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Reconsidering Turkey
Richard Falk
Zaman
10.06.2004 Wednesday
There is an exciting process of reform and reorientation taking place
in Turkey during the last few years that has been hardly noticed in
America, and certainly not properly appreciated.
To the extent any attention has been given, it has been to whether the
soft Islam of the AK Party provides the United States with an
opportunity to demonstrate its willingness and capacity to abide a
moderate Muslim outlook on the part of a foreign country in the Middle
East.
This possibility was severely strained in the weeks leading up to the
Iraq War when the Turkish Parliament twice narrowly turned down an
American request to use Turkish territory to launch its invasion. This
was at the time an unexpected show of strategic independence on the
part of Turkey, especially in the face of an American offer to provide
Turkey with much needed financial assistance in the amount of $16
billion. It is worth remembering that during and after the cold war
Turkey had shaped its foreign policy entirely on the basis of being a
subordinate ally of the United States, and regionally since the early
1990s, by working in an avowed partnership with Israel.
What was most surprising, and in the end revealing, about the Iraq
decision initially so resented in Washington was that the Turkish
military stayed in the barracks. In the recent past, any elected
government in Turkey was subject to repudiation by a military coup or
takeover if it crossed the red lines of either 'secularism' or the
strategic relationship with the United States and Israel. There
existed little room for maneuver on the part of politicians, and
foreign policy in particular was regarded as the domain of 'the deep
state,' the non-elected, non-accountable army leadership that had
claimed for itself the uncontested role of guarding the constitutional
order of republican Turkey as established by its founding leader
[Mustafa] Kemal Ataturk. What is fascinating about this recent phase
of Turkish foreign policy is this silent process of fundamental change
that has been taking place without attracting notice except on an
issue by issue basis. The scope and cumulative weight of these changes
should not be exaggerated. The deep state remains in ultimate control
of the political destiny of Turkey, and the red lines still limit the
options for elected leaders. But the softening of these constraints is
also part of the unfolding reality, and deserves more attention than
it has so far received.
Why this softening? I think the strength of the mandate received by
the AK Party in the last round of national elections over two years
ago, and the admitted absence of a secular alternative, has been
crucial. But also significant is the skill and creativity of its
leaders, particularly its Prime Minister, [Recep] Tayyip Erdogan, and
Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, in taking steps forward in a manner
made acceptable to the hidden military overseers, including even the
civilianizing of the Turkish National Security Council. And overall,
the unexpected success of the present leadership in Ankara of
stabilizing runaway Turkish inflation while generating one of the
world's fastest rates of economic growth has given the government an
underpinning of credibility.
The most obvious explanation of this Turkish opening is undoubtedly
the consensus in Ankara that it is in the national interest of the
country to obtain membership in the European Union at the earliest
possible time. And it is agreed on all sides that this goal is
attainable, if at all, only if Turkey demonstrates a willingness to
clean up its human rights record and solve its main internal and
external problems. This pressure was present even before the AK
leadership arrived, and first became visible in earthquake diplomacy
in which the Greek humanitarian response to the Turkish disaster in
1998 led to a dramatic thawing of Greek/Turkish tensions, initiating a
process that removed a major source of resistance to Turkey's presence
in the EU. In that instance, Turkey responded positively, but it was
Athens that took the initiative. But what has been happening more
recently discloses a much greater Turkish willingness to take bold
initiatives in foreign policy.
I would mention several notable developments, but there are more. The
Turkish government overcame the influence of its own formidable
rejectionists to accept the carefully balanced proposals by Kofi
Annan, on behalf of the United Nations, to solve the long-festering
Cyprus crisis. When Turkish Cypriots voted to accept the plan, and
Greek Cypriots voted to reject it, there emerged a new European and
global realization that Turkey was moving away from its earlier
pattern of rigid nationalism. It was also a clear signal that Turkey
was ready to become a responsible member of the EU.
