Tweet
Balkanalysis.com, AZ
Nov 10 2004
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Infighting Dominate Political Agenda (Part 1)
Posted on Saturday, February 28 @ 12:15:00 EST by balkanalysis
C Deliso writes " Eurasianet.org reports that talks between
Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed province of Nagorno-Karabakh
have ground to a halt. Speaking at a conference in Geneva, Armenian
representatives "…flatly rejected Baku's recent suggestion to restart
the process 'from scratch,' according to Armenian journalist Emil
Danielyan.
In addition, says Danielyan, "…Armenian leaders have threatened to
freeze direct contacts with Azerbaijan if Baku refuses to revive
agreements reportedly reached by the two countries three years ago."
This is in reference to a supposed deal reached in Key West, Florida
by Armenian president Robert Kocharian and his late counterpart,
Heydar Aliyev.
This echoed Interfax's report of 18 February, quoting Kocharian as
ruling out restarting talks "from scratch:"
"…over the years, we have invested significant efforts in laying the
groundwork for resolving the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict… I will not
throw away that effort.
…I do not think that the Azerbaijani president opposes any changes
but in the 10 years of peace, a situation has emerged in which the
two sides are reconciled to facts, so a change of the status quo is
more dangerous than maintaining it."
Brief history of Nagorno-Karabakh
An almost kidney-shaped, mountainous area within Azerbaijan but
populated by an Armenian majority, Nagorno ('Upper') Karabakh has
been the subject of contentious dispute for many generations.
Somewhat like Bosnia, it was a Christian region partially Islamicized
by the Turks. In the 11th century, the low-lying eastern parts of the
Christian province fell to the Seljuk Turks, who left the mark of
religion and language on people who were "the direct descendents of
present-day Azerbaijanis," according to Armenian-American scholar
Ronald Grigor Suny.
Through the many centuries of different empires that ruled in the
Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh changed hands several times but, says
Suny, "semi-independent Armenian princes" ruled there until the early
19th century, when the Russian Tzar annexed the region from Iran.
A century later, with the coming of the Russian Revolution, the
Armenian-dominated province tried to reunify with Soviet Armenia, but
the Turkish-supported Azerbaijanis forced them to remain part of
Azerbaijan. The communist Kavbiuro promised in 1920 to return the
region to Armenia, and resolved to do so on 3 July 1921. However,
"…mysteriously, two days later, the bureau reversed itself
'considering the necessity of national harmony between Muslims and
Armenians, the economic linkage between upper and lower Karabagh, and
its permanent ties to Azerbaijan."
Stalin had already found it useful for his greater Soviet strategy to
preserve this localized enmity, thus preventing either Armenia or
Azerbaijan from becoming too powerful or independent. Suny adds,
"…For sixty years Karabagh remained an enclave within Azerbaijan, an
anomaly in the Soviet system- the only autonomous national region
with a majority that was of the same ethnicity as a neighboring
Soviet republic yet was not permitted to join that republic.
Discontent with Azerbaijani rule grew, as discrimination against
Armenian language, culture, and contacts with Soviet Armenia became a
persistent practice. Armenians believed that Azerbaijan preferred to
invest economically in regions where its own nationality were a
majority rather than in Karabagh where 75 to 80 percent of the
population was Armenian.
…The city of Shusha, once an Armenian cultural center, became almost
entirely Azerbaijani. In 1959 Armenians made up 84.4 percent of
Karabagh's population. Twenty years later they were just under 76
percent." (pp. 194-5)
After Stalin's death, nationalist ferment increased among Armenian
politicians, intellectuals and the people. This phenomenon was
mirrored in Azerbaijan. Both sides have long lists of grievances
detailing the murders, perfidy and general transgressions allegedly
carried out by the other side.
As could have been expected, the demise of the Soviet Union saw the
explosion of this long-suppressed, localized cold war. The rekindled
national zeal of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis led to open fighting
in 1992, which raged for two years, resulting in additional
grievances for the list-keepers.
According to Baku, 700,000 Azerbaijanis were forced to leave their
homes in Nagorno-Karabakh because of the war, as were 300,000 ethnic
Azerbaijanis then living in Armenia proper. Yet this had been
preceded by the expulsion of up to 300,000 ethnic Armenians from
Azerbaijan from 1988-90, when re-unification desires began to
intensify.
The current state of play
An international mediating committee called the Minsk Group, headed
by France, the United States and Russia, was set up in 1995. Yet
Nagorno-Karabakh is quite possibly one of the region's great
unresolvable issues. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan consider the area
their historically rightful property, the former because they have
always lived there and the latter because their co-religionists, the
Turks and Iranians, ruled over the area for long periods.
