RFE/RL Newsline Special Issue, "EU Expands Eastward," - 05/03/2004

[Lazarian Mary]

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ __________________
RFE/RL NEWSLINE SPECIAL ISSUE, "EU EXPANDS EASTWARD," 3 May 2004

NOTE TO READERS: In line with RFE/RL's changing priorities, as of
4 May, "RFE/RL Newsline" will substantially reduce its coverage of the
eight Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European states -- Slovenia,
Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary, Estonia, and the Czech
Republic -- that became full-fledged members of the European Union on
1 May, and also of Croatia and Bulgaria. This means that domestic
political and economic developments in those countries will no longer
be reported on a daily basis. We will, however, continue to report on
topics of importance to our broadcast region, including security
concerns and NATO-related issues, as well as human rights and
minority issues.

READ RFE/RL'S UNIQUE INSIGHT INTO THE EU'S HISTORIC
EXPANSION. For detailed analysis and long-running coverage from the
Baltics to the Balkans, see our dedicated "European Union Expands
Eastward" webpage: http://www.rferl.org/specials/euexpands.

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* EU WELCOMES NEW MEMBERS, BUT WHERE IS THE
ENTHUSIASM?
* WHERE DOES EUROPE'S ENLARGEMENT END?
* POLAND RIDES INTO EU ON EBBING ENTHUSIASM
* EU EXPANSION BRINGS LITTLE JOY TO CROSS-BORDER
TRADERS IN BELARUS, UKRAINE
* REFERENDUMS ON EU CONSTITUTION COULD PROVE TRICKY
* CZECHS STILL FEAR FIREWORKS MARK PYRRHIC VICTORY
* SLOVAKIA'S EU RUN HAS LEFT PREMIER GASPING
* THE BALTIC STATES' ROCKY ROAD TO THE EU
* EU, RUSSIA AGREE COMPROMISE TEXT FOR JOINT
MINORITIES DECLARATION
* EU/RUSSIA: LANDMARK ENLARGEMENT DEAL SIGNED, BUT
LOOSE ENDS REMAIN
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ANALYSIS: EU WELCOMES NEW MEMBERS, BUT WHERE IS THE
ENTHUSIASM?

By Ulrich Buechsenschuetz

Ten new countries will join the European Union on 1 May: Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia. In figures, the event means the addition of
some 83 million new EU citizens to the current 378 million, making
the 25-member union a huge, complex, and economically powerful global
player that accounts for about one-quarter of the world's economic
output.
In the loftier language of the EU, the enlargement is "a
historic opportunity to unite Europe peacefully after generations of
division and conflict," which "will extend the EU's stability and
prosperity to a wider group of countries, consolidating the political
and economic transition that has taken place in Central and Eastern
Europe since 1989" (see
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/faq/index.htm).
The new union's architects also hope that by pushing its
borders beyond the former Iron Curtain, the EU will not only achieve
peace and stability in Europe but also gain global influence. Such a
union could eventually meet the challenges of both economic
globalization and global terrorism, the enlarged EU's crafters hope.
At present, it is impossible to know whether the EU will
eventually grow into a federal state or remain a family of sovereign
states that are bound together by common economic rather than
political interests. Early enthusiasm for enlargement and the
visionary period appear to have been eclipsed by popular reticence.
Recent opinion polls suggest that public support for the
enlargement is waning among current and acceding member states alike.
One such poll was conducted in March by Austria's IMAS polling
institute and included 6,000 respondents from Austria, Germany, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. It concluded the following:

* 42 percent of Poles are convinced the enlargement will benefit
their country, while 33 percent remain unconvinced of the advantages.

* In Hungary, 34 percent are optimistic and 27 percent regard the
expansion with skepticism.

* In the Czech Republic, 35 percent of the public is optimistic and
33 percent skeptical about the benefits of expansion.

* 46 percent of Austrians are skeptical of expansion and 24 percent
favor it.

* Germans are even more critical, with 47 percent skeptical of the
enlargement and 20 percent supporting it.

The IMAS poll highlights two aspects of the EU enlargement. For
representatives of the governments and the economic sectors among
older EU countries, enlargement is widely regarded as a major
opportunity for economic expansion. But for the broader populations
so often influenced by the low-brow reporting of tabloid newspapers,
the opening of the borders presents a threat to their jobs -- and not
only among states bordering the acceding countries, such as Austria
or Germany. Ed Vulliamy noted in "The Observer" of 11 April:
"Suddenly, our new partner citizens in the EU -- those same people
whose deliverance from Communism, wrought by their own bravery, we
celebrated 14 years ago -- have become potential 'benefit tourists'
(Daily Mail), agents of 'social upheaval' (Financial Times), a
'menace' (the Mail again) to our social services, a horde of gypsies,
or a 'flood tide' (Daily Express) of 'millions of immigrants' (the
Mail again). Government talk is not of liberty or union, but of
'habitual residence requirements' and 'employment registration
certificates.'"
But it is not only the largely unfounded fear of immigrant
flows that has prompted some politicians in the older member states
to turn populist. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder recently
slammed calls by German industrial leaders to move facilities to the
future member states as "unpatriotic." To avert such moves, he called
on acceding countries not to seek to attract investments through low
corporate tax rates. He also warned the newer EU members not to spend
the taxes paid in the large industrial countries, such as Germany, on
infrastructure projects in the less-developed new member states.
On the other hand, the growing skepticism in the new member
states about the enlargement is mainly due to such attempts by the
larger members such as France or Germany to bully them into giving up
their economic advantages and their sovereignty on foreign-policy
issues.
Negotiations on a European constitutional treaty have presented
another sobering reminder for new EU members. Poland, the largest
country joining the EU on 1 May, felt cheated by the EU's big players
when the voting rights that it was granted by the 2001 Treaty of Nice
were again restricted in the draft constitution. Although a new
double-majority system might ensure to some extent that the EU's
smaller countries are not so easily outvoted, many Poles still feel
betrayed. No wonder, then, that anti-EU populists such as the radical
leader of the Self-Defense party in Poland, Andrzej Lepper, are doing
so well in the polls.
There are also the Euro-skeptic torchbearers like Czech
President Vaclav Klaus, who in an article for "Mlada fronta Dnes" of
22 April claimed that EU membership entails a loss of independence
for the Czech Republic. Czechs "must do everything we can so we are
not lost in the EU, so that our unique existence over 1,000 years
will not crumble and be lost," Klaus wrote.
While there is little basis for such fears, they hint at what
an enormous challenge it will be for the EU to integrate new members.
Integration might be easy in the EU's core sectors, such as the
economy, tax policy, or customs. However, a significant dream of some
current members will remain a dream for some time to come -- creating
a joint EU foreign and security policy for all 25 members. The rift
between much of "old Europe" and "new Europe" over Iraq has clearly
demonstrated the difficulty of attaining one of the main aims of a
joint foreign and security policy for the EU: creating an effective
counterweight to the United States.
This is a question of political unity and of military power.
Neither will the new EU members, from the Baltics to the Balkans,
surrender their view that the United States is a necessary safeguard
against Russian pretensions; nor will the EU reach U.S. levels of
military expenditure anytime soon.
In other words, at least for the time being, EU enlargement
will bring about less change than one might have expected.

