'LaRouche Doctrine' Is the Key To Peace

[Talalian Arpi]

Executive Intelligence Review (EIR), VA
May 5 2004


This interview appears in the May 7, 2004 issue of Executive
Intelligence Review.

Interview: Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

'LaRouche Doctrine' Is the Key To Peace
in Southwest Asia

Democratic Presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche gave this
videotaped interview to Hussein Askary, Arabic correspondent for EIR,
on April 24, 2004. The interview is currently in production as a DVD,
in both English and Arabic, and will be available soon from the
LaRouche in 2004 campaign committee.
Askary: Mr. Lyndon LaRouche, the Democratic Presidential candidate
and prominent economist and statesman of the United States, has put
forward a proposal to salvage the situation in Iraq and the Middle
East in general, which he has called "The LaRouche Doctrine," and
which is being circulated inside the United States and
internationally—that, in the context of his proposals for the
reorganization of the international financial and monetary systems.
So, we are going to ask Mr. Lyndon LaRouche to elaborate on these
proposals, and explain the way his initiatives could work.

LaRouche: Well, what I did was, among other things, I made a
ten-point argument, in order to have it in the point form, which is
more easily understood, and divided into three sections the ten
points. The first is to emphasize that the present view of the
strategic situation in the Middle East is wrong, and can not possibly
lead to a successful result. Therefore, we have to redefine the
question on all sides; various proposals from all sides, will not
work, as previously established. For one reason, the situation [in
Iraq] has gone much too far. We're now in advanced asymmetric
warfare, and the United States could not stay in, and the United
States could not simply get out, without leaving chaos behind. And
therefore, some completely different approach has to be taken to the
situation.

The first thing is to recognize that we have to create a zone of
security, which is accepted among the countries of the region, and
deal with the problem of reconstructing Iraq, in the context of an
agreement within the region. Now, the zone I defined is as follows:
To the north, you have Turkey; next to it, you have Syria, and you
have Iran. You have also at the corner, of the intersection of Turkey
and Iraq and Iran, you also have Armenia, and you have Azerbaijan,
where there are also problems. If someone is to destabilize
Transcaucasia, including the problems between Azerbaijan and Armenia
and Iran, then you could not possibly maintain a secure Middle East
security policy.

So therefore, there has to be a sense of a primary policy, which, on
the north, is Turkey, which is a strong nation-state, with a very
definite perception of what the Middle East problems are, for it. You
have Iran; whether you agree with Iran or not, it's a major factor in
the region, and has to be consulted and brought in on the agreement.
Otherwise there is no secure agreement. You have Iraq itself, but
Iraq doesn't have power now. So, Syria has a sense of being a Middle
East power; that is, it has a sense of power as an integrity of a
nation, and its own policy. You have Egypt, which is the keystone
nation from the other side. You have various other nations that can
be brought in, including Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and so forth, but
they can not actually function, unless there is a framework in which
they can efficiently function within the region.

So that's number one. So we have to say, "Take the British term
'Middle East,' and scrap it." There is no Middle East, there's
Southwest Asia. And people who want peace will stop using the term
"Middle East" and say "Southwest Asia" instead.

Askary: What is the significance of that?

LaRouche: Well, the British invented the term "Middle East," which
goes back to the beginning of the 19th Century in the course of the
Napoleonic Wars, when the British decided that the Ottoman Empire was
going to be in trouble. And they were going to be on the inside, and
they were going to make trouble. So, they planted the first Jewish
settlement, under British direction, in the Middle East, and also
picked up some of the Jews who were there, who were bankers, in Syria
and so forth, and picked them up and tried to play them as factors in
the grain trade and other things which were inside the Ottoman
Empire, and play this.

So, all during this period, from 1763 on, in particular, we've had a
British Empire in fact. Beginning with 1763, with the Treaty of
Paris, all of Europe had been involved, by the British, in attacking
Prussia, and during this period, the British had exploited this war,
the so-called Seven Years' War, in order to gobble up India, and to
gobble up North America, from France. At that point the Treaty of
Paris established the British East India Company—a company—as an
empire. And later, this became, formally, the British Empire. But all
during this period, from 1763, Europe had been dominated by a group,
based in London, which, in fact, is a British Empire. It still exists
today, except today, the difference is, the United States was picked,
as an English-speaking country, to become a kind of Big Brother, on
doing errands for the British masters in London—that sort of thing.

So, what we have to do, is get a sense of Asia as a whole, and the
region as a whole, as the area, not some proprietary conception of
British intelligence. Because all the classical things that we get on
Middle East policy, come from the question of the British Empire, and
various—Russia, Austro-Hungary, at one point, Turkey—all dealing with
this region. So, the region has certain internal characteristics. It
is the one area in Asia which is in trouble. It's the one area that
has to be fixed. So, the people in this area really do have certain
common, or interlocking interests, and therefore, unless you are able
to bring together these nations around the idea of their interlocking
interests—in common security interests, and economic development—you
don't have a party in the Middle East which is going to be capable of
administrating the question.

Now, we're dealing with the Arab, in particular, at the same time.
>From my experience, of more than a quarter of a century: Don't tell
an Arab what to do. Give him an option to make a decision.

So, the first purpose was, define the question in that way. Instead
of trying to impose an outside dictate on the region, let the region
agree on its own common interest.

Askary: There is a question that comes up in that context: It's the
role of the United States itself, because it is the occupying power,
it is the dominant power in the Middle East, it is the party which is
supporting the Israeli policy, and could determine the situation. You
say, you can't impose a solution, but what could the U.S.—

LaRouche: That's what I get to. That's exactly it. That's exactly it.

It can only come from me, because I'm the only leading American
figure, from the United States, who is in a position to, and willing
to, take that view of what U.S. policy must be. The advantage of my
doing it, is that they have no other solution. We're headed into an
impossible situation. And there are—contrary to what the impression
is from the outside—because many people outside don't understand the
United States. Many people in the United States don't understand the
United States, so it's not an exclusive club. But, we have a
Presidential system, and our country, unlike European countries,
which are based today on the British-Dutch Liberal model of
parliamentary system, we don't have that. We don't really think like
that, as a nation. We have many people in the United States who think
like that, unfortunately, but we are not that as a nation.

Our system is a Presidential system. It's a
Constitutional-Presidential system, based on principles set forth in
the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution.
Therefore, from the beginning of the American Revolution, 1776,
officially, we built a Presidential system, which is based on a
central government, as a Presidential system, with a group of states
which agree to become part of a Federal government, not a group of
associate governments.

As a result, you have, with this kind of government, the Presidency
has to make the decisions. The parliament can not make competent
decisions and will not make decisions. It's for that reason, that in
every crisis, every constitutional government in Europe has been
overthrown. The British avoided that by never having a constitutional
government. They have an arbitrary government of the monarchy. It's a
relic of an imperial system, which doesn't require a parliamentary
system: The boss is the boss. What do you need a constitution for?
The boss is going to make the decisions. It may not be the Queen
herself, but it's a group of people who have that function.

So, our system is unique, in the sense that we have an efficient
system, which is based on the people, largely, who are permanent
servants of government: in the military, in the intelligence
services, diplomatic services, and other functions of the Federal
government, who are also associated, with their collaborators,
traditional collaborators, outside government, who actually run the
government, as an Executive branch

The problem is, the way we run the government, depends upon what kind
of a President we have, because under the Constitution, the President
is the chief executive. And, if the guy is a dummy, as this present
one is, and so forth, you have a problem. Or, if he's an enemy, as
many of our Presidents have been, have been virtual traitors, you
have problems.

But the essential thing is, we're the only country that, since 1789,
the only country in the world, that has maintained the same
constitution, the same constitutional system. Not just a revision of
the constitution—we've made revisions, in details of the
Constitution—but we are the only country in the world which has a
viable constitution of that type.

Now, my position is not only that of a candidate, which I've been
several times, but for various reasons, I'm essentially a part of the
Presidential system. It's the way it works in our country. In
connection with the SDI, for example, I had to take an oath, because
I was dealing with the Soviet government, as a back channel, for the
United States government.

Askary: You mean the SDI, the Strategic Defense Initiative?

LaRouche: Right. So, since I was dealing with the Soviet government
on behalf of the Presidency, I had to take an oath, in terms of what
I was doing, a secrecy oath in terms of certain things I was doing.
So, because of that, I am essentially part of the system. And many
people who are candidates, not in this crowd in particular—Kerry is,
of course—are part of the Presidential system, even though he's a
Senator. So, therefore, when you get a statement from me, on a matter
of crisis, where the rest of the system doesn't work, and where the
great numbers, the majority—for example, the majority of the military
hate this policy. It's only the dummies that like it. It's a fascist
system, which is against the military. Most of the intelligence
services don't like it; they've been opposed to it.

Askary: As part of your expertise in these security and military
issues, I'd like to hear your view of the situation itself inside
Iraq, and also, as these circles see it inside Iraq; in
military-political terms, how have you seen the war itself, the
developments since the war, and the current situation?

LaRouche: I'll give you an example. We discussed this weekend some of
the changes—even Bremer has been forced to make certain adjustments
in his language—in Iraq. What that represents, is, we've had a
discussion, over the past days, in leading circles inside the United
States, and other places: They agreed with my proposal, in broad
terms—they haven't discussed thoroughly all the details. They put the
pressure on. We have a crisis. It's obvious that the President's a
failure, everybody else is a failure in dealing with the thing.
Therefore, the people who represent the institutions, the permanent
institutions of government, whether they're out of service or in
service, go as experts, and say to their friends who are in
government: "This is not going to work, and here is a possibility of
a solution. And therefore, in U.S. national interests, we've got to
get out of this mess."

And therefore, they like this ["The LaRouche Doctrine"], I think some
of them like it, and you saw an immediate reflection, once the
discussion came on this initial proposal. That was my purpose. My
purpose was, not to try to push the thing, negotiate it myself, but
to state the proposal, have people in the Arab world, in particular,
hear it; have the people who know me in the United States and
elsewhere, hear it, and say—now, knowing that it's an urgent
situation—that if we can't do something within less than 30 days, the
situation may be impossible for anyone to deal with.

Askary: So, the problem with the discussions that come up is, that,
first of all, the situation inside Iraq is somehow locked. That the
parties inside Iraq itself are incapable of finding a solution,
because some people say, there might be a solution if we get more
American casualties, then this will create a reaction inside the
United States. But on the other hand, there are forces inside Iraq,
and in the Middle East, who look at you as a person of credibility,
somebody whom they could trust, because you have a history of
interventions in the Middle East, and you have been tested on that
side. But then the question that comes up is, two sides of the thing:
How you can mobilize forces inside the United States—you refer to
these circles—but you, as a political figure, but not only as an
individual, because you are also leading a political movement, within
the Democratic Party and within the nation as a whole.

