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The Caucasus powder keg: Russia threatens military interventions
By Peter Schwarz
World Socialist, United States
sept 28 2004
The reaction of the Russian government to the Beslan hostage crisis
increasingly recalls that of the American government to the attacks
of September 11, 2001. The horrifying events in Beslan, which shocked
and angered millions of people all over the world, are being used by
the regime of President Vladimir Putin as a pretext for a domestic
offensive against basic democratic rights and the implementation of
a foreign policy agenda that will inevitably lead to new wars.
While the background to the events in Beslan remains obscure due
to the official policy of secrecy, reinforced by Putin's rejection
of an independent inquiry, the Moscow regime has already drawn
far-reaching conclusions from the hostage disaster. In the future,
regional governors will no longer be elected, but will instead be
nominated by the president, and the election law will be changed so as
to strip small opposition parties of any real chance of winning office.
Such measures will serve to further strengthen the powers of the
president, which under Putin have assumed increasingly authoritarian
dimensions. There is now talk of a "strong state with an iron fist,"
and parallels have been drawn to the Stalin era.
There barely remains any possibility for democratic control under
conditions in which the media is spoon-fed by the Kremlin and the
parliament is dependent on the president. All that remains for
the people as a whole is to cast their vote every few years in
a referendum to confirm a president whose real power base is the
intelligence forces and military apparatus.
The change in foreign policy after the Beslan hostage crisis was
announced by the general chief of staff of the Russian armed forces.
Yuri Baluievski threatened that Russia "would undertake all measures
to liquidate the terrorist bases in any part of the world."
Many commentators interpreted this comment as a translation of the
Bush doctrine of "pre-emptive war" from American into Russian. Moscow
assumes the right to carry out military action against other countries,
bypassing international law. The states neighbouring southern Russia,
which first achieved independence after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, particularly regard this as a threat--especially Georgia, which
has been repeatedly accused by Moscow of harbouring Chechen terrorists.
Despite the parallels between the United States and Putin's Russia,
the comparison cannot be taken too far. The threat to the world
arising from US aggression is incomparably greater. The United
States is economically and militarily a great power and is openly
striving to establish world hegemony. Russia is an economic dwarf,
whose productive capacity is comparable to that of Holland. Its army is
decrepit, and even if it wished to do so, it would be unable to attack
distant countries, as did the US in the cases of Serbia, Afghanistan
and Iraq. Russia does, however, possess an arsenal of nuclear weapons
that it inherited from the Soviet era. In his recent comments,
Baluievski excluded the use of such weapons--at least for the present.
Nevertheless, the threat to world peace posed by Baluievski's
announcement should not be underestimated. On the one hand, he has
declared that Russia is prepared to violate international laws which
formerly provided at least a certain deterrent to direct military
action. According to a spokesman for the Carnegie Institute in Moscow:
"What the Americans have shown us now constitutes the standard for
Russia. The Chinese and the Indians will also follow suit."
Even more significant is the emergence of a global development
which ever more clearly points to a military confrontation between
imperialist powers or power blocs, and is heading towards a Third
World War. In this respect, the regions of Central Asia and the
Caucasus play a role similar to that of the Balkans on the eve of
the First World War. Together with the neighbouring Middle East,
this region constitutes the so-called "strategic ellipse," housing
the most extensive reserves of world energy resources.
The Balkans and the Caucasus
As is well known, the immediate trigger for the outbreak of the
First World War was the murder in Sarajevo of the successor to the
Habsburg throne, Franz Ferdinand. The causes of the war, however,
lay elsewhere, and cannot be reduced merely to an event of secondary
historical significance.
The roots of the war lay in the explosive contradictions between the
main imperialist powers that had been building up for decades. In
the final analysis, the war resulted from the fact that in the
epoch of world economy, the nation state was no longer viable. In
particular, the ruling elite in Germany had come to the conclusion
that this contradiction could be resolved only through the violent
reorganisation of Europe under its domination. It wanted the war.
It was no accident that the spark that exploded the powder keg
came in the Balkans. This was the site where rival interests of the
imperialist powers and power blocs directly intersected. The weakest
point in the fragile international balance of forces, it was where
tensions assumed a most immediate and tangible form.
The detachment of Bosnia from Austrian domination would have led
to the decline of the Habsburg multinational state, strengthening
the position of Serbia and its Russian protector. This, in turn,
would have significantly weakened Germany in relation to its rivals
England and France, which shared an alliance with Russia. That is
why the deed of a Bosnian Serb nationalist could unleash a chain of
events plunging Europe into a four-year bloodbath which, in turn,
expanded into a world-wide conflagration.
The parallels between the Balkans at the start of the twentieth
century and Central Asia today are remarkable. The Caucasus and Central
Asia are not merely the focal point of the conflicting interests of
Russia and the US; the future of the entire region is of fundamental
significance for Europe and, in particular, Germany. The same applies
to rapidly growing China and India. Also involved are Iran and Turkey,
which want to be involved in a new edition of the "Great Game" in
Central Asia. Two things are at stake in this "game"--geo-strategic
power and access to oil and gas, which assume ever-increasing
importance as world reserves shrink in the twenty-first century.
The situation is not yet as advanced as in 1914, at the time of the
Sarajevo assassination. In contrast to then, the conflicting interests
in the Caucasus are only vaguely delineated today. There is a great
deal in flux. Deals and manoeuvres are still being made, and there has
been no final determination of international axes and power blocs. But
the general development is proceeding in a similar direction.
An indication of growing tensions is the divergent reactions
by Washington and Berlin to the Beslan hostage drama and its
consequences. While Washington clearly criticised the latest measures
proposed by Putin, Berlin was demonstrably silent.