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ANALYSIS: WHERE DOES EUROPE'S ENLARGEMENT END?

By Luke Allnutt

The European Union has always remained deliberately vague about where
its borders lie. Provided countries fulfill the 1993 Copenhagen
criteria -- guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights, and respect
for minorities, as well as having a functioning market economy --
technically anyone can join. In the late 1980s, Morocco -- with its
eyes on the market just 16 kilometers across the Straits of Gibraltar
-- applied to join the union, only to be told it was not European
enough.
Following the accession of 10 mostly Central and Eastern
European countries on 1 May, one of the big questions is: Where next?
If all goes well, Romania and Bulgaria (and possibly Croatia) will
join in 2007. In the event that they meet the demands of Copenhagen,
the remaining countries of the western Balkans and Turkey are
probably next on the list, perhaps sometime in the next decade.
After that, the choices become less palatable. Ukraine is still
trying to make the right noises, but its enthusiasm for reforms
remains laconic at best. Moldova, Europe's poorest country, has a
flimsy civil society and a glacial pace of reform. It is burdened by
Transdniester -- a pro-Russian breakaway region that is a lawless
paradise for gangsters and arms dealers. Belarus, hamstrung by the
erratic populism of autocratic President Alyaksandr Lukashenka and
its unreformed Soviet-style economy, is a particularly unattractive
prospect.
Farther east, there are the countries of the South Caucasus:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The latter's "Rose Revolution" in
November brought the region back onto policymakers' radar screens,
but subsequent tensions over the breakaway republic of Adjaria
represent a major step backward for Georgia. Armenia's strongman
president, Robert Kocharian, has meanwhile responded ruthlessly to
public demands that he respect the courts and the ballot box.
Azerbaijan remains isolated from the European family over
shortcomings like the continuing battle for Nagorno-Karabakh, the
government's stubborn refusal to release political prisoners, and a
general lack of respect for democracy and human rights. The stakes in
the CIS are considerably higher, as those former communist countries
are part of Russia's "near abroad." With that in mind, it is
difficult to imagine these countries joining the EU in anything less
than two decades.
That is not necessarily a gloomy prognosis. John Palmer, the
political director of the Brussels-based European Policy Center,
thinks that after the countries of the western Balkans get accepted,
"we might see the end of classic enlargement."
That could usher in a multispeed Europe -- one that allows for
a certain amount of differentiation. European politicians have always
balked at the term, for all its connotations of a Europe divided
between dunces and high-flyers. More recently it has been seen as
French President Jacques Chirac's Plan B -- an opportunity for France
and Germany to forge ahead with an inward-looking European agenda
after the failure of the European constitution talks late last year.
Yet a multispeed EU might be the only way the union can expand
further while maintaining the standards laid out in the acquis
communautaire and not overstretching the purse strings of the richest
member states. The recurring nightmare for many European politicians
is that the inclusion of dubious democracies -- like Moldova or
Ukraine -- would seriously discredit the union. The EU would become
an ailing franchise, the political equivalent of a fast-food giant
letting any old greasy spoon hang its global logo above the door.
Even the Eurovision song contest would garner more respect on the
international stage.
Early signs of the EU's willingness to embrace differentiation
can be seen in the Wider Europe program, which is a framework for
countries in the western NIS and southern Mediterranean who will soon
find themselves sharing a border with the union. Countries in the
Wider Europe program have been offered the prospect of full
participation in the EU's market and its four fundamental freedoms --
goods, capital, services, and, eventually, people -- provided they
adhere to certain core values and show concrete progress in
political, economic, and institutional reforms. The ethos of the
program is "Integration, Not Membership."
In the future, if the EU abandoned its open-door policy, states
on the fringes of the union would not become full members of the
union, but there would be some elements of shared sovereignty. Europe
might become what has been termed a "union of concentric circles,"
with an inner core that accepts the acquis communautaire in full,
monetary union, the Common Agricultural Policy, and then wider
circles of countries accepting decreasing levels of commitment.
Europe a la carte exists already to some degree, most notably
with the single currency, and the European Policy Center's Palmer
says these types of ad hoc alliances and groupings will become more
common. Countries will club together and pursue various shared policy
interests.
There are several significant problems with such a
differentiated approach. The first, according to Jonathan Lipkin, an
analyst for Oxford Analytica writing for EUObserver.com, is "how
overlapping coalitions of states could find a way to put in place
coherent and effective administrative and enforcement mechanisms."
The second is that prospective partners, or members, might not
go for an "accession lite." Anything less than full membership "just
doesn't do it for these countries. It's not enough," says Gergana
Noutcheva, an enlargement expert at the Center for European Policy
Studies in Brussels. And as financier and philanthropist George Soros
wrote in a syndicated column for Project Syndicate in March, "The
most powerful tool that the EU has for influencing political and
economic developments in neighboring countries is the prospect of
membership."
Further expansion will also require a good deal of
housekeeping. The brouhaha about the draft constitution in December
illustrated the shortcomings of the decision-making process within a
larger union. Without reform, the situation would only get worse.
"The bigger the EU gets, the national veto will become more a source
of paralysis," Palmer says. That means the union will have to rely
more heavily on qualified majority voting (QMV) in the future.
The likelihood and extent of further expansion (in terms of
political will and popular tolerance) will depend largely on how this
most recent wave goes. Enlargement fatigue has already set in. The
richest EU states are worried about the cost of integration and are
currently sparring with the European Commission about capping the
budget. Europeans outside the Euro-elite tend to be lukewarm about EU
expansion. According to a November Eurobarometer poll, 54 percent of
the French public opposed enlargement.
It would only take a few high-level scandals (diseased Slovak
chickens or embezzled structural funds earmarked for a children's
hospital in Poznan, perhaps) for the mood to swing further against
enlargement. Britain's recent backpedaling over migration after a few
scaremongering stories in the tabloid press about the imminent
arrival of job-stealing, welfare-sapping Eastern Europeans showed the
impact that public opinion can have on government policy.

