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Rocky Mountain News, CO
April 15 2005
Speakout: A little modesty might serve U.S. well
By Christoph H. Stefes, Special to the News
Fifteen years after the revolutions that overthrew the communist
dictatorships of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the region has
witnessed once again a wave of political upheaval, starting with
Georgia in November 2003, followed by Ukraine a year later and
Kyrgyzstan last month. In these former Soviet republics, massive
demonstrations toppled political leaders who failed to fulfill the
hopes of their citizens for a better, more prosperous and democratic
life.
The Bush administration welcomes these so-called democratic
revolutions, emphasizing the success of the American battle to spread
democracy worldwide. Yet the Rose, Orange and Tulip "revolutions" in
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, were not revolutions
by any stretch of the term. It is not even clear if they can be
called "democratic," as democratic institutions look feeble in these
countries.
Furthermore, U.S. democracy assistance has only been one factor among
many that have caused these recent transitions. By claiming
differently, the Bush administration downplays the role of domestic
factors and provokes the authoritarian leaders of surrounding
countries to further crack down on the opposition. The U.S. also
risks further disrupting cooperation with Russia on Chechnya and
terrorism. In short, it might be better if the U.S. government
continued to promote democracy in the region but was less
ostentatious about it.
First, the events in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan bear striking
similarities. In all three countries, the post-Soviet leaders
initially appeared to embrace the values and institutions of
democratic and free-market societies. They rapidly privatized state
companies and liberalized the economies. Moreover, they encouraged
the formation of civic groups and a free media and refrained from
repressing their political opponents.
Unfortunately, from the mid- 1990s on they allowed relatives and
political supporters to seize the most prosperous economic sectors at
the expense of the general population of which more than half live in
deep poverty. As clientelism and corruption sparked public outcry and
threatened to defeat the ruling parties at the ballot box, they
relied on massive electoral fraud to stay in power.
Moreover, in Georgia, Ukraine and (to a lesser degree) Kyrgyzstan the
popular uprisings were orchestrated and led by opposition leaders who
had served as top-ranking officials under the previous regime. These
leaders are unlikely to seek a radical transformation of the
societal, economic and political structures of their countries.
>From this brief analysis, it should have become clear that we are not
dealing with a replication of the 1989-'91 revolutions. This may not
be worryisome, since strong, democratic leadership can be just as
responsible for the improvement of people's lives as can revolutions.
Viktor Yushchenko provides this leadership in Ukraine, but we can be
less sure about his Georgian counterpart, Mikhail Saakashvili, who
has recently amassed presidential power at the expense of the
parliament. In Kyrgyzstan, the outcome of the recent events is even
less clear, as the opposition is divided and new clan networks have
already begun to infiltrate government structures. In short, it might
be a bit too early for the Bush administration to celebrate the rise
of democracy in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.
Second, although U.S. democracy assistance has played a role in these
events, the numbers do not show that it was a decisive role. Over the
last few years, the U.S. government has provided about as much
assistance to Armenia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which continue to
be ruled by authoritarian leaders, as do Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.
Moreover, to triumphantly declare credit for the rise of democracy is
not only premature but also counterproductive. Russia's President
Vladimir Putin and his colleagues in the neighboring countries have
nervously reacted to the toppling of their erstwhile counterparts.
Blaming Western involvement for bringing political instability to the
region, they have begun to crack down on Western-sponsored
organizations. By exaggerating its role in the political transitions,
the U.S. administration does a disservice to the reformers in the
region.
In short, depending on many factors, of which U.S. democracy
assistance is just one, the recent wave of political transitions
might reach other countries, opening doors for the possible
establishment of new democratic regimes (though not a guaranteed
outcome). In order to facilitate this process, the U.S. government is
well-advised to understate its role in the region.
Christoph H. Stefes is an assistant professor for Comparative
European and Post-Soviet Studies at the Political Science Department
of the University of Colorado at Denver.
