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DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
September 1, 2004, Wednesday
SMOULDERING CONFLICTS FLARE UP
SOURCE: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No 32, August 27 - September
2, 2004, p. 2
by Igor Plugatarev
THERE IS MORE THAN ONE HOT SPOT IN THE CAUCASUS NOWADAYS
President of Russia Vladimir Putin on a "working vocation" in Sochi
made an unplanned trip to Chechnya on the morning of August 22. The
official excuse - the desire to lay a wreath to the tomb of the late
President Akhmad Kadyrov. In the meantime, some analysts saw in the
trip another motive - one analogous to why Putin visited the Caucasus
after the Ingushetian raid on June 22.
Ingushetian scenario in the Chechen manner
On the night of August 22, several mobile groups of Chechen gunmen
attacked some polling stations, police stations, military
commandant's offices, and checkpoints in Grozny. Clashes were
reported in the environs of Minutka Square and in the Oktyabrsky and
Staropromyslovsky districts. The Regional Operational Headquarters
claims that the federal forces thwarted Aslan Maskhadov's and Shamil
Basayev's attempt to destabilize the situation in the republic.
Objective information indicates that it is wishful thinking on the
military's part.
Statements of the Regional Operational Headquarters aired by Major
General Ilya Shabalkin bear a strong resemblance to the confused
statements of security structures in Ingushetia after June 22. Take
the phrase that "Gunmen were quite weak and did not plan to overrun
any objects" alone. Society regularly hears the assurances that
gunmen "lack the strength", that they number "500 men at best" in
Chechnya, that they are out of Basayev's and Maskhadov's control and
"splinter groups are aimlessly roaming the mountains." Add roughly
how many activists of illegal armed formations were killed and taken
prisoner by the federal forces, and you will find this figure "500
men at best" multiplied several times. It's no wonder Shabalkin
offers neither a rough estimate of the gangs participating in the
raid last Sunday, nor their numerical strength. There were at least
200 gunmen involved in the Ingushetian raid in June. Witnesses say
that the ones attacking Grozny did not number any less.
Right after the battles in Grozny, Shabalkin said that "the
possibility of repetition of August 22 is practically impossible":
gunmen are being hunted down. Many of them already arrested, and
their "attempt to make a lot of noise in Gudermes with a really small
force and this to make a resonance" failed. But serious fighting was
reported again on August 24. Not only in Grozny, but in the nearby
settlements as well. Once again, the policemen and noncombatants
(potential voters) were killed.
It seems that Chechen ringleaders succeeded in pulling off what the
federal forces call "a lot of noise". As Shabalkin put it, if the
criminals "intended to draw foreign sponsors' attention", they
apparently succeeded. There is a lot of noise nowadays, a week before
the election. Even the West took note: the German media, for example,
extensively commented on the events beginning with Putin's visit to
Chechnya. From this point of view, gunmen pulled off the scenario
they had already succeeded with in Ingushetia on June 22 when they
attacked Nazran, Karabulak, and Ordzhonikidzevskaya. The massacres
there resulted in the deaths of 98 (including 67 servicemen of the
army, Interior Ministry, Federal Security Service, and Border
Service, and the rest were civilians).
Tbilisi's war cry
Tension on the Georgian-Ossetian border deteriorates while the
hostilities in Chechnya continue.
Moscow responds to Tbilisi's aggressive statements aggressively too -
with maneuvers.
First and foremost, the matter concerns maneuvers of the 58th Army
with headquarters in Vladikavkaz. It is quartered in North Ossetia,
right near the Georgian borders. Its 429th (Mozdok, North Ossetia)
and 135th (Prokhladny in Kabardino-Balkaria) regiments moved to the
Sernovodsk testing site - the exercise area - on August 23. (By the
day the Djava heights near Tskhinvali were cleared by the Georgians).
That same day, Georgian Defense Minister Georgy Baramidze said that
"these maneuvers on a full scale are an expression of a
non-constructive position on Russia's part" and that "situation being
what it is, their organization in the vicinity of the conflict area
generates tension." It goes without saying that the Defense Ministry
of Russia immediately replied that the exercise had been planned last
year and that what Georgia perceived as a "full scale exercise" was
but "ordinary routine" for Russia. In the meantime, this "routine"
exercise was commanded by Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev, 58th
Army Commander (which is strange because routine exercises are
usually run by division COs). It involved over 2,000 servicemen and
almost 100 armored vehicles, and drilled mobilizational and combat
readiness and combat missions. It is also interesting that this
numerical strength and fire power is an approximate equivalent of
what Tbilisi concentrated on the South Ossetian borders - between
2,000 and 3,000 servicemen, 30 tanks, and other armored vehicles.
