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"Russia's Slippery Foothold in Abkhazia Becomes a Slide"
PINR
29 November 2004
Over the past two months, Moscow's geostrategy has suffered serious
setbacks in Ukraine and Abkhazia, a mini-state on the Black Sea that
broke away from Georgia in 1993 and has since been dependent for its
existence on Russian support.
The guiding aim of President Vladimir Putin's geostrategy is to restore
Moscow's influence over its periphery, which it lost after the fall
of the Soviet Union. The Putin regime envisions a trade and security
alliance that would incorporate some of the republics of the former
Soviet Union in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, in which
Russia would be the dominant power. Moscow pursues its goal by trying
to promote and cultivate friendly governments in the target states.
Wherever Moscow attempts to reassert its influence, it meets with
opposition from the Euro-American alliance, which has the strategic
aim of incorporating Russia's periphery -- especially in Eastern Europe
and the Caucasus -- into the Western system of market democracies. If
Ukraine tilted westward, it would be a candidate for admission to
the European Union and N.A.T.O. If Abkhazia were to be reabsorbed
into Georgia, Moscow would lose one of its important footholds in
the Transcaucasus to a pro-Western state.
The Putin regime has responded to its persistent structural conflict
with the West by taking a proactive approach toward the political
systems of its target states and dependencies. In Ukraine and Abkhazia,
Moscow has most notably attempted to influence the outcomes of
presidential elections overtly through Putin's endorsements of favored
candidates and by sending in political operatives to strategize and
support those candidates.
In both cases, Moscow's tactics have backfired; it has not been able
to overcome internal divisions within the target states and it has
awakened resistance in electorates to outside influence, resulting in
disputed elections that have brought endemic conflicts to a head and,
in Abkhazia's case, institutional failure. Through overplaying its
hand, Moscow now finds itself threatened with a permanent loss of
influence in Eastern Europe and the Transcaucasus. The situation in
Abkhazia is particularly revealing, because that small country with
a quarter-million people shows in microcosm how even a society that
is radically dependent on Moscow and is pro-Russian will resist its
protector when it feels that it is subject to undue pressure.
Abkhazia's Disputed Election
Until its first contested presidential election on October 3, 2004,
Abkhazia was ruled by strong man Vladislav Ardzinba who had followed
an unwavering pro-Moscow line. Unrecognized by any state, including
Russia, Ardzinba's regime was subject to an economic blockade by
Georgia and was only able to survive through the presence of Russian
"peacekeepers" who kept the Georgian military at bay.
During Ardzinba's tenure, Abkhazia's economy collapsed, leaving half
the country's working-age population unemployed. Criminal activity
became rampant and corruption and cronyism were rife within the state
bureaucracies. Nonetheless, when it came time to replace the aging
Ardzinba, Moscow hit upon a plan of contested elections, which it
calculated would result in the victory of its favorite, Raul Khajimba,
an ex-K.G.B. agent and the incumbent prime minister, and would have the
added benefit of conferring a modicum of legitimacy on the mini-state,
which would strengthen its position in any future deal with Georgia
or pave the way to some regularized and permanent form of separation.
>>From all appearances, the Abkhazian elections seemed to be a win-win
situation for Moscow. All five candidates were pledged to maintain
Abkhazia's special relation with Russia. Indeed, they could not do
otherwise: the civil war of 1992-1993 had resulted in the ethnic
cleansing of the Georgian half of the country's population, leaving
its ethnic Abkhaz, Armenian and Russian components completely dependent
on Moscow for protection against an irredentist Georgia, which gained
enhanced Western backing after the 2003-2004 Rose Revolution.
Despite the fact that Russian interests were not likely to be impaired
whomever won the presidential election, Putin made it clear that
he endorsed Khajimba by meeting with him and no other candidate,
and posing with him for a photograph that became an icon of the
campaign. Moscow also dispatched operatives to plan and support
Khajimba's campaign.
To the surprise of Moscow and political analysts, Putin's efforts
to manipulate the election had the opposite of their intended
effect. Opposition candidate Sergei Bagapsh, running on a platform
of continued ties with Russia and promises of an anti-crime and
anti-corruption administration, won slightly more than 50 percent of
the vote (44,002) to Khajimba's 30,815 votes, with the other candidates
splitting the rest.