Bush, of all people, publicly warned Putin to respect "democratic
principles" in waging the anti-terror struggle. This criticism was
promptly rebuffed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who
employed a standard formulation from the days of the cold war. The
issue was a "Russian internal matter," he said, adding smugly: "We are
aware that the US also took quite tough measures after September 11."
The German government expressly refused to solidarise itself with
Washington's criticism. Instead, the spokesman for the German
government, Béla Anda, declared that German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder was conducting a "very confidential and intensive dialogue"
with Putin. Already prior to the events in Beslan, Schröder had
welcomed the recent Moscow-rigged presidential elections in Chechnya.
For its part, Washington had criticised the conduct of the elections.
In order to understand the conflicting interests in the Caucasus,
one cannot remain at the level of diplomatic gibes. It is necessary
to examine the strategies and interests of the main players in a
broader historical and international framework. This article gives
a brief overview.
The conflict between the US and Russia
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has deliberately and
systematically penetrated the former territory of the Soviet Union
and its sphere of influence. This was one of the principal purposes of
the US-led war against Yugoslavia, as well as the eastward expansion
of NATO and the occupation of Afghanistan.
The three Baltic states, which at one point belonged to the Soviet
Union, are now members of NATO, together with most of the former Warsaw
Treaty states. The US has also set up military bases in a number of
former Soviet republics in Central Asia and supports governments that,
in turn, enjoy friendly relations with Washington.
In Georgia, the US provided political and financial help to install a
government that is utterly hostile to Moscow and is seeking to join
NATO. Georgia is not only of great strategic importance because of
its immediate proximity to the crisis-ridden Caucasus region, it
also controls the passage from the Caspian Basin to the Black Sea,
i.e., the most important corridor for the export of gas and oil from
Central Asia to the West. In addition, the country forms a bridge
between southern Russia and Asia Minor.
Until now, President Putin has refrained from public criticism of
Washington and maintained a close personal and political relationship
with the US president. This was partly in recognition that Moscow
had little hope of success should it seek an open confrontation with
Washington, but was also due to the fact that such a stance promised
Moscow a free hand to deal with the separatist movements threatening
the southern edge of the Russian state. Putin has continually sought
to present the Chechen separatists as a component of "international
terrorism" in order to wave off international criticism of the brutal
activities of the Russian army in the region.
It is apparent, however, that Moscow feels increasingly under pressure
from the US. In his first public television appearance following the
Beslan massacre, Putin declared that he was dealing "with (the) direct
intervention of international terrorism against Russia," and indicated
that foreign powers were behind the terror action--without, however,
naming names. He said Russia was being targeted by terrorists because
"as one of the world's major nuclear powers, Russia still poses a
threat to someone, and this threat must be removed."
One day later, he held an unusually long and open briefing with
selected foreign journalists and Russia specialists at his country
residence, Novo Ogarjevo. Here he was even clearer in his comments:
"I didn't say Western countries were initiating terrorism, and I
didn't say it was policy. But we've observed incidents. It's a replay
of the mentality of the cold war. There are certain people who want
us to be focused on internal problems and they pull strings here so
that we don't raise our heads internationally."
Once again, Putin refrained from giving any names and expressly
praised US President Bush, whom he described as a "reliable partner."
He even indicated that he would prefer to see a victory for Bush in
the November elections.
Putin went on to openly criticise the US's closest European ally,
Great Britain. He attacked London for giving political asylum to
Achmed Sakajev, the European representative of Chechen separatist
leader Aslan Machadov. The Russian foreign ministry has officially
demanded his extradition.
Putin informed his Western audience that he regretted the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. He repeatedly expressed his fear that separation
by Chechnya would lead to the break-up of Russia itself, and spoke
in this connection of a "domino effect."
His fears are not ungrounded. A further disintegration of Russian
territory to the south could very well lead to the complete collapse of
the country--there are sufficient centrifugal forces at work. There
would be nothing progressive arising from such a development. It
would lead to a wave of expulsions, ethnic cleansing and regional
conflicts. The new states that arose would be neither self-determining
nor democratic. Instead, they would be dependent on the intrigues
of the great powers and rival, semi-criminal cliques. The series of
events that led to the devastation of Yugoslavia in the 1990s would
be repeated--this time on an even larger scale.
The suspicion that Western circles would deliberately encourage such a
development has not been plucked from thin air. While Washington has
officially refrained from interfering in Putin's Chechen policy in
order to secure Russian support for the US war in Iraq, the so-called
neo-conservatives who play a leading role in US foreign policy are
openly propagating the Chechen cause. The same people who played
significant roles in the propaganda preparation for the Iraq war
occupy prominent posts in the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya
(ACPC), a pro-Chechen lobby group.
In a contribution to the British Guardian, John Laughland, a member
of the British Helsinki Committee, gave the following names: "They
include Richard Perle, the notorious Pentagon adviser; Elliott Abrams
of Iran-Contra fame; Kenneth Adelman, the former US ambassador to
the UN who egged on the invasion of Iraq by predicting it would be
'a cakewalk'; Midge Decter, biographer of Donald Rumsfeld and a
director of the right-wing Heritage Foundation; Frank Gaffney of
the militarist Centre for Security Policy; Bruce Jackson, former US
military intelligence officer and one-time vice-president of Lockheed
Martin, now president of the US Committee on NATO; Michael Ledeen
of the American Enterprise Institute, a former admirer of Italian
fascism and now a leading proponent of regime change in Iran; and R.
James Woolsey, the former CIA director who is one of the leading
cheerleaders behind George Bush's plans to re-model the Muslim world
along pro-US lines." (Guardian, September 8, 2004)
Laughland concluded: "Coming from both political parties, the ACPC
members represent the backbone of the US foreign policy establishment,
and their views are indeed those of the US administration."
