Tweet
Zero-Sum Game on the Caspian
Moscow Times
Thursday, April 28, 2005. Issue 3156. Page 8.
By Taleh Ziyadov
A possible deployment of American troops to Azerbaijan has been a
topic of contention for years, not only between Baku and Moscow, but
also between Russia and the United States. Journalists took up the
subject again after an unexpected visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld to Baku on April 12. Although the parties have not
revealed the content of their discussion, the Azeri and Russian media
have claimed that the United States is getting ready to send American
troops to Azerbaijan.
The potential deployment of American troops to Azerbaijan is not a new
idea. Since September 11, 2001, as a part of the war against
terrorism, the US has increased its attention to the region and
indicated that it would strengthen its presence in the Caspian
Basin. In particular, the South Caucasus became a geopolitical
battlefield for the United States and other regional powers that seek
to expand their influence. This resulted in the formation of
quasi-alliances between states, such as Armenia-Iran-Russia and
Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey. Moreover, the close proximity of
Azerbaijan and Georgia to Iran and other parts of the Middle East, as
well as ongoing major energy projects in the region, contributed to
the increased strategic importance of the South Caucasus to U.S.
national security.
When it came to stationing American troops in the region, Azerbaijan
has acted cautiously to avoid offending its northern and southern
neighbors. It tried to downplay reports about U.S. long-term
objectives in Azerbaijan and has committed itself to a balanced
foreign policy.
Over the past few years, however, analysts, military experts and
ordinary citizens have voiced different opinions on the issue of
American troops on Azerbaijani soil. Some have been critical of the
idea, saying it will jeopardize Azerbaijan's relations with Russia and
Iran, while others, mostly in Azerbaijan, have supported it, arguing
that this will secure Azerbaijan's strategic and military position in
the region and help to strengthen its independent development.
Those who have argued against it -- even against the idea of temporary
rapid deployment forces -- have claimed that an American presence in
the South Caucasus will undermine Russia's strategic role in the
region and will make its "southern tier" more vulnerable to external
threats. According to this argument, the main "external threat" in
this case is the United States itself. Indeed, the root of this
argument lies in the all-or-nothing approach that some in Russia still
hold with respect to the region, which they often call Russia's "near
abroad." It also raises questions about Russia's current strategic
role in the South Caucasus. How much influence does Russia have in the
region, and how long it is likely to last? Is there any way Russia
could preserve its strategic interests in the region with an American
military presence? Or is it simply not an option for Russia's
advocates of an all-or-nothing view of the situation?
The more hard-line Russia's position becomes, the more difficult it is
for Moscow to accept subsequent setbacks. For example, despite
Russia's strong opposition to NATO's expansion in the 1990s, NATO
completed several successful rounds of enlargement, the last of which
included the three former Soviet Republics of Latvia, Lithuania and
Estonia. While there is no question that NATO's expansion has affected
Russia's position in Central and Eastern Europe, it is actually the EU
enlargement that has dealt a greater blow to Russia's economic
interests in Europe. However, the real question is what would have
been different had NATO not expanded? Would Moscow's role and its
influence in Central and Eastern Europe be stronger than it is today?
Perhaps, but with or without NATO, Russia could not have altered the
continuing global trends that even today work against its geopolitical
position in the South Caucasus.
The emotional and sometimes unreasonable arguments made by Russia's
hardliners undermine the country's real strategic interests in the
CIS, especially in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Azerbaijan and Russia have
shared a common history for more than 200 years and managed to coexist
peacefully since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite periodic
tensions during the Yeltsin era, the two states have normalized and
improved their relations since President Vladimir Putin came to office
in 2000. Moscow's fear that Azerbaijan would turn its back on Russia,
as the Baltic States did in the early 1990s, has proven to be
unjustified. There are nearly 2 million ethnic Azeris living in
Russia, and Russian is one of the most widely spoken languages in
Azerbaijan. In short, Azerbaijan and Russia are neighbors and will
have to live side by side no matter what.
American and Russian military bases are already operating in
Kyrgyzstan, and American military instructors are present in Georgia
and Uzbekistan. The deployment of U.S. rapid forces to Azerbaijan or
even the eventual accession of Azerbaijan into NATO should not be
viewed as an end to the Azerbaijan-Russian partnership. Baku and
Moscow share social, political and economic interests that will
continue to develop as long as their national interests are mutually
respected. However, it is important to note that Azerbaijan's balanced
and pro-Western orientation is not likely to change.
Thus, Russia would gain more if it re-evaluates its position in the
CIS and overcomes its decade old phobia of encirclement. With this
mentality, more setbacks and disappointments are unavoidable.
Instead of continuing to play a zero-sum game, it would be better for
Russian policy makers to develop a clear-cut strategy in which there
is common ground for cooperation, not conflict. Today, Moscow and
Washington are far from effective collaboration and if current trends
continue, their interests will not coincide anytime in the near
future.
Taleh Ziyadov is a graduate fellow at the Center for Eurasian, Russian
and East European Studies at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service. He contributed this comment to The Moscow
Times.