Analysts attributed Bagapsh's unexpected showing to widespread public
resentment against Abkhazia's corrupt political system and Moscow's
efforts to perpetuate it. The slogan "We Can Decide Ourselves"
appeared on the streets, signaling popular defiance of Moscow.
Although Abkhazia's Central Electoral Commission certified Bagapsh's
victory, the election was clouded by charges of irregularities and an
unconstitutional revote in the Gali district, to which Bagapsh and
Khajimba agreed. When the Central Electoral Commission met to reach
its decision on October 6 and 11, supporters of Bagapsh occupied the
building where it was deliberating, setting a precedent of direct
action that would be repeated over the coming weeks by both sides,
finally eventuating in institutional failure and political paralysis.
Institutional Failure
Despite having agreed to the revote in Gali, Khajimba did not accept
the Commission's verdict and sued to have the vote overturned by the
country's Supreme Court. On October 28, after having heard testimony
that Bagapsh supporters had threatened commissioners during their
deliberations, the Court declared the Commission's decision to be
valid. Upon learning of the Court's verdict, Khajimba's supporters
seized the court building and held the judges hostage until they
reversed their decision and replaced it with a ruling ordering
the Central Electoral Commission to set up a revote. On October 29,
incumbent President Ardzinba issued a decree requiring new elections,
setting the stage for a downward spiral to institutional failure.
In quick succession, Bagapsh's forces took over the state television
and Khajimba's sealed off parliament, in which Bagapsh supporters
have a majority, to prevent it from declaring Ardzinba's decree
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, the Central Electoral Commission refused
to meet to plan new elections and Ardzinba replaced Khajimba as prime
minister with former Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations operative
Nodar Khashba, a Moscow loyalist.
With different institutions under the control of opposing factions,
Abkhazia's political system became paralyzed as neither candidate
proved willing to compromise, despite repeated negotiations. Bagapsh
insisted that he would be inaugurated on December 6, whereas Khajimba
demanded a revote.
The stand off spiraled out of control on November 12 when, during
a large rally of Bagapsh supporters, a group of them seized control
of the government complex in Abkhazia's capital Sukhumi, including
the president's office, supposedly to allow Bagapsh to set up his
new administration. In the commotion, 78 year old Tamara Sharkyl -- a
linguist, human-rights advocate and respected Abkhaz nationalist -- was
killed by a ricocheting bullet fired by Ardzinba's presidential guard.
At the urging of Bagapsh, his supporters left the government complex,
but remained outside it, preventing official business from being
conducted there. Since then, the tensions have deepened. After Bagapsh
supporters brought two presidential guards to the prosecutor's office
in connection with Sharkyl's death, security forces loyal to Ardzinba
launched a commando raid on the office and freed them, setting
off a chain of events leading to a "declaration of disobedience"
by 2000 police officers who vowed to refuse to follow orders from
the government.
Throughout the deepening tensions, Moscow supported Ardzinba, Khashba
and Khajimba, refusing to concede anything to Bagapsh. On November 12,
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Alexander Yakovenko
placed Moscow's support behind the Ardzinba regime and threatened
Russian intervention: "If the situation continues to follow the illegal
track, the Russian side will have to protect its interests. In Abkhazia
one and all should know that all responsibility for the likely effects
will be placed on Bagapsh and his followers."
Not only did Moscow's hard line fail to break the resolve of the
Bagapsh faction; it also provoked a strong response from Tbilisi,
which regards Abkhazia as part of Georgia. Despite the failure of
its assertive posture, Moscow has continued to try to exert pressure,
redeploying some of its peacekeepers from Abkhazia's Georgian border
toward Sukhumi and temporarily closing crossings along Abkhazia's
border, threatening to impede Abkhazia's citrus harvest from going
to market.
With Moscow taking one side in the election dispute and Abkhazian
state institutions divided and deadlocked, a last attempt at
conflict resolution was undertaken by the Council of Elders, an
extra-constitutional public body of clan and local leaders. When the
Council met in Sukhumi on November 20, its proceedings were disrupted
by an invasion of 100 old people bussed in by the Bagapsh camp. The
meeting was quickly called off after a decision was made to reconvene
the Council with new membership.