LaRouche: It's a question of temperament. You see, we keep quoting
Shakespeare: Julius Caesar, Cassius to Brutus. Most people, including
people in high positions of government, think, as Cassius said of
himself to Brutus: "We are underlings." Now, what does the underling
do? The underling puts out a statement, and hopes that he will become
admired for making this statement, and sits and waits, for admiration
to sink in. Now, people who actually know something about government,
particularly the Presidential system, don't do that. I go as far as I
dare, in actually making the thing happen, and keep pushing. And
that's the way you have to act; if you're a President, that's the way
you act; if you're a key official of government, in a responsible
position, that's the way you act. You have a responsibility: Your
responsibility is to act. But your responsibility is also not to act,
without clarifying what your purpose of action is, and what the
action is.

So, what I did, within my limits, was to say, "I am pushing now, as
an individual, within the U.S. system, for the United States to make
a change in its behavior in this area."

This means that we have to do some other things, apart from just
dealing with Iraq. Go back, for example, to what the problem is:
First of all, the war was totally unjustified. It was fraudulent. The
Congress were a bunch of cowards, the entire U.S. system, the
Congressional system, was a bunch of cowards. This includes Kerry and
the rest of them. They don't have the guts to be the President of the
United States, because they're cowards. And on the question of the
war, fundamental issues, if you're a coward on that issue, and you
compromise, you don't have the qualifications for governing, leading
a country.

Yes, in a parliamentary system, you can have a fool as parliament,
and what they do, if you get a crisis, the parliament is overthrown,
a new government comes in, and somebody runs the thing anyway, not
generally too well.

But in the Presidential system, you have to act that way. My proposal
is not a proposal for discussion, like parliamentary discussion: It's
a proposal of action. It's a proposal which, in the United States, is
addressed primarily to two things: to those who represent the
Presidential institutions; and to those in the Congress whom I
consider responsible people, who can organize lawful support for what
we must do. That is, there are certain people in the Congress who are
very important. They have important committees, they have friends in
the Congress, you have networks in the Congress. They're bipartisan.
They're both Republican and Democratic—it's not a partisan affair. In
a national emergency, people in both parties forget the parties for a
moment, and they concentrate on what the national emergency is, and
join forces to deal with it. So, if you have support from leading
people in the Congress, and if you have the Executive branch prepared
to act, you can do something.

And that's the purpose of this. It's to set forth, primarily to lay
down for the Americans—that's why I call it a "doctrine"—is to lay
down for the United States, a doctrine under which the Executive
branch of government will act. My intention is, they will act
immediately, not as something that's going to happen after the next
election. And that's what sometimes you have do, in leadership.

So, in this case, I know that we have to have a client; the United
States has to have someone to talk to; and the people to talk to, are
not the people who are in power, in any way, in Iraq today. So
therefore, we have to create a client. The client can not be just
Iraq. It has to be a group of nations in the region, who are
concerned about what's happening in Iraq. That's why I define the
Southwest Asia policy. These nations, people in these nations, must
agree that this crisis must be dealt with, and they want a solution.
And they have to be a part of it.

Because, remember, when the U.S. went in there, right after they went
in, they did the worst thing to complicate the problem. Any competent
military commander, invading a country—whether he wanted to or not,
but he's doing it because he's ordered—the first thing he will do,
when he takes over any part of the territory of that country: He will
go immediately to the local officials in that country, local
institutions, and tell them: "Okay, we're here. Our job is, while
we're here, you keep functioning. We set up a liaison with you and
you continue functioning, as you would normally, in terms of the
country."

Askary: That's the institutions which already exist, like the
military, the security—?

LaRouche: Right, exactly. You go to these institutions, and say,
"Okay, we're here. We're having a fight with your boss, who may be
kicked out. But you are running the country, it's your country; it's
not our country. Therefore, you in the military, you must take
responsibility for security. And you must take responsibility for
economic coordination. You cannot have a disaster." Then you go to
the civilian people, who run the various institutions, power plants,
and so forth and so on, and say, "You stay on the job. If you've got
a problem, you need cooperation, come to us, you will get our
cooperation."

So, you know you're in there, not as an occupying force permanently;
you're in there as a military force, which has moral responsibility
for what it does to the country it's occupying.

Askary: Not only did the occupation forces demolish all these
institutions, but moreover, they were meddling in the constitutional
laws of the country. You had made a statement earlier, on the
importance of restoring the previous constitutions of Iraq as an
interim period, to have the Iraqis dealing with this problem
themselves.

LaRouche: Especially when you had an unjust war. I mean, many Iraqis
did not like Saddam Hussein. But some of them feel they have an
imitation Saddam Hussein in Paul Bremer, sitting there in the same
place, doing the same kind of thing that many Iraqis complained about
[with] Saddam Hussein. So, if we want to democratize the country, the
first thing to do, if we think Saddam was bad, we'd better get Paul
Bremer out of there. And I would say, get his friend [George] Shultz,
his sponsor, out of there too, because he's not going to do much
good.