Putin's reaction
Putin's answer to US encirclement--the violent suppression of Chechen
resistance, the strengthening of an authoritarian, centralized state,
and the threat of military strikes abroad--is as reactionary as
it is counter-productive. It corresponds to the interests of the
social class that Putin represents--the new Russian elite, which
plundered state-owned property after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and shamelessly enriched itself at the expense of the mass of
the population.
Under Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who proclaimed the
end of the Soviet Union in December 1991, this plundering was
chaotic and disorganised. Billions were transferred abroad, and
state-owned companies, in particular the lucrative energy sector, were
"denationalized" in a semi-criminal manner. Corruption and criminality
flowered. The Russian state threatened to disintegrate and become a
toy in the hands of the Western great powers.
With the coming to power of Putin, whom Yeltsin had personally selected
as his successor and who was supported by the leading oligarchs,
a limited course correction took place. The new elite realised that
to secure their wealth and power, they required a strong state and
the ability to play a role internationally amongst the great powers.
Putin, who could look back over a long career in the Soviet secret
service, the KGB, filled key political and administrative offices
with secret service veterans. The KGB, which served the Stalinist
regime as a kind praetorian guard, was suited to this task because it
had been imbued with Great Russian chauvinism by Stalin in the 1930s
and 1940s. For the KGB, the "defence of the Soviet Union" did not
mean defending the socialist achievements of the October Revolution,
but the defence of the internal and external power of the state.
Putin consolidated the power of the new capitalist elite by
strengthening the central state in relation to the regions, extending
the police and secret service apparatus, limiting freedom of opinion
and the press, and finally, this summer, abolishing the numerous,
state-financed social benefits that still remained from Soviet times.
Yeltsin had not dared to take such a step, because he feared an
uncontrollable reaction from the general population.
With regard to foreign policy, Putin aimed to restore Russia's status
as a great power. To this end, he acted with extreme brutality against
separatist tendencies in the Caucasus. At the end of 1999, even prior
to taking over the office of president, he unleashed the second Chechen
war, which is still raging today. Chechnya was largely destroyed,
as was any prospect of a peaceful solution. At the same time, the
war served to stifle increasing discontent over the social crisis in
Russia and justify the further strengthening of the state apparatus.
With some success, Putin was able to present the Chechen conflict
as a consequence of foreign interference and appeal to nationalist
sentiments in Russia. This was facilitated by the support he received
from the Communist Party.
For its part, the so-called "democratic" opposition criticized the
Chechen war, but endorsed the course of the "free-market" reforms,
cooperated closely with Western governments, and relied financially
on the oligarchs. The weakness of the Russian "democrats" can only in
part be attributed to the fact that the Kremlin exercises a monopoly
over the media. The real reason lies in the fact that their economic
and social policies are diametrically opposed to the social interests
of the population.
Putin also strove to bind the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS)--the loose confederation of states that replaced the old Soviet
structure--more closely to Russia, employing a mixture of economic,
military and diplomatic pressure, especially in the cases of White
Russia and the Ukraine.
In the Caucasus, Moscow supports Armenia against Azerbaijan, which
is falling increasingly under Western influence. It maintains its own
troops in the rebellious areas of Georgia. In Central Asia, Moscow aims
at a strategic alliance with the two most important energy producers,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The energy sector plays a key role in Putin's great power plans. It
constitutes 40 percent of national tax receipts, 55 percent of export
profits, and 20 percent of the Russian economy. In the Ukraine, in
Georgia and in Kazakhstan, Russian firms close to the Kremlin are
buying up gas and oil companies.
The conflict between the Kremlin and a section of the oligarchs is
about who will exercise control over this sector. The state, according
to Russia expert Alexander Rahr, will "not permit that this sector,
on which Russia depends to reemerge as a great power, is controlled
by the particularist interests of profit-seeking oligarchs, or that
it falls under the control of foreign transnational enterprises." He
says that, although Putin does not want to renationalise the oil
companies that were denationalised in the 1990s, they will have "to
fit in with the Kremlin's rules of play, otherwise they will share
the same fate that befell 'Yukos,' which has been made an example
of." (CIS Barometer, September 2004)
On these two key questions--control of the immense energy reserves
of Russia and Central Asia, and supremacy over the states of Eastern
Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia -- interests collide that cannot
be reconciled peacefully in the long term. They are not only cause for
constant tensions between Russia on the one hand and the US and Europe
on the other; the strategic aims of America, the European powers and,
in the long term, China, clash irreconcilably here as well. That makes
Central Asia and the Caucasus a powder keg of future confrontations.
European interests
As in the question of the Iraq war, European foreign policy is deeply
divided in its attitude to Russia. The enlargement of the European
Union to the east, advanced by Germany and France for economic reasons,
has turned out to be an obstacle to a common foreign policy.
Germany and France, supported by Italy, aim to establish a strategic
partnership with Russia. Already on the eve of the Iraq conflict,
Berlin, Paris and Moscow cooperated closely to prevent a war resolution
being tabled at the UN. Since then, Putin, German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac have met regularly,
with the last such gathering taking place in Sochi on the Black Sea
just before the Beslan hostage crisis.
The energy question is central to German interests in Russia, the
main issues for Berlin being the creation of a counterweight to
American hegemony and the opening up of the Russian market. Germany
possesses no energy reserves apart from its own enormously expensive
coal stockpiles, and consequently depends to a high degree on Russian
gas and oil. This becomes all the more critical since supplies of
North Sea oil, which previously covered a third of German needs,
will be exhausted in the near future.