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ANALYSIS: POLAND RIDES INTO EU ON EBBING ENTHUSIASM

By Jan Maksymiuk

Poland joins the European Union on 1 May along with nine other
newcomers. For many Poles, this will obviously be a joyous historic
occasion. The day might well be viewed as a symbolic boundary that
puts a definitive end to the post-World War II division of Europe
into two antagonistic camps by the Iron Curtain. The formal admission
of Poland to the EU crowns that country's effort to overcome the
consequences of the 1945 Yalta Agreement, which cut Poles off from
Europe and left them in the Soviet-dominated zone for nearly half a
century.
"Such days are very rare in human life," "Gazeta Wyborcza"
Editor in Chief Adam Michnik wrote on 30 April on the occasion of the
EU expansion.
For a majority of Poles, however, the festive mood instilled by
media, government officials, and communist-era dissidents on this
occasion will be mingled with serious apprehension and anxiety. In a
June 2003 referendum, more than 77 percent of Polish voters said
"yes" to EU membership. But recent opinion polls suggest Polish
enthusiasm for the EU has fallen well below 50 percent. Polish
farmers are among the most strident EU-skeptics in the country -- no
more than 30 percent of them view EU accession in a positive light.
The most popular party in the country is the outspokenly anti-EU
Self-Defense party led by Andrzej Lepper, which enjoys the support of
one-third of Polish voters.
What are the most pressing anxieties in Poland in relation to
country's EU entry? Generally, most Poles are afraid that EU
membership might not bring the economic advantages advertised by the
government during accession talks. In particular, there is
apprehension that Poland might become a net contributor to the EU
budget from the outset, even though its economic output per capita is
less than 40 percent of the EU average.
The Polish farming sector is the most graphic example of such
anxiety. More than 2 million farms in Poland are small and poorly
equipped to compete with West European farmers on an expanded market
of 450 million consumers. Initially, Polish farmers will be
additionally handicapped by the EU's system of direct farm subsidies:
They will receive just 25, 30, and 35 percent of full EU subsidies in
2004, 2005, 2006, respectively. No one can predict how enlargement
will affect and alter the Polish agricultural sector.
Poland's unemployment rate has been fluctuating between 18 and
20 percent in the past year, which translates into nearly 3.5 million
job seekers. Fearing a flood of cheap labor, all EU members apart
from Ireland and Great Britain will introduce temporary restrictions
on access to their labor markets for Poles and other postcommunist EU
nationals. Poland will hardly be improving its employment situation
by virtue of joining an expanded job market. Some in Poland argue
that the unemployment rate might even increase in the short term due
to the closures of businesses that cannot compete with rivals from
Western Europe.
Another grave concern is that moneyed foreigners will "buy up"
Poland -- that is, purchase the most attractive real estate and land
in Poland before Poles are sufficiently wealthy to afford such
purchases. To dampen such fears, the Polish government negotiated a
reasonably long transition period on property land sales; foreigners
are banned from buying farmland and forests for 12 years after Poland
joins the EU. That period is reduced to seven years for EU farmers
who currently lease land in the west and north of the country
(regions that belonged to Germany before World War II), and to three
years for similar cases throughout the rest of the country.
However, Polish populist and nationalist parties warn their
compatriots that Poland might be faced with a flood of property-
restitution claims from the heirs or successors of ethnic Germans
forced to leave the territories ceded to Poland after World War II.
No one has convincingly assured Poles that such an eventuality is not
on the horizon.
Apart from the aforementioned concerns, which are shared by
large segments of ordinary Poles, there are also tricky issues
connected with EU entry for the Polish ruling elite. Poland and Spain
blocked the adoption of an EU constitution late last year, objecting
to the double-majority voting system stipulated in the document.
Spain's new Socialist government subsequently withdrew those
objections. Poland has signaled its desire for consensus on the
voting-rights issue, but no face-saving compromise has emerged.
Moreover, Warsaw's staunch pro-Washington stance is widely seen
as a major hurdle on the EU's path toward a coherent and united
foreign policy.
In other words, the momentous and much-coveted "reunion of
Poland with Europe" for many Poles signals the beginning of a new
epoch of obstacles and, in all probability, social unrest. The fiery
Lepper has warned that Poland will "renegotiate" most agreements with
the EU if he comes to power. "If Poland is not treated [by the EU] on
an equal footing, then Poland's EU accession might be the beginning
of the end of the European Union in its present shape," Lepper told
at a throng of cheering Poles last week.
Or at least, to borrow Winston Churchill's witticism, the end
of the beginning.

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EU EXPANSION BRINGS LITTLE JOY TO CROSS-BORDER TRADERS IN
BELARUS, UKRAINE

By Valentinas Mite

On 1 May, the 10 new members of the EU will be celebrating their
accession to the bloc. But the celebrations are unlikely to extend
further east. Cross-border traders and travelers in the former Soviet
republics of Belarus and Ukraine are worried the new EU borders will
mean stricter controls on their movement and livelihood.