The Caucasus Military District began flexing its muscles
simultaneously - reservists totaling 5,000 to 6,000 reservists were
called in.
Moreover, it so happened that Russian peacekeepers - in Georgia
itself, right on the border of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict - ran
an exercise at the same time. This exercise too was run by a
lieutenant general, peacekeeping force commander Alexander Yevteev.
The units drilled increase of combat readiness, deployment in the
zone of responsibility, and prevention of armed clashes. All of what
General Svyatoslav Nabzdorov in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict area
is doing in real life, his colleague Yevteev drilled. After South
Ossetia, Georgia is unlikely to try Revolution of the Roses in
Abkhazia, but better safe than sorry. Needless to say, this exercise
was "planned" too.
Add here the Russian-Armenian exercise near Yerevan. It was even more
serious. It involved two regiments (one of them Armenian and the
other a regiment of the 102nd Russian Base) and aviation (MIG-29
fighters and SU-25 ground strafers).
Finding itself in a ring of exercises, Tbilisi sobered up. Hotheads
like Interior Minister Irakly Okruashvili (the man Nabzdorov
regularly condemns for escalation of the conflict) calmed down some.
Okruashvili said, however, that should anything happened, Georgian
troops would be in Tskhinvali within 15 minutes and that "we will
respond with three shots to every one fired at us." Experts ascribe
it to emotions rather than a true evaluation of his own capacities.
Debates are still under way over who the Georgians fought but it is
clear at this point that Tskhinvali defeated Tbilisi at 1 to 2 ratio.
(Sources in the Interior Ministry of Georgia reported that 20
servicemen and policemen were killed and 54 wounded, while South
Ossetian losses are estimated at about a dozen men.) Ossetians still
know how to fight - ever since the war on Zviad Gamsakhurdia's army.
In short, there are lots of potential hot spots in the Caucasus.
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
September 1, 2004, Wednesday
SMOULDERING CONFLICTS FLARE UP
SOURCE: Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No 32, August 27 - September
2, 2004, p. 2
by Igor Plugatarev
THERE IS MORE THAN ONE HOT SPOT IN THE CAUCASUS NOWADAYS
President of Russia Vladimir Putin on a "working vocation" in Sochi
made an unplanned trip to Chechnya on the morning of August 22. The
official excuse - the desire to lay a wreath to the tomb of the late
President Akhmad Kadyrov. In the meantime, some analysts saw in the
trip another motive - one analogous to why Putin visited the Caucasus
after the Ingushetian raid on June 22.
Ingushetian scenario in the Chechen manner
On the night of August 22, several mobile groups of Chechen gunmen
attacked some polling stations, police stations, military
commandant's offices, and checkpoints in Grozny. Clashes were
reported in the environs of Minutka Square and in the Oktyabrsky and
Staropromyslovsky districts. The Regional Operational Headquarters
claims that the federal forces thwarted Aslan Maskhadov's and Shamil
Basayev's attempt to destabilize the situation in the republic.
Objective information indicates that it is wishful thinking on the
military's part.
Statements of the Regional Operational Headquarters aired by Major
General Ilya Shabalkin bear a strong resemblance to the confused
statements of security structures in Ingushetia after June 22. Take
the phrase that "Gunmen were quite weak and did not plan to overrun
any objects" alone. Society regularly hears the assurances that
gunmen "lack the strength", that they number "500 men at best" in
Chechnya, that they are out of Basayev's and Maskhadov's control and
"splinter groups are aimlessly roaming the mountains." Add roughly
how many activists of illegal armed formations were killed and taken
prisoner by the federal forces, and you will find this figure "500
men at best" multiplied several times. It's no wonder Shabalkin
offers neither a rough estimate of the gangs participating in the
raid last Sunday, nor their numerical strength. There were at least
200 gunmen involved in the Ingushetian raid in June. Witnesses say
that the ones attacking Grozny did not number any less.