Russia is already providing 35 percent of German natural gas
requirements. This is expected to grow to over 50 percent over the next
20 years. German energy companies, which maintain close personnel
contacts with the chancellor's office, are involved in Russian
enterprises with close state connections, and are investing billions
in the development of the new Siberian gas fields. A new gas pipeline
between Russia and Germany via the Baltic Sea is also being planned.
During the recent crisis in the Caucasus, the German government
stood demonstratively behind Putin. In his September 8 budget speech,
Chancellor Schröder said Germany had no interest in endangering the
territorial integrity of Russia. Two days later, Putin and Schröder
published a common declaration, in which they agreed to cooperate
closely in the fight against terrorism. Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer also publicly denounced Chechen independence efforts. This
cannot be "a solution, because it would continue the dissolution of
Russia, with disastrous consequences for the whole region and for
world security," he told the Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung.
While Germany and France endorse a partnership with Russia, the
new European Union members, who until 1989 belonged to the Warsaw
Pact, are seeking the containment of Russia. Close relations between
Berlin and Moscow still produce nightmares in Warsaw. If there are
differences of opinion between Washington and Russia, these states
almost automatically side with the US.
Despite its close relations with Germany, France and Italy, Russia's
relations with the EU as a whole are strained. The European Union
Commission in Brussels has repeatedly criticized Russia's Chechnya
policy and, following expansion to the East, displayed an unexpectedly
tough attitude towards Moscow in bilateral disputes.
Brussels has imposed visas for Russian citizens in transit to
Kaliningrad, which became an enclave following the Baltic States'
entry into the EU, and restrictions on imported Russian goods into
the former Eastern-bloc member states. Moscow is also distrustful of
intensive European moves towards the Ukraine, White Russia, Moldavia
and Georgia, which Russia regards as part of its sphere of influence.
Despite the interest in a strategic partnership with Moscow and
access to Russian oil and gas, Berlin and Paris are not ready to
subordinate themselves to Russian claims in the Caucasus and Central
Asia. Alongside America, Germany has emerged as the most important
trading partner with Central Asia and shares an interest with the
US in establishing a transport corridor connecting Europe and Asia,
running outside Russian territory via Georgia and Azerbaijan. Berlin
and Paris are therefore developing their own relations with the local
ruling powers in the region, even if this strains their relationship
with Moscow.
Moreover, Schröder's close relations with Putin are a subject of
controversy in Germany. Many veterans of German foreign policy
from both the government and the conservative opposition camp have
publicly backed Schröder. These include Wolfgang Schäuble (Christian
Democratic Union--CDU), Karl Lamers (CDU), Egon Bahr (Social Democratic
Party--SPD) and ex-foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher (Free
Democratic Party--FPD).
However, sharp criticism has been levelled by political groupings
and by the media. Schröder is accused of undermining German foreign
policy in the Middle East and Africa and the common European foreign
policy through his silence on human rights violations in Chechnya.
Others warn that he is embracing Putin too closely, under conditions
where the latter's own position is coming unstuck as a result of the
unwinnable Chechen war.
Germany, France and Russia are collaborating closely in what is
probably the most explosive question in the region at present--Iran's
nuclear programme. Iran was a central topic at the last tri-partite
summit in Sochi. Schröder, Chirac and Putin agreed to exert joint
pressure on Teheran to stop the production of enriched uranium. They
want to forestall any escalation of the conflict between Iran and
the US.
Russia maintains good relations with Teheran and supplies Iran with
nuclear technology. In contrast to the US, the EU endorses cooperation
with the country's energy industry.
European observers fear that in the wake of a Bush election victory,
the US will increase pressure on Iran, whose government has refused
to halt production of enriched uranium. "A reelected president Bush
will hardly hesitate to threaten military blows," wrote Der Spiegel.
A preventive strike by Israel, which bombed an Iraqi atomic reactor
in 1981, is also considered possible. The US has just agreed to
supply to Israel 500 so-called "bunker busters," which could be used
against Iran or possibly Syria, as Israeli security experts freely
admit. These precision bombs, weighing a ton, can penetrate deeply
underground and pierce concrete walls up to two metres thick.
European tactical calculations could, however, go awry, as the example
of Iraq has shown. The regime in Baghdad was pressed by Europe to
accede to American demands for disarmament in order to forestall a
war. Baghdad gave way and destroyed its weapons and rockets, but the
US attacked nevertheless.
Conclusions
The danger of war, threatened by the escalation of the conflicts in
the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, cannot be answered by
supporting one imperialist grouping against another--the weaker against
the stronger, or the "more peaceful" against the more aggressive.
There can be no doubt that American imperialism is today the most
dangerous and aggressive factor in world politics. A change in the
US presidency would not alter this.
However, the Iraq war has already demonstrated the complete
inability of the European governments to counter this danger. Even
those countries that rejected the war did so half-heartedly, and
later sanctioned Iraq's occupation. They studiously avoid resting
on the powerful movement against the Iraq war that developed
worldwide--including in the US itself.
In the end, their "rejection" of the Iraq war was motivated by their
own imperialist interests in the region. They reacted to the war by
strengthening their own military apparatuses to be able to carry out
international interventions, at the same time intensifying attacks
on the social and democratic achievements of their own populations,
so as to stake their claims in the global fight for economic and
strategic power. There is an inseparable connection between growing
militarism on the one hand, and the attacks on social and democratic
rights on the other.
The same applies to Russia, where the working class is paying for
Putin's great power pretensions with pauperization and the loss of
democratic rights.
The resistance of the working class to the danger of war and the
attacks being carried by their own governments all over the world must
be armed with an international socialist perspective. That is the only
viable basis for preventing the danger of a new world conflagration. As
in 1914, the alternative today is once again: socialism or barbarism.