So, the first thing is to simply recognize, you are not an imperial
force. You are engaged in warfare. You have to operate under the
modern law of war. And, if you are a military force, and taking
responsibilities that a government has, you must act as a responsible
agent to protect the very people whose country you're occupying. And
the first thing you do, is make sure that the essential institutions
of the country function. In other words, you go into an area, there's
a mayor. Find the mayor, or find the police chief, find these various
people: Where are they? We've got to talk to them. We've got to get
this thing going again. And you tell them, "What do you need? What do
you need? We'll try to get it for you." And so that was not done.
Therefore, we took a situation which was already bad, that is, an
illicit invasion of a country that had been looted over a period of
years, under this UN occupation process.

Askary: The sanctions.

LaRouche: Now, you come in, and you work to destroy the very
structure of the country which you had been looting, as an occupying
force. So, what you've done, is, you've created the ideal situation
which exists in the world for what's called "asymmetric warfare."
What you do is, you take the Iraqi military, which are a capable,
trained force, as a military force—they may not have the most
advanced weapons in the world, but they were a trained military
force. You throw them out, and you start killing the people that they
were supposed to be defending, their own people. You shut down the
institutions on which the country depended for reasonable
functioning. You turn the whole country against you, with the feeling
of not only hatred, but desperation.

What happens? The Iraqi Army was trained, and others were trained,
for asymmetric warfare. They were trained to fade into the desert and
come back into the urban areas. You forced them to do that.

And you threaten to go to other countries and do the same. You create
a general feeling in the so-called Arab world, and beyond, that this
is something bigger than just Iraq. Then, they look across, and look
at Israel and Palestine. And they see the same U.S. government which
did this crime, the same George Bush and company, that did this
crime, of an unlawful war—it's actually, a war crime was done against
the U.S. Constitution, a war conducted, an occupation conducted,
against the law of war. And you say, "We're going to do it
everywhere."

So, what you do is, you put into motion generalized asymmetric
warfare. And you do it under conditions of crisis.

You look at Sharon. What Sharon is doing in the Middle East, and with
the consent and backing of the United States President, and Cheney,
especially: This is mass murder. This is Hitler-like crimes. And you
have a long period of a long war of the Israeli occupation of the
Palestinian territory. And you have cruel, monstrous oppressions,
actions which are comparable to those that Hitler perpetrated in
occupied territory. You create a general acceleration of a deep,
simmering hatred, which has been going on for generations.

Under those conditions, what are you doing? You're setting into
motion the preconditions for—you've created combustible material that
is about to burst into flames.

Now, you have the first thing which becomes the resistance phase,
asymmetric war as resistance. Then it goes into a second phase. It
becomes, not a resistance; it becomes an institution; it becomes a
government of its own type. We've reached that phase.

So therefore, the United States can not get out, because we destroyed
the structure of stability. The Europeans and others don't have the
troops to put in. Therefore, we have to say, "Well, where do we get
the troops?" "Oh, we have Iraqi troops! We have Iraqi institutions!
We don't need to bring in a vast force of occupying military. We
don't need to bring in a vast force of institutions. We need simply
to provide what we should have been doing before: Provide cooperation
and assistance in rebuilding the country." These Iraqis—I've got an
army there. Call them back into service. You want 350,000 troops?
They're there. Call them back into service, and tell them, now
they're going to save the country. And you will find that works.

So, my view was, how do you get that into place? So, we had to go to
a process in which the people of the region, or the key governments
at least, would agree, that this is an area which is not just Iraq,
but it's an area which has a coherent strategic interest, a group of
states and peoples, who have coherent interests in having peaceful
and productive relations among themselves, without having outside
interference. So, that was number one.

The idea was, if they responded, then I could go to people in the
United States and elsewhere, and say, "Okay, now we have a client. We
have people who are responding, who say they want this kind of
policy, or they want more of this kind of policy. So, now, we have
somebody to talk to."

Askary: So, you are now addressing not only the U.S. policymakers,
but also the nations of the Middle East and the governments. So, if
you want to address them, what kind of action do you expect from
them, in response to your proposal, which you say, has to be in your
name, as the "LaRouche Doctrine"?

LaRouche: It's like Bremer. Bremer, in the past couple of days, has
made statements which sound like he's caving in to my policy. So
therefore, words, or something that sounds like similar words, are
not the same thing as my intention. Therefore, it has to be in my
name, since—what's this policy mean? Well, I'll tell you what the
policy means: You've got somebody who's a guarantor of the intent of
the policy, so don't go to some commentator, or some drunk on the
street, and ask him what the policy means, like the thing with
Bremer. So, the sane thing was to get a sense, an emergency sense, of
an agreement on a Southwest Asia security pact, among the nations of
the Middle East, with the idea that the United States would commit
itself, by a doctrine of the United States, to support and
participate in supporting that strategic interest.

In other words, Southwest Asia was the no man's land of Asia. There
was no coherent definition of a strategic interest. Nasser tried to
do something like this, with the United Arab Republic, which blew
apart, because the Syrians were a little jealous of this kind of
thing from Egypt. There has not been a clear, coherent, sharp
definition of a Southwest Asia interest.

Askary: If you can elaborate here, because, when people hear,
"American interest in the Middle East," the first they think about is
the oil.

LaRouche: No, it's not the oil.

Askary: What do you mean by "American interest," national, strategic,
interest?

LaRouche: Well, we have an interest in going past the thing that
caused two world wars, which is still running loose. We are in danger
of going into a global dark age. Now, to get out of that dark age,
means that economic and other things have to be done, in many parts
of the world.

We have a very difficult situation among nations, with China. China
is a positive part of a solution of security and development. It also
has a conflict with its neighbors. China is trying to play down its
conflict with its neighbors, to come to agreement with countries such
as Russia, India, and so forth, and to become a cooperating partner,
which it sees as a necessary policy.

