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Syria, Lebanon, and the Government of 14
By Walid Choucair
Al-Hayat
2004/09/11
Leaks, which are rampant in Lebanese media and political circles,
of the names that might be included in the next Lebanese government,
indicate only one thing: the confusion with which Lebanese President
Emile Lahoud's team and the Syrian leadership are lost in. This
leadership is looking after the details of Lebanese situation, more
than at any other time, after it cornered itself with limited choices.
No matter what was said to justify these leaks' tactical goals, some of
them are pathetic, and condemned, because they indicate fleeing from
insecurity caused by the mistakes, which accompanied the Lebanese
presidential elections, on the internal and external levels; from
insistence on extending Lahoud's term, to the United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSC) 1559. It indicates that limiting the damage,
which Lebanon and Syria fell into, is done with old "working tools"
that are not related to "the new mentality," which we hear about,
and with the call for "turning the page, and beginning reconciliation"
- Syrian President Bashar Al Assad's advice to Lahoud.
The available choices to exit the fleeing forward policy are possible,
despite their scarcity. However, missing the opportunity of forming
a new government to launch these choices would be a mistake over
and above the previous errors, which would accomplish nothing other
than increasing the burdens. If the Syrian leadership and its allies
are talking about a "positive shock" that Lebanon needs to return
cohesiveness to Syria's "first line of defense," it does not come
without a new policy that is radically different from the previous one.
One of those who care about the Lebanese situation (not a politician)
raised a question about what prevents Damascus from moving in the
direction of a government of Lebanese leaders, which strengthens
its chances of facing the situation that is likely to aggravate on
internal and external levels, opens the way in front the "possibility"
of saving Lebanon economically, and reducing the pressure of an
international-American attack on both. A government that seeks true
national reconciliation suggests solutions to the Lebanese-Syrian
relations, and comforts Damascus, because these leaders are its
strategic allies.
Away from pompous and boring slogans, the idea's owner held the
answer in his mind: Rafiq Al Hariri as Prime Minister, with former PM
Omar Karami and Fouad Al Siniora (or Tammam Salam) representing the
Sunnis. The Shiites will be represented by: former Speaker Hussein
Al Husseini, Ali Osseiran, and an independent close to Hezbollah. The
Maronites will be represented by: Suleiman Franjieh and Naseeb Lahoud
(or Elie Ferzli), Walid Jumblatt representing the Druze, Elias Skaff
representing the Catholics, and Sebouh Hovnanian representing the
Armenians.
Some politicians' reaction was disapproval; because they thought that
neither Lahoud nor Hariri nor the Syrians would approve of such a
composition; and such a selection is "too good to be true." Perhaps the
major reason to find such a selection strange is the belief of those
who heard about it that it is impossible for Damascus to allow this
level of Lebanese administration for the Lebanese situation. However,
looking closely at the names shows that more than their two-thirds
are "guaranteed' for Syria, without bearing the burden of interfering
in details.
Is it hard to convince Lahoud and Hariri of this composition? As
long as Damascus convinced the former of "national reconciliation"
and the latter of extension, it can convince them that it is required
for the upcoming government to be a "trusteeship council." Is not it
enough that Lahoud got the extension?
Is it difficult to convince Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir and
the head of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) Walid Jumblatt? It
would not be easy, and would require serious negotiations on the
part of Damascus with both of them to convince; especially Sfeir,
that such a government will be assigned the mission of "correcting
the mistake," not backing down on the extension.
Certainly, Syria's conviction with such a composition requires not
considering the UNSC resolution a victory!
By Walid Choucair
Al-Hayat
2004/09/11
Leaks, which are rampant in Lebanese media and political circles,
of the names that might be included in the next Lebanese government,
indicate only one thing: the confusion with which Lebanese President
Emile Lahoud's team and the Syrian leadership are lost in. This
leadership is looking after the details of Lebanese situation, more
than at any other time, after it cornered itself with limited choices.
No matter what was said to justify these leaks' tactical goals, some of
them are pathetic, and condemned, because they indicate fleeing from
insecurity caused by the mistakes, which accompanied the Lebanese
presidential elections, on the internal and external levels; from
insistence on extending Lahoud's term, to the United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSC) 1559. It indicates that limiting the damage,
which Lebanon and Syria fell into, is done with old "working tools"
that are not related to "the new mentality," which we hear about,
and with the call for "turning the page, and beginning reconciliation"
- Syrian President Bashar Al Assad's advice to Lahoud.
The available choices to exit the fleeing forward policy are possible,
despite their scarcity. However, missing the opportunity of forming
a new government to launch these choices would be a mistake over
and above the previous errors, which would accomplish nothing other
than increasing the burdens. If the Syrian leadership and its allies
are talking about a "positive shock" that Lebanon needs to return
cohesiveness to Syria's "first line of defense," it does not come
without a new policy that is radically different from the previous one.
One of those who care about the Lebanese situation (not a politician)
raised a question about what prevents Damascus from moving in the
direction of a government of Lebanese leaders, which strengthens
its chances of facing the situation that is likely to aggravate on
internal and external levels, opens the way in front the "possibility"
of saving Lebanon economically, and reducing the pressure of an
international-American attack on both. A government that seeks true
national reconciliation suggests solutions to the Lebanese-Syrian
relations, and comforts Damascus, because these leaders are its
strategic allies.
Away from pompous and boring slogans, the idea's owner held the
answer in his mind: Rafiq Al Hariri as Prime Minister, with former PM
Omar Karami and Fouad Al Siniora (or Tammam Salam) representing the
Sunnis. The Shiites will be represented by: former Speaker Hussein
Al Husseini, Ali Osseiran, and an independent close to Hezbollah. The
Maronites will be represented by: Suleiman Franjieh and Naseeb Lahoud
(or Elie Ferzli), Walid Jumblatt representing the Druze, Elias Skaff
representing the Catholics, and Sebouh Hovnanian representing the
Armenians.
Some politicians' reaction was disapproval; because they thought that
neither Lahoud nor Hariri nor the Syrians would approve of such a
composition; and such a selection is "too good to be true." Perhaps the
major reason to find such a selection strange is the belief of those
who heard about it that it is impossible for Damascus to allow this
level of Lebanese administration for the Lebanese situation. However,
looking closely at the names shows that more than their two-thirds
are "guaranteed' for Syria, without bearing the burden of interfering
in details.
Is it hard to convince Lahoud and Hariri of this composition? As
long as Damascus convinced the former of "national reconciliation"
and the latter of extension, it can convince them that it is required
for the upcoming government to be a "trusteeship council." Is not it
enough that Lahoud got the extension?
Is it difficult to convince Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Sfeir and
the head of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) Walid Jumblatt? It
would not be easy, and would require serious negotiations on the
part of Damascus with both of them to convince; especially Sfeir,
that such a government will be assigned the mission of "correcting
the mistake," not backing down on the extension.
Certainly, Syria's conviction with such a composition requires not
considering the UNSC resolution a victory!