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Global Politician, NY
April 18 2005
INTERVIEW: Caucasus is No Longer the Source of Discord for Russia and Turkey
GP Interviews - 4/18/2005
Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. is a Professor of International Relations at
Acharyan University in Yerevan, Armenia. He's also the Director of
the Department of Turkish Studies at the Armenian National Academy
of Sciences. In the past, he served as a Counselor of the Armenian
Embassy in Germany and was the Deputy Director of the Department of
Political Analysis for the Office of the President of Armenia.
Mr. Safrastyan, the results of the visit of Vladimir Putin to Ankara
and the following visit of Turkish Prime Minister R. T. Erdogan to
Moscow testify that Russian-Turkish relations have become closer.
Only the fact that 600 Turkish businessmen accompanied Erdogan
testifies much. How great is the potential of political rapprochement
of Turkey and Russia in your opinion? Or the observed processes come
to lobbying of the interests of Russian business in Turkey?
Well, as regards 600 Turkish businessmen, it is an absolute record.
Usually, prime ministers take with them some 200 people. Of course, it
testifies that the Turkish business circles are rather interested in
Russia. The volume of Turkish investments in Russia is rather great,
at present. The economic interests prevail on the part of Russia
as well. In general, Putin's Administration has marked the economic
direction as a priority, as I understand. In this connection, I'd like
to mention the statement of Anatoliy Chubays about the liberal empire,
which, by the way, made enough fuss in Armenia as well. Anyhow, it
is evident that both Russia and Turkey are interested in development
and deepening of the economic component of the cooperation in various
spheres. It is the most important, but, at the same time, just one
side of the medal.
The second factor is that both Russia and Turkey are not enough
satisfied with their present positions in the world. These states
are dissatisfied with the fact that they are not the leading players
in the world arena, and this dissatisfaction makes them closer, to
some extent. The changes which took place in the foreign policy of
Turkey during the last years connected with worsening of its strategic
relations with the USA, and, which is the most important, worsening
of the Turkish-Israeli relations, testify to a new direction in the
Turkish policy. That is, aspiration for more independence. The same
concerns Russia. Moscow tries to use the privileges gained during
the last years due to high prices for oil not only in the economic
sphere, but also to make it a certain strategic unit. Thus, the two
super powers dissatisfied with their role in the world try to find
their new place, a new niche in the world policy. In this background,
rapprochement of Russia and Turkey is possible not only in economy, but
also at a strategic level. The declaration on the results of Putin's
visit to Ankara contained such a concept as multilateral cooperation
for the first time. In the course of Erdogan's last visit to Moscow,
the strategic cooperation was already in question, though it was not
put on paper. Meanwhile, the term "multilateral cooperation" was not
only fixed, but also was perceived and presented by the parties to
the world as a new degree in the bilateral relations. It is necessary
to pay attention to another circumstance. Putin stated in Astana
that quite unexpectedly for him Turkey had displayed an interest in
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, China, Kirgizistan,
Russia and Uzbekistan are included in SCO - ed.). The Shanghai six
is known to try to lay a foundation of a new union of states, which
will play a considerable role in that region in future, as SCO leaders
think. Russia and China are mainly in question. The fact that Turkey
has displayed an interest in SCO is an evidence of rather serious
changes in the foreign policy of that country. In this connection,
it is necessary to mention the concept presented by Erdogan's adviser
for foreign policy, Professor Ahmet Davutoglu in his book entitled
"Strategic Depth" in 2000. The term strategic depth itself belongs
to military science and characterizes an interest of a country that
its strategic facilities are in the depth inaccessible for a possible
rival. However, during the last decades, several states, in particular,
Pakistan, Israel, applied the given concept to general political and
strategic issues. It was just in this light that Professor Davutoglu
tried to apply the given concept to Turkey perceiving the strategic
depth not only in the spatial, but also historical expression. He
speaks of Turkey like a country having a historical depth and
entering the 20th century alongside with seven empires controlling
over the big regions in the world. At the same time, he draws a
conclusion that Turkey must play a great role in the world arena
and it must not be treated as a small European country. According to
the concept, all the territories once included in the Ottoman Empire
are strategically important territories for present day Turkey and
it must play a special role there. In the special expression, the
strategic depth is interpreted by Davutoglu as establishment of not
only good-neighbored relations with the direct neighbors of Turkey,
but also an aspiration that these states enclose the greatest part
of their policy in Turkey. For example, for Georgia and Bulgaria
cooperate through Turkey. In this connection, Davutoglu is perceived
in Turkey as a supporter of neo-Ottomanism.