We have Pakistan and India; we have Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh.
We have Southeast Asia, in terms of the Mekong Delta development
area, and Myanmar, and so forth. So, these areas—their cooperation is
essential to a recovery from the process that's now going on in the
world. It's also essential to get past this matter of routine, every
few decades, a new world war. Therefore, we have to build a positive
economic system of cooperation in Eurasia, in particular. If we do
not have cooperation in Southwest Asia, then Southwest Asia, and
adjoining countries, will become the ulcer to blow up the whole
blasted agreement.

We have an African situation, where genocide is occurring.

Now, you have the problem, for example, of Sudan, and Egypt, and
water. The United States is playing a dirty game, in water supplies
of Sudan, Egypt, and so forth. And trying to take over, in view of an
operation run from Britain and the United States and Israel, of the
water sources of the Nile. Now, if you start to drain the water
sources of the Nile, and control them, again, you're going to sink
Sudan and Egypt. Therefore, that means trouble.

Therefore, we have a security interest, which does not mean simply
protection. It means we have to have agreements, which are
overriding, that people in that area accept: that any attempt to
break those agreements will be jointly resisted by all the nations in
the area, by a common agreement, in common interest. You don't have
to agree on everything; but you have to define certain things you
will agree upon, because you recognize you must defend these things
in your common interest. So that's what it was aimed at.

And also, the development of Southwest Asia, which has to be looked
at as the crossroads between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
What is needed is an economic development, which does not look at the
desert as an impossible thing, but has to look at large-scale water
management; we have to look in the long term, at petroleum and
natural gas resources, not as fuels, but as petrochemical feed
stocks, for the development of industries in the area; and to use the
crossroads area, as an area of development. We build transportation
routes, not only through the canals; but land routes, where you're
going to put along the land routes, new cities, new centers, which
will be centers of production: which means to transform a long-term
development of what has been the desert area, a gradual development,
which will play a key part in the relationship between Europe and
Asia. Not merely through the canal, but as actually a part of the
connection of the process of production. So, it's an interest area.

Askary: You usually refer to these all these strategic issues in the
context of your view of the world financial-economic situation. And
your view is, also, that the question of stability and peace could
also be essential to have the economic situation and development part
of it—but there might be other forces who are not interested, whom
you refer to.

LaRouche: Cheney, and some people in London in the Blair government,
are very much against that: traditionally, the Fabian Society.
Remember the Fabian Society was the instrument, as typified by H.G.
Wells, and Bertrand Russell, which gave us, in the first case, World
War I, from Britain, which was an attempt to play the nations of Asia
and Eurasia against each other, to preserve the British Empire, by
organizing a war. Then, later, you had Bertrand Russell, who came in
with the idea of world government through preventive nuclear warfare,
and perpetual warfare, like a Roman Empire based on nuclear weapons.

So, the Fabian Society is not exactly a friendly institution for
normal people. They, and their friends in the United States, typified
merely by Cheney, are determined to have a world war, now: warfare,
using nuclear weapons—especially so-called mini-nukes, which are
actually low-radioactive-yield, but highly powerful weapons.

They may have been used at the airport, for all I know, in Baghdad:
Something melted those tanks, and it wasn't a big firestorm—it was
difficult to create a big firestorm there; there is one thing that
will do it, and that is, the right kind of nuclear weapon. But
suddenly, something happened at the airport, which has never been
cleared up, in my view. Someday, we'll find out.

But, the point is, they do have a nuclear intention, of hitting the
nuclear reactor in Iran. They do have the intention of nuclear
weapons dropped on North Korea—Cheney has that intention. This is the
intention shared with people in the Blair government. The Blair
government is a bunch of Fabian Society fanatics, one of my favorite
enemies in the world; I mean, the people I like to have as enemies,
in a sense.

And therefore, we do have a danger. Therefore, we've come to the
time, where we can no longer have these kinds of wars. Therefore, we
have to think of new ways, of alternatives to war. We can not
eliminate the responsibility for strategic defense by countries, but
we can avoid going to wars of the type we've gone to, and that some
are trying to put us in, now.

So, it's a matter of defending civilization. And this is one corner
of civilization; if we can secure this area and neutralize the danger
of war from inside this area, we are doing part of our job in respect
to the world as a whole. And if we don't do this, then the very fact
that we don't do this, may mean that this part of Eurasia may be a
cockpit for triggering more general war, as we've seen recently. We
have to do it.

Askary: But, what is the motivation of these forces, who would oppose
such a solution for the region? But it also includes a solution for
the political situation inside the United States? Because, there are
obviously forces you have been fighting against, who are behind the
war in Iraq, who are supporting Sharon's policies, and they are
intending to spread that kind of warfare. What is their motivation?

LaRouche: Well, this is the Crusades all over again. And if you look
at the Crusades, as they actually were, who fought them: The people
who launched the Crusades were not Christians, first of all. They
were Crusaders, and the Crusaders were Normans, largely Norman
chivalry, who, with the control by Venice, by Venice's oligarchical
families, and by certain other forces in Europe, for a long period of
time, from about the 10th Century A.D. until near the end of the 14th
Century, dominated Europe. And the Crusades were actually an
extension of the Roman Empire. These people had the idea of being the
new form of the Roman Empire, and they conducted the Crusades for
that reason. For example, in the Fourth Crusade, what did they do?
They took Byzantium, what was left of it, they occupied it and looted
it. If you go to Venice today, you will find that what was in
Byzantium, is there, in the form of pillars and so forth, stolen, by
the Venetians from their wars in the 13th Century. This was the kind
of force.