Prague, 28 April 2004 (RFE/RL) -- The 1 May EU enlargement means
changes for people living in the new member states. But it also means
changes for those living just beyond the new EU borders -- in
countries like Belarus and Ukraine.
A number of changes are taking place at the borders -- some
gradually, some immediately. And small-scale border trading, the only
livelihood for many impoverished residents of Ukraine and Belarus, is
likely to be strongly scaled back.
Thousands of Ukrainians and Belarusians travel to the border
with imminent EU members Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and
Hungary to sell cigarettes, vodka, and food -- a modest trade that
brings them just enough money to support their families.
But with the borders of those countries now regulated by the
EU's visa regimes, such cross-border trade has already sharply
declined.
A majority of the trade takes place along the Ukrainian Polish
border. Oksana Plyak is a pensioner living in the small western
Ukrainian village of Bikiv near the Polish border. She tells Reuters
that with pensions of only about $20 per month, many people are
surviving thanks only to border trade.
Poland's stricter border control has already scared off many
traders. Plyak continues to trade, but it's not an easy day's work.
She has to walk 7 kilometers and spend three or four hours waiting in
line for a visa that allows her to cross into Poland for the day.
Plyak is worried the EU expansion will mean the end of her
extra income, even though the payoff is next to nothing.
"And from all of this you won't make more than three to four dollars
a crossing because you can't carry that many [things to sell]. You
can make more money, but I don't know if I can carry any more."
Belarusians living in the border regions with Poland, Latvia,
and Lithuania are also afraid they will be affected by the new
regulations.
Andrei Fedorov is an independent political analyst in Minsk. He
says the regulations being imposed by each of the border countries
have slight differences.
"As concerns Poland, as far as I know, a visa will become twice
as cheap. From the first of May, a one-time visa will cost 5 euros
[$6], but I think it is not even connected with the [Polish] EU
accession because the agreement was reached earlier. As concerns
Latvia, it will introduce a substantially more expensive visa -- from
10 to 25 euros. However, instead of several types of visas there will
be only two types of visas left -- a transit visa and a visa for
entering the country," Fedorov says.
Few border traders can afford to pay 25 or even 10 euros for a
visa. Even Poland's 5 euro visa will dip heavily into whatever
profits a cross-border trader can hope to make in a day's work.
Sergio Carrera is a political analyst with the Center for
European Policy Studies in Brussels, where he specializes in EU visa
policy and free-movement issues. He says the European Commission has
repeatedly said the new border regimes should not become a barrier to
trade or cultural exchange, and has taken steps to facilitate local
border traffic.
"It will grant a specific sort of visa for people living in an
area close to the border, within 50 kilometers. And this visa will
allow people traveling to Poland -- for instance, for purposes of
trade or for purposes of family, with those people who are living
very close to the Polish border and have family in Poland -- they
will have the possibility by holding this visa to come in and come
out of Poland without the necessity of further administrative checks
and lengthy procedures," Carrera says.
Carrera also says that cross-border trade and traveling within
the new EU countries will inevitably become more complicated for
Belarusians and Ukrainians after the new members become full-fledged
members of the Schengen agreement in three years.
Carrera says technically, Germany's eastern border will remain
the official EU border for that time. Until the new members fully
join Schengen, the EU will have two eastern borders rather than one.

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ANALYSIS: REFERENDUMS ON EU CONSTITUTION COULD PROVE TRICKY

By Ulrich Buechsenschuetz

When British Prime Minister Tony Blair called for a referendum on the
planned constitutional charter of the European Union on 20 April, he
not only "wrong-footed" the British opposition Conservative Party, as
London's "Independent" put it the following day. He also -- probably
unwillingly -- highlighted the fact that a number of current EU
members, as well as some of the new member states, which are to join
the union on 1 May, will also hold referendums. In addition, Blair's
move led some media to ask what would happen if any of the EU members
rejects the EU constitution in a referendum.
The constitutional charter is to provide a new framework for
decision-making processes, the structure of the EU's institutions,
and the basic rights for the enlarged EU. It is aimed at replacinig
the old, complex, and ponderous system of treaties. Its main
achievement, some observers contend, is that democracy within the EU
institutions will be strengthened by granting greater powers to the
European Parliament and the parliaments of member states. Moreover,
the constitution could also help foster a European identity, as
authors such as Christine Landfried of Hamburg University believe.
Of the current EU members, Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and
Luxembourg have already decided to hold referendums.
There are three countries in which a decision on a referendum
has not yet been made, but which appear set to give the people a say
on the constitutional charter: the Netherlands, where a referendum
would be purely consultative and not binding for the government, and,
among the new EU members, Poland and Latvia.
Although Estonia has not adopted any official position thus
far, it may possibly join the countries holding referendums -- but
only if a parliamentary majority decides to do so.
The group of countries that have not yet decided whether to put
the EU's new basic law to popular vote or not include Austria,
France, Portugal, and Spain among the old members, and the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Slovenia among the new.
Many Western European newspaper commentators agree that Blair's
decision in favor of the referendum has drastically increased the
pressure on French President Jacques Chirac to do the same. Other
leaders, like Austria's Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel, have said they
prefer "the right moment" to decide on the EU constitution.
In the Czech Republic, a public debate on a possible referendum
on the EU constitution ended without result. Hungary, Slovakia, and
Slovenia are also still undecided on how to ratify the union's future
constitution. In 10 countries -- Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Finland, and Sweden of the current members, and Cyprus, Estonia,
Lithuania, and Malta of the new -- it will be up to the parliament to
ratify the constitution. Despite traditional reservations about
plebiscites, some smaller German parties have already signaled that
they would prefer the people to ratify the constitution rather than
the parliament. However, the alliance of such divergent parties as
the governing Green Party and Bavaria's ruling Christian Social Union
is unlikely to succeed in convincing the vast majority of German
politicians to let the people have a say.
Since the populations of many current and future EU members
remain skeptical of the EU and its benefits, it might well be that,
if given the chance to do so, they would refuse to ratify the EU
constitution. And it is just as likely that the British, Danes, or
Poles will go the same way.
In that case, as Joachim-Fritz Vannahme wrote in the Hamburg
weekly "Die Zeit" on 22 April, the "cryptic" Article IV-7 of the EU
constitution would apply: "If, two years after the signature of the
treaty amending the Treaty establishing the Constitution, four fifths
of the Member States have ratified it and one or more Member States
have encountered difficulties in proceeding with ratification, the
matter shall be referred to the European Council." (For the full text
of the draft constitution see
http://www.europa.eu.int/futurum/constitution/index_en.htm.)
Because of this article, Hans-Gert Poettering, the chairman of
the conservative European People's Party group in the European
Parliament, demanded on 20 April that a provision be added to the
draft constitution stipulating that member states that vote against
the constitution must leave the union.
Vannahme described two possible scenarios. If only one or two
member states fail to ratify the constitution, it will be up to the
European Council to decide whether to go ahead without those states,
"But only [if these states are small countries like] Denmark or
Estonia, and not France or...Britain."
However, if six or seven EU members fail to ratify the
constitution, it would not be worth the paper it was written on and
the EU would be facing a major crisis, Vannahme wrote. He added that
this perspective is not as unlikely as it may sound today. Given that
a number of countries holding referendums have populations prone to
Euro-skepticism and the possibility of shifting majorities in some
parliaments, it may well be that the EU will go on functioning
without a constitution for some time to come, using the old system of
treaties. This system may be ponderous, but it has the advantage of
not completely dividing the union, Vannahme wrote.
On the other hand, a "no" vote in a referendum need not
necessarily mean a definite "no." After all, Ireland voted twice on
the Treaty of Nice, while the Danes approved the Maastricht Treaty on
the second attempt.