By Peter Schwarz
World Socialist, United States
sept 28 2004
The reaction of the Russian government to the Beslan hostage crisis
increasingly recalls that of the American government to the attacks
of September 11, 2001. The horrifying events in Beslan, which shocked
and angered millions of people all over the world, are being used by
the regime of President Vladimir Putin as a pretext for a domestic
offensive against basic democratic rights and the implementation of
a foreign policy agenda that will inevitably lead to new wars.
While the background to the events in Beslan remains obscure due
to the official policy of secrecy, reinforced by Putin's rejection
of an independent inquiry, the Moscow regime has already drawn
far-reaching conclusions from the hostage disaster. In the future,
regional governors will no longer be elected, but will instead be
nominated by the president, and the election law will be changed so as
to strip small opposition parties of any real chance of winning office.
Such measures will serve to further strengthen the powers of the
president, which under Putin have assumed increasingly authoritarian
dimensions. There is now talk of a "strong state with an iron fist,"
and parallels have been drawn to the Stalin era.
There barely remains any possibility for democratic control under
conditions in which the media is spoon-fed by the Kremlin and the
parliament is dependent on the president. All that remains for
the people as a whole is to cast their vote every few years in
a referendum to confirm a president whose real power base is the
intelligence forces and military apparatus.
The change in foreign policy after the Beslan hostage crisis was
announced by the general chief of staff of the Russian armed forces.
Yuri Baluievski threatened that Russia "would undertake all measures
to liquidate the terrorist bases in any part of the world."
Many commentators interpreted this comment as a translation of the
Bush doctrine of "pre-emptive war" from American into Russian. Moscow
assumes the right to carry out military action against other countries,
bypassing international law. The states neighbouring southern Russia,
which first achieved independence after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, particularly regard this as a threat--especially Georgia, which
has been repeatedly accused by Moscow of harbouring Chechen terrorists.
Despite the parallels between the United States and Putin's Russia,
the comparison cannot be taken too far. The threat to the world
arising from US aggression is incomparably greater. The United
States is economically and militarily a great power and is openly
striving to establish world hegemony. Russia is an economic dwarf,
whose productive capacity is comparable to that of Holland. Its army is
decrepit, and even if it wished to do so, it would be unable to attack
distant countries, as did the US in the cases of Serbia, Afghanistan
and Iraq. Russia does, however, possess an arsenal of nuclear weapons
that it inherited from the Soviet era. In his recent comments,
Baluievski excluded the use of such weapons--at least for the present.
Nevertheless, the threat to world peace posed by Baluievski's
announcement should not be underestimated. On the one hand, he has
declared that Russia is prepared to violate international laws which
formerly provided at least a certain deterrent to direct military
action. According to a spokesman for the Carnegie Institute in Moscow:
"What the Americans have shown us now constitutes the standard for
Russia. The Chinese and the Indians will also follow suit."
Even more significant is the emergence of a global development
which ever more clearly points to a military confrontation between
imperialist powers or power blocs, and is heading towards a Third
World War. In this respect, the regions of Central Asia and the
Caucasus play a role similar to that of the Balkans on the eve of
the First World War. Together with the neighbouring Middle East,
this region constitutes the so-called "strategic ellipse," housing
the most extensive reserves of world energy resources.
The Balkans and the Caucasus
As is well known, the immediate trigger for the outbreak of the
First World War was the murder in Sarajevo of the successor to the
Habsburg throne, Franz Ferdinand. The causes of the war, however,
lay elsewhere, and cannot be reduced merely to an event of secondary
historical significance.
The roots of the war lay in the explosive contradictions between the
main imperialist powers that had been building up for decades. In
the final analysis, the war resulted from the fact that in the
epoch of world economy, the nation state was no longer viable. In
particular, the ruling elite in Germany had come to the conclusion
that this contradiction could be resolved only through the violent
reorganisation of Europe under its domination. It wanted the war.
It was no accident that the spark that exploded the powder keg
came in the Balkans. This was the site where rival interests of the
imperialist powers and power blocs directly intersected. The weakest
point in the fragile international balance of forces, it was where
tensions assumed a most immediate and tangible form.
The detachment of Bosnia from Austrian domination would have led
to the decline of the Habsburg multinational state, strengthening
the position of Serbia and its Russian protector. This, in turn,
would have significantly weakened Germany in relation to its rivals
England and France, which shared an alliance with Russia. That is
why the deed of a Bosnian Serb nationalist could unleash a chain of
events plunging Europe into a four-year bloodbath which, in turn,
expanded into a world-wide conflagration.
The parallels between the Balkans at the start of the twentieth
century and Central Asia today are remarkable. The Caucasus and Central
Asia are not merely the focal point of the conflicting interests of
Russia and the US; the future of the entire region is of fundamental
significance for Europe and, in particular, Germany. The same applies
to rapidly growing China and India. Also involved are Iran and Turkey,
which want to be involved in a new edition of the "Great Game" in
Central Asia. Two things are at stake in this "game"--geo-strategic
power and access to oil and gas, which assume ever-increasing
importance as world reserves shrink in the twenty-first century.
The situation is not yet as advanced as in 1914, at the time of the
Sarajevo assassination. In contrast to then, the conflicting interests
in the Caucasus are only vaguely delineated today. There is a great
deal in flux. Deals and manoeuvres are still being made, and there has
been no final determination of international axes and power blocs. But
the general development is proceeding in a similar direction.
An indication of growing tensions is the divergent reactions
by Washington and Berlin to the Beslan hostage drama and its
consequences. While Washington clearly criticised the latest measures
proposed by Putin, Berlin was demonstrably silent.