More impressive, and more subtle, were the Turkish moves to improve
their relations with their Islamic neighbors. Prime Minister Erdogan
engaged in successful goodwill diplomacy with most of Turkey's
neighbors, achieving a dramatic breakthrough by establishing an
accommodation with Syria, and notably improved relations with Iran and
Egypt. The Turkish government criticized Israel for the targeted
assassinations of Hamas leaders, further solidifying its new image as
a truly independent sovereign state that was now conducting its
foreign policy according to ethical and legal principles, as well as
on the basis of real politik.
Recently, I had the benefit of long conversations with Ahmet
Davutoglu, Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
who confirmed these trends, speaking of 'a new paradigm' in Turkish
foreign policy. This influential policy advisor, previously a leading
intellectual presence in the country, saw Turkey as playing a decisive
role as participant in an emerging multi-dimensional world order,
being still in a positive relationship with the United States and
Israel, but also an active player in Europe, the Middle East, and
Central Asia. Davutoglu represents a new cultural and political trend
in Turkey associated with a deliberate revival of the Ottoman past,
both as a matter of cultural enrichment, but also as a source of an
enriched Turkish identity as a political actor. What Davutoglu
particularly celebrates is what he calls the 'accommodative' character
of the Ottoman Empire at its height, that is, the willingness to
appreciate and respect civilizational and ethnic diversity, and to
deal with political conflict in a spirit of compromise and
reconciliation. Davutoglu seeks what he calls 'a zero conflict'
foreign policy for Turkey, as well as a balance between relations with
Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and with the United States. He agrees
that much of this hinges in the end on the willingness of Europe to
set a schedule for Turkish accession to the EU, and thereby confirm
the benefits of this innovative approach being taken by the AK
leadership in Ankara. Without this tangible positive result, there are
dangers of a return to the earlier rigid and narrower Turkish
nationalism that approached conflict in a somewhat paranoid and
zero-sum fashion that seemed incapable of reaching peaceful solutions
because of its intense fear of being seen as 'weak.'
There are additional lingering difficulties with this rather hopeful
line of assessment. It is still not entirely clear which way the army
will jump in future crises, especially if it views its guardian role
as being subverted. Furthermore, Turkish urban elites are deeply
suspicious of the AK leadership, fearing that it conceals an
undisclosed agenda to turn the country into an Islamic
republic. Turkish society is quite polarized, as Kemalists refuse to
acknowledge the progress being made, contending unconvincingly that
any leadership would have taken similar steps. Also, there are some
remaining open wounds that the current leadership has not yet
healed. The acknowledgement of the Armenian genocide is still
resisted, and keeps this disturbing issue alive. And although the AK
leadership has taken some notable positive moves with respect to its
large Kurdish minority, on such matters as language and cultural
rights, it has not gone nearly far enough in providing the Kurdish
regions in the Eastern part of the country with a measure of
self-rule. As well, the economic picture is not rosy for the Turkish
masses as unemployment, poverty, and a low average standard of living
torment most of the society.
Yet on balance, considering the darkness that has descended on so much
of the world since 9/11, the Turkish story is encouraging. And, in
fairness, the Bush administration has, despite the refusal of Turkey
to join actively in the Iraq War, has welcomed these shifts in Turkish
foreign policy, and this has mad the process possible. At this point,
what will push the process forward is a positive response from Europe,
setting a date for the start of accession process, which even
optimists will take more than a decade and will be confronted by
roadblocks along the way. Nevertheless, at this moment, those that
believe in democracy and a peaceful world order should take heart from
Turkey's impressive efforts to reform its foreign policy, and
congratulate the Turkish foreign ministry for exploring the frontiers
of the politically acceptable.
This has been a commentary exclusively written by Mr. Falk for ZAMAN
daily.
Mr. Falk, is a professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton
University, a prolific writer, speaker and activist of world affairs
and the author or co-author of more than 20 books, among them "Crimes
of War", "Revolutionaries and Functionaries", "The War System", "A
Study of Future Worlds", "The End of World Order", Revitalizing
International Law", "Nuclear Weapons and International Law" and "On
Human Governance".
