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Eurasianet Organization
August 8, 2005
RUSSIA AND TURKEY FORGE NEW TIES ON SECURITY, TRADE
by Igor Torbakov
Turkish Prime-Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's recent talks with
Russian President Vladimir Putin suggest that the two Eurasian
countries have found common ground on a number of key regional
security issues.
`It's our fourth meeting during the last seven months, and I guess,
all of you understand what it means,' Erdogan said at a news
conference following the July 17-18 negotiations at Putin's posh
summer residence in the Russian Black Sea resort town of Sochi. `Our
views totally coincide with regard to the situation in the region as
well as to the issues concerning the preservation of stability in the
world,' Interfax news agency quoted Erdogan as saying.
The current Russian-Turkish encounter came after the Kremlin leader's
official visit to Ankara in December 2004 and Erdogan's trip to
Moscow in January 2005. Last May the Turkish prime minister also
attended festivities in the Russian capital commemorating the 60th
anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II.
Such a sharp increase in top-level contacts appears to be the result
of both countries' wariness toward political turbulence in their
overlapping `near abroads' - specifically, in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia, the regional analysts say.
Both Moscow and Ankara are closely following the geopolitical changes
that are taking place in post-Soviet Eurasia - in particular, those
brought about by the so called `color revolutions.' In the South
Caucasus, the `frozen conflicts' between Tbilisi and the breakaway
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the stalemate between
Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh drive these mutual
concerns.
In public, both Russian and Turkish leaders have stressed their
commitment to the peaceful settlement of the inter-ethnic conflicts
in the Caucasus. However, a number of Turkish and Russian experts
argue that Ankara and Moscow seem reluctant to embrace political
changes in the Commonwealth of Independent States' southern tier and
would rather support the preservation of the status quo.
Even before the Putin-Erdogan meeting in Sochi, some regional
analysts suggested there might be joint Russian-Turkish attempts to
solve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. As Armenia's main
geopolitical ally, Russia can be expected to mediate between Turkey
and Armenia on a number of issues, they say.
Russian media reports confirmed that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was
discussed during the Russian-Turkish talks. The Russian government
newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta reported on July 19 that Moscow had
expressed its readiness to pursue the settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh
`more actively,' and that Ankara had agreed to cooperate on this
issue. Furthermore, according to some Russian and Azerbaijani
sources, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul, who made an official
visit to Baku on July 18-21, hinted that Ankara is interested in
normalization of relations with Yerevan and discussed with
Azerbaijani leadership the prospects of Turkey's participation in the
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
At the same time, Turkey appears keen to act as a mediator in the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Turkey is home to a sizeable Abkhazian
community, and Ankara has established friendly ties both with Moscow
and Tbilisi, some Turkish commentators note.
`We don't want to live in a world where enmity dominates; we need a
world where friendship reigns supreme,' Erdogan said in Sochi,
referring to the urgent need to settle the South Caucasus's
conflicts.
Both leaders, however, appear to share a strong apprehension
regarding potential political upheavals on post-Soviet territory.
While both Moscow and Ankara understand fully that a huge potential
exists for political change in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the
Putin administration and Erdogan government are unlikely to welcome
the revolutionary transformation of the authoritarian regimes in the
region, some Turkish analysts contend.
Azerbaijan's November 2005 parliamentary elections are a case in
point, noted Suat Kiniklioglu, head of the Turkish office of the
German Marshall Fund of the United States. For Russia, securing
stability in this energy-rich Caspian state is important within the
framework of the Kremlin's strategy of preserving its influence in
the Caucasus, Kiniklioglu said. But Turkey, too, wants to see
Azerbaijan stable, and keep secure the delivery of crude oil via the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan export pipeline, he said in an interview with the
Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper.
Similarly, in Central Asia, Turkey and Russia seek to maintain the
geopolitical status quo. According to Kiniklioglu, both the Turks and
the Russians would prefer to deal with the likes of Uzbek President
Islam Karimov and other autocratic regional leaders than face the
uncertainty of revolutionary turmoil. A number of Turkish foreign
policy experts suggest that Ankara's strategic perspective on Central
Asia is much closer to the Russian position than to that of the
United States. `Neither Moscow nor Ankara is happy to see US forces
in the region,' wrote analyst Semih Idiz in the mass circulation
Milliyet daily.