Bush, of all people, publicly warned Putin to respect "democratic
principles" in waging the anti-terror struggle. This criticism was
promptly rebuffed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who
employed a standard formulation from the days of the cold war. The
issue was a "Russian internal matter," he said, adding smugly: "We are
aware that the US also took quite tough measures after September 11."
The German government expressly refused to solidarise itself with
Washington's criticism. Instead, the spokesman for the German
government, Béla Anda, declared that German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder was conducting a "very confidential and intensive dialogue"
with Putin. Already prior to the events in Beslan, Schröder had
welcomed the recent Moscow-rigged presidential elections in Chechnya.
For its part, Washington had criticised the conduct of the elections.
In order to understand the conflicting interests in the Caucasus,
one cannot remain at the level of diplomatic gibes. It is necessary
to examine the strategies and interests of the main players in a
broader historical and international framework. This article gives
a brief overview.
The conflict between the US and Russia
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US has deliberately and
systematically penetrated the former territory of the Soviet Union
and its sphere of influence. This was one of the principal purposes of
the US-led war against Yugoslavia, as well as the eastward expansion
of NATO and the occupation of Afghanistan.
The three Baltic states, which at one point belonged to the Soviet
Union, are now members of NATO, together with most of the former Warsaw
Treaty states. The US has also set up military bases in a number of
former Soviet republics in Central Asia and supports governments that,
in turn, enjoy friendly relations with Washington.
In Georgia, the US provided political and financial help to install a
government that is utterly hostile to Moscow and is seeking to join
NATO. Georgia is not only of great strategic importance because of
its immediate proximity to the crisis-ridden Caucasus region, it
also controls the passage from the Caspian Basin to the Black Sea,
i.e., the most important corridor for the export of gas and oil from
Central Asia to the West. In addition, the country forms a bridge
between southern Russia and Asia Minor.
Until now, President Putin has refrained from public criticism of
Washington and maintained a close personal and political relationship
with the US president. This was partly in recognition that Moscow
had little hope of success should it seek an open confrontation with
Washington, but was also due to the fact that such a stance promised
Moscow a free hand to deal with the separatist movements threatening
the southern edge of the Russian state. Putin has continually sought
to present the Chechen separatists as a component of "international
terrorism" in order to wave off international criticism of the brutal
activities of the Russian army in the region.
It is apparent, however, that Moscow feels increasingly under pressure
from the US. In his first public television appearance following the
Beslan massacre, Putin declared that he was dealing "with (the) direct
intervention of international terrorism against Russia," and indicated
that foreign powers were behind the terror action--without, however,
naming names. He said Russia was being targeted by terrorists because
"as one of the world's major nuclear powers, Russia still poses a
threat to someone, and this threat must be removed."
One day later, he held an unusually long and open briefing with
selected foreign journalists and Russia specialists at his country
residence, Novo Ogarjevo. Here he was even clearer in his comments:
"I didn't say Western countries were initiating terrorism, and I
didn't say it was policy. But we've observed incidents. It's a replay
of the mentality of the cold war. There are certain people who want
us to be focused on internal problems and they pull strings here so
that we don't raise our heads internationally."
Once again, Putin refrained from giving any names and expressly
praised US President Bush, whom he described as a "reliable partner."
He even indicated that he would prefer to see a victory for Bush in
the November elections.
Putin went on to openly criticise the US's closest European ally,
Great Britain. He attacked London for giving political asylum to
Achmed Sakajev, the European representative of Chechen separatist
leader Aslan Machadov. The Russian foreign ministry has officially
demanded his extradition.
Putin informed his Western audience that he regretted the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. He repeatedly expressed his fear that separation
by Chechnya would lead to the break-up of Russia itself, and spoke
in this connection of a "domino effect."
His fears are not ungrounded. A further disintegration of Russian
territory to the south could very well lead to the complete collapse of
the country--there are sufficient centrifugal forces at work. There
would be nothing progressive arising from such a development. It
would lead to a wave of expulsions, ethnic cleansing and regional
conflicts. The new states that arose would be neither self-determining
nor democratic. Instead, they would be dependent on the intrigues
of the great powers and rival, semi-criminal cliques. The series of
events that led to the devastation of Yugoslavia in the 1990s would
be repeated--this time on an even larger scale.
The suspicion that Western circles would deliberately encourage such a
development has not been plucked from thin air. While Washington has
officially refrained from interfering in Putin's Chechen policy in
order to secure Russian support for the US war in Iraq, the so-called
neo-conservatives who play a leading role in US foreign policy are
openly propagating the Chechen cause. The same people who played
significant roles in the propaganda preparation for the Iraq war
occupy prominent posts in the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya
(ACPC), a pro-Chechen lobby group.
In a contribution to the British Guardian, John Laughland, a member
of the British Helsinki Committee, gave the following names: "They
include Richard Perle, the notorious Pentagon adviser; Elliott Abrams
of Iran-Contra fame; Kenneth Adelman, the former US ambassador to
the UN who egged on the invasion of Iraq by predicting it would be
'a cakewalk'; Midge Decter, biographer of Donald Rumsfeld and a
director of the right-wing Heritage Foundation; Frank Gaffney of
the militarist Centre for Security Policy; Bruce Jackson, former US
military intelligence officer and one-time vice-president of Lockheed
Martin, now president of the US Committee on NATO; Michael Ledeen
of the American Enterprise Institute, a former admirer of Italian
fascism and now a leading proponent of regime change in Iran; and R.
James Woolsey, the former CIA director who is one of the leading
cheerleaders behind George Bush's plans to re-model the Muslim world
along pro-US lines." (Guardian, September 8, 2004)
Laughland concluded: "Coming from both political parties, the ACPC
members represent the backbone of the US foreign policy establishment,
and their views are indeed those of the US administration."
