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Turkish Press
Nov 7 2004
News Analysis by Ugur Akinci, Ph.D.
Turkish Fears and Emerging Processes at EU's Threshold
Ugur Akinci: 11/6/2004
Turkey is about to start full-membership talks with the European
Union (EU). But there is a "minor problem." To become a part of EU
requires a shift in national identity and a nuanced approach to
sensitive concepts like "minority" and "sovereignty."
The Turkish establishment interprets these terms by taking the
Lausanne Treaty of 1923 as its sole reference while EU insists on its
current definitions and implementations as reflected in the famous
"Copenhagen Criteria" of 1993, which Turkey has endorsed.
Since Turkey is the one who wants to join the EU, and not the other
way around, Turkey`s insistence on its own definition of such
politically-loaded concepts as "sovereignty" and "minority" is
interpreted by some observers as an attempt (to use an Americanism)
to have one`s cake and eat it too.
But this is a static approach and the dynamic reality is more nuanced
than that.
******** The static picture
According to the static approach, Turkey needs to choose either the
EU`s or its own definitions of "sovereignty" and "minority."
The differences are glaring indeed.
For Turkey, a "minority group" is one of the specific non-Muslim
minorities defined by the Lausanne Treaty. That is why the Jewish,
Greek-Orthodox and Armenian-Orthodox communities are today recognized
as minorities with distinct rights and privileges protected by the
Turkish Constitution -- but the Alawis, Kurds or, let`s say, Women,
are not.
In EU, any group with sufficient numbers, self-identification (and
political clout, one must add) counts as a "minority," whether they
are defined by any international treaty or not. This does not to mean
that their "rights" are always "granted," or if granted, "observed"
and "enforced." Just ask the Turks living in Germany and other EU
countries. However, at least there is no deep-seated collective fear
in EU to recognize a self-identified group as a minority.
Turkey interprets all such attempts to label self-identified groups
as minorities as a sinister move to split Turkey -- and for
understandable historic reasons. Certain European powers have spent
well-documented amounts of cash to mobilize religious and ethnic
minorities against the Kemalist movement right after the First World
War, and through the `20s. That`s why the Turks do have a valid
historic reason to get paranoid every time the Europeans start
talking about the "minority rights." In that sense, the First World
War is still not over for a lot of Turks.
However, if Turkey is to join the EU, then she also has to decide
whether she is joining a group of enemies or friends. She has to
decide which historic memory she is going to emphasize as a main
reference in configuring her relationships in the 21st century.
Desperately trying to join the EU while treating it as a source of
threat to one`s national unity is like stepping on the gas and the
break pedals simultaneously. It is political schizophrenia.
The same is valid for "sovereignty" as well. Joining the EU, by
definition, means relinquishing the exclusive "national right" to
decide on which policies to follow in favor of the collective
policies of the EU. However, I must also add that in matters of
foreign policy, for example, member countries will retain the right
to ratify or veto the EU decisions.
As an EU member, Turkey will not be able to fend off inquiries on
sensitive political issues on the grounds that "foreigners cannot
interfere with our internal affairs" simply because, A) the fellow
family-members will not count as "foreigners" anymore and, B) what
was once an "internal" affair will now be a permissible topic of
discussion for all the twenty five European countries. There is no
way getting around that hard fact.
Just to give an example, Turkey will have to recognize the
"Greek-Cypriot Administration" as the only legitimate Government of
Cyprus, like the rest of the EU.
Another example: Turkey will not be able to spend the monies she
wants on the projects she wants without first getting the approval of
the other 25.
There will be a lot of "interruptions," frequent "interferences," and
a very different meaning of "national sovereignty" on the table.
Thus more Turkish "fears and loathing" should be expected in the days
ahead.
******** The dynamic reality
What I have portrayed above is a static picture of irreconcilable and
clashing interests. If that was all to this story, we might have to
reach a "take it or leave it" type of harsh conclusion as far as
Turkey`s EU membership is concerned. But, since the famous "Law of
Unintended Consequences" is at work 24 hours a day, we are witnessing
surprising "third alternative" solutions emerging without tipping the
cart.
The Turkish state is totally committed to EU membership and, at this
point, it will not and cannot change its mind. However, in the main,
the Turkish establishment is equally committed to its traditional
definitions of politically sensitive concepts such as "sovereignty"
and "minority."
So, I see a new process emerging right before our own eyes:
Turkey is delivering the CONTENT of EU conditions without admitting
the European FORMS that traditionally accompanied such content.
Turkey is delivering the same wine in new bottles, so to speak, to
keep the guests and the host still sitting at the table. I think,
whether it is intentionally implemented that way or not, we are
looking at a very nuanced and creative policy process at work here.