On November 23, the Council met again and declared that Bagapsh
should assume the presidency and that he and Khajimba should form
a team. Earlier, Bagapsh had offered Khajimba the posts of prime
minister or vice president, which the latter had refused, calling
instead either for a revote or for both candidates to drop out in
favor of a new election with new candidates, one of whom presumably
would be Moscow's current protégé Khashba. Khajimba responded to
the Elder's decision by appearing to back down for the first time,
saying that he would consult with his supporters before reaching a
decision. Meanwhile, Khashba threatened to resign as prime minister if
the supporters of both candidates did not vacate the public property
that they had seized and disband their militia, and Ardzinba announced
that he would not vacate the presidency on December 6.
In response to Ardzinba's announcement, parliament passed a resolution
on November 26 declaring Bagapsh's victory to be valid and demanding
that the State Guard Service "provide for the inauguration of the
president elect" on December 6. Khajimba labeled the resolution
"absurd" and Ardzinba's office announced that the incumbent
president had not instructed state agencies to obey the parliamentary
instructions. Deputies in the Parliament who are opposed to Bagapsh
reported that 200 of his supporters had invaded the chamber, demanding
that their candidate's victory be recognized.
Moscow Hardens its Line and Georgia Senses an Opportunity
With Moscow's strategy in a state of collapse, Abkhazia appears to
be headed for yet another confrontation on December 6, when Bagapsh
has vowed to be inaugurated as president and Ardzinba has pledged
to remain in power. In order to head off a Bagapsh takeover, Moscow,
speaking through anonymous government sources and Alexander Tkachov,
governor of Krasnodar territory, which borders Abkhazia, ratcheted
up its hard-line rhetoric, threatening -- if Bagapsh assumed the
presidency -- to cut off pensions to Russian citizens in Abkhazia
and to close the country's border with Russia, blocking the citrus
exports and tourist trade that are Abkhazia's major sources of income.
In a sharp break from his previous pro-Russian position, Bagapsh
responded that if Moscow followed through on its threats, Tbilisi
would have an opportunity to restore its control over Abkhazia,
an opinion echoed by Alexander Shakov, an analyst at the Russian
Institute of Strategic Research.
Thus far, Moscow's position has been eased by the reluctance of the
United Nations, which monitors the cease-fire between Georgia and
Abkhazia, and the United States to intervene in the conflict. Tbilisi,
however, has sensed an advantage and has stated that the "people's
will" should prevail in Abkhazia, a shift from its standard line
that nothing that transpires in the breakaway republic's political
system is legitimate or worthy of comment. Georgian Minister for
Conflict Resolution and Prevention Georgy Khaindrava offered Sukhumi
"the widest authority ever known in international practice."
Tbilisi believes that time is on its side. In a news conference
on November 24 celebrating the anniversary of the Rose Revolution,
Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili noted that Georgia's budget
in 2005 will be triple its current figure, that much of the increased
spending will go to beef up the military and that N.A.T.O. and the
E.U. are considering Georgia as a candidate for membership. With
reference to Abkhazia, Saakashvili said that "it is the main goal and
task of my life, my personal life," adding that Tbilisi is getting
ready to reassert sovereignty over the breakaway region and that
"we need patience," but not "excessive pacifism."
Conclusion: The Pitfalls of Neo-Imperialism
It is reasonable to conclude that Moscow has acted to the detriment
of its interests in Abkhazia. The cause of the mini-state's
institutional failure and political implosion resides less in the
internal divisions of its society than in Moscow's "neo-imperialist"
policies. Like their neo-conservative counterparts in Washington, the
Russian neo-imperialists are long on vision and short on a realistic
appraisal of actual conditions. Just as the neo-conservatives believed
that U.S. forces would be welcomed in Iraq, Moscow hard liners
were confident that their favored candidate would win in Abkhazia's
contested election, simply by dint of Putin's endorsement, government
control of the local media, the Abkhazian population's pro-Russian
attitudes and its dependency on Moscow, and Moscow's campaign
support. They did not reckon with the large number of people in the
mini-state who were disaffected by a decade of economic depression,
rampant crime and corrupt rule, and were willing to back a member of
the established political class who promised to bring reform while
maintaining good relations with Moscow.