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ANALYSIS: CZECHS STILL FEAR FIREWORKS MARK PYRRHIC VICTORY

By Michael Shafir

As fireworks lit up Prague's historic Old Town after midnight on 1
May to mark the country's accession to the European Union, divisions
among the country's political elites over the significance and the
implications of the step were equally prominent over the Czech
capital's horizon.
Former President Vaclav Havel was expected to celebrate the
event together with the speakers of both houses of parliament and
representatives of the 25 old and new EU members in the Czech
Senate's Wallenstein Gardens on the evening of 1 May -- an extension
of celebrations that began one day earlier in the company of Prime
Minister Vladimir Spidla, Czech and European writers, and other
luminaries.
"As it always is in this world, it won't come for free, it will
take work, and it won't be easy for everyone -- especially at the
beginning, in a new environment," Spidla told an audience on 30
April. "But I am sure that we will overcome and that this historic
choice will pay off for us."
On the other hand, the current occupant of Prague Castle,
President Vaclav Klaus, had announced that he saw no need to take
part in the celebrations and that for him the evening would be spent
quietly, without doing "anything special." Klaus ended up delivering
a television speech in which he urged Czechs not to "lose ourselves"
or "blur our identity" and warned: "Today we are not entering Europe,
because we have long been in [Europe] and always will be -- including
in the period of our greatest subjugation. Today we are entering the
European Union; and our task is thus far more prosaic: to learn to
orient ourselves and operate within the Brussels structures and in
the formation of a complex supranational entity, which has nothing at
all in common with poetry."
The Czech Republic's self-described "Euro-realist" head of
state announced his intention of "doing nothing" to celebrate EU
accession during a recent trip to China -- arguably not the most
appropriate spot for such a comment. It was also during that trip
that Klaus lashed out at EU enlargement: In an article published in
the daily "Mlada fronta Dnes," Klaus wrote that the Czech Republic
would cease to exist as an independent country and urged his
countrymen to "do everything we can so we are not lost in the EU, so
that our unique existence over 1,000 years will not crumble and be
lost." A former prime minister under whose leadership the country
applied for EU membership, Klaus has often stated that joining the EU
is to be regarded as a "marriage of convenience," not of love, and
that the Czech Republic has had no choice but to join the union out
of fear of finding itself in isolation on the continent. He has
squandered few occasions to bash "Brussels bureaucrats" or insist
that manifold aspects of EU overregulation or financial indiscretion
will have a negative impact on his country.
In the Czech Republic's case, a feeling of entitlement dates
all the way back to the 1938 Munich Agreement, when France and
Britain "sold out" the independent Czechoslovak state to Hitler's
Germany.
These are also, by and large, the positions of the senior
opposition Civic Democratic Party (ODS), whose honorary chairman
Klaus remains. The ODS is comfortably leading in opinion polls. It
would be imprudent to attribute that popularity solely to the party's
positions on the EU, but it demonstrates that -- at a minimum --
there are many Czechs who do not object to such Euro-skepticism. In a
June 2003 referendum on EU membership, Czech voters endorsed
membership by a large majority of 77 percent, but turnout was also a
mere 55 percent. Since then, however, Czechs have become increasingly
skeptical of EU enlargement.
A recent poll for the widest-circulation Czech daily, "Mlada
fronta Dnes," suggested that a majority of Czechs reject Klaus's talk
of "the dissolving of [the Czech Republic] in the EU." But fears
abound of higher prices after accession, a decreased level of control
over events, and a lack of preparedness for EU membership, according
to the same research. One-third of Czechs believe the country's
political leadership conducted itself poorly in negotiations over the
terms of accession, the pollsters concluded.
Other independent polls suggest Czechs are less supportive of
EU membership than either Hungarians or Poles, with a negligible
difference between "Euro-optimists" and "Euro-skeptics," at roughly
one-third each of the total population.
Three main factors appear to have contributed most strongly to
the drop in popularity of EU membership: the immediate costs of
enlargement for the Czech taxpayer; panic among the EU's 15 "old"
members over a possible invasion of cheap labor from the "new"
members; and persistent squabbles over the postwar Benes Decrees with
neighboring Germany and Austria, but also with segments of the
Hungarian political elite.
The decision of the Czech government to use the goal of value-
added-tax harmonization with the EU effectively to increase taxation
(a move that President Klaus unsuccessfully vetoed) -- amid talk of
elusive fiscal discipline ahead of adopting the euro, moreover -- has
highlighted fears of higher costs. Few Czechs, or for that matter few
nationals from among the other new members, are likely to gain much
solace from the long-term promises of EU advantages.
Second, Czechs and other accession citizens feel they are being
treated unfairly by being depicted as potential invaders in search of
jobs in Western Europe -- all the more so as their own government has
opted not to impose retaliatory measures (unlike Hungary and Poland).
But they also feel that their western partners are betraying the
ideals enounced during the long period of communist dominance over
the eastern part of the continent. As Czech Labor and Social Affairs
Minister Zdenek Skromach put it recently, the sentiment is widespread
that the West was able to fight communism successfully and raise
living standards in part because Easterners presented a telling
picture of the alternative. Consequently the West "owes us
something," Skromach said, suggesting that the time is ripe for the
repayment of that debt by doing precisely what the West most fears --
namely, channeling funds into the eastern part of the continent. In
the Czech Republic's case (even more than in Slovakia), that feeling
of entitlement dates all the way back to the 1938 Munich Agreement,
when France and Britain "sold out" the independent Czechoslovak state
to Hitler's Germany.
That "debt" has helped turn the thorny issue of the 1945-46
Benes Decrees into one that helps build a consensus across party
lines. The insistence of organizations representing expelled Sudeten
Germans that the decrees be abolished -- and the backing of that
insistence by politicians from Germany's Christian Democratic Union,
Austria's Freedom Party, and Hungary's FIDESZ -- heighten suspicions
in the Czech Republic that disputes will continue well into the era
of EU membership.
The fireworks in Prague after midnight on 1 May were
nevertheless a sign that optimism has prevailed. It is now up to
Czechs and their fellow EU citizens to demonstrate that those
pyrotechnics did not mark a Pyrrhic victory.