Putin's reaction
Putin's answer to US encirclement--the violent suppression of Chechen
resistance, the strengthening of an authoritarian, centralized state,
and the threat of military strikes abroad--is as reactionary as
it is counter-productive. It corresponds to the interests of the
social class that Putin represents--the new Russian elite, which
plundered state-owned property after the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and shamelessly enriched itself at the expense of the mass of
the population.
Under Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, who proclaimed the
end of the Soviet Union in December 1991, this plundering was
chaotic and disorganised. Billions were transferred abroad, and
state-owned companies, in particular the lucrative energy sector, were
"denationalized" in a semi-criminal manner. Corruption and criminality
flowered. The Russian state threatened to disintegrate and become a
toy in the hands of the Western great powers.
With the coming to power of Putin, whom Yeltsin had personally selected
as his successor and who was supported by the leading oligarchs,
a limited course correction took place. The new elite realised that
to secure their wealth and power, they required a strong state and
the ability to play a role internationally amongst the great powers.
Putin, who could look back over a long career in the Soviet secret
service, the KGB, filled key political and administrative offices
with secret service veterans. The KGB, which served the Stalinist
regime as a kind praetorian guard, was suited to this task because it
had been imbued with Great Russian chauvinism by Stalin in the 1930s
and 1940s. For the KGB, the "defence of the Soviet Union" did not
mean defending the socialist achievements of the October Revolution,
but the defence of the internal and external power of the state.
Putin consolidated the power of the new capitalist elite by
strengthening the central state in relation to the regions, extending
the police and secret service apparatus, limiting freedom of opinion
and the press, and finally, this summer, abolishing the numerous,
state-financed social benefits that still remained from Soviet times.
Yeltsin had not dared to take such a step, because he feared an
uncontrollable reaction from the general population.
With regard to foreign policy, Putin aimed to restore Russia's status
as a great power. To this end, he acted with extreme brutality against
separatist tendencies in the Caucasus. At the end of 1999, even prior
to taking over the office of president, he unleashed the second Chechen
war, which is still raging today. Chechnya was largely destroyed,
as was any prospect of a peaceful solution. At the same time, the
war served to stifle increasing discontent over the social crisis in
Russia and justify the further strengthening of the state apparatus.
With some success, Putin was able to present the Chechen conflict
as a consequence of foreign interference and appeal to nationalist
sentiments in Russia. This was facilitated by the support he received
from the Communist Party.
For its part, the so-called "democratic" opposition criticized the
Chechen war, but endorsed the course of the "free-market" reforms,
cooperated closely with Western governments, and relied financially
on the oligarchs. The weakness of the Russian "democrats" can only in
part be attributed to the fact that the Kremlin exercises a monopoly
over the media. The real reason lies in the fact that their economic
and social policies are diametrically opposed to the social interests
of the population.
Putin also strove to bind the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS)--the loose confederation of states that replaced the old Soviet
structure--more closely to Russia, employing a mixture of economic,
military and diplomatic pressure, especially in the cases of White
Russia and the Ukraine.
In the Caucasus, Moscow supports Armenia against Azerbaijan, which
is falling increasingly under Western influence. It maintains its own
troops in the rebellious areas of Georgia. In Central Asia, Moscow aims
at a strategic alliance with the two most important energy producers,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The energy sector plays a key role in Putin's great power plans. It
constitutes 40 percent of national tax receipts, 55 percent of export
profits, and 20 percent of the Russian economy. In the Ukraine, in
Georgia and in Kazakhstan, Russian firms close to the Kremlin are
buying up gas and oil companies.
The conflict between the Kremlin and a section of the oligarchs is
about who will exercise control over this sector. The state, according
to Russia expert Alexander Rahr, will "not permit that this sector,
on which Russia depends to reemerge as a great power, is controlled
by the particularist interests of profit-seeking oligarchs, or that
it falls under the control of foreign transnational enterprises." He
says that, although Putin does not want to renationalise the oil
companies that were denationalised in the 1990s, they will have "to
fit in with the Kremlin's rules of play, otherwise they will share
the same fate that befell 'Yukos,' which has been made an example
of." (CIS Barometer, September 2004)
On these two key questions--control of the immense energy reserves
of Russia and Central Asia, and supremacy over the states of Eastern
Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia -- interests collide that cannot
be reconciled peacefully in the long term. They are not only cause for
constant tensions between Russia on the one hand and the US and Europe
on the other; the strategic aims of America, the European powers and,
in the long term, China, clash irreconcilably here as well. That makes
Central Asia and the Caucasus a powder keg of future confrontations.
European interests
As in the question of the Iraq war, European foreign policy is deeply
divided in its attitude to Russia. The enlargement of the European
Union to the east, advanced by Germany and France for economic reasons,
has turned out to be an obstacle to a common foreign policy.
Germany and France, supported by Italy, aim to establish a strategic
partnership with Russia. Already on the eve of the Iraq conflict,
Berlin, Paris and Moscow cooperated closely to prevent a war resolution
being tabled at the UN. Since then, Putin, German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac have met regularly,
with the last such gathering taking place in Sochi on the Black Sea
just before the Beslan hostage crisis.
The energy question is central to German interests in Russia, the
main issues for Berlin being the creation of a counterweight to
American hegemony and the opening up of the Russian market. Germany
possesses no energy reserves apart from its own enormously expensive
coal stockpiles, and consequently depends to a high degree on Russian
gas and oil. This becomes all the more critical since supplies of
North Sea oil, which previously covered a third of German needs,
will be exhausted in the near future.