When the election did not yield Moscow's desired result, Putin could
have accepted defeat and turned it into an opportunity by playing the
role of honest broker and arranging the kind of deal that the Council
of Elders proposed and Bagapsh offered, allowing Bagapsh to assume the
presidency and giving the prime minister's post to Khajimba. Instead,
Moscow refused to recognize its mistake and has continued to back
the losing side, now to the point of threatening the population with
severely punitive economic sanctions and possible military coercion.
Moscow has stood by and watched Abkhaz political society split apart,
counting on the resulting stress to bring its adversaries and the
general population around to heed its dictates. Abkhazia's plunge
into direct action and political gang rule, verging on civil warfare,
cancels any possibility of a legitimized pro-Moscow regime there. If
Moscow succeeds in installing a president to its liking in Sukhumi,
his regime will be perceived as an imposed domination both inside and
outside Abkhazia. If Bagapsh assumes the presidency, Moscow will either
institute punitive measures, driving Sukhumi to bargain with Tbilisi,
or it will have to mend fences with its former opponent. The latter
option is the only one that is consistent with Russian interests,
but it is not clear that Putin will take it.
Moscow has managed to cause a shift in attitudes that was unthinkable
before the October 3 election. Bagapsh, who consistently asserted that
Abkhazia had to be pro-Russian, because if it was not, it would be
"swallowed" by Georgia, is now saying that Moscow is forcing Abkhazia
into Tbilisi's arms. Tbilisi is now signaling that it will be generous
to a "popular" government in Sukhumi. It is a difficult feat to bring
Georgians and Abkhazians together after a bloody civil war and ethnic
cleansing, but it seems possible that Moscow is doing just that.
The Euro-American alliance stands to gain the most from Moscow's
mismanagement of Abkhazia, just as it does in Ukraine. What appeared
immediately after the October 3 election to be a minor slippage in
Russia's foothold in Abkhazia has now become a slide that will be
difficult to arrest.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight
into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests
involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report
may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written
permission of [email protected]. All comments should be directed
to [email protected].
--Boundary_(ID_I0gAUsMHnziW7BRrd+oGAQ)--
PINR
29 November 2004
Over the past two months, Moscow's geostrategy has suffered serious
setbacks in Ukraine and Abkhazia, a mini-state on the Black Sea that
broke away from Georgia in 1993 and has since been dependent for its
existence on Russian support.
The guiding aim of President Vladimir Putin's geostrategy is to restore
Moscow's influence over its periphery, which it lost after the fall
of the Soviet Union. The Putin regime envisions a trade and security
alliance that would incorporate some of the republics of the former
Soviet Union in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, in which
Russia would be the dominant power. Moscow pursues its goal by trying
to promote and cultivate friendly governments in the target states.
Wherever Moscow attempts to reassert its influence, it meets with
opposition from the Euro-American alliance, which has the strategic
aim of incorporating Russia's periphery -- especially in Eastern Europe
and the Caucasus -- into the Western system of market democracies. If
Ukraine tilted westward, it would be a candidate for admission to
the European Union and N.A.T.O. If Abkhazia were to be reabsorbed
into Georgia, Moscow would lose one of its important footholds in
the Transcaucasus to a pro-Western state.
The Putin regime has responded to its persistent structural conflict
with the West by taking a proactive approach toward the political
systems of its target states and dependencies. In Ukraine and Abkhazia,
Moscow has most notably attempted to influence the outcomes of
presidential elections overtly through Putin's endorsements of favored
candidates and by sending in political operatives to strategize and
support those candidates.
In both cases, Moscow's tactics have backfired; it has not been able
to overcome internal divisions within the target states and it has
awakened resistance in electorates to outside influence, resulting in
disputed elections that have brought endemic conflicts to a head and,
in Abkhazia's case, institutional failure. Through overplaying its
hand, Moscow now finds itself threatened with a permanent loss of
influence in Eastern Europe and the Transcaucasus. The situation in
Abkhazia is particularly revealing, because that small country with
a quarter-million people shows in microcosm how even a society that
is radically dependent on Moscow and is pro-Russian will resist its
protector when it feels that it is subject to undue pressure.