The talk of shared security interests extends to economic issues,
too. Bilateral trade and energy issues figured prominently during the
Sochi meeting. The two leaders said they aim to raise the trade
volume between the two countries to $25 billion from the current $11
billion.
The Russian president signaled that Russia would like to increase
energy exports to Turkey. Putin set out plans for new gas pipelines
through Turkey to supply southern European markets and also raised
the possibility of electric power exports to Turkey and Iraq. Erdogan
appeared to welcome Moscow's intention to boost gas supplies to
Turkey. `There is serious potential for increasing supplies through
the Blue Stream pipeline,' the Turkish prime minister said. According
to Erdogan, the pipeline has a capacity of 16 billion cubic meters
per year, but current supplies amount to only 4.7 billion cubic
meters. The 1, 213-kilometer Blue Stream gas pipeline under the Black
Sea was completed in 2002, but has since been a source of dispute
between Russia and Turkey over gas prices.
Most Russian and Turkish commentators give a very positive overall
assessment of the Putin-Erdogan meeting's outcome. The rapid
rapprochement between the two Eurasian powers could serve as useful
leverage for boosting each country's geopolitical stature, they
argue.
The strengthening of cooperation between Russia and Turkey `adds
significantly to our country's international prestige,' noted one
Russian commentary posted on the Politcom.ru website. Many Turkish
experts seem to agree. Argued Milliyet foreign policy columnist Idiz:
`It may be an exaggeration to call our bilateral relations `strategic
partnership,' but Turkish-Russian relations have already grown in
importance to the extent that they affect the entire region.'
NOTES: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher who
specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History from
Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of
Sciences. He was Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian
History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; a Visiting Scholar at
the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Washington DC; a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University,
New York; and a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University. He is now
based in Istanbul, Turkey.
August 8, 2005
RUSSIA AND TURKEY FORGE NEW TIES ON SECURITY, TRADE
by Igor Torbakov
Turkish Prime-Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's recent talks with
Russian President Vladimir Putin suggest that the two Eurasian
countries have found common ground on a number of key regional
security issues.
`It's our fourth meeting during the last seven months, and I guess,
all of you understand what it means,' Erdogan said at a news
conference following the July 17-18 negotiations at Putin's posh
summer residence in the Russian Black Sea resort town of Sochi. `Our
views totally coincide with regard to the situation in the region as
well as to the issues concerning the preservation of stability in the
world,' Interfax news agency quoted Erdogan as saying.
The current Russian-Turkish encounter came after the Kremlin leader's
official visit to Ankara in December 2004 and Erdogan's trip to
Moscow in January 2005. Last May the Turkish prime minister also
attended festivities in the Russian capital commemorating the 60th
anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II.
Such a sharp increase in top-level contacts appears to be the result
of both countries' wariness toward political turbulence in their
overlapping `near abroads' - specifically, in the South Caucasus and
Central Asia, the regional analysts say.
Both Moscow and Ankara are closely following the geopolitical changes
that are taking place in post-Soviet Eurasia - in particular, those
brought about by the so called `color revolutions.' In the South
Caucasus, the `frozen conflicts' between Tbilisi and the breakaway
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the stalemate between
Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh drive these mutual
concerns.
In public, both Russian and Turkish leaders have stressed their
commitment to the peaceful settlement of the inter-ethnic conflicts
in the Caucasus. However, a number of Turkish and Russian experts
argue that Ankara and Moscow seem reluctant to embrace political
changes in the Commonwealth of Independent States' southern tier and
would rather support the preservation of the status quo.
Even before the Putin-Erdogan meeting in Sochi, some regional
analysts suggested there might be joint Russian-Turkish attempts to
solve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. As Armenia's main
geopolitical ally, Russia can be expected to mediate between Turkey
and Armenia on a number of issues, they say.