The point is this, is, you have, in the Roman Empire, typically, and
its legacy in Europe, and in the practice of slavery, you have a
conception, that some people, who are animals, but beastly animals,
have other people who are lackeys, also animals. And they prey upon
two other kinds of human cattle: wild cattle, they hunt down and
kill; other cattle they herd, exploit, and when they get tired of
them, they cull the herd. It's like camels, in some parts of the Arab
world, where the camel runs his race, he has performed his function,
and now his fine qualities will be appreciated in a dinner.

The general point is, we don't treat human beings that way. We may
admire camels, but we also eat them. And some people treat people
pretty much the same way.

So, the point is, that those who do not want the kind of world
system, in which the people control their own destiny, because under
that system, there's no room for these kind of people as powers.

And, it's the same thing: You see it in Cheney. And, you see it in
Shultz, and so forth. You see it in some of the forces behind Blair.
Their idea is to destroy the economy, as they've done in the past 40
years. We've destroyed the world economy. We shut down vital
industries. We stopped infrastructure. We stopped development. No
longer do we have development as a policy. We have "cheaper, cheaper,
cheaper; cheaper labor; everything cheaper."

We are looting the world. We like to loot primary materials.
Petroleum is something we like to loot. Now, the use of petroleum as
a fuel is excessive, because, actually, a better fuel, are
hydrogen-based fuels which we can generate synthetically, as with
nuclear power. Petroleum is essentially a petrochemical resource,
which we also burn as a fuel, as we burn wood. But, we stopped
burning wood, because we found out this was creating a problem, by
destroying the trees, which are essential for the climate. So
therefore, you want to conserve your so-called natural or
biospherical resources, and not use them, or just burn them up, but
use them in a better way, for a higher rate of benefit to humanity.
And use other systems.

So, we are denied technological development—we are told—in the name
of controlling carbon dioxide (that's the big issue in the Kyoto
agreements). Now, actually, we'd have a much better planet, if we had
more carbon dioxide, because plants have one thing they love to eat,
and that is carbon dioxide. They live on it. They make trees, they
make plants, they make vegetables, they make the climate better. And,
if you have more green growth on the planet, the climate is more
moderate. You begin to bloom the desert. So, actually, those who are
trying to—they're just trying to stop technological progress.

So, it is this conception of man, this degraded conception of man,
which has been around for a long time: that some people decide they
have a system, under which they will rule, and they will not allow
the ordinary people to develop or acquire the powers, to take a hand
in their own destiny. We kill people! We have medical policies,
health policies—we kill people. We say, "They're not worth keeping
them alive; kill them. Kill 'em! Let 'em die!"

So it's that kind of attitude, that the problem is. And
unfortunately, most people are underlings. And those of us who are
not underlings by disposition, have to defend the people, against
their own underling qualities: by giving them courage, giving them a
higher sense of what they are. So that they will be more creative,
more confident, and not easily drawn into this kind of nonsense.

Askary: Right. Now, you addressed the people who are watching this,
whether in the Middle East itself, or inside the United
States—because there is a U.S. population also, that has to be
mobilized. What do you want to tell them, in, for example, support
for your initiative, as a person?

LaRouche: We don't have that much of a problem. The problem we have
is of a different type. It's not a lack of knowledge. I'm one of the
best-known figures in the United States. I'm much better known, and
have a broader base of support in the United States, than, actually,
Kerry had, up until recently. Kerry nominally has more support,
because he went into this thing with Dean and company, of getting
contributions through the e-mail contributors, which we don't really
use. We have access to do it, but we don't do it—I don't like it.
But, we have a broader base of support for my candidacy, than
virtually any other individual in the United States, in terms of that
kind of support: the number of people who financially support me, and
my candidacy.

So therefore, I don't have a problem. I have a problem—people think
that the enemy is not going to let me win. That's where the problem
is. And, who's my enemy? My enemy is the oligarchy. It's usually the
British oligarchy, which took over the United States and took over
our financial system. It's the same thing, as the worst kind behind
Tony Blair. And Tony Blair's a part of it. So that's the problem.

But, when you come to a crisis, as we did several times, as with
Roosevelt—we come to a crisis, the American people will break out of
their "underlingness." They will respond to leadership, and they will
act. But, they will only act if given the kind of leadership to which
they will respond. What they will respond to, is someone who, they
are convinced, is on their side—who is not out to loot them, but is
on their side; and who has practical measures in view. Like, for
example, employment: "You want to create a lot of jobs? Okay, that's
good." That sort of thing.

So, we're in one of those periods of crisis, where we're either going
to Hell, or we're going to go the other way. As with Roosevelt in
1933, we're going to have to make a decision. We're at a turning
point. And since we're the only nation on the planet with a
combination of significant power, we have a responsibility to the
world, to have the courage to take the first step, in getting the
whole world out of this financial crisis we're in now. Anyone who
does understand the United States, who understands the world, who
looks at the problem, as I looked at this problem: You have a sense,
you have a personal responsibility, given your limitations, of: What
can you do to bring about an initiative, which will change something
that urgently needs to be changed? And, it is not sitting back, and
trying to write a book full of proposals for future generations. You
have to act now, to save people now. You don't kill people, and then
hope that you glory in the fact that they should have acted that way;
they should have acted as you proposed.