Now, Azerbaijan is indignant because of alleged Armenian violations
of cease-fire agreements. For their part, Armenians are especially
incensed because of apparent Azerbaijani greed. Azerbaijan already
has official ownership of the Nakhichevan province, an
Azerbaijani-majority area on Armenia's border with Iran- and one
completely cut off from any physical connection with Azerbaijan, a
situation comparable only to Russia's ownership of the similarly
geographically estranged city of Kaliningrad. There is a sentiment
that due to this reality Armenia has already given away far too much-
especially considering the much earlier loss of the majority of its
historical territories to the Turkish state.
While the situation remains unresolved, Armenia feels it now has the
upper hand in Nagorno-Karabakh. The province is largely free of
Baku's interference. Armenia also claims that a nearly-finalized deal
between the two countries, made by Kocharian and the late President
Aliyev, should be honored.
Key West: the agreement that almost was
According to Eurasianet's Emil Danielyan, Armenia and Azerbaijan
"…have engaged in lots of political maneuvering in early 2004. Aliyev
and other leaders in Baku complained that existing Minsk Group
proposals fail to ensure that Karabakh would remain part of
Azerbaijan, going on to accuse the international community of tacitly
wanting to reward 'Armenian aggression.'
Armenian officials, in turn, have repeated their claim that Karabakh
is now an 'integral part' of Armenia. 'Our aim is to win
international recognition of the aforesaid, but it is difficult to
say when we will achieve this,' Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian told
Yerevan TV on February 12. Armenian insists the only way to break the
existing impasse is to return to the agreement reportedly reached by
Kocharian and Ilham's late father and predecessor, Heidar Aliyev,
during April 2001 talks on the Florida resort island of Key West."
The reason Armenia will not consider returning to negotiations 'from
scratch' is that they believe Key West constituted a breakthrough,
and one that should be honored as final:
"Armenian officials say the Key West framework would effectively
transfer Karabakh to Armenia in return for Armenia's withdrawal from
occupied territories in Azerbaijani proper. Armenia would also have
to guarantee unfettered transport and communication -- and possibly
open a permanent land corridor -- between the Nakhichevan exclave and
the rest of Azerbaijan. According to the chief US negotiator on
Karabakh, Rudolf Perina, the parties were 'incredibly close' to a
deal. 'The issues of principle have been decided, and what is left
are technical differences,' Perina told a conference in Washington in
May 2002.
In the aftermath of the Key West talks, according to the Armenian
version of events, Heider Aliyev suddenly and without explanation
backed away from the agreement. Today, Baku maintains no formal deal
ever existed. Azerbaijan's presidential Chief of Staff, Novruz
Mammadov, said during a live video link between Baku and Yerevan on
February 13 that 'there is no {Key West agreement] and there cannot
be any such document.'"
Despite the affirmation of the negotiations by American
representative Perina, Baku denies that an agreement was ever
reached. Instead, claimed Azerbaijani Presidential Chief of Staff
Novruz Mammadov Friday, "…certain people thought they could impose
some ideas on us, but we rejected them at once."
Baku argues that Washington actually favors its own side: right now,
Azerbaijan is making hay of this year's US State Department February
25 report on human rights, claiming that it supports its position
over Nagorno-Karabakh:
"…as usual, the Department of State recognized the continuing
aggression of Armenian against Azerbaijan.
…In the Report on human rights, it is noted that occupation of the
Azerbaijan territories is one of the major factors impeding
democratic and economic development of Azerbaijan. Further, it is
noted that the repeated violation by the Armenians in 2003 of the
ceasefire regime led to death of the civilians and militaries."
Despite stepped up diplomatic efforts from the internationals,
prospects for peace remain distant. The young and untested
Azerbaijani president is more concerned with issues like the economy.
Recent provocations have not helped, either.
For example, Baku gleefully reported recently that its spy rings in
Yerevan have yet to be cracked:
"'…Not a single agent of [Azerbaijani] Ministry of National Security
has ever been found in Armenia. This network is still functioning,'
Azerbaijani Minister of National Security Namiq Abbasov told
reporters. The minister didn't rule out the possibility that the arch
foe neighbor, Armenia, also has infiltrated spies into Azerbaijan,
but said those spies would be gradually found out."
Abbasov's comments came in reaction to the recent Armenian
announcement that 5 Russian nationals had been arrested in Yerevan,
and charged with betraying military secrets to the Azerbaijanis.
Most galling for the Armenians, however, was the perceived
'heroicization' of an Azerbaijani soldier who hacked to death an
Armenian colleague on 19 February- ironically, at a NATO 'Partnership
for Peace' conference in Hungary. Emil Danielyan relays that for the
Yerevan daily 'Aravot,' "…this is a political murder provoked by that
country's government which has been pursuing a policy of hatred
towards Armenians and filling Azerbaijani hearts with hostility."
http://www.balkanalysis.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=273
--Boundary_(ID_QiAWJvN3+K9gz9ggZCypxA)--
Nov 10 2004
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Infighting Dominate Political Agenda (Part 1)
Posted on Saturday, February 28 @ 12:15:00 EST by balkanalysis
C Deliso writes " Eurasianet.org reports that talks between
Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed province of Nagorno-Karabakh
have ground to a halt. Speaking at a conference in Geneva, Armenian
representatives "…flatly rejected Baku's recent suggestion to restart
the process 'from scratch,' according to Armenian journalist Emil
Danielyan.