************************************************** **********

ANALYSIS: SLOVAKIA'S EU RUN HAS LEFT PREMIER GASPING

By Michael Shafir

Slovakia's diminutive prime minister, Mikulas Dzurinda, is a
passionate marathon runner. The marathon over which he has presided
during his country's race to EU membership, however, has assuredly
left him breathless. And although it will have ended on 1 May,
Dzurinda crosses the finish line to anything but an ovation among
Slovaks. Some even doubt the Slovak premier will survive for long in
his current position.
When Dzurinda first became prime minister in 1998, his country
had been excluded from the first wave of postcommunist NATO invitees
and the European Union had left it out among "fast-track" candidates
for membership in that organization. It was no secret that the
perceived culprit for such failures was three-time former Prime
Minister Vladimir Meciar, whose policies had increasingly isolated
Slovakia from the West.
Under Dzurinda's leadership, the Slovak government set out to
undo that damage. Many at the time questioned the country's ability
to overcome the many obstacles created by Meciar's hectic policies of
nationalism and cronysim, his harassment of political opponents, and
his courting of dubious political figures in Moscow. But by early
2004, Slovakia had been included among the seven new postcommunist
states that would join NATO in April, and it could boast success in
its bid for EU membership, having met that organization's political
and economic criteria for membership.
Such accomplishments appeared to be paying political dividends
at home, too. Dzurinda was quite openly backed by EU and NATO
officials ahead of the 2002 parliamentary elections, while Meciar was
(unsuccessfully) trying to shrug off his image as a leader
unacceptable to the West. Slovaks for the first time in the country's
brief 10-year history overcame their reluctance to vote in
plebiscites with a May 2003 vote on EU membership; an overwhelming
majority of 92 percent of the 52 percent of voters who cast ballots
in that referendum endorsed Slovakia's accession.
On the face of things, it seemed nothing could stop the hard-
running prime minister.
Yet on the eve of EU accession, Slovakia has placed its future
partners in an awkward position. This month's presidential election
produced an unlikely head of state. Ex-parliamentary speaker Ivan
Gasparovic is a former Meciar crony. While he successfully skirted
responsibility for the policies and abuses of his erstwhile ally in
the eyes of voters in the 17 April presidential runoff, his
credibility among EU officials leaves room for doubt. Notably,
European Commission President Romano Prodi waited one day to
congratulate Gasparovic on his victory. It is Gasparovic who will now
preside officially over his country's foreign policy, including
aspects linked to Slovakia's EU membership, despite the weak nature
of the Slovak presidency.
As in many other acceding states, public enthusiasm for EU
membership has waned as its perceived costs have become increasingly
clear -- particularly among low-income households, the poorly
uneducated, and pensioners. Slovakia's future EU partners have also
displayed more than generalized fears about the effect of the 10-
country enlargement; particular fears have been raised concerning
Slovakia. Its Roma population, estimated at some 9 percent of the
Slovak population of 5.4 million people, is living in dire poverty;
unemployment rates among Roma are the highest in the country, while
education levels are the lowest. There have been widespread attempts
at emigration by Slovak Roma before; riots and looting erupted
earlier this year after the government in Bratislava decided to cut
social spending in its reform drive. Populists like the country's
most popular politician, Smer (Direction) party leader and Gasparovic
supporter Robert Fico -- who has a record of Roma-baiting --
invariably know how to benefit from such situations.
Dzurinda can only hope he gets his second wind. After all, his
cabinet has managed to turn Slovakia into an attractive country for
foreign investment by introducing a 19-percent flat tax; by 2006,
Slovakia is expected to have become the EU's largest car producer in
per capita terms. In many other respects, Slovakia is still lagging,
even among accession states. According the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), Slovakia's per capita GDP is less than $4,000 -- that
is to say, lowest among the eight postcommunist countries now joining
the EU -- while its jobless rate of over 15 percent is second-highest
after Poland. But looking back at where Slovakia stood in 1998 --
when the entire political spectrum allied to unseat Meciar's Movement
for a Democratic Slovakia -- by most accounts, this should be a
success story.
If that is not quite the case, Dzurinda must partly blame
himself. His indelicate handling of political allies has isolated him
since his second term as prime minister began in 2002; a question
mark hangs over the future of his coalition government, which lost
its parliamentary majority largely as a result of the prime
minister's maladroit performance. The result is that the first
criterion that Slovakia managed to meet on its path to EU membership
-- political stability -- might become the first one that Slovakia
stumbles over after having crossed the finish line.