April 15 2005
Speakout: A little modesty might serve U.S. well
By Christoph H. Stefes, Special to the News
Fifteen years after the revolutions that overthrew the communist
dictatorships of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the region has
witnessed once again a wave of political upheaval, starting with
Georgia in November 2003, followed by Ukraine a year later and
Kyrgyzstan last month. In these former Soviet republics, massive
demonstrations toppled political leaders who failed to fulfill the
hopes of their citizens for a better, more prosperous and democratic
life.
The Bush administration welcomes these so-called democratic
revolutions, emphasizing the success of the American battle to spread
democracy worldwide. Yet the Rose, Orange and Tulip "revolutions" in
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, were not revolutions
by any stretch of the term. It is not even clear if they can be
called "democratic," as democratic institutions look feeble in these
countries.
Furthermore, U.S. democracy assistance has only been one factor among
many that have caused these recent transitions. By claiming
differently, the Bush administration downplays the role of domestic
factors and provokes the authoritarian leaders of surrounding
countries to further crack down on the opposition. The U.S. also
risks further disrupting cooperation with Russia on Chechnya and
terrorism. In short, it might be better if the U.S. government
continued to promote democracy in the region but was less
ostentatious about it.
First, the events in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan bear striking
similarities. In all three countries, the post-Soviet leaders
initially appeared to embrace the values and institutions of
democratic and free-market societies. They rapidly privatized state
companies and liberalized the economies. Moreover, they encouraged
the formation of civic groups and a free media and refrained from
repressing their political opponents.
Unfortunately, from the mid- 1990s on they allowed relatives and
political supporters to seize the most prosperous economic sectors at
the expense of the general population of which more than half live in
deep poverty. As clientelism and corruption sparked public outcry and
threatened to defeat the ruling parties at the ballot box, they
relied on massive electoral fraud to stay in power.
Moreover, in Georgia, Ukraine and (to a lesser degree) Kyrgyzstan the
popular uprisings were orchestrated and led by opposition leaders who
had served as top-ranking officials under the previous regime. These
leaders are unlikely to seek a radical transformation of the
societal, economic and political structures of their countries.
>From this brief analysis, it should have become clear that we are not
dealing with a replication of the 1989-'91 revolutions. This may not
be worryisome, since strong, democratic leadership can be just as
responsible for the improvement of people's lives as can revolutions.
Viktor Yushchenko provides this leadership in Ukraine, but we can be
less sure about his Georgian counterpart, Mikhail Saakashvili, who
has recently amassed presidential power at the expense of the
parliament. In Kyrgyzstan, the outcome of the recent events is even
less clear, as the opposition is divided and new clan networks have
already begun to infiltrate government structures. In short, it might
be a bit too early for the Bush administration to celebrate the rise
of democracy in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.
Second, although U.S. democracy assistance has played a role in these
events, the numbers do not show that it was a decisive role. Over the
last few years, the U.S. government has provided about as much
assistance to Armenia, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which continue to
be ruled by authoritarian leaders, as do Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.
Moreover, to triumphantly declare credit for the rise of democracy is
not only premature but also counterproductive. Russia's President
Vladimir Putin and his colleagues in the neighboring countries have
nervously reacted to the toppling of their erstwhile counterparts.
Blaming Western involvement for bringing political instability to the
region, they have begun to crack down on Western-sponsored
organizations. By exaggerating its role in the political transitions,
the U.S. administration does a disservice to the reformers in the
region.
In short, depending on many factors, of which U.S. democracy
assistance is just one, the recent wave of political transitions
might reach other countries, opening doors for the possible
establishment of new democratic regimes (though not a guaranteed
outcome). In order to facilitate this process, the U.S. government is
well-advised to understate its role in the region.
Christoph H. Stefes is an assistant professor for Comparative
European and Post-Soviet Studies at the Political Science Department
of the University of Colorado at Denver.