Russia is already providing 35 percent of German natural gas
requirements. This is expected to grow to over 50 percent over the next
20 years. German energy companies, which maintain close personnel
contacts with the chancellor's office, are involved in Russian
enterprises with close state connections, and are investing billions
in the development of the new Siberian gas fields. A new gas pipeline
between Russia and Germany via the Baltic Sea is also being planned.
During the recent crisis in the Caucasus, the German government
stood demonstratively behind Putin. In his September 8 budget speech,
Chancellor Schröder said Germany had no interest in endangering the
territorial integrity of Russia. Two days later, Putin and Schröder
published a common declaration, in which they agreed to cooperate
closely in the fight against terrorism. Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer also publicly denounced Chechen independence efforts. This
cannot be "a solution, because it would continue the dissolution of
Russia, with disastrous consequences for the whole region and for
world security," he told the Märkische Allgemeine Zeitung.
While Germany and France endorse a partnership with Russia, the
new European Union members, who until 1989 belonged to the Warsaw
Pact, are seeking the containment of Russia. Close relations between
Berlin and Moscow still produce nightmares in Warsaw. If there are
differences of opinion between Washington and Russia, these states
almost automatically side with the US.
Despite its close relations with Germany, France and Italy, Russia's
relations with the EU as a whole are strained. The European Union
Commission in Brussels has repeatedly criticized Russia's Chechnya
policy and, following expansion to the East, displayed an unexpectedly
tough attitude towards Moscow in bilateral disputes.
Brussels has imposed visas for Russian citizens in transit to
Kaliningrad, which became an enclave following the Baltic States'
entry into the EU, and restrictions on imported Russian goods into
the former Eastern-bloc member states. Moscow is also distrustful of
intensive European moves towards the Ukraine, White Russia, Moldavia
and Georgia, which Russia regards as part of its sphere of influence.
Despite the interest in a strategic partnership with Moscow and
access to Russian oil and gas, Berlin and Paris are not ready to
subordinate themselves to Russian claims in the Caucasus and Central
Asia. Alongside America, Germany has emerged as the most important
trading partner with Central Asia and shares an interest with the
US in establishing a transport corridor connecting Europe and Asia,
running outside Russian territory via Georgia and Azerbaijan. Berlin
and Paris are therefore developing their own relations with the local
ruling powers in the region, even if this strains their relationship
with Moscow.
Moreover, Schröder's close relations with Putin are a subject of
controversy in Germany. Many veterans of German foreign policy
from both the government and the conservative opposition camp have
publicly backed Schröder. These include Wolfgang Schäuble (Christian
Democratic Union--CDU), Karl Lamers (CDU), Egon Bahr (Social Democratic
Party--SPD) and ex-foreign minister Hans Dietrich Genscher (Free
Democratic Party--FPD).
However, sharp criticism has been levelled by political groupings
and by the media. Schröder is accused of undermining German foreign
policy in the Middle East and Africa and the common European foreign
policy through his silence on human rights violations in Chechnya.
Others warn that he is embracing Putin too closely, under conditions
where the latter's own position is coming unstuck as a result of the
unwinnable Chechen war.
Germany, France and Russia are collaborating closely in what is
probably the most explosive question in the region at present--Iran's
nuclear programme. Iran was a central topic at the last tri-partite
summit in Sochi. Schröder, Chirac and Putin agreed to exert joint
pressure on Teheran to stop the production of enriched uranium. They
want to forestall any escalation of the conflict between Iran and
the US.
Russia maintains good relations with Teheran and supplies Iran with
nuclear technology. In contrast to the US, the EU endorses cooperation
with the country's energy industry.
European observers fear that in the wake of a Bush election victory,
the US will increase pressure on Iran, whose government has refused
to halt production of enriched uranium. "A reelected president Bush
will hardly hesitate to threaten military blows," wrote Der Spiegel.
A preventive strike by Israel, which bombed an Iraqi atomic reactor
in 1981, is also considered possible. The US has just agreed to
supply to Israel 500 so-called "bunker busters," which could be used
against Iran or possibly Syria, as Israeli security experts freely
admit. These precision bombs, weighing a ton, can penetrate deeply
underground and pierce concrete walls up to two metres thick.
European tactical calculations could, however, go awry, as the example
of Iraq has shown. The regime in Baghdad was pressed by Europe to
accede to American demands for disarmament in order to forestall a
war. Baghdad gave way and destroyed its weapons and rockets, but the
US attacked nevertheless.
Conclusions
The danger of war, threatened by the escalation of the conflicts in
the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, cannot be answered by
supporting one imperialist grouping against another--the weaker against
the stronger, or the "more peaceful" against the more aggressive.
There can be no doubt that American imperialism is today the most
dangerous and aggressive factor in world politics. A change in the
US presidency would not alter this.
However, the Iraq war has already demonstrated the complete
inability of the European governments to counter this danger. Even
those countries that rejected the war did so half-heartedly, and
later sanctioned Iraq's occupation. They studiously avoid resting
on the powerful movement against the Iraq war that developed
worldwide--including in the US itself.
In the end, their "rejection" of the Iraq war was motivated by their
own imperialist interests in the region. They reacted to the war by
strengthening their own military apparatuses to be able to carry out
international interventions, at the same time intensifying attacks
on the social and democratic achievements of their own populations,
so as to stake their claims in the global fight for economic and
strategic power. There is an inseparable connection between growing
militarism on the one hand, and the attacks on social and democratic
rights on the other.
The same applies to Russia, where the working class is paying for
Putin's great power pretensions with pauperization and the loss of
democratic rights.
The resistance of the working class to the danger of war and the
attacks being carried by their own governments all over the world must
be armed with an international socialist perspective. That is the only
viable basis for preventing the danger of a new world conflagration. As
in 1914, the alternative today is once again: socialism or barbarism.