************************************************** **********

ANALYSIS: THE BALTIC STATES' ROCKY ROAD TO THE EU

By Saulius Girnius

With their respective accessions to the European Union on 1 May and
to NATO in late March, the Baltic states have achieved their two most
important foreign policy goals since regaining independence. NATO is
seen as an ironclad guarantee of national independence, no small
matter for countries that have spent most of the past two centuries
under foreign rule. EU membership is considered to be the key to
future economic prosperity, setting conditions for a level of
personal welfare for their citizens that would otherwise be hardly
attainable. Equally important, membership is public recognition at
the highest level of the European identity of the Baltic states, a
central aspect of the national identities of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. Although insistently, even pugnaciously assertive of their
being as much a part of Europe, as say France or Sweden, the people
of the Baltic states have also feared, particularly during the years
of Soviet occupation, that Western Europeans might forget or minimize
this tie. Their presence in the first wave of postcommunist countries
to join the EU is thus deeply satisfying and reassuring.
The effort to rejoin Europe has been a driving force in Baltic
foreign policy from the very start, even when membership in the EU
and NATO seemed a very distant, if not unimaginable, goal. Most Balts
felt little kinship with Russia and the other former Soviet republics
who joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and
politicians who argued that exploring the possibility of informal
ties with the CIS should not be rejected out of hand were vigorously
rebuffed. By 1992, the initiatives of Baltic diplomacy bore their
first fruits with the signing of separate trade and economic-
cooperation treaties with Western European states. In 1994, all three
countries signed free-trade agreements with the EU and further
intensified European-integration efforts. Another important step was
the signing in Luxembourg in June 1995 of the so-called European
agreements, granting them the status of EU associate members. The
Baltic states also submitted applications to become full members of
the union.
Satisfying the stringent criteria for EU membership was no easy
task for any state of the former Eastern bloc. For the Baltic states,
it was arguably harder. Their incorporation into the USSR not only
meant that they lacked the most basic elements of sovereignty while
being burdened by lower standards of living and wages, but also that
their economies and judiciaries were merely subdivisions of the
Soviet whole. Many of the most important institutions -- such as the
central bank, diplomatic corps, trade representatives, and the
judiciary -- had to be created ex nihilo. The cutting of the
umbilical cord was an extremely complicated task and one that had to
be performed in the teeth of a severe economic recession.
When the EU began to evaluate the candidate states in 1997, it
noted considerable differences in their developments and abilities to
make necessary reforms. In July of the same year, the European
Commission decided to recommend that only six candidate states,
including Estonia, be invited to begin EU accession talks. The actual
negotiations on admission, dealing with a broad range of topics in 29
areas, were begun only in 1998. The main deficiency of the other
candidate states was their inability to establish a functioning
market economy that could have liberalized prices and trade, along
with the lack of an enforceable legal system with property rights. EU
reports on the candidate states in 1997 stated that some -- including
Latvia and Lithuania -- were capable of passing the EU political
criteria for accession set in Copenhagen in June 1993, namely that
they achieve "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the
rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities."
In the next several years, Latvia and Lithuania embarked on a
series of economic reforms that stabilized their economies,
attracting substantial foreign direct investment. By February 2002,
the EU decided that both had made substantial progress and were ready
to begin accession negotiations. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were
among the 10 states that completed their accession negotiations at an
EU summit meeting in Copenhagen on 13 December 2002, and each
officially signed an EU Accession Treaty in Athens on 16 April 2003.
Lithuania was the first of the Baltic states to hold the
required referendum on EU membership. Out of fear of low voter
participation, the balloting was held over two days, 10-11 May 2003.
Voter turnout on the first day was low, creating fears that the
requirement of at least 50 percent participation by eligible voters
might not be met. In an effort to persuade more people to vote, the
owners of the largest foodstore chain advertised on both radio and
television that various items -- such as laundry detergent, chocolate
bars, or beer -- would be sold at giveaway prices to any customer who
showed a sticker indicating that they had voted. In the end, 63.3
percent of the 2.6 million eligible voters participated, with 91.07
percent of the valid ballots favoring membership.
Estonia and Latvia held their referendums on 14 and 20
September, respectively. In Estonia, 64.1 percent of the 867,714
eligible voters cast ballots, with 66.5 percent voting "yes." In
Latvia, 1.01 million, or 71.5 percent of eligible voters, cast
ballots, with 67 percent voting "yes."
Russia never disguised its deep dissatisfaction with the Baltic
states' NATO membership, stating more than once that it would be
forced to take strong measures to counter the growth of foreign
forces on its borders. Its comments on Baltic membership in the EU
were more moderate, recognizing the right of the three states to
pursue closer ties with whichever states they wished. However, Moscow
intensified its campaign against what it described as the
mistreatment of Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia, while
protesting that the Kaliningrad exclave must not be left isolated
from Russia after Lithuania joined the EU. Intense negotiations on
the latter issue led to a compromise solution among the EU,
Lithuania, and Russia. Moscow never eased its verbal attacks on
Latvia and Estonia. The Kremlin made a final show of its displeasure
when it demurred on an EU request that Russia assent to the inclusion
of the new members in the EU-Russian Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement immediately upon entry on 1 May. Russia responded by
presenting 14 points it demanded in exchange for its agreement.
Twelve of the points dealt with economic matters and were quickly
resolved, but two concerned political matters, transit to and from
the Kaliningrad Oblast through Lithuania, and the rights of the
Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia. When the EU stood firm, the
Russian minorities issue was deleted.
Although some residents in the Baltic states have expressed
their dissatisfaction that their countries will be giving up a
measure of independence by joining the European Union, the vast
majority see numerous benefits that were lacking in the almost 50
years spent in a another union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).
EU supporters stress that the two unions should not be compared, as
membership in the EU is a voluntary decision approved by a referendum
and not imposed by the invasion of a foreign army. They recall that
in the period between the two World Wars, they had established
independent republics whose forced incorporation into the USSR in
1940 many Western countries never recognized.