Moscow Times
Thursday, April 28, 2005. Issue 3156. Page 8.
By Taleh Ziyadov
A possible deployment of American troops to Azerbaijan has been a
topic of contention for years, not only between Baku and Moscow, but
also between Russia and the United States. Journalists took up the
subject again after an unexpected visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld to Baku on April 12. Although the parties have not
revealed the content of their discussion, the Azeri and Russian media
have claimed that the United States is getting ready to send American
troops to Azerbaijan.
The potential deployment of American troops to Azerbaijan is not a new
idea. Since September 11, 2001, as a part of the war against
terrorism, the US has increased its attention to the region and
indicated that it would strengthen its presence in the Caspian
Basin. In particular, the South Caucasus became a geopolitical
battlefield for the United States and other regional powers that seek
to expand their influence. This resulted in the formation of
quasi-alliances between states, such as Armenia-Iran-Russia and
Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey. Moreover, the close proximity of
Azerbaijan and Georgia to Iran and other parts of the Middle East, as
well as ongoing major energy projects in the region, contributed to
the increased strategic importance of the South Caucasus to U.S.
national security.
When it came to stationing American troops in the region, Azerbaijan
has acted cautiously to avoid offending its northern and southern
neighbors. It tried to downplay reports about U.S. long-term
objectives in Azerbaijan and has committed itself to a balanced
foreign policy.
Over the past few years, however, analysts, military experts and
ordinary citizens have voiced different opinions on the issue of
American troops on Azerbaijani soil. Some have been critical of the
idea, saying it will jeopardize Azerbaijan's relations with Russia and
Iran, while others, mostly in Azerbaijan, have supported it, arguing
that this will secure Azerbaijan's strategic and military position in
the region and help to strengthen its independent development.
Those who have argued against it -- even against the idea of temporary
rapid deployment forces -- have claimed that an American presence in
the South Caucasus will undermine Russia's strategic role in the
region and will make its "southern tier" more vulnerable to external
threats. According to this argument, the main "external threat" in
this case is the United States itself. Indeed, the root of this
argument lies in the all-or-nothing approach that some in Russia still
hold with respect to the region, which they often call Russia's "near
abroad." It also raises questions about Russia's current strategic
role in the South Caucasus. How much influence does Russia have in the
region, and how long it is likely to last? Is there any way Russia
could preserve its strategic interests in the region with an American
military presence? Or is it simply not an option for Russia's
advocates of an all-or-nothing view of the situation?
The more hard-line Russia's position becomes, the more difficult it is
for Moscow to accept subsequent setbacks. For example, despite
Russia's strong opposition to NATO's expansion in the 1990s, NATO
completed several successful rounds of enlargement, the last of which
included the three former Soviet Republics of Latvia, Lithuania and
Estonia. While there is no question that NATO's expansion has affected
Russia's position in Central and Eastern Europe, it is actually the EU
enlargement that has dealt a greater blow to Russia's economic
interests in Europe. However, the real question is what would have
been different had NATO not expanded? Would Moscow's role and its
influence in Central and Eastern Europe be stronger than it is today?
Perhaps, but with or without NATO, Russia could not have altered the
continuing global trends that even today work against its geopolitical
position in the South Caucasus.
The emotional and sometimes unreasonable arguments made by Russia's
hardliners undermine the country's real strategic interests in the
CIS, especially in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Azerbaijan and Russia have
shared a common history for more than 200 years and managed to coexist
peacefully since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite periodic
tensions during the Yeltsin era, the two states have normalized and
improved their relations since President Vladimir Putin came to office
in 2000. Moscow's fear that Azerbaijan would turn its back on Russia,
as the Baltic States did in the early 1990s, has proven to be
unjustified. There are nearly 2 million ethnic Azeris living in
Russia, and Russian is one of the most widely spoken languages in
Azerbaijan. In short, Azerbaijan and Russia are neighbors and will
have to live side by side no matter what.
American and Russian military bases are already operating in
Kyrgyzstan, and American military instructors are present in Georgia
and Uzbekistan. The deployment of U.S. rapid forces to Azerbaijan or
even the eventual accession of Azerbaijan into NATO should not be
viewed as an end to the Azerbaijan-Russian partnership. Baku and
Moscow share social, political and economic interests that will
continue to develop as long as their national interests are mutually
respected. However, it is important to note that Azerbaijan's balanced
and pro-Western orientation is not likely to change.
Thus, Russia would gain more if it re-evaluates its position in the
CIS and overcomes its decade old phobia of encirclement. With this
mentality, more setbacks and disappointments are unavoidable.
Instead of continuing to play a zero-sum game, it would be better for
Russian policy makers to develop a clear-cut strategy in which there
is common ground for cooperation, not conflict. Today, Moscow and
Washington are far from effective collaboration and if current trends
continue, their interests will not coincide anytime in the near
future.
Taleh Ziyadov is a graduate fellow at the Center for Eurasian, Russian
and East European Studies at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service. He contributed this comment to The Moscow
Times.