Giving an analysis to the Party Justice and Development (PJD)
ruling in Turkey, we arrive to a conclusion that it tried to put the
aforementioned concept into practice. Today Turkey exerts great efforts
to improve the relations with its neighbors. For example, at the end
of the 20th century, Turkey was in disagreeable relations almost with
all its neighbors, both in the Arab world and in the Caucasus and with
Iran. The picture is different at present. One should not ignore the
Eurasian subject matter either. The program of the PJD mentions the
Eurasian subject matter as well. An agreement of cooperation in Eurasia
was signed between Turkey and Russia in New York in 2001. According
to this document, task groups at a high level were formed, which
would coordinate the policy of the two countries in the Eurasian
space. Despite the fact that these groups gathered some three of four
times in that period of time, the attempt to coordinate geo-strategies
between Turkey and Russia in the Eurasian space testifies much.
As a result, if one studies the conceptual basis of the existing
Russian-Turkish relations, the following two concepts go into it:
strategic depth and Eurasian subjects. In this aspect, the existing
trends can be characterized as an aspiration of the two regional
super powers to deaden regional cooperation, which, of course, still
remains, to strengthen economic cooperation and gradually begin to
solve geo-strategic tasks.
Let us suppose that Russia and Turkey are dissatisfied with their
positions in the world arena and try to coordinate their acts to
increase their rating. How will the USA and Europe response to it? It
is right to consider the rapprochement with Russia an alternative
for Turkey in the issue of joining the EU, taking into account the
tension in the relations of Russia with the EU?
I shall start with the last question. In the course of his visit
to Ankara, Putin, in particular, said the following: you needn't
admission to the European Union; you'd better deepen the cooperation
with us. If Turkey becomes a EU-member, it will be more difficult for
it to cooperate with Russia. It was in early December. By the way,
these words of Putin arouse a negative response of Turkey. However,
already on December 17, the situation changed. In the course of
Erdogan's visit to Moscow, Putin made a cardinally opposite statement
coming to the following: it is very good that the EU has made a
right decision and Turkey will be admitted to the EU. As a result,
our cooperation will even more strengthen.
There are rather influential forces in Turkish elite, which thinks
about the following: Europe is a good think, indeed, and we should
become part of it, but to be respected, we must have a reliable and
influential rear. And the greater is the influence outside the EU,
the more influence we shall gain inside it. Thus, Turkey, of course,
will do everything to use the privileges gained during the last
two-three years in the aspect of the increase in its influence and
reputation in the eyes of Europeans, including though development of
relations with Russia. It is the meaning of a group.
These is also a pro-American group sure that Turkey should aspire for
maintenance of special relations with the USA, and that aspiration
for the EU and the relations with Russia are of secondary importance,
in the given case. At present, this group is ousted from big politics,
but it is still very strong. The Eurasian group, which is marginal,
belongs to the third wing. It is for the necessity of deepening
relations with Iran, as well as with Russia and China, including,
within the frameworks of SCO.
As regards the top ruling over Turkey at present, one should not
forget that these people belong to the traditional Turkish elite.
There is a very interesting opinion that today Turkey is coming back
to the very natural appearance it must be in. It is connected with the
fact that the ruling party expresses the aspirations and interests
of the greatest part of the population unlike all the other Turkish
rulers, starting from Young Turks, who implanted definite concepts
contradicting to the Turkish mentality. In this aspect, the greatest
part of the Turkish elite does not perceive seriously the people
who are in power at present. The first think that Turkey must not
exceed the frameworks of the traditional policy, as it is stronger
in an alliance with the USA. Thus, anti-Americanism in Turkey cannot
bring any considerable political dividends, though, at the same time,
the country itself is one of the most anti-American ones, as to
public sentiments, leaving behind the same Iran. It is this public
anti-Americanism that is used by the PJD ruling in Turkey. They play
on it and it is part of their very big internal popularity.
What do you think of Moscow's position on the Cyprus problem,
especially in the light of the failure of UN Secretary General's plan?
After the Turkish part of Cyprus voted for Kofi Annan's plan,
Vladimir Putin stated that it is absolutely senseless and foul to
continue isolating the Turkish part of Cyprus. Of course, Turks were
pleasantly surprised with the words of the Russian President. Judging
by the official reaction of the Greek and Cyprian parties, they have
seen no real sign of a change in Moscow's policy in this issue yet.
The EU is known to prepare for presentation of a new plan of resolution
to Cyprian problem, however, as I know, Russia is for Annan's plan
and it will not support that of the EU. I think, the fact that Turks
provided Russia with an opportunity to occur in the internal gas,
oil and now energy markets of Turkey played a definite role here. The
privatization of Turkish energy distribution networks is in process,
with Russia displaying an interest in it. Besides, a possibility of
laying electricity transmission lines along the bottom of Black Sea
is currently under consideration. It is most probably that Russia
also gave its agreement on the construction and even financing of
the Trans-Thracian oil pipeline. Construction of a gas terminal in
the port Ceyhan is supposed to become the largest Russian investment
program abroad, though no official announcements have been made in
this connection.