Askary: There is actually a recognition, especially among people from
older generations, for example, in the Middle East, people, even
religious personalities, who are aware of your role. And they
actually recognize the fact that the United States, when they were
students in the '40s and '50s, represented something totally
different from what you see today. But, they refer to that America.
They say, you are—Lyndon LaRouche is the representative of that
America. You yourself talk about a mission for the United States.
What is this mission?

LaRouche: We've come to the point where the purpose for which we were
created, is now on our plate. We were created by Europeans, who
despaired of being able to create a true republic in Europe at that
time, under those conditions of the 18th Century, in which the
British had just begun the empire. And, you had the British, and then
you had all these reactionary types, like the Habsburgs and so forth,
running loose. So, it was impossible for them.

The idea was, by creating a republic in North America, sponsoring it,
that they would create the conditions under which you could spread it
into Europe. Well, it never happened, because of the French
Revolution, which the British orchestrated. So, Europe never had a
true republic. The closest we came to it in Europe, was with de
Gaulle, in the high point of his period. We never had a true republic
in Europe.

And, the institutions in Europe are based on Anglo-Dutch Liberal
standards. This standard gives you a government, which is, first of
all, it's impotent, in a crisis. It may work fine, from time to time.
But it can not respond effectively in a time of crisis, not on its
own. It can follow other people, but it can not take the initiative.
And, so, that's the nature of the situation. And also, there were two
world wars in Europe. Europe has been destroyed by two world wars:
demoralizing effect. This has cumulative effects, which go from
generation to generation. It does not have the courage to do that any
more.

So, we have a responsibility in the United States, of performing the
mission which was assigned us by Europe: of being the key example,
which was supposed to unleash a wave of transformations of
governments in Europe. And the next government on the list, was
supposed to be France. At that point, France was destroyed, and
turned into a monster, by the Jacobin Terror and by Napoleon. We
never recovered in Europe, from that. It still goes around to this
day.

You still have—human beings are human beings, and therefore, good
human beings will always develop things which are progressive,
beneficial to humanity. So, we have institutions in Europe, and
developments, which are highly beneficial. But! They were never
allowed to stay in charge. Always, the bankers came in. The
Anglo-Dutch Liberal bankers and similar influence came in, and always
managed—by wars, by orchestrating wars and so forth—to control the
situation, so that every time some durable thing was being proposed
in Europe, it got smashed, by some kind of interference.

And that's the situation today. So we, as the United States, we have
a moral responsibility, to free the world from the legacy of
Anglo-Dutch Liberal tyranny. And give the world a sense, that we can
run the affairs of nations without any of this dictatorship.

Askary: So, it's not a natural state of affairs in history, that
great powers usually become like an empire. That was not the
intention of the founders of the U.S. republic?

LaRouche: No! Actually, this intention goes back to Mesopotamia,
things like that. The Persian Empire, for example, is one expression
of it. Or the Babylonian Empire, before then, which rotted out, and
was replaced by the Persians. Then, the Peloponnesian War in Greece,
which was an imperial kind of thing; the Roman Empire; the medieval
imperial system, run by Venice and the Norman chivalry. And, then,
the attempt to found empires again, by the Venetians, afterwards,
against the Renaissance. Then, you've got the British Empire
emerging, in the attempt to try to create a new empire, to prevent
this kind of reform from occurring.

So, what we had is, we had a legacy of empire, which is based on this
idea, that some small group has to dominate the world. And,
basically, in Europe today, it's the Roman Empire, the legacy of the
Roman Empire. And we have to get rid of that legacy.

Askary: Or, the Western side, like people in the Middle East, for
example, in the Arab and other nations—they see themselves all the
time as victims, that they are weakened nations at the moment—

LaRouche: They are!

Askary: And their only reaction is frustration, and desperation. But
in the context of your proposal, your statements of policy, you refer
also to the question, that the Muslim and Arab nations could play a
role, in the sense of a dialogue among civilizations. Not that the
Arab and Muslim ones are always the receivers, or the subjects of a
certain policy, but, what is their role, as a culture or as a people
of historical background, in bringing about these kinds of things?

LaRouche: Very simple: You have an area of development, an area which
needs development. The worst example is the Middle East desert.

Now, you know, I was in Iraq, in 1975, and went up the Euphrates
River. And I saw—which I had known before, because I knew the period
of Haroun al-Rashid—here I was, in a country, it's in the 20th
Century, and the population of Iraq now, is lower than it was under
Haroun al-Rashid. And when I go up the Euphrates River, and there are
these [irrigation water] wheels: Where they function, you have the
village, and the fruit and so forth is fine, very good. Then, you go
to the next place, where there used to be a village: It's not
there—the wheel doesn't turn, it's not there any more.

So therefore, the destruction of what had been built up, in the
various parts of the history of the area, to where there had been a
population estimated at 35 million people—under more primitive
conditions economically, in the world—had a higher standard of
living. And the collapse, of course, of the Caliphate was actually
another story. But, nonetheless, under the Caliphate, under al-Mamoun
and so forth, things had developed to a certain point.

And you go into the country, and you see: This is wrong. The water
system is still there. It has to be managed. We can do synthetic
things with water supplies; we can change the climate, if we just get
enough plant growth going, by micro-weather systems, will come in.