************************************************** **********

BALTICS: EU, RUSSIA AGREE COMPROMISE TEXT FOR JOINT
MINORITIES DECLARATION

By Ahto Lobjakas

EU foreign ministers in Luxembourg have settled on a compromise
proposal to jointly address with Moscow the situation of Russian-
speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia. Disagreements over the
wording of a paragraph on Baltic minorities are the last obstacle to
the signing of a landmark joint EU-Russia declaration on enlargement.
Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will respond to the proposal
at today's Partnership Council meeting with the EU.
Brussels, 27 April 2004 (RFE/RL) -- After weeks of bitter
wrangling, the EU-Russia joint declaration on enlargement is
virtually ready.
The two sides have already resolved all of Russia's concerns
over the economic impact of enlargement. Last week, they reached
agreement on most key issues to do with goods transit between the
Russian mainland and Kaliningrad.
On 26 April, the EU agreed to what it hopes is an acceptable
compromise for Russia to address what is perhaps the thorniest issue
-- the situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia and
Latvia.
There are hundreds of thousands of Russian speakers in the two
Baltic countries. Moscow has argued that the Russian-speaking
minority, though large, suffers discrimination because of strict
language and citizenship laws that affect everything from education
to employment.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is due today to hold
talks on the issue with European Union officials. If Russia accepts
the compromise, it will pave the way for extending Moscow's
partnership treaty with the EU to the bloc's new members.
This in turn will help prevent a possible trade war and
heightened tensions in EU-Russia relations.
According to a draft obtained by RFE/RL, the EU now suggests
that the last paragraph of its joint statement with Russia should
read as follows: "The EU and the Russian Federation welcome EU
membership as a firm guarantee for the protection of human rights and
the protection of persons belonging to minorities. Both sides
underline their commitment to the protection of human rights and the
protection of persons belonging to minorities."
Estonia's foreign minister, Kristiina Ojuland, told RFE/RL that
Estonia is satisfied with the agreement.
"I am very pleased to be able to note that the EU position that
was formulated [on 23 April] has remained the same. It has been
passed on to the Russian side. This position, in my opinion, embodies
fully the solidarity principle inherent in European Union
[membership]," Ojuland said.
Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen, speaking for the current EU
presidency, said he expects the agreement will be signed today.
That sentiment was echoed by the EU's external relations
commissioner, Chris Patten.
Russia has been holding out for wording that is more critical
of the governments of Estonia and Latvia.
But its suggestion -- that the EU add another sentence
supporting the "social integration" of minorities -- was refused
following talks yesterday.
Estonian sources have told RFE/RL that, instead of the Russia
suggestion, the EU has retained a second possible formulation should
difficulties arise in today's discussions.
An EU source told RFE/RL the sentence says that further support
will be provided to the "social inclusion" of the minorities. It is
not clear if Russia would accept such wording.
Estonian Foreign Minister Kristiina Ojuland refused to comment
on any further possible modifications.
"At this stage, it would not be politic to comment on the text
in any greater detail. It meets the Estonian position, and is within
the confines of the mandate provided by the Estonian government [on
22 April]. And I think this text is, in any case, a very significant
improvement over the draft first tabled by the European Commission a
week ago," Ojuland says.
Latvian Foreign Minister Rihards Piks added he was very
satisfied with yesterday's compromise, and urged Russia not to press
for further modifications.
A number of sources told RFE/RL that Latvia was highly
concerned with securing for itself a binding guarantee from the other
member states, as well as from the European Commission, that it fully
meets the Copenhagen political EU membership criteria.
The issue has received relatively little attention in Latvia,
but has become politically very sensitive in Estonia.
Accordingly, Estonia last week listed a number of tightly
defined conditions without the fulfillment of which it would be
unable to support any reference to its minorities.
Among them were a refusal to accept the naming of specific
member states or groups of member states who might suffer from
minority issues. Any references to minorities were also to be non-
specific. Finally, Estonia said it would reject the term
"integration" as too far-reaching.

************************************************** **********

EU/RUSSIA: LANDMARK ENLARGEMENT DEAL SIGNED, BUT LOOSE ENDS
REMAIN

By Ahto Lobjakas

Brussels, 27 April 2004 (RFE/RL) -- The European Union and Russia
today signed an agreement extending their existing Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) to the 10 new EU member states.
The deal -- signed this morning in Luxembourg by Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and an EU delegation headed by Irish
Foreign Minister Brian Cowen -- puts an end to months of bitter
wrangling that threatened to seriously undermine relations between
the two sides.
Cowen today said the agreement would put relations on a "new
level." "Now that PCA has been extended to take account of the
enlargement of the European Union, I believe that the EU and Russia
can look forward to a productive summit in May and to bringing EU-
Russia partnership to a new level. The extension of the PCA to the 10
acceding states would allow the enlarged European Union and the
Russian Federation to benefit from the opportunities created by EU
enlargement," he said.
As part of the deal, the EU and Russia also signed a joint
statement detailing EU responses to a number of Russian concerns
related to enlargement.
The declaration addresses various trade issues, the transit of
goods to Russia's Kaliningrad exclave, and the easing of the EU visa
regime for Russia.
The statement also makes reference to the protection of
minorities, although it does not name any countries.
Lavrov today said further EU action on minorities is needed
before the PCA extension deal can be ratified by the Russian Duma.
"I would also like to express my satisfaction that we were
promised to be handed in the coming days concrete information on EU
action plans for the social integration of minorities," Lavrov said.
"We will have a close look at them and support them. Now it is about
putting what was agreed into practice. I underscore that specifically
this aspect will be take into consideration by the Russian [Duma] at
the ratification of the protocols extending the [PCA] signed by us
today to the new member states."
Russia had initially demanded that the phrase "social
integration" be included in the joint statement. However, spirited
resistance from Estonia and Latvia -- which both have sizable
Russian-speaking minorities -- prevented this. The reference in the
joint statement to minorities does not name specific countries or
minorities.
EU diplomats said the European Commission will now collate
information about existing integration schemes for the new member
states. However, they did not rule out the creation of new schemes.
Estonian and Latvian diplomats, speaking on condition of
anonymity, warned this could give rise to demands from Russia for
further talks in the coming months.
Lavrov said today Russia agrees to the extension of the PCA on
a provisional basis, meaning pending final ratification by the Duma.
EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten today appeared to
rule out what he called any further "conditionality." He repeated the
EU view that the agreement to extend the PCA and the joint statement
are separate issues and not conditionally linked.
"Let's be clear about terms," Patten said. "We've been
discussing this joint statement in parallel to the discussions about
the enlargement protocol and the application of the PCA to the 10 new
member states. We haven't been talking about conditionalities, we've
been talking about a parallel addressing of concerns."
Latvia yesterday took the unusual step of having a note
appended to the minutes of the EU foreign ministers' meeting stating
that the bloc reconfirms it meets the so-called Copenhagen political
entry criteria.
The minutes are not normally made public, although RFE/RL has
obtained a copy of the note.
Latvian sources say the note was deemed necessary to avoid
future Russian attempts to raise the minorities issue at the EU
level.

************************************************** **********

QUOTATIONS

"Europe is opening its borders today for the young, for their energy,
for their knowledge. This will probably be a generation -- the first
generation -- that will actually wonder what the borders were for,
because they really gave no cause for joy." -- Slovenian Prime
Minister Anton Rop

"As is always the case in a person's life and in the life of human
civilization, we are gaining something today; but at the same time we
are losing something. Always something for something. We should do
everything to ensure that the relationship between what we are
gaining and what we are losing remains in our favor -- which is not
and will not in any case be automatic. It will depend foremost on
ourselves." -- Czech President Vaclav Klaus

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