It is necessary to assess as another factor that 40,000-strong Turkish
army is dislocated in Cyprus, which is favorable for the USA as Cyprus
is close to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and, which is the most important,
to Ceyhan. Factually, in the strategic aspect, Cyprus protects Ceyhan,
i.e. the uninterrupted supply of oil from Ceyhan terminal. Americans
plan to construct a military base in Cyprus, where they have a tracking
base, which is the largest in the Middle East controlling over the
South Caucasus, Middle East and Arab states. As regards Europe, it is
also favorable for it that Cyprus be restored as a united state. If
Annan's plan were accepted, Europe would have to allocate over $20
billion for its implementation.
Still, how real is Turkey's full membership at the EU? Whether Europe's
response will be in favor of Ankara in this connection?
I do not think the prospect of a positive response so simple. Turkey
may receive a negative answer as well. In my opinion, the European
public is not satisfied with the decision to start talks for Turkey's
admission to the EU adopted on December 17. In their turn, France and
Austria stated that they would announce a referendum on the given
issue. Meanwhile, it is a factual rejection to Ankara taking into
account the existing realities. Evidently, there is a great field for
bargaining here and the result will depend on Turkey's state. Let's
think of the issue seriously. Europe feels no need in Turkey. Just one
geo-political factor can be a clear answer to it - EU with Turkey is
one thing, while EU without Turkey is quite another. On the other hand,
I have grounds to suppose that Armenia will become a EU member-state
sooner than Turkey.
In the course of Russian-Turkish negotiations in Moscow, the issues of
the Armenian agenda, including Karabakh problem and the blockade of the
Armenian-Turkish boundary, were also in question. What do you think,
whether the rapprochement of Russia and Turkey is able to influence
the position of the Russian party on the Karabakh problem or become
a reason for an unfavorable shuffle of the Armenian cards?
Before answering the question, I'd like to draw your attention to
data of a survey carried out by the Russian Center for Public Opinion
Studies (VCIOM) on the attitude of Russians to Turkey. According to
these data, 71% of Russians display a positive attitude to Turkey,
51% consider it a reliable trade-and-economic partner, and 16% think
it a fraternal country. The Gallop International in Georgia asked a
similar question. The following data were fixed: only 7% of Georgians
consider Turkey a reliable partner, another 13% see some danger in
that country. To compare, only 3% of Russians think that Turkey is
an enemy country and a probable rival.
Deepening of political cooperation of Russia with Turkey is in the
background of a factual closure of Turkey's approach to the South
Caucasus. I think the spring of 2002 a crucial point in this respect.
Then Americans made a decision to dispatch a limited contingent
of military instructors to Georgia. As I know, dispatch of Turkish
specialists to Georgia was considered initially. However, in future,
Washington refused from that idea. Probably, Turkey's role as a junior
partner, assistance of the USA in its expansion to the South Caucasus,
is brought to the minimum at present. Though, we mechanically keep
considering Turkey the major guide of US policy. It is not so. I
think, establishment of new type mobile bases of the USA in Georgia
is a question of time, but probably it will happen in Azerbaijan at
first. So, in this respect, in the Caucasus, Turkey is no longer
dangerous for Russia. That is, the Caucasus, which was an apple
of discord for the two empires for centuries, is no longer the
same. It should be noted that at the beginning of the last century,
the Caucasus was divided between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey,
in the first half of 90s when Russia's withdrawal resulted in vacuum
in the Caucasus, Turkey tried to fill that vacuum. Then Russia began
returning and Turkey withdrawing again. But, then occurred the USA,
which neglected both Russia and Turkey in the same way and acted
as it thought fit. Hence, the geo-political rivalry of Russia and
Turkey in the Caucasus has been brought to the minimum, which made
their deeper cooperation possible, on the whole. In this background,
of course, the Turkish party each time raises an issue to Moscow
concerning the pressure on its ally, Armenia, to make it release
the territories. Turkey raised this issue in the course of Putin's
visits to Ankara and to Moscow recently. However, to all appearances,
Russia each time rejects it. Speaking at a press conference, Putin
stated rather exactly that Russia had no intention to exert pressure
on any country; it would limit itself with the role of a mediator
and a guarantor of fulfillment of the agreements to be signed by the
parties. Sergey Ivanov stated almost the same in the USA. That is,
I do not share the concerns of definite political circles of Armenia
that Russia will expert pressure on us in the issue of Karabakh in
favor of Turkey. There are no real grounds for it. Russia and Turkey
have many other spheres to go on compromises. But, I repeat, at the
present level of Russia-Turkey and Russia-Armenia relations a pressure
on Yerevan on Karabakh problem is ruled out.
Is it possible that Moscow exerts pressure both on Armenia and
Azerbaijan demanding resolution of the issue in the nearest future?
Turkey is not a country able to affect the process of Karabakh
conflict's resolution within the framework of OSCE Minsk Group. It
can influence the process as it did one or two times torpedoing almost
ready agreements in 90s using all its influence on Azerbaijan. At the
given stage, Turkey is unable to influence Russia in order that it,
in its turn, influences Armenia. Moscow will not go on it.
A decision to start negotiations with Turkey for its admission to the
EU was made on December 17. Naturally, the process will last long.
What do you think, how heavy factor of pressure on Turkey by Europe
can become the Armenian Clause?
At first, Armenia does not perceive adequately what has happened. The
Armenian Clause is included into the agenda of the big European
politics. That is, it has happened what Armenians aspired for
decades. It is a fact, which Armenia is not fully aware of. By the
way, it does not mean that this issue cannot be in the same agenda.
Yet at the beginning of the last year, Chirac said although the fact
of the Genocide was adopted by the French Parliament, the issue of
recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey must be solved by
Ankara and Yerevan; but, everything changed by the end of the year.
It was not only Chirac that pointed out the necessity of raising the
issue of recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey, but also one
of the leading politicians N. Sarkozy and Foreign Minister M. Barnier.
One should not forget that Armenia is a sovereign state, which is
able to play a definite role and does it. At the same time, for me
personally, dividends can be exclusively moral. Recognition of the
Genocide by Turkey is my duty to the annihilated generations. What is
the policy of the European Union? These are political decisions adopted
by bureaucratic structures of the EU and the EU member-states. However,
not only pragmatic calculations and political interests, but also
public opinion influence the adoption of these decisions. It is a
very strong resource of influence on the policy of the EU in the
Armenian Clause. I think Armenia does not use it fully. I think
diplomacy is diplomacy, but the public resource must be used.
Today Turkey exerts great efforts to protect its interests in the
issue of Genocide. At the end of December, the Foreign Minister of
Turkey, Abdullah Gul, met MPs and stated, in particular, the following:
the issue of admission to the EU comes to that of recognition of the
Armenian Genocide. That is, as to the remaining issues, compromises
can be found. Meanwhile, there is no compromise in the issue of the
Genocide, either Turkey recognizes it or not. I think Europe will be
adherent in this issue. Meanwhile, one should not hope for Diaspora,
but to express its position exactly and insist on it.
What do you think, whether the crisis in the American-Turkish relations
is able to lead to recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey,
taking into account Washington's statements that Turkey should not
forget about the events of the beginning of the last century when
raising the issue of Kirkuk? It is necessary to mention that 30 States
have recognized the Armenian Genocide.
The Armenian Diaspora of the USA has rather wide lobbying activities.
However, I think that it made a very big fault. In the course of the
last presidential election in the USA, it supported John Kerry only
and has practically broken its ties with Republicans unlike the first
elections. Definite attempts of diversifications are currently made,
however, the positions of the Armenian lobby in the USA have become
considerably weak. Even without taking it into account, I do not
think that the Republican Administration of the White House will go
on recognition of the Genocide. In my opinion, neo-conservatives just
dislike Armenians.
Today the Armenian public is concerned for the possibility of Armenia's
being bypassed by the new project to build a railroad connecting Turkey
with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Do you see any good grounds in the urges
for abandoning the idea of the Armenian Genocide recognition in order
to avoid the lot of a deadlock country for Armenia?
I don't accept such a formulation. There can be no 100% benefit or
detriment from one or another decision. As for concerns, they are
inspired by Turkey and come to one single formula - cooperation
or deadlock. Meanwhile, Armenia has a big advantage over the other
South Caucasian states. We have preserved our territorial integrity
unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, which, according to the well-known
concept, is the first feature of a full-fledged state. Armenia has
been controlling big (in regional dimensions) territories for ten
years already managing in the meantime to enhance its economic growth.
These two factors alone show that Armenia cannot be a deadlock
country. On the contrary, today we are the dominating center of
this geo-political area and being in the center both geographically
and geo-politically one cannot simply get in a deadlock. This is an
axiom. Of course, Turkey and Azerbaijan may want to bypass Armenia.
But I don't think that Georgia might want the same. The real actors on
the global arena, such as the US and Russia, will nonetheless be guided
by geo-political ends in the first place. It's not a coincidence that
Armenia has been officially included in the "North-South" international
transport corridor. As for the above-mentioned Kars (Turkey)-Akhalkaki
(Georgia) railroad, this idea was first expressed by Shevardnadze while
Saakashvili signed the agreement already. As you may know Saakashvili
has an idée fix to make Batumi a big transport center with an airport
of international importance. To have a free hand he needs to connect
Batumi with Kars - this project is part of his plan. In any case,
I don't see any big threat for Armenia - if the South Caucasian
borders are opened we will be able to join this road at any moment.
The interview was originally conducted by the Regnum News Agency and
provided to the Global Politician by Prof. Safrastyan.
--Boundary_(ID_Y9y7sEC7p3qvO+dDDzh9yQ)--
April 18 2005
INTERVIEW: Caucasus is No Longer the Source of Discord for Russia and Turkey
GP Interviews - 4/18/2005
Ruben Safrastyan, Ph.D. is a Professor of International Relations at
Acharyan University in Yerevan, Armenia. He's also the Director of
the Department of Turkish Studies at the Armenian National Academy
of Sciences. In the past, he served as a Counselor of the Armenian
Embassy in Germany and was the Deputy Director of the Department of
Political Analysis for the Office of the President of Armenia.
Mr. Safrastyan, the results of the visit of Vladimir Putin to Ankara
and the following visit of Turkish Prime Minister R. T. Erdogan to
Moscow testify that Russian-Turkish relations have become closer.
Only the fact that 600 Turkish businessmen accompanied Erdogan
testifies much. How great is the potential of political rapprochement
of Turkey and Russia in your opinion? Or the observed processes come
to lobbying of the interests of Russian business in Turkey?
Well, as regards 600 Turkish businessmen, it is an absolute record.
Usually, prime ministers take with them some 200 people. Of course, it
testifies that the Turkish business circles are rather interested in
Russia. The volume of Turkish investments in Russia is rather great,
at present. The economic interests prevail on the part of Russia
as well. In general, Putin's Administration has marked the economic
direction as a priority, as I understand. In this connection, I'd like
to mention the statement of Anatoliy Chubays about the liberal empire,
which, by the way, made enough fuss in Armenia as well. Anyhow, it
is evident that both Russia and Turkey are interested in development
and deepening of the economic component of the cooperation in various
spheres. It is the most important, but, at the same time, just one
side of the medal.
The second factor is that both Russia and Turkey are not enough
satisfied with their present positions in the world. These states
are dissatisfied with the fact that they are not the leading players
in the world arena, and this dissatisfaction makes them closer, to
some extent. The changes which took place in the foreign policy of
Turkey during the last years connected with worsening of its strategic
relations with the USA, and, which is the most important, worsening
of the Turkish-Israeli relations, testify to a new direction in the
Turkish policy. That is, aspiration for more independence. The same
concerns Russia. Moscow tries to use the privileges gained during
the last years due to high prices for oil not only in the economic
sphere, but also to make it a certain strategic unit. Thus, the two
super powers dissatisfied with their role in the world try to find
their new place, a new niche in the world policy. In this background,
rapprochement of Russia and Turkey is possible not only in economy, but
also at a strategic level. The declaration on the results of Putin's
visit to Ankara contained such a concept as multilateral cooperation
for the first time. In the course of Erdogan's last visit to Moscow,
the strategic cooperation was already in question, though it was not
put on paper. Meanwhile, the term "multilateral cooperation" was not
only fixed, but also was perceived and presented by the parties to
the world as a new degree in the bilateral relations. It is necessary
to pay attention to another circumstance. Putin stated in Astana
that quite unexpectedly for him Turkey had displayed an interest in
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Kazakhstan, China, Kirgizistan,
Russia and Uzbekistan are included in SCO - ed.). The Shanghai six
is known to try to lay a foundation of a new union of states, which
will play a considerable role in that region in future, as SCO leaders
think. Russia and China are mainly in question. The fact that Turkey
has displayed an interest in SCO is an evidence of rather serious
changes in the foreign policy of that country. In this connection,
it is necessary to mention the concept presented by Erdogan's adviser
for foreign policy, Professor Ahmet Davutoglu in his book entitled
"Strategic Depth" in 2000. The term strategic depth itself belongs
to military science and characterizes an interest of a country that
its strategic facilities are in the depth inaccessible for a possible
rival. However, during the last decades, several states, in particular,
Pakistan, Israel, applied the given concept to general political and
strategic issues. It was just in this light that Professor Davutoglu
tried to apply the given concept to Turkey perceiving the strategic
depth not only in the spatial, but also historical expression. He
speaks of Turkey like a country having a historical depth and
entering the 20th century alongside with seven empires controlling
over the big regions in the world. At the same time, he draws a
conclusion that Turkey must play a great role in the world arena
and it must not be treated as a small European country. According to
the concept, all the territories once included in the Ottoman Empire
are strategically important territories for present day Turkey and
it must play a special role there. In the special expression, the
strategic depth is interpreted by Davutoglu as establishment of not
only good-neighbored relations with the direct neighbors of Turkey,
but also an aspiration that these states enclose the greatest part
of their policy in Turkey. For example, for Georgia and Bulgaria
cooperate through Turkey. In this connection, Davutoglu is perceived
in Turkey as a supporter of neo-Ottomanism.
Giving an analysis to the Party Justice and Development (PJD)
ruling in Turkey, we arrive to a conclusion that it tried to put the
aforementioned concept into practice. Today Turkey exerts great efforts
to improve the relations with its neighbors. For example, at the end
of the 20th century, Turkey was in disagreeable relations almost with
all its neighbors, both in the Arab world and in the Caucasus and with
Iran. The picture is different at present. One should not ignore the
Eurasian subject matter either. The program of the PJD mentions the
Eurasian subject matter as well. An agreement of cooperation in Eurasia
was signed between Turkey and Russia in New York in 2001. According
to this document, task groups at a high level were formed, which
would coordinate the policy of the two countries in the Eurasian
space. Despite the fact that these groups gathered some three of four
times in that period of time, the attempt to coordinate geo-strategies
between Turkey and Russia in the Eurasian space testifies much.
As a result, if one studies the conceptual basis of the existing
Russian-Turkish relations, the following two concepts go into it:
strategic depth and Eurasian subjects. In this aspect, the existing
trends can be characterized as an aspiration of the two regional
super powers to deaden regional cooperation, which, of course, still
remains, to strengthen economic cooperation and gradually begin to
solve geo-strategic tasks.
Let us suppose that Russia and Turkey are dissatisfied with their
positions in the world arena and try to coordinate their acts to
increase their rating. How will the USA and Europe response to it? It
is right to consider the rapprochement with Russia an alternative
for Turkey in the issue of joining the EU, taking into account the
tension in the relations of Russia with the EU?
I shall start with the last question. In the course of his visit
to Ankara, Putin, in particular, said the following: you needn't
admission to the European Union; you'd better deepen the cooperation
with us. If Turkey becomes a EU-member, it will be more difficult for
it to cooperate with Russia. It was in early December. By the way,
these words of Putin arouse a negative response of Turkey. However,
already on December 17, the situation changed. In the course of
Erdogan's visit to Moscow, Putin made a cardinally opposite statement
coming to the following: it is very good that the EU has made a
right decision and Turkey will be admitted to the EU. As a result,
our cooperation will even more strengthen.
There are rather influential forces in Turkish elite, which thinks
about the following: Europe is a good think, indeed, and we should
become part of it, but to be respected, we must have a reliable and
influential rear. And the greater is the influence outside the EU,
the more influence we shall gain inside it. Thus, Turkey, of course,
will do everything to use the privileges gained during the last
two-three years in the aspect of the increase in its influence and
reputation in the eyes of Europeans, including though development of
relations with Russia. It is the meaning of a group.
These is also a pro-American group sure that Turkey should aspire for
maintenance of special relations with the USA, and that aspiration
for the EU and the relations with Russia are of secondary importance,
in the given case. At present, this group is ousted from big politics,
but it is still very strong. The Eurasian group, which is marginal,
belongs to the third wing. It is for the necessity of deepening
relations with Iran, as well as with Russia and China, including,
within the frameworks of SCO.
As regards the top ruling over Turkey at present, one should not
forget that these people belong to the traditional Turkish elite.
There is a very interesting opinion that today Turkey is coming back
to the very natural appearance it must be in. It is connected with the
fact that the ruling party expresses the aspirations and interests
of the greatest part of the population unlike all the other Turkish
rulers, starting from Young Turks, who implanted definite concepts
contradicting to the Turkish mentality. In this aspect, the greatest
part of the Turkish elite does not perceive seriously the people
who are in power at present. The first think that Turkey must not
exceed the frameworks of the traditional policy, as it is stronger
in an alliance with the USA. Thus, anti-Americanism in Turkey cannot
bring any considerable political dividends, though, at the same time,
the country itself is one of the most anti-American ones, as to
public sentiments, leaving behind the same Iran. It is this public
anti-Americanism that is used by the PJD ruling in Turkey. They play
on it and it is part of their very big internal popularity.
What do you think of Moscow's position on the Cyprus problem,
especially in the light of the failure of UN Secretary General's plan?
After the Turkish part of Cyprus voted for Kofi Annan's plan,
Vladimir Putin stated that it is absolutely senseless and foul to
continue isolating the Turkish part of Cyprus. Of course, Turks were
pleasantly surprised with the words of the Russian President. Judging
by the official reaction of the Greek and Cyprian parties, they have
seen no real sign of a change in Moscow's policy in this issue yet.
The EU is known to prepare for presentation of a new plan of resolution
to Cyprian problem, however, as I know, Russia is for Annan's plan
and it will not support that of the EU. I think, the fact that Turks
provided Russia with an opportunity to occur in the internal gas,
oil and now energy markets of Turkey played a definite role here. The
privatization of Turkish energy distribution networks is in process,
with Russia displaying an interest in it. Besides, a possibility of
laying electricity transmission lines along the bottom of Black Sea
is currently under consideration. It is most probably that Russia
also gave its agreement on the construction and even financing of
the Trans-Thracian oil pipeline. Construction of a gas terminal in
the port Ceyhan is supposed to become the largest Russian investment
program abroad, though no official announcements have been made in
this connection.
It is necessary to assess as another factor that 40,000-strong Turkish
army is dislocated in Cyprus, which is favorable for the USA as Cyprus
is close to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and, which is the most important,
to Ceyhan. Factually, in the strategic aspect, Cyprus protects Ceyhan,
i.e. the uninterrupted supply of oil from Ceyhan terminal. Americans
plan to construct a military base in Cyprus, where they have a tracking
base, which is the largest in the Middle East controlling over the
South Caucasus, Middle East and Arab states. As regards Europe, it is
also favorable for it that Cyprus be restored as a united state. If
Annan's plan were accepted, Europe would have to allocate over $20
billion for its implementation.
Still, how real is Turkey's full membership at the EU? Whether Europe's
response will be in favor of Ankara in this connection?
I do not think the prospect of a positive response so simple. Turkey
may receive a negative answer as well. In my opinion, the European
public is not satisfied with the decision to start talks for Turkey's
admission to the EU adopted on December 17. In their turn, France and
Austria stated that they would announce a referendum on the given
issue. Meanwhile, it is a factual rejection to Ankara taking into
account the existing realities. Evidently, there is a great field for
bargaining here and the result will depend on Turkey's state. Let's
think of the issue seriously. Europe feels no need in Turkey. Just one
geo-political factor can be a clear answer to it - EU with Turkey is
one thing, while EU without Turkey is quite another. On the other hand,
I have grounds to suppose that Armenia will become a EU member-state
sooner than Turkey.
In the course of Russian-Turkish negotiations in Moscow, the issues of
the Armenian agenda, including Karabakh problem and the blockade of the
Armenian-Turkish boundary, were also in question. What do you think,
whether the rapprochement of Russia and Turkey is able to influence
the position of the Russian party on the Karabakh problem or become
a reason for an unfavorable shuffle of the Armenian cards?
Before answering the question, I'd like to draw your attention to
data of a survey carried out by the Russian Center for Public Opinion
Studies (VCIOM) on the attitude of Russians to Turkey. According to
these data, 71% of Russians display a positive attitude to Turkey,
51% consider it a reliable trade-and-economic partner, and 16% think
it a fraternal country. The Gallop International in Georgia asked a
similar question. The following data were fixed: only 7% of Georgians
consider Turkey a reliable partner, another 13% see some danger in
that country. To compare, only 3% of Russians think that Turkey is
an enemy country and a probable rival.
Deepening of political cooperation of Russia with Turkey is in the
background of a factual closure of Turkey's approach to the South
Caucasus. I think the spring of 2002 a crucial point in this respect.
Then Americans made a decision to dispatch a limited contingent
of military instructors to Georgia. As I know, dispatch of Turkish
specialists to Georgia was considered initially. However, in future,
Washington refused from that idea. Probably, Turkey's role as a junior
partner, assistance of the USA in its expansion to the South Caucasus,
is brought to the minimum at present. Though, we mechanically keep
considering Turkey the major guide of US policy. It is not so. I
think, establishment of new type mobile bases of the USA in Georgia
is a question of time, but probably it will happen in Azerbaijan at
first. So, in this respect, in the Caucasus, Turkey is no longer
dangerous for Russia. That is, the Caucasus, which was an apple
of discord for the two empires for centuries, is no longer the
same. It should be noted that at the beginning of the last century,
the Caucasus was divided between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey,
in the first half of 90s when Russia's withdrawal resulted in vacuum
in the Caucasus, Turkey tried to fill that vacuum. Then Russia began
returning and Turkey withdrawing again. But, then occurred the USA,
which neglected both Russia and Turkey in the same way and acted
as it thought fit. Hence, the geo-political rivalry of Russia and
Turkey in the Caucasus has been brought to the minimum, which made
their deeper cooperation possible, on the whole. In this background,
of course, the Turkish party each time raises an issue to Moscow
concerning the pressure on its ally, Armenia, to make it release
the territories. Turkey raised this issue in the course of Putin's
visits to Ankara and to Moscow recently. However, to all appearances,
Russia each time rejects it. Speaking at a press conference, Putin
stated rather exactly that Russia had no intention to exert pressure
on any country; it would limit itself with the role of a mediator
and a guarantor of fulfillment of the agreements to be signed by the
parties. Sergey Ivanov stated almost the same in the USA. That is,
I do not share the concerns of definite political circles of Armenia
that Russia will expert pressure on us in the issue of Karabakh in
favor of Turkey. There are no real grounds for it. Russia and Turkey
have many other spheres to go on compromises. But, I repeat, at the
present level of Russia-Turkey and Russia-Armenia relations a pressure
on Yerevan on Karabakh problem is ruled out.
Is it possible that Moscow exerts pressure both on Armenia and
Azerbaijan demanding resolution of the issue in the nearest future?
Turkey is not a country able to affect the process of Karabakh
conflict's resolution within the framework of OSCE Minsk Group. It
can influence the process as it did one or two times torpedoing almost
ready agreements in 90s using all its influence on Azerbaijan. At the
given stage, Turkey is unable to influence Russia in order that it,
in its turn, influences Armenia. Moscow will not go on it.
A decision to start negotiations with Turkey for its admission to the
EU was made on December 17. Naturally, the process will last long.
What do you think, how heavy factor of pressure on Turkey by Europe
can become the Armenian Clause?
At first, Armenia does not perceive adequately what has happened. The
Armenian Clause is included into the agenda of the big European
politics. That is, it has happened what Armenians aspired for
decades. It is a fact, which Armenia is not fully aware of. By the
way, it does not mean that this issue cannot be in the same agenda.
Yet at the beginning of the last year, Chirac said although the fact
of the Genocide was adopted by the French Parliament, the issue of
recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey must be solved by
Ankara and Yerevan; but, everything changed by the end of the year.
It was not only Chirac that pointed out the necessity of raising the
issue of recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey, but also one
of the leading politicians N. Sarkozy and Foreign Minister M. Barnier.
One should not forget that Armenia is a sovereign state, which is
able to play a definite role and does it. At the same time, for me
personally, dividends can be exclusively moral. Recognition of the
Genocide by Turkey is my duty to the annihilated generations. What is
the policy of the European Union? These are political decisions adopted
by bureaucratic structures of the EU and the EU member-states. However,
not only pragmatic calculations and political interests, but also
public opinion influence the adoption of these decisions. It is a
very strong resource of influence on the policy of the EU in the
Armenian Clause. I think Armenia does not use it fully. I think
diplomacy is diplomacy, but the public resource must be used.
Today Turkey exerts great efforts to protect its interests in the
issue of Genocide. At the end of December, the Foreign Minister of
Turkey, Abdullah Gul, met MPs and stated, in particular, the following:
the issue of admission to the EU comes to that of recognition of the
Armenian Genocide. That is, as to the remaining issues, compromises
can be found. Meanwhile, there is no compromise in the issue of the
Genocide, either Turkey recognizes it or not. I think Europe will be
adherent in this issue. Meanwhile, one should not hope for Diaspora,
but to express its position exactly and insist on it.
What do you think, whether the crisis in the American-Turkish relations
is able to lead to recognition of the Armenian Genocide by Turkey,
taking into account Washington's statements that Turkey should not
forget about the events of the beginning of the last century when
raising the issue of Kirkuk? It is necessary to mention that 30 States
have recognized the Armenian Genocide.
The Armenian Diaspora of the USA has rather wide lobbying activities.
However, I think that it made a very big fault. In the course of the
last presidential election in the USA, it supported John Kerry only
and has practically broken its ties with Republicans unlike the first
elections. Definite attempts of diversifications are currently made,
however, the positions of the Armenian lobby in the USA have become
considerably weak. Even without taking it into account, I do not
think that the Republican Administration of the White House will go
on recognition of the Genocide. In my opinion, neo-conservatives just
dislike Armenians.
Today the Armenian public is concerned for the possibility of Armenia's
being bypassed by the new project to build a railroad connecting Turkey
with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Do you see any good grounds in the urges
for abandoning the idea of the Armenian Genocide recognition in order
to avoid the lot of a deadlock country for Armenia?
I don't accept such a formulation. There can be no 100% benefit or
detriment from one or another decision. As for concerns, they are
inspired by Turkey and come to one single formula - cooperation
or deadlock. Meanwhile, Armenia has a big advantage over the other
South Caucasian states. We have preserved our territorial integrity
unlike Georgia and Azerbaijan, which, according to the well-known
concept, is the first feature of a full-fledged state. Armenia has
been controlling big (in regional dimensions) territories for ten
years already managing in the meantime to enhance its economic growth.
These two factors alone show that Armenia cannot be a deadlock
country. On the contrary, today we are the dominating center of
this geo-political area and being in the center both geographically
and geo-politically one cannot simply get in a deadlock. This is an
axiom. Of course, Turkey and Azerbaijan may want to bypass Armenia.
But I don't think that Georgia might want the same. The real actors on
the global arena, such as the US and Russia, will nonetheless be guided
by geo-political ends in the first place. It's not a coincidence that
Armenia has been officially included in the "North-South" international
transport corridor. As for the above-mentioned Kars (Turkey)-Akhalkaki
(Georgia) railroad, this idea was first expressed by Shevardnadze while
Saakashvili signed the agreement already. As you may know Saakashvili
has an idée fix to make Batumi a big transport center with an airport
of international importance. To have a free hand he needs to connect
Batumi with Kars - this project is part of his plan. In any case,
I don't see any big threat for Armenia - if the South Caucasian
borders are opened we will be able to join this road at any moment.
The interview was originally conducted by the Regnum News Agency and
provided to the Global Politician by Prof. Safrastyan.
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