Right after the battles in Grozny, Shabalkin said that "the
possibility of repetition of August 22 is practically impossible":
gunmen are being hunted down. Many of them already arrested, and
their "attempt to make a lot of noise in Gudermes with a really small
force and this to make a resonance" failed. But serious fighting was
reported again on August 24. Not only in Grozny, but in the nearby
settlements as well. Once again, the policemen and noncombatants
(potential voters) were killed.
It seems that Chechen ringleaders succeeded in pulling off what the
federal forces call "a lot of noise". As Shabalkin put it, if the
criminals "intended to draw foreign sponsors' attention", they
apparently succeeded. There is a lot of noise nowadays, a week before
the election. Even the West took note: the German media, for example,
extensively commented on the events beginning with Putin's visit to
Chechnya. From this point of view, gunmen pulled off the scenario
they had already succeeded with in Ingushetia on June 22 when they
attacked Nazran, Karabulak, and Ordzhonikidzevskaya. The massacres
there resulted in the deaths of 98 (including 67 servicemen of the
army, Interior Ministry, Federal Security Service, and Border
Service, and the rest were civilians).
Tbilisi's war cry
Tension on the Georgian-Ossetian border deteriorates while the
hostilities in Chechnya continue.
Moscow responds to Tbilisi's aggressive statements aggressively too -
with maneuvers.
First and foremost, the matter concerns maneuvers of the 58th Army
with headquarters in Vladikavkaz. It is quartered in North Ossetia,
right near the Georgian borders. Its 429th (Mozdok, North Ossetia)
and 135th (Prokhladny in Kabardino-Balkaria) regiments moved to the
Sernovodsk testing site - the exercise area - on August 23. (By the
day the Djava heights near Tskhinvali were cleared by the Georgians).
That same day, Georgian Defense Minister Georgy Baramidze said that
"these maneuvers on a full scale are an expression of a
non-constructive position on Russia's part" and that "situation being
what it is, their organization in the vicinity of the conflict area
generates tension." It goes without saying that the Defense Ministry
of Russia immediately replied that the exercise had been planned last
year and that what Georgia perceived as a "full scale exercise" was
but "ordinary routine" for Russia. In the meantime, this "routine"
exercise was commanded by Lieutenant General Viktor Sobolev, 58th
Army Commander (which is strange because routine exercises are
usually run by division COs). It involved over 2,000 servicemen and
almost 100 armored vehicles, and drilled mobilizational and combat
readiness and combat missions. It is also interesting that this
numerical strength and fire power is an approximate equivalent of
what Tbilisi concentrated on the South Ossetian borders - between
2,000 and 3,000 servicemen, 30 tanks, and other armored vehicles.
The Caucasus Military District began flexing its muscles
simultaneously - reservists totaling 5,000 to 6,000 reservists were
called in.
Moreover, it so happened that Russian peacekeepers - in Georgia
itself, right on the border of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict - ran
an exercise at the same time. This exercise too was run by a
lieutenant general, peacekeeping force commander Alexander Yevteev.
The units drilled increase of combat readiness, deployment in the
zone of responsibility, and prevention of armed clashes. All of what
General Svyatoslav Nabzdorov in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict area
is doing in real life, his colleague Yevteev drilled. After South
Ossetia, Georgia is unlikely to try Revolution of the Roses in
Abkhazia, but better safe than sorry. Needless to say, this exercise
was "planned" too.
Add here the Russian-Armenian exercise near Yerevan. It was even more
serious. It involved two regiments (one of them Armenian and the
other a regiment of the 102nd Russian Base) and aviation (MIG-29
fighters and SU-25 ground strafers).
Finding itself in a ring of exercises, Tbilisi sobered up. Hotheads
like Interior Minister Irakly Okruashvili (the man Nabzdorov
regularly condemns for escalation of the conflict) calmed down some.
Okruashvili said, however, that should anything happened, Georgian
troops would be in Tskhinvali within 15 minutes and that "we will
respond with three shots to every one fired at us." Experts ascribe
it to emotions rather than a true evaluation of his own capacities.
Debates are still under way over who the Georgians fought but it is
clear at this point that Tskhinvali defeated Tbilisi at 1 to 2 ratio.
(Sources in the Interior Ministry of Georgia reported that 20
servicemen and policemen were killed and 54 wounded, while South
Ossetian losses are estimated at about a dozen men.) Ossetians still
know how to fight - ever since the war on Zviad Gamsakhurdia's army.
In short, there are lots of potential hot spots in the Caucasus.