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Eye on Eurasia: Putin's greatest fear
Putinru.com
05 October 2004
Russian President Vladimir Putin warned last month that the
post-Soviet states face "up to 2,000" potential ethno-confessional
conflicts, any one of which could explode "if we don't do anything
about them." Both that number and the possibility that they will
involve violence far exceed estimates made by most Russian and Western
analysts. But Putin's expressed belief in them highlights his sense of
the fragility of Russia and other former Soviet republics. And it
helps to explain his commitment to rebuilding the coercive capacity of
the state.
In a partial transcript of the Russian president's meeting with
foreign academics and journalists on Sept. 6 provided by Jonathan
Steele of The Guardian newspaper and distributed on the Johnson Russia
List, Putin provided his clearest statement yet of just how much
ethnic and religious conflicts threaten the post-Soviet states.
"In the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union, many conflicts of
ethnic and confessional nature have broken out," Putin said, adding,
"We do have up to 2,000 conflicts of the type which are in the dormant
stage." But, "If we don't do anything about them, they could provide a
flare up instantaneously."
Putin then offered his views on why such conflicts could emerge, who
is responsible, and the roles democracy and state power have to play
to ensure that potential conflicts do not become real.
The Russian president suggested that the conflicts that have broken
out did so precisely because of the collapse of state power: Pointing
to the violence in Karabakh and South Ossetia, Putin said that "once
the state became weaker, separatism, which was very natural, was on
the rise. It happened elsewhere. It happened here."
In linking the emergence of such conflicts to the decline of state
power, Putin explicitly rejected that Russian policies had been in any
way responsible for what has happened in Chechnya. "There is no
connection whatsoever, there is no connection between the policies of
Russia regarding Chechnya and subsequent events," he said.
The Russian leader indicated that the free play of democracy could not
by itself prevent ethnic and confessional flare-ups. Indeed, democracy
introduced too quickly or in ways that are not "in conformity with the
development of society" could in that event be "carrying a destructive
element."
Consequently, Putin said, he and his government will "see to it" that
democratic institutions in his country become ever more "efficient"
and work closely with those institutions that are rebuilding the power
of state rather than weakening them.
Three aspects of Putin's remarks are striking. First, he views his
country and its neighbors as far more threatened by ethnic and
religious conflicts than almost any other leader or analyst does. And
he sees conflicts as potentially having a domino effect, in which the
outbreak of any conflict anywhere threatens to spark more conflicts
elsewhere.
Second, the Russian president clearly believes that the weakness of
the state rather than the aspirations of the people involved is the
primary cause of current conflicts and of future ones.
And third, he sees democracy as a a form of government that may
trigger such conflicts rather than as a means of managing or even
solving them. Consequently, democracy for Putin is a system that must
be managed lest democratic arrangements "undermine through
counterproductive means" the ideas of democracy.
This set of views helps to explain why Putin is so obsessed with the
restoration of the agencies of state power, why he is unwilling to
deal with these challenges in a political way, and why he views
democracy as a threat rather than an opportunity.
But the experience of authoritarian states, including the Soviet
Union, suggests, Putin's approach -- however understandable it may be
given his premises -- may prove counterproductive, radicalizing those
whose views the authorities are not prepared to listen to and making
them more rather than less willing to turn to violence to gain their
ends.
Source: The Washington Times
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Putinru.com
05 October 2004
Russian President Vladimir Putin warned last month that the
post-Soviet states face "up to 2,000" potential ethno-confessional
conflicts, any one of which could explode "if we don't do anything
about them." Both that number and the possibility that they will
involve violence far exceed estimates made by most Russian and Western
analysts. But Putin's expressed belief in them highlights his sense of
the fragility of Russia and other former Soviet republics. And it
helps to explain his commitment to rebuilding the coercive capacity of
the state.
In a partial transcript of the Russian president's meeting with
foreign academics and journalists on Sept. 6 provided by Jonathan
Steele of The Guardian newspaper and distributed on the Johnson Russia
List, Putin provided his clearest statement yet of just how much
ethnic and religious conflicts threaten the post-Soviet states.
"In the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union, many conflicts of
ethnic and confessional nature have broken out," Putin said, adding,
"We do have up to 2,000 conflicts of the type which are in the dormant
stage." But, "If we don't do anything about them, they could provide a
flare up instantaneously."
Putin then offered his views on why such conflicts could emerge, who
is responsible, and the roles democracy and state power have to play
to ensure that potential conflicts do not become real.
The Russian president suggested that the conflicts that have broken
out did so precisely because of the collapse of state power: Pointing
to the violence in Karabakh and South Ossetia, Putin said that "once
the state became weaker, separatism, which was very natural, was on
the rise. It happened elsewhere. It happened here."
In linking the emergence of such conflicts to the decline of state
power, Putin explicitly rejected that Russian policies had been in any
way responsible for what has happened in Chechnya. "There is no
connection whatsoever, there is no connection between the policies of
Russia regarding Chechnya and subsequent events," he said.
The Russian leader indicated that the free play of democracy could not
by itself prevent ethnic and confessional flare-ups. Indeed, democracy
introduced too quickly or in ways that are not "in conformity with the
development of society" could in that event be "carrying a destructive
element."
Consequently, Putin said, he and his government will "see to it" that
democratic institutions in his country become ever more "efficient"
and work closely with those institutions that are rebuilding the power
of state rather than weakening them.
Three aspects of Putin's remarks are striking. First, he views his
country and its neighbors as far more threatened by ethnic and
religious conflicts than almost any other leader or analyst does. And
he sees conflicts as potentially having a domino effect, in which the
outbreak of any conflict anywhere threatens to spark more conflicts
elsewhere.
Second, the Russian president clearly believes that the weakness of
the state rather than the aspirations of the people involved is the
primary cause of current conflicts and of future ones.
And third, he sees democracy as a a form of government that may
trigger such conflicts rather than as a means of managing or even
solving them. Consequently, democracy for Putin is a system that must
be managed lest democratic arrangements "undermine through
counterproductive means" the ideas of democracy.
This set of views helps to explain why Putin is so obsessed with the
restoration of the agencies of state power, why he is unwilling to
deal with these challenges in a political way, and why he views
democracy as a threat rather than an opportunity.
But the experience of authoritarian states, including the Soviet
Union, suggests, Putin's approach -- however understandable it may be
given his premises -- may prove counterproductive, radicalizing those
whose views the authorities are not prepared to listen to and making
them more rather than less willing to turn to violence to gain their
ends.
Source: The Washington Times
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress