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'Forgotten Armies': Their Lousiest Hour

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  • 'Forgotten Armies': Their Lousiest Hour

    New York Times
    April 16 2005

    'Forgotten Armies': Their Lousiest Hour
    By BENJAMIN SCHWARZ

    FORGOTTEN ARMIES
    The Fall of British Asia, 1941-1945.
    By Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper.
    Illustrated. 555 pp. The Belknap Press/ Harvard University Press.
    $29.95.


    EVERAL hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941,
    Japanese troops stormed the beaches of southeastern Thailand and
    northern Malaya. Their goal was Singapore, some 400 miles south,
    among the world's richest and most cosmopolitan cities, and, along
    with Gibraltar, the most heavily defended piece of land in the
    British Empire. Just over two months later that supposedly
    impregnable fortress was in Japanese hands. A garrison of more than
    85,000 troops had surrendered to a Japanese assault force numbering
    about 30,000. Singapore's capture, Winston Churchill said, was ''the
    worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history.'' By
    April the Japanese were bombing Calcutta, and India was preparing to
    be invaded. Britain's ''great crescent,'' which had stretched from
    India's border with Burma down the Malay peninsula, was lost.

    In ''Forgotten Armies'' Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, two
    Cambridge historians, explore these events and their intricate and
    often terrible repercussions from the perspectives of both the
    British and the Asian peoples of the region. A work at once scholarly
    and panoramic, it is as precise in dissecting, say, the logistical
    problems the Japanese Army confronted during the 1944 campaign in
    northern Burma (''the worst defeat in Japan's military history'') as
    it is arresting in examining such sweeping events as the 1942 trek of
    some 600,000 Indian, Burmese and Anglo-Indian refugees from Burma
    through the high passes of Assam into India, fleeing the advancing
    Japanese.

    Hundreds of monographs have examined aspects of this story, but Bayly
    and Harper's is the only history that matches the scope and nuance of
    novels like J. G. Farrell's ''Singapore Grip,'' Paul Scott's ''Raj
    Quartet,'' Anthony Burgess's ''Enemy in the Blanket,'' Orwell's
    ''Burmese Days'' and Amitov Ghosh's ''Glass Palace.'' Their 70-page
    prologue is a triumph of scene setting. The great crescent between
    Calcutta and Singapore was, Bayly and Harper show, a multinational
    and multiethnic stew. Indians, Chinese, Malays and Burmese toiled in
    the factories and oil fields of Burma and the rubber plantations and
    tin mines of Malaya; Chinese merchant princes ruled the trading
    houses of Penang and Malacca; Japanese owned shops in virtually every
    small town on the Malay peninsula, controlled Malaya's iron mines and
    dominated Singapore's fishing fleet.

    At the apex of this world, of course, the British ruled. ''Forgotten
    Armies'' artfully evokes their prewar idyll: the string of posh
    hotels; the mountaintop golf courses carved out of the jungle; the
    torpor of the hill stations (exacerbated by chronic gin-swilling),
    where expats speaking an ''outmoded English slang'' saw to it that
    ''the ova of trout were carted up on ice'' to stock the streams; and,
    most memorably, what Lady Diana Cooper characterized as the
    ''Sino-Monte-Carlo'' atmosphere of Singapore -- a strikingly clean
    and modern city of snobbish clubs, air-conditioned cinemas and a glut
    of playing fields, populated by Arabs, Armenians, Jews, Parsis and
    White Russians, as well as Indians, Malays, Burmese, Chinese,
    Japanese and their British overlords.

    The ignominious British and Australian rout down the length of the
    Malay peninsula (the retreating soldiers sardonically adopted the
    theme from the Hope and Crosby movie ''The Road to Singapore'' as
    their marching song) and Singapore's subsequent fall have already
    been described, memorably, in Farrell's novel and in a host of
    military histories, most notably Alan Warren's ''Singapore 1942,''
    but Bayly and Harper's account is both vivid and authoritative. One
    of their great contributions lies in their stinging appraisal of the
    debacle -- all but inevitable given Britain's competing strategic
    priorities, but made worse in every conceivable way by the
    fecklessness, dithering, incompetence, jealousies and cowardice of
    commanders on the spot. A second is their chronicle of the nearly
    complete moral collapse of British colonial society and civil
    administration throughout the great crescent. That collapse, they
    convincingly show, began just eight days after the Japanese invasion,
    with the shameful European evacuation of Penang, in which Britons
    abandoned the Asians they ruled to an utterly vicious conqueror.
    British imperialism certainly had its high-minded and responsible
    aspects, but at the time and place ''Forgotten Armies'' recounts it
    revealed itself to be selfish, unlovely and, in the parlance of the
    time, unmanly.

    This British failure of nerve enormously strengthened the region's
    national independence movements during and after the war. The
    Japanese, of course, tried to exploit anti-imperialist sentiment in
    the name of pan-Asian solidarity, but Bayly and Harper, though
    plainly unsympathetic to Britain's imperialism, make clear that
    Japan's was incomparably worse. The Japanese systematically executed
    70,000 ethnic Chinese in Singapore and southern Malaya. They sexually
    enslaved well over 50,000 of the great crescent's women, and raped
    tens of thousands more; 14,000 Allied prisoners of war died as slave
    laborers on the Thailand-Burma railway (an ordeal made famous in
    ''The Bridge on the River Kwai''), along with possibly 20 times as
    many Indians, Burmese, Chinese and Malays, who were starved and
    worked to death. (Bayly and Harper should be praised for making plain
    a grim fact of war that nearly always goes unsaid: ''The scale of
    animal fatality was colossal.'') The British of course temporarily
    took back their Southeast Asian empire, but only with the help of
    their erstwhile subjects (Asians and Africans made up 70 percent of
    the soldiers in William Slim's victorious 14th Army). In the terrible
    choices war gave the inhabitants of the great crescent, the craven
    hypocrisy of the British was infinitely preferable to the medieval
    sadism of the Japanese.



    Benjamin Schwarz is the literary editor and national editor of The
    Atlantic Monthly.
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