Russian media reports confirmed that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was
discussed during the Russian-Turkish talks. The Russian government
newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta reported on July 19 that Moscow had
expressed its readiness to pursue the settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh
`more actively,' and that Ankara had agreed to cooperate on this
issue. Furthermore, according to some Russian and Azerbaijani
sources, Turkish Defense Minister Vecdi Gonul, who made an official
visit to Baku on July 18-21, hinted that Ankara is interested in
normalization of relations with Yerevan and discussed with
Azerbaijani leadership the prospects of Turkey's participation in the
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
At the same time, Turkey appears keen to act as a mediator in the
Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. Turkey is home to a sizeable Abkhazian
community, and Ankara has established friendly ties both with Moscow
and Tbilisi, some Turkish commentators note.
`We don't want to live in a world where enmity dominates; we need a
world where friendship reigns supreme,' Erdogan said in Sochi,
referring to the urgent need to settle the South Caucasus's
conflicts.
Both leaders, however, appear to share a strong apprehension
regarding potential political upheavals on post-Soviet territory.
While both Moscow and Ankara understand fully that a huge potential
exists for political change in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the
Putin administration and Erdogan government are unlikely to welcome
the revolutionary transformation of the authoritarian regimes in the
region, some Turkish analysts contend.
Azerbaijan's November 2005 parliamentary elections are a case in
point, noted Suat Kiniklioglu, head of the Turkish office of the
German Marshall Fund of the United States. For Russia, securing
stability in this energy-rich Caspian state is important within the
framework of the Kremlin's strategy of preserving its influence in
the Caucasus, Kiniklioglu said. But Turkey, too, wants to see
Azerbaijan stable, and keep secure the delivery of crude oil via the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan export pipeline, he said in an interview with the
Russian Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper.
Similarly, in Central Asia, Turkey and Russia seek to maintain the
geopolitical status quo. According to Kiniklioglu, both the Turks and
the Russians would prefer to deal with the likes of Uzbek President
Islam Karimov and other autocratic regional leaders than face the
uncertainty of revolutionary turmoil. A number of Turkish foreign
policy experts suggest that Ankara's strategic perspective on Central
Asia is much closer to the Russian position than to that of the
United States. `Neither Moscow nor Ankara is happy to see US forces
in the region,' wrote analyst Semih Idiz in the mass circulation
Milliyet daily.
The talk of shared security interests extends to economic issues,
too. Bilateral trade and energy issues figured prominently during the
Sochi meeting. The two leaders said they aim to raise the trade
volume between the two countries to $25 billion from the current $11
billion.
The Russian president signaled that Russia would like to increase
energy exports to Turkey. Putin set out plans for new gas pipelines
through Turkey to supply southern European markets and also raised
the possibility of electric power exports to Turkey and Iraq. Erdogan
appeared to welcome Moscow's intention to boost gas supplies to
Turkey. `There is serious potential for increasing supplies through
the Blue Stream pipeline,' the Turkish prime minister said. According
to Erdogan, the pipeline has a capacity of 16 billion cubic meters
per year, but current supplies amount to only 4.7 billion cubic
meters. The 1, 213-kilometer Blue Stream gas pipeline under the Black
Sea was completed in 2002, but has since been a source of dispute
between Russia and Turkey over gas prices.
Most Russian and Turkish commentators give a very positive overall
assessment of the Putin-Erdogan meeting's outcome. The rapid
rapprochement between the two Eurasian powers could serve as useful
leverage for boosting each country's geopolitical stature, they
argue.
The strengthening of cooperation between Russia and Turkey `adds
significantly to our country's international prestige,' noted one
Russian commentary posted on the Politcom.ru website. Many Turkish
experts seem to agree. Argued Milliyet foreign policy columnist Idiz:
`It may be an exaggeration to call our bilateral relations `strategic
partnership,' but Turkish-Russian relations have already grown in
importance to the extent that they affect the entire region.'
NOTES: Igor Torbakov is a freelance journalist and researcher who
specializes in CIS political affairs. He holds an MA in History from
Moscow State University and a PhD from the Ukrainian Academy of
Sciences. He was Research Scholar at the Institute of Russian
History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow; a Visiting Scholar at
the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, Washington DC; a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University,
New York; and a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University. He is now
based in Istanbul, Turkey.