In addition, says Danielyan, "…Armenian leaders have threatened to
freeze direct contacts with Azerbaijan if Baku refuses to revive
agreements reportedly reached by the two countries three years ago."
This is in reference to a supposed deal reached in Key West, Florida
by Armenian president Robert Kocharian and his late counterpart,
Heydar Aliyev.
This echoed Interfax's report of 18 February, quoting Kocharian as
ruling out restarting talks "from scratch:"
"…over the years, we have invested significant efforts in laying the
groundwork for resolving the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict… I will not
throw away that effort.
…I do not think that the Azerbaijani president opposes any changes
but in the 10 years of peace, a situation has emerged in which the
two sides are reconciled to facts, so a change of the status quo is
more dangerous than maintaining it."
Brief history of Nagorno-Karabakh
An almost kidney-shaped, mountainous area within Azerbaijan but
populated by an Armenian majority, Nagorno ('Upper') Karabakh has
been the subject of contentious dispute for many generations.
Somewhat like Bosnia, it was a Christian region partially Islamicized
by the Turks. In the 11th century, the low-lying eastern parts of the
Christian province fell to the Seljuk Turks, who left the mark of
religion and language on people who were "the direct descendents of
present-day Azerbaijanis," according to Armenian-American scholar
Ronald Grigor Suny.
Through the many centuries of different empires that ruled in the
Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh changed hands several times but, says
Suny, "semi-independent Armenian princes" ruled there until the early
19th century, when the Russian Tzar annexed the region from Iran.
A century later, with the coming of the Russian Revolution, the
Armenian-dominated province tried to reunify with Soviet Armenia, but
the Turkish-supported Azerbaijanis forced them to remain part of
Azerbaijan. The communist Kavbiuro promised in 1920 to return the
region to Armenia, and resolved to do so on 3 July 1921. However,
"…mysteriously, two days later, the bureau reversed itself
'considering the necessity of national harmony between Muslims and
Armenians, the economic linkage between upper and lower Karabagh, and
its permanent ties to Azerbaijan."
Stalin had already found it useful for his greater Soviet strategy to
preserve this localized enmity, thus preventing either Armenia or
Azerbaijan from becoming too powerful or independent. Suny adds,
"…For sixty years Karabagh remained an enclave within Azerbaijan, an
anomaly in the Soviet system- the only autonomous national region
with a majority that was of the same ethnicity as a neighboring
Soviet republic yet was not permitted to join that republic.
Discontent with Azerbaijani rule grew, as discrimination against
Armenian language, culture, and contacts with Soviet Armenia became a
persistent practice. Armenians believed that Azerbaijan preferred to
invest economically in regions where its own nationality were a
majority rather than in Karabagh where 75 to 80 percent of the
population was Armenian.
…The city of Shusha, once an Armenian cultural center, became almost
entirely Azerbaijani. In 1959 Armenians made up 84.4 percent of
Karabagh's population. Twenty years later they were just under 76
percent." (pp. 194-5)
After Stalin's death, nationalist ferment increased among Armenian
politicians, intellectuals and the people. This phenomenon was
mirrored in Azerbaijan. Both sides have long lists of grievances
detailing the murders, perfidy and general transgressions allegedly
carried out by the other side.
As could have been expected, the demise of the Soviet Union saw the
explosion of this long-suppressed, localized cold war. The rekindled
national zeal of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis led to open fighting
in 1992, which raged for two years, resulting in additional
grievances for the list-keepers.
According to Baku, 700,000 Azerbaijanis were forced to leave their
homes in Nagorno-Karabakh because of the war, as were 300,000 ethnic
Azerbaijanis then living in Armenia proper. Yet this had been
preceded by the expulsion of up to 300,000 ethnic Armenians from
Azerbaijan from 1988-90, when re-unification desires began to
intensify.
The current state of play
An international mediating committee called the Minsk Group, headed
by France, the United States and Russia, was set up in 1995. Yet
Nagorno-Karabakh is quite possibly one of the region's great
unresolvable issues. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan consider the area
their historically rightful property, the former because they have
always lived there and the latter because their co-religionists, the
Turks and Iranians, ruled over the area for long periods.