The population of Iraq, at that time, for example, as I knew it in
'75, it was in a highly progressive mode. Baghdad, I think, was about
2 million people, at that time. It was a small country, but you could
see building everywhere—building, building, building! You'd walk the
street, you'd see there's a new Pakistan-designed mosque that's going
up, probably some Saudi prince was paying for it. And you see,
building, building, building! And the spirit of the population, which
is a highly cultured population—many whom I dealt with were fairly
ordinary Arabs—they spoke English fluently (because of the benefit of
the British occupation). But, they are a highly cultured people. And
with a very strong passion for improving their country. It was
destroyed!

So that, if we did the obvious thing, this area, because of its
geographic location, under conditions of development of Asia, in Asia
generally, and in Europe, would become—actually, as I described it in
Abu Dhabi[1]: It would become a crossroads of development, not merely
for pipelines for petroleum; but actually, that the movement, as in
the U.S. continental railroad, transcontinental railroad, when you
move a system of transportation, along a route, it becomes a zone of
production. If you move power and water along that route, this
becomes a zone of production. So that, the railroad costs you
nothing, because it makes possible the production which otherwise
would not occur. You, therefore, transform the area into an area of
agriculture and industrial production, which more than pays for the
cost of maintaining and creating the railroad.

So, if you take the Middle East as that way, you say: Europe is going
to develop. Asia is going to continue to develop. Here's an area
which is the natural crossroads, between the Mediterranean and the
Indian Ocean. So, it's obviously an area of great potential for
development. You look at the population of the Palestinians, or, what
it was some time ago—they've been brutalized since. But the
Palestinians are a well-educated population, in general, highly
culturally motivated. Given an opportunity, they would become a very
positive factor. You have an Egyptian population, which has the same
qualities. You put some of these—.

What I saw in Abu Dhabi: In the development there, within 20 years,
just what occurred in 20 years, a place with two buildings on a
sparse desert, next to just the edge of the water of the Gulf: And
here, you have a bustling city, of people from all over the Arab
world. Some are citizens, and some are not. But they have permanent
visas, they work there. You look at the conditions of life of these
people, the habits; and you have a city, which is a beautiful
city—developed out of the desert—with plans to develop the whole
country.

The whole area has a natural potentiality for development.

Askary: It's quite seldom, in the context of political discussions,
and conversations, and interviews, that economic issues come up in
the discussion. This is one of the major problems, in, for example,
looking at politics in the Middle East, the way people look at it
that way. Because what we have, is a similar situation, in the
Palestinian-Israeli peace agreements: Everybody wanted to talk about
political solutions! And nobody was willing to discuss economic
solutions, as if these are two separate things! They would say:
"Let's get the political agreement, to these long-standing historical
problems first, and then we will think about the economy."

LaRouche: That's absolutely the wrong way to do it.

But now, there were people who did want to do it. But: The point was,
that the World Bank intervened on the Oslo Accords, and ruled out the
allowance of development; and said, "You can have micro-development."

We're in an area that needs water to develop, as in Jordan. I mean,
we went through Jordan: You've got sand—and a couple of enclaves.
Sand, sand, sand, sand! You fly from Sudan, and you go in there, and
it's sand, sand, sand! So therefore, obviously, development—water
development and power development—are the major keystones to
development of the area. If you want peace, if you don't have enough
water, for both the Israelis and the Palestinians, how are you going
to have peace? If you take all the water away from the Palestinians,
how're you going to have peace?

Askary: So, Mr. LaRouche, what is the next step you're going to take,
immediately now, in the coming days and weeks?

LaRouche: I'm just trying to see what—I'm going to do what I'm doing,
in this area; what I've laid out as a policy and doctrine.

I think we're getting people interested in Europe in this, some
important people that I've talked to. We're getting response from
some people, in the Arab world in particular. Others are interested.

We have among people in the United States, who are influential in the
Presidential system and in certain parts of the Congress, we're
getting interest. I mean really, immediately, interest.

I'm actually discussing, with some people, who are senior people, to
come on as a task force with me, under the auspices of my
Presidential campaign, who are experts in this area: to be prominent
Americans associated with me, people who have certain special
capabilities, to make themselves apparent, both as advisors to me,
and so forth. So, that if we get the situation, where people in that
part of the world are able to respond, and we signal that we can then
go, by an escalation, a rapid escalation of international discussion.
And I'm sure that there are people in various parts, like Cairo and
so forth, who will tend to sponsor that kind of discussion, and to
get a general idea—not a detailed contract, not a contract; but a
principled agreement on objectives. And make very simple lines: "Here
are the things that have to be done, to bring about peace."

That would mean—and I've had technical discussions with people on
this, how we actually go about it. Get the Iraqi military, get the
Iraqi technicians, back into employment, immediately. Give them back
their government, under their constitution. Forget all experiments.
Don't try to settle every problem. Get the country functioning. And,
we draw the U.S. forces, and other military forces in there, as
supporting forces, for the Iraqi military. Because Iraq will demand,
by instinct, it will have the capability of defending themselves. So
therefore, an Iraqi army has to be rebuilt. That's one of the tasks
to turn this thing around. We're not coming in as enemies: We're
coming to help you build something for you, so you can defend
yourself.

Askary: Ladies and gentlemen, we thank Mr. Lyndon LaRouche for this
enlightening approach, and his patience and time.

LaRouche: Thank you.

[1] Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., "The Middle East as a Strategic
Crossroad," speech in Abu Dhabi, published in EIR, June 14, 2002.