from Baku.
(Precisely what status Nagorno-Karabakh was to have been granted
under the "Paris principles" remains a matter for conjecture. Aliev
rejected a proposal by the Minsk Group in late 1998 that Azerbaijan
and Nagorno-Karabakh should form a "common state".) The failure of
the "Paris Principles" underscores the degree to which the outcome of
any peace process is inevitably hostage to domestic political
considerations, specifically, the willingness or the reluctance of
national leaders to risk their careers by agreeing to concessions
that many voters consider not only politically unacceptable but an
insult to the memory of those who gave their lives fighting. While
success could be rewarded by a nomination for the Nobel Peace prize,
failure, or even badly judged timing, can spell the end of a
political career. One of the reasons for Armenian President Levon
Ter-Petrossian's forced resignation in February 1998 was his
readiness to accept a "step-by-step" peace plan unveiled by the Minsk
Group the previous September. Azerbaijan's current president, Ilham
Aliev, who hopes to win a second presidential term in 2008, has
little incentive to undermine his chances of doing so by making major
concessions before then, and indeed has said on several occasions
that he will "never" do so.
Speculation, disinformation, dangerous rumors
The conflict sides and the OSCE Minsk Group have a gentlemen's
agreement not to divulge either specific proposals under discussion
or the reactions of one side to statements by the other. That
insistence on the confidentiality of the negotiating process is
intended to preclude the leak of details that could destroy a tenuous
consensus reached in months or even years of talks by provoking a
domestic political backlash that might even endanger the stability of
one or both governments. But the lack of detailed information also
serves to engender any amount of speculation, disinformation, and
rumors concerning peace proposals that have no formal status - such
as that by EU rapporteur Per Gahrton early this year that Armenia
withdraw its forces from five occupied Azeri districts in return for
the resumption of rail communication between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Merzlyakov's Moscow disclosure suggests that there are indeed grounds
for cautious optimism that a solution to the conflict could be
reached. But Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov warned that it
would take time. The Azeri daily Ekho on 24 June quoted him as
comparing the negotiations to cooking, implying that for the best
results, neither process should be rushed. At the same time,
Mammadyarov expressed confidence that the final product will be both
"tasty" and "digestible" to everyone.
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/infoservice/secwatch/index.cfm?service=cwn&parent=detail&menu=8 &sNewsID`06