Now, Azerbaijan is indignant because of alleged Armenian violations
of cease-fire agreements. For their part, Armenians are especially
incensed because of apparent Azerbaijani greed. Azerbaijan already
has official ownership of the Nakhichevan province, an
Azerbaijani-majority area on Armenia's border with Iran- and one
completely cut off from any physical connection with Azerbaijan, a
situation comparable only to Russia's ownership of the similarly
geographically estranged city of Kaliningrad. There is a sentiment
that due to this reality Armenia has already given away far too much-
especially considering the much earlier loss of the majority of its
historical territories to the Turkish state.
While the situation remains unresolved, Armenia feels it now has the
upper hand in Nagorno-Karabakh. The province is largely free of
Baku's interference. Armenia also claims that a nearly-finalized deal
between the two countries, made by Kocharian and the late President
Aliyev, should be honored.
Key West: the agreement that almost was
According to Eurasianet's Emil Danielyan, Armenia and Azerbaijan
"…have engaged in lots of political maneuvering in early 2004. Aliyev
and other leaders in Baku complained that existing Minsk Group
proposals fail to ensure that Karabakh would remain part of
Azerbaijan, going on to accuse the international community of tacitly
wanting to reward 'Armenian aggression.'
Armenian officials, in turn, have repeated their claim that Karabakh
is now an 'integral part' of Armenia. 'Our aim is to win
international recognition of the aforesaid, but it is difficult to
say when we will achieve this,' Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian told
Yerevan TV on February 12. Armenian insists the only way to break the
existing impasse is to return to the agreement reportedly reached by
Kocharian and Ilham's late father and predecessor, Heidar Aliyev,
during April 2001 talks on the Florida resort island of Key West."
The reason Armenia will not consider returning to negotiations 'from
scratch' is that they believe Key West constituted a breakthrough,
and one that should be honored as final:
"Armenian officials say the Key West framework would effectively
transfer Karabakh to Armenia in return for Armenia's withdrawal from
occupied territories in Azerbaijani proper. Armenia would also have
to guarantee unfettered transport and communication -- and possibly
open a permanent land corridor -- between the Nakhichevan exclave and
the rest of Azerbaijan. According to the chief US negotiator on
Karabakh, Rudolf Perina, the parties were 'incredibly close' to a
deal. 'The issues of principle have been decided, and what is left
are technical differences,' Perina told a conference in Washington in
May 2002.
In the aftermath of the Key West talks, according to the Armenian
version of events, Heider Aliyev suddenly and without explanation
backed away from the agreement. Today, Baku maintains no formal deal
ever existed. Azerbaijan's presidential Chief of Staff, Novruz
Mammadov, said during a live video link between Baku and Yerevan on
February 13 that 'there is no {Key West agreement] and there cannot
be any such document.'"
Despite the affirmation of the negotiations by American
representative Perina, Baku denies that an agreement was ever
reached. Instead, claimed Azerbaijani Presidential Chief of Staff
Novruz Mammadov Friday, "…certain people thought they could impose
some ideas on us, but we rejected them at once."
Baku argues that Washington actually favors its own side: right now,
Azerbaijan is making hay of this year's US State Department February
25 report on human rights, claiming that it supports its position
over Nagorno-Karabakh:
"…as usual, the Department of State recognized the continuing
aggression of Armenian against Azerbaijan.
…In the Report on human rights, it is noted that occupation of the
Azerbaijan territories is one of the major factors impeding
democratic and economic development of Azerbaijan. Further, it is
noted that the repeated violation by the Armenians in 2003 of the
ceasefire regime led to death of the civilians and militaries."
Despite stepped up diplomatic efforts from the internationals,
prospects for peace remain distant. The young and untested
Azerbaijani president is more concerned with issues like the economy.
Recent provocations have not helped, either.
For example, Baku gleefully reported recently that its spy rings in
Yerevan have yet to be cracked:
"'…Not a single agent of [Azerbaijani] Ministry of National Security
has ever been found in Armenia. This network is still functioning,'
Azerbaijani Minister of National Security Namiq Abbasov told
reporters. The minister didn't rule out the possibility that the arch
foe neighbor, Armenia, also has infiltrated spies into Azerbaijan,
but said those spies would be gradually found out."
Abbasov's comments came in reaction to the recent Armenian
announcement that 5 Russian nationals had been arrested in Yerevan,
and charged with betraying military secrets to the Azerbaijanis.
Most galling for the Armenians, however, was the perceived
'heroicization' of an Azerbaijani soldier who hacked to death an
Armenian colleague on 19 February- ironically, at a NATO 'Partnership
for Peace' conference in Hungary. Emil Danielyan relays that for the
Yerevan daily 'Aravot,' "…this is a political murder provoked by that
country's government which has been pursuing a policy of hatred
towards Armenians and filling Azerbaijani hearts with hostility."
http://www.balkanalysis.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=273
--Boundary_(ID_QiAWJvN3+K9gz9ggZCypxA)--