Richard Falk
Zaman
10.06.2004 Wednesday
There is an exciting process of reform and reorientation taking place
in Turkey during the last few years that has been hardly noticed in
America, and certainly not properly appreciated.
To the extent any attention has been given, it has been to whether the
soft Islam of the AK Party provides the United States with an
opportunity to demonstrate its willingness and capacity to abide a
moderate Muslim outlook on the part of a foreign country in the Middle
East.
This possibility was severely strained in the weeks leading up to the
Iraq War when the Turkish Parliament twice narrowly turned down an
American request to use Turkish territory to launch its invasion. This
was at the time an unexpected show of strategic independence on the
part of Turkey, especially in the face of an American offer to provide
Turkey with much needed financial assistance in the amount of $16
billion. It is worth remembering that during and after the cold war
Turkey had shaped its foreign policy entirely on the basis of being a
subordinate ally of the United States, and regionally since the early
1990s, by working in an avowed partnership with Israel.
What was most surprising, and in the end revealing, about the Iraq
decision initially so resented in Washington was that the Turkish
military stayed in the barracks. In the recent past, any elected
government in Turkey was subject to repudiation by a military coup or
takeover if it crossed the red lines of either 'secularism' or the
strategic relationship with the United States and Israel. There
existed little room for maneuver on the part of politicians, and
foreign policy in particular was regarded as the domain of 'the deep
state,' the non-elected, non-accountable army leadership that had
claimed for itself the uncontested role of guarding the constitutional
order of republican Turkey as established by its founding leader
[Mustafa] Kemal Ataturk. What is fascinating about this recent phase
of Turkish foreign policy is this silent process of fundamental change
that has been taking place without attracting notice except on an
issue by issue basis. The scope and cumulative weight of these changes
should not be exaggerated. The deep state remains in ultimate control
of the political destiny of Turkey, and the red lines still limit the
options for elected leaders. But the softening of these constraints is
also part of the unfolding reality, and deserves more attention than
it has so far received.
Why this softening? I think the strength of the mandate received by
the AK Party in the last round of national elections over two years
ago, and the admitted absence of a secular alternative, has been
crucial. But also significant is the skill and creativity of its
leaders, particularly its Prime Minister, [Recep] Tayyip Erdogan, and
Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, in taking steps forward in a manner
made acceptable to the hidden military overseers, including even the
civilianizing of the Turkish National Security Council. And overall,
the unexpected success of the present leadership in Ankara of
stabilizing runaway Turkish inflation while generating one of the
world's fastest rates of economic growth has given the government an
underpinning of credibility.
The most obvious explanation of this Turkish opening is undoubtedly
the consensus in Ankara that it is in the national interest of the
country to obtain membership in the European Union at the earliest
possible time. And it is agreed on all sides that this goal is
attainable, if at all, only if Turkey demonstrates a willingness to
clean up its human rights record and solve its main internal and
external problems. This pressure was present even before the AK
leadership arrived, and first became visible in earthquake diplomacy
in which the Greek humanitarian response to the Turkish disaster in
1998 led to a dramatic thawing of Greek/Turkish tensions, initiating a
process that removed a major source of resistance to Turkey's presence
in the EU. In that instance, Turkey responded positively, but it was
Athens that took the initiative. But what has been happening more
recently discloses a much greater Turkish willingness to take bold
initiatives in foreign policy.
I would mention several notable developments, but there are more. The
Turkish government overcame the influence of its own formidable
rejectionists to accept the carefully balanced proposals by Kofi
Annan, on behalf of the United Nations, to solve the long-festering
Cyprus crisis. When Turkish Cypriots voted to accept the plan, and
Greek Cypriots voted to reject it, there emerged a new European and
global realization that Turkey was moving away from its earlier
pattern of rigid nationalism. It was also a clear signal that Turkey
was ready to become a responsible member of the EU.