Abkhazia's Disputed Election
Until its first contested presidential election on October 3, 2004,
Abkhazia was ruled by strong man Vladislav Ardzinba who had followed
an unwavering pro-Moscow line. Unrecognized by any state, including
Russia, Ardzinba's regime was subject to an economic blockade by
Georgia and was only able to survive through the presence of Russian
"peacekeepers" who kept the Georgian military at bay.
During Ardzinba's tenure, Abkhazia's economy collapsed, leaving half
the country's working-age population unemployed. Criminal activity
became rampant and corruption and cronyism were rife within the state
bureaucracies. Nonetheless, when it came time to replace the aging
Ardzinba, Moscow hit upon a plan of contested elections, which it
calculated would result in the victory of its favorite, Raul Khajimba,
an ex-K.G.B. agent and the incumbent prime minister, and would have the
added benefit of conferring a modicum of legitimacy on the mini-state,
which would strengthen its position in any future deal with Georgia
or pave the way to some regularized and permanent form of separation.
>>From all appearances, the Abkhazian elections seemed to be a win-win
situation for Moscow. All five candidates were pledged to maintain
Abkhazia's special relation with Russia. Indeed, they could not do
otherwise: the civil war of 1992-1993 had resulted in the ethnic
cleansing of the Georgian half of the country's population, leaving
its ethnic Abkhaz, Armenian and Russian components completely dependent
on Moscow for protection against an irredentist Georgia, which gained
enhanced Western backing after the 2003-2004 Rose Revolution.
Despite the fact that Russian interests were not likely to be impaired
whomever won the presidential election, Putin made it clear that
he endorsed Khajimba by meeting with him and no other candidate,
and posing with him for a photograph that became an icon of the
campaign. Moscow also dispatched operatives to plan and support
Khajimba's campaign.
To the surprise of Moscow and political analysts, Putin's efforts
to manipulate the election had the opposite of their intended
effect. Opposition candidate Sergei Bagapsh, running on a platform
of continued ties with Russia and promises of an anti-crime and
anti-corruption administration, won slightly more than 50 percent of
the vote (44,002) to Khajimba's 30,815 votes, with the other candidates
splitting the rest.
Analysts attributed Bagapsh's unexpected showing to widespread public
resentment against Abkhazia's corrupt political system and Moscow's
efforts to perpetuate it. The slogan "We Can Decide Ourselves"
appeared on the streets, signaling popular defiance of Moscow.
Although Abkhazia's Central Electoral Commission certified Bagapsh's
victory, the election was clouded by charges of irregularities and an
unconstitutional revote in the Gali district, to which Bagapsh and
Khajimba agreed. When the Central Electoral Commission met to reach
its decision on October 6 and 11, supporters of Bagapsh occupied the
building where it was deliberating, setting a precedent of direct
action that would be repeated over the coming weeks by both sides,
finally eventuating in institutional failure and political paralysis.
Institutional Failure
Despite having agreed to the revote in Gali, Khajimba did not accept
the Commission's verdict and sued to have the vote overturned by the
country's Supreme Court. On October 28, after having heard testimony
that Bagapsh supporters had threatened commissioners during their
deliberations, the Court declared the Commission's decision to be
valid. Upon learning of the Court's verdict, Khajimba's supporters
seized the court building and held the judges hostage until they
reversed their decision and replaced it with a ruling ordering
the Central Electoral Commission to set up a revote. On October 29,
incumbent President Ardzinba issued a decree requiring new elections,
setting the stage for a downward spiral to institutional failure.
In quick succession, Bagapsh's forces took over the state television
and Khajimba's sealed off parliament, in which Bagapsh supporters
have a majority, to prevent it from declaring Ardzinba's decree
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, the Central Electoral Commission refused
to meet to plan new elections and Ardzinba replaced Khajimba as prime
minister with former Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations operative
Nodar Khashba, a Moscow loyalist.
With different institutions under the control of opposing factions,
Abkhazia's political system became paralyzed as neither candidate
proved willing to compromise, despite repeated negotiations. Bagapsh
insisted that he would be inaugurated on December 6, whereas Khajimba
demanded a revote.
The stand off spiraled out of control on November 12 when, during
a large rally of Bagapsh supporters, a group of them seized control
of the government complex in Abkhazia's capital Sukhumi, including
the president's office, supposedly to allow Bagapsh to set up his
new administration. In the commotion, 78 year old Tamara Sharkyl -- a
linguist, human-rights advocate and respected Abkhaz nationalist -- was
killed by a ricocheting bullet fired by Ardzinba's presidential guard.
At the urging of Bagapsh, his supporters left the government complex,
but remained outside it, preventing official business from being
conducted there. Since then, the tensions have deepened. After Bagapsh
supporters brought two presidential guards to the prosecutor's office
in connection with Sharkyl's death, security forces loyal to Ardzinba
launched a commando raid on the office and freed them, setting
off a chain of events leading to a "declaration of disobedience"
by 2000 police officers who vowed to refuse to follow orders from
the government.
Throughout the deepening tensions, Moscow supported Ardzinba, Khashba
and Khajimba, refusing to concede anything to Bagapsh. On November 12,
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Alexander Yakovenko
placed Moscow's support behind the Ardzinba regime and threatened
Russian intervention: "If the situation continues to follow the illegal
track, the Russian side will have to protect its interests. In Abkhazia
one and all should know that all responsibility for the likely effects
will be placed on Bagapsh and his followers."
Not only did Moscow's hard line fail to break the resolve of the
Bagapsh faction; it also provoked a strong response from Tbilisi,
which regards Abkhazia as part of Georgia. Despite the failure of
its assertive posture, Moscow has continued to try to exert pressure,
redeploying some of its peacekeepers from Abkhazia's Georgian border
toward Sukhumi and temporarily closing crossings along Abkhazia's
border, threatening to impede Abkhazia's citrus harvest from going
to market.
With Moscow taking one side in the election dispute and Abkhazian
state institutions divided and deadlocked, a last attempt at
conflict resolution was undertaken by the Council of Elders, an
extra-constitutional public body of clan and local leaders. When the
Council met in Sukhumi on November 20, its proceedings were disrupted
by an invasion of 100 old people bussed in by the Bagapsh camp. The
meeting was quickly called off after a decision was made to reconvene
the Council with new membership.
On November 23, the Council met again and declared that Bagapsh
should assume the presidency and that he and Khajimba should form
a team. Earlier, Bagapsh had offered Khajimba the posts of prime
minister or vice president, which the latter had refused, calling
instead either for a revote or for both candidates to drop out in
favor of a new election with new candidates, one of whom presumably
would be Moscow's current protégé Khashba. Khajimba responded to
the Elder's decision by appearing to back down for the first time,
saying that he would consult with his supporters before reaching a
decision. Meanwhile, Khashba threatened to resign as prime minister if
the supporters of both candidates did not vacate the public property
that they had seized and disband their militia, and Ardzinba announced
that he would not vacate the presidency on December 6.
In response to Ardzinba's announcement, parliament passed a resolution
on November 26 declaring Bagapsh's victory to be valid and demanding
that the State Guard Service "provide for the inauguration of the
president elect" on December 6. Khajimba labeled the resolution
"absurd" and Ardzinba's office announced that the incumbent
president had not instructed state agencies to obey the parliamentary
instructions. Deputies in the Parliament who are opposed to Bagapsh
reported that 200 of his supporters had invaded the chamber, demanding
that their candidate's victory be recognized.
Moscow Hardens its Line and Georgia Senses an Opportunity
With Moscow's strategy in a state of collapse, Abkhazia appears to
be headed for yet another confrontation on December 6, when Bagapsh
has vowed to be inaugurated as president and Ardzinba has pledged
to remain in power. In order to head off a Bagapsh takeover, Moscow,
speaking through anonymous government sources and Alexander Tkachov,
governor of Krasnodar territory, which borders Abkhazia, ratcheted
up its hard-line rhetoric, threatening -- if Bagapsh assumed the
presidency -- to cut off pensions to Russian citizens in Abkhazia
and to close the country's border with Russia, blocking the citrus
exports and tourist trade that are Abkhazia's major sources of income.