>>> Example 1:
Turkey has not surrendered its national sovereignty in jurisprudence
to anyone. She still has her own independent courts. However, in May
2004, as a part of the Constitutional reform package regarding human
rights, Turkey has admitted the supremacy of international agreements
over domestic courts in matters concerning "human rights and
fundamental freedoms."
Since October 2003, for example, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) delivered 161 judgments on Turkey. In 132 of these court cases
Turkey was found "in violation" of Turkey`s international treaty
commitments. In 23 cases a "friendly settlement" was reached, and in
2 cases Turkey was not found in violation.
Some readers might also remember the case of of Ms. Louzidou, a
Greek-Cypriot woman who sued Turkey in ECHR for losing her property
and won a handsome monetary settlement from Ankara.
Thus Turkey has already surrendered the ultimate legal arbitration
authority in human rights cases to EU without creating much fuss at
home about "national sovereignty."
>>> Example 2:
Another dynamic policy development in which Turkey has proven that
she can indeed "eat her cake and have it too" took place in
broadcasting in "minority languages."
In June 2004, the Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), the Turkish
state-owned broadcasting company, has quietly started to broadcast
programs in the following non-Turkish languages: Bosnian, Arabic,
Circasian, and in two Kurdish dialects (Kirmanci and Zaza).
Other ethnic groups living in Turkey may conceivably demand similar
non-Turkish broadcasts and these may be followed by similar
non-Turkish broadcasts by private radio and TV stations as well. All
may become a reality in due time.
This has all happened without changing a single letter of the classic
definition of a "minority group" in Turkey. In that regard, the
Lausanne Treaty of 1923 is still the only reference. However, as long
as "minority languages" are freely spoken, printed, and broadcast,
how can EU complain about "violations of cultural rights and
fundamental freedoms"?
I think the Turkish establishment is showing some flexibility and
creativity in meeting the EU requirements without opening the cans of
worms that have been sealed shut since 1923.
If and when Turkey joins the European Parliament it will be one of
the largest voting blocks to determine the common policies of the
Union.
And that`s why some EU observers are as worried about losing their
"sovereignty" as some of their Turkish counterparts.
But static fears are not the end of the road. The dynamic mid-path
solutions developed by Ankara are creative policy alternatives worthy
of emulation.
Nov 7 2004
News Analysis by Ugur Akinci, Ph.D.
Turkish Fears and Emerging Processes at EU's Threshold
Ugur Akinci: 11/6/2004
Turkey is about to start full-membership talks with the European
Union (EU). But there is a "minor problem." To become a part of EU
requires a shift in national identity and a nuanced approach to
sensitive concepts like "minority" and "sovereignty."
The Turkish establishment interprets these terms by taking the
Lausanne Treaty of 1923 as its sole reference while EU insists on its
current definitions and implementations as reflected in the famous
"Copenhagen Criteria" of 1993, which Turkey has endorsed.
Since Turkey is the one who wants to join the EU, and not the other
way around, Turkey`s insistence on its own definition of such
politically-loaded concepts as "sovereignty" and "minority" is
interpreted by some observers as an attempt (to use an Americanism)
to have one`s cake and eat it too.
But this is a static approach and the dynamic reality is more nuanced
than that.
******** The static picture
According to the static approach, Turkey needs to choose either the
EU`s or its own definitions of "sovereignty" and "minority."
The differences are glaring indeed.
For Turkey, a "minority group" is one of the specific non-Muslim
minorities defined by the Lausanne Treaty. That is why the Jewish,
Greek-Orthodox and Armenian-Orthodox communities are today recognized
as minorities with distinct rights and privileges protected by the
Turkish Constitution -- but the Alawis, Kurds or, let`s say, Women,
are not.
In EU, any group with sufficient numbers, self-identification (and
political clout, one must add) counts as a "minority," whether they
are defined by any international treaty or not. This does not to mean
that their "rights" are always "granted," or if granted, "observed"
and "enforced." Just ask the Turks living in Germany and other EU
countries. However, at least there is no deep-seated collective fear
in EU to recognize a self-identified group as a minority.
Turkey interprets all such attempts to label self-identified groups
as minorities as a sinister move to split Turkey -- and for
understandable historic reasons. Certain European powers have spent
well-documented amounts of cash to mobilize religious and ethnic
minorities against the Kemalist movement right after the First World
War, and through the `20s. That`s why the Turks do have a valid
historic reason to get paranoid every time the Europeans start
talking about the "minority rights." In that sense, the First World
War is still not over for a lot of Turks.
However, if Turkey is to join the EU, then she also has to decide
whether she is joining a group of enemies or friends. She has to
decide which historic memory she is going to emphasize as a main
reference in configuring her relationships in the 21st century.
Desperately trying to join the EU while treating it as a source of
threat to one`s national unity is like stepping on the gas and the
break pedals simultaneously. It is political schizophrenia.
The same is valid for "sovereignty" as well. Joining the EU, by
definition, means relinquishing the exclusive "national right" to
decide on which policies to follow in favor of the collective
policies of the EU. However, I must also add that in matters of
foreign policy, for example, member countries will retain the right
to ratify or veto the EU decisions.
As an EU member, Turkey will not be able to fend off inquiries on
sensitive political issues on the grounds that "foreigners cannot
interfere with our internal affairs" simply because, A) the fellow
family-members will not count as "foreigners" anymore and, B) what
was once an "internal" affair will now be a permissible topic of
discussion for all the twenty five European countries. There is no
way getting around that hard fact.
Just to give an example, Turkey will have to recognize the
"Greek-Cypriot Administration" as the only legitimate Government of
Cyprus, like the rest of the EU.
Another example: Turkey will not be able to spend the monies she
wants on the projects she wants without first getting the approval of
the other 25.
There will be a lot of "interruptions," frequent "interferences," and
a very different meaning of "national sovereignty" on the table.
Thus more Turkish "fears and loathing" should be expected in the days
ahead.
******** The dynamic reality
What I have portrayed above is a static picture of irreconcilable and
clashing interests. If that was all to this story, we might have to
reach a "take it or leave it" type of harsh conclusion as far as
Turkey`s EU membership is concerned. But, since the famous "Law of
Unintended Consequences" is at work 24 hours a day, we are witnessing
surprising "third alternative" solutions emerging without tipping the
cart.
The Turkish state is totally committed to EU membership and, at this
point, it will not and cannot change its mind. However, in the main,
the Turkish establishment is equally committed to its traditional
definitions of politically sensitive concepts such as "sovereignty"
and "minority."
So, I see a new process emerging right before our own eyes:
Turkey is delivering the CONTENT of EU conditions without admitting
the European FORMS that traditionally accompanied such content.
Turkey is delivering the same wine in new bottles, so to speak, to
keep the guests and the host still sitting at the table. I think,
whether it is intentionally implemented that way or not, we are
looking at a very nuanced and creative policy process at work here.
>>> Example 1:
Turkey has not surrendered its national sovereignty in jurisprudence
to anyone. She still has her own independent courts. However, in May
2004, as a part of the Constitutional reform package regarding human
rights, Turkey has admitted the supremacy of international agreements
over domestic courts in matters concerning "human rights and
fundamental freedoms."
Since October 2003, for example, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) delivered 161 judgments on Turkey. In 132 of these court cases
Turkey was found "in violation" of Turkey`s international treaty
commitments. In 23 cases a "friendly settlement" was reached, and in
2 cases Turkey was not found in violation.
Some readers might also remember the case of of Ms. Louzidou, a
Greek-Cypriot woman who sued Turkey in ECHR for losing her property
and won a handsome monetary settlement from Ankara.
Thus Turkey has already surrendered the ultimate legal arbitration
authority in human rights cases to EU without creating much fuss at
home about "national sovereignty."
>>> Example 2:
Another dynamic policy development in which Turkey has proven that
she can indeed "eat her cake and have it too" took place in
broadcasting in "minority languages."
In June 2004, the Turkish Radio and Television (TRT), the Turkish
state-owned broadcasting company, has quietly started to broadcast
programs in the following non-Turkish languages: Bosnian, Arabic,
Circasian, and in two Kurdish dialects (Kirmanci and Zaza).
Other ethnic groups living in Turkey may conceivably demand similar
non-Turkish broadcasts and these may be followed by similar
non-Turkish broadcasts by private radio and TV stations as well. All
may become a reality in due time.
This has all happened without changing a single letter of the classic
definition of a "minority group" in Turkey. In that regard, the
Lausanne Treaty of 1923 is still the only reference. However, as long
as "minority languages" are freely spoken, printed, and broadcast,
how can EU complain about "violations of cultural rights and
fundamental freedoms"?
I think the Turkish establishment is showing some flexibility and
creativity in meeting the EU requirements without opening the cans of
worms that have been sealed shut since 1923.
If and when Turkey joins the European Parliament it will be one of
the largest voting blocks to determine the common policies of the
Union.
And that`s why some EU observers are as worried about losing their
"sovereignty" as some of their Turkish counterparts.
But static fears are not the end of the road. The dynamic mid-path
solutions developed by Ankara are creative policy alternatives worthy
of emulation.