More impressive, and more subtle, were the Turkish moves to improve
their relations with their Islamic neighbors. Prime Minister Erdogan
engaged in successful goodwill diplomacy with most of Turkey's
neighbors, achieving a dramatic breakthrough by establishing an
accommodation with Syria, and notably improved relations with Iran and
Egypt. The Turkish government criticized Israel for the targeted
assassinations of Hamas leaders, further solidifying its new image as
a truly independent sovereign state that was now conducting its
foreign policy according to ethical and legal principles, as well as
on the basis of real politik.
Recently, I had the benefit of long conversations with Ahmet
Davutoglu, Chief Advisor to the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
who confirmed these trends, speaking of 'a new paradigm' in Turkish
foreign policy. This influential policy advisor, previously a leading
intellectual presence in the country, saw Turkey as playing a decisive
role as participant in an emerging multi-dimensional world order,
being still in a positive relationship with the United States and
Israel, but also an active player in Europe, the Middle East, and
Central Asia. Davutoglu represents a new cultural and political trend
in Turkey associated with a deliberate revival of the Ottoman past,
both as a matter of cultural enrichment, but also as a source of an
enriched Turkish identity as a political actor. What Davutoglu
particularly celebrates is what he calls the 'accommodative' character
of the Ottoman Empire at its height, that is, the willingness to
appreciate and respect civilizational and ethnic diversity, and to
deal with political conflict in a spirit of compromise and
reconciliation. Davutoglu seeks what he calls 'a zero conflict'
foreign policy for Turkey, as well as a balance between relations with
Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and with the United States. He agrees
that much of this hinges in the end on the willingness of Europe to
set a schedule for Turkish accession to the EU, and thereby confirm
the benefits of this innovative approach being taken by the AK
leadership in Ankara. Without this tangible positive result, there are
dangers of a return to the earlier rigid and narrower Turkish
nationalism that approached conflict in a somewhat paranoid and
zero-sum fashion that seemed incapable of reaching peaceful solutions
because of its intense fear of being seen as 'weak.'
There are additional lingering difficulties with this rather hopeful
line of assessment. It is still not entirely clear which way the army
will jump in future crises, especially if it views its guardian role
as being subverted. Furthermore, Turkish urban elites are deeply
suspicious of the AK leadership, fearing that it conceals an
undisclosed agenda to turn the country into an Islamic
republic. Turkish society is quite polarized, as Kemalists refuse to
acknowledge the progress being made, contending unconvincingly that
any leadership would have taken similar steps. Also, there are some
remaining open wounds that the current leadership has not yet
healed. The acknowledgement of the Armenian genocide is still
resisted, and keeps this disturbing issue alive. And although the AK
leadership has taken some notable positive moves with respect to its
large Kurdish minority, on such matters as language and cultural
rights, it has not gone nearly far enough in providing the Kurdish
regions in the Eastern part of the country with a measure of
self-rule. As well, the economic picture is not rosy for the Turkish
masses as unemployment, poverty, and a low average standard of living
torment most of the society.
Yet on balance, considering the darkness that has descended on so much
of the world since 9/11, the Turkish story is encouraging. And, in
fairness, the Bush administration has, despite the refusal of Turkey
to join actively in the Iraq War, has welcomed these shifts in Turkish
foreign policy, and this has mad the process possible. At this point,
what will push the process forward is a positive response from Europe,
setting a date for the start of accession process, which even
optimists will take more than a decade and will be confronted by
roadblocks along the way. Nevertheless, at this moment, those that
believe in democracy and a peaceful world order should take heart from
Turkey's impressive efforts to reform its foreign policy, and
congratulate the Turkish foreign ministry for exploring the frontiers
of the politically acceptable.
This has been a commentary exclusively written by Mr. Falk for ZAMAN
daily.
Mr. Falk, is a professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton
University, a prolific writer, speaker and activist of world affairs
and the author or co-author of more than 20 books, among them "Crimes
of War", "Revolutionaries and Functionaries", "The War System", "A
Study of Future Worlds", "The End of World Order", Revitalizing
International Law", "Nuclear Weapons and International Law" and "On
Human Governance".