In a sharp break from his previous pro-Russian position, Bagapsh
responded that if Moscow followed through on its threats, Tbilisi
would have an opportunity to restore its control over Abkhazia,
an opinion echoed by Alexander Shakov, an analyst at the Russian
Institute of Strategic Research.
Thus far, Moscow's position has been eased by the reluctance of the
United Nations, which monitors the cease-fire between Georgia and
Abkhazia, and the United States to intervene in the conflict. Tbilisi,
however, has sensed an advantage and has stated that the "people's
will" should prevail in Abkhazia, a shift from its standard line
that nothing that transpires in the breakaway republic's political
system is legitimate or worthy of comment. Georgian Minister for
Conflict Resolution and Prevention Georgy Khaindrava offered Sukhumi
"the widest authority ever known in international practice."
Tbilisi believes that time is on its side. In a news conference
on November 24 celebrating the anniversary of the Rose Revolution,
Georgia's President Mikhail Saakashvili noted that Georgia's budget
in 2005 will be triple its current figure, that much of the increased
spending will go to beef up the military and that N.A.T.O. and the
E.U. are considering Georgia as a candidate for membership. With
reference to Abkhazia, Saakashvili said that "it is the main goal and
task of my life, my personal life," adding that Tbilisi is getting
ready to reassert sovereignty over the breakaway region and that
"we need patience," but not "excessive pacifism."
Conclusion: The Pitfalls of Neo-Imperialism
It is reasonable to conclude that Moscow has acted to the detriment
of its interests in Abkhazia. The cause of the mini-state's
institutional failure and political implosion resides less in the
internal divisions of its society than in Moscow's "neo-imperialist"
policies. Like their neo-conservative counterparts in Washington, the
Russian neo-imperialists are long on vision and short on a realistic
appraisal of actual conditions. Just as the neo-conservatives believed
that U.S. forces would be welcomed in Iraq, Moscow hard liners
were confident that their favored candidate would win in Abkhazia's
contested election, simply by dint of Putin's endorsement, government
control of the local media, the Abkhazian population's pro-Russian
attitudes and its dependency on Moscow, and Moscow's campaign
support. They did not reckon with the large number of people in the
mini-state who were disaffected by a decade of economic depression,
rampant crime and corrupt rule, and were willing to back a member of
the established political class who promised to bring reform while
maintaining good relations with Moscow.
When the election did not yield Moscow's desired result, Putin could
have accepted defeat and turned it into an opportunity by playing the
role of honest broker and arranging the kind of deal that the Council
of Elders proposed and Bagapsh offered, allowing Bagapsh to assume the
presidency and giving the prime minister's post to Khajimba. Instead,
Moscow refused to recognize its mistake and has continued to back
the losing side, now to the point of threatening the population with
severely punitive economic sanctions and possible military coercion.
Moscow has stood by and watched Abkhaz political society split apart,
counting on the resulting stress to bring its adversaries and the
general population around to heed its dictates. Abkhazia's plunge
into direct action and political gang rule, verging on civil warfare,
cancels any possibility of a legitimized pro-Moscow regime there. If
Moscow succeeds in installing a president to its liking in Sukhumi,
his regime will be perceived as an imposed domination both inside and
outside Abkhazia. If Bagapsh assumes the presidency, Moscow will either
institute punitive measures, driving Sukhumi to bargain with Tbilisi,
or it will have to mend fences with its former opponent. The latter
option is the only one that is consistent with Russian interests,
but it is not clear that Putin will take it.
Moscow has managed to cause a shift in attitudes that was unthinkable
before the October 3 election. Bagapsh, who consistently asserted that
Abkhazia had to be pro-Russian, because if it was not, it would be
"swallowed" by Georgia, is now saying that Moscow is forcing Abkhazia
into Tbilisi's arms. Tbilisi is now signaling that it will be generous
to a "popular" government in Sukhumi. It is a difficult feat to bring
Georgians and Abkhazians together after a bloody civil war and ethnic
cleansing, but it seems possible that Moscow is doing just that.
The Euro-American alliance stands to gain the most from Moscow's
mismanagement of Abkhazia, just as it does in Ukraine. What appeared
immediately after the October 3 election to be a minor slippage in
Russia's foothold in Abkhazia has now become a slide that will be
difficult to arrest.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
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into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
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