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Why Turkey is not in US plans
By Burak Bekdil
Kathimerini English Edition
Tuesday August 16, 2005
Ankara has little relevance within emerging energy map of world and
Washington's intentions to shape it
For over half a century the USA has deemed Turkey a staunch ally. The
end of the Cold War sealed the beginning of the end of the once-solid
alliance.
Since the start of the Iraq war, there has been every indication of
mutual mistrust, as well as a visible decay in bilateral ties.
It's perhaps too simplistic to blame the corrosion on Turkey's refusal
to allow US troops to use Turkish soil as a launch pad for an attack
against Iraq. There are broader, more realistic (and less sentimental)
reasons why Turkey does not appear in American plans for the future.
The USA today cannot get any reading on the position of Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's "unreadable" governance. They think the Turks
are keeping their cards "close to their chest." Then again, to the
Turks the United States appears to be an object of hysterical fear and
hatred when viewed from the other side of the Atlantic. The new fight,
disguised as efforts to promote democracy in non-democratic states,
will be for energy.
Although the USA would welcome it if Turkey decided to participate
in Washington's new war on terror at any level they wish, it is hard
to imagine, today, that the Americans want anything but amicable and
business-like relations with Turkey, and at a minimum.
According to well-informed US sources, Turkey has not exerted any
influence in Central Asia on behalf of the effort to support US
anti-terrorism operations and promote democratic reform. Turkey is
sympathetic to the Shanghai Group, which the US thinks solely exists
to advance Chinese and Russian interests against the allied efforts
to stabilize Central Asia.
There is much evidence that this seemingly new conceptual framework
for dealing with the Islamic fundamentalist movement will represent a
large change in how the US will do business around the world. There are
a number of important trends that must be combined into any foreign
policy strategy, and the new Pentagon formulation indicates a "sea
change" in US operations and incorporates these various trends.
The steady rise in energy prices is a trend that will probably continue
until most nations are flat on their backs. Oil should be at $70/bbl
by this winter. In 2006, one may look for prices in the $90 range,
and a deep worldwide depression should set in by 2008. The United
States is quite aware of this trend. Already, drastic conditions are
developing in numerous countries. Indonesia has a shortfall of 20
percent in oil usage which the US thinks is a disaster. The US is
having troubles on its southern border too.
Mounting pressure Mexico is a major source of oil for the US market
and has announced that its largest oil field, El Cantarell, has
reached its peak of production. That field accounts for 62 percent of
Mexican production and is now depleting at a rate of 14 percent per
year. Conservatively, the US absorbs approximately 3 million Mexican
refugees, and the pressure will probably increase.
The stability of China and its international intentions is a major
US preoccupation. Africa is collapsing, and the US intends to protect
the West African oil fields.
Europe, according to US sources, is disarming itself and is of little
to no use beyond its own borders. The US is currently withdrawing
the bulk of its armed forces back to US territory (two divisions are
returning from Germany, leaving only one brigade; three brigades are
returning from South Korea, and probably about 70-90,000 personnel
will withdraw from the Middle East by the end of 2006).
The era of the stabilizing influence of large numbers of US forces
stationed around the world is probably over. The USA is retrenching
and providing its main support to what it deems "reliable/democratic"
allies. And that would be Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
India and Israel. Otherwise, it is trying to reach out to nations
that wish to assist in anti-terrorist and stabilization efforts on
their own behalf. Turkey does not appear to be in either group.
Also, the US thinks certain places must be protected one way or another
without fail. These are the critical geopolitical pressure points:
that would be Egypt, the Malacca Strait, Panama, the Horn of Africa,
South Africa, US territorial waters and approaches.
Access to Middle Eastern oil is extremely important, but not as
important as one might expect. If it comes to priorities, says one
US expert, and it soon will, West Africa, Mexico, the North Sea,
Trinidad, Canada, Australia, and Japan are more important than what
the United States is doing in the Middle East today.
"Now," the expert says, "if we had reliable allies in Europe and
Turkey, things would look differently. That is not the case. So,
at some point, the problem will belong to Europe and Turkey without
major US participation. If you want oil and stability, you go get it."
He continues, "Frankly, with oil at $90-150 a barrel and even more,
Kurdish Iraq, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and the Azeris may be more important
than Turkey.
In a world of extremely high-priced oil and diminishing supplies,
who knows, even Turkey might find that its eastern provinces are a
bigger liability than they are worth."
All that should ring alarm bells in Ankara. It may, soon. But there
is little Turkey can do in an emerging energy map of the world and
US intentions to shape it - especially at a time when the Americans
think Turkey has been cast adrift by US policy.
By Burak Bekdil
Kathimerini English Edition
Tuesday August 16, 2005
Ankara has little relevance within emerging energy map of world and
Washington's intentions to shape it
For over half a century the USA has deemed Turkey a staunch ally. The
end of the Cold War sealed the beginning of the end of the once-solid
alliance.
Since the start of the Iraq war, there has been every indication of
mutual mistrust, as well as a visible decay in bilateral ties.
It's perhaps too simplistic to blame the corrosion on Turkey's refusal
to allow US troops to use Turkish soil as a launch pad for an attack
against Iraq. There are broader, more realistic (and less sentimental)
reasons why Turkey does not appear in American plans for the future.
The USA today cannot get any reading on the position of Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan's "unreadable" governance. They think the Turks
are keeping their cards "close to their chest." Then again, to the
Turks the United States appears to be an object of hysterical fear and
hatred when viewed from the other side of the Atlantic. The new fight,
disguised as efforts to promote democracy in non-democratic states,
will be for energy.
Although the USA would welcome it if Turkey decided to participate
in Washington's new war on terror at any level they wish, it is hard
to imagine, today, that the Americans want anything but amicable and
business-like relations with Turkey, and at a minimum.
According to well-informed US sources, Turkey has not exerted any
influence in Central Asia on behalf of the effort to support US
anti-terrorism operations and promote democratic reform. Turkey is
sympathetic to the Shanghai Group, which the US thinks solely exists
to advance Chinese and Russian interests against the allied efforts
to stabilize Central Asia.
There is much evidence that this seemingly new conceptual framework
for dealing with the Islamic fundamentalist movement will represent a
large change in how the US will do business around the world. There are
a number of important trends that must be combined into any foreign
policy strategy, and the new Pentagon formulation indicates a "sea
change" in US operations and incorporates these various trends.
The steady rise in energy prices is a trend that will probably continue
until most nations are flat on their backs. Oil should be at $70/bbl
by this winter. In 2006, one may look for prices in the $90 range,
and a deep worldwide depression should set in by 2008. The United
States is quite aware of this trend. Already, drastic conditions are
developing in numerous countries. Indonesia has a shortfall of 20
percent in oil usage which the US thinks is a disaster. The US is
having troubles on its southern border too.
Mounting pressure Mexico is a major source of oil for the US market
and has announced that its largest oil field, El Cantarell, has
reached its peak of production. That field accounts for 62 percent of
Mexican production and is now depleting at a rate of 14 percent per
year. Conservatively, the US absorbs approximately 3 million Mexican
refugees, and the pressure will probably increase.
The stability of China and its international intentions is a major
US preoccupation. Africa is collapsing, and the US intends to protect
the West African oil fields.
Europe, according to US sources, is disarming itself and is of little
to no use beyond its own borders. The US is currently withdrawing
the bulk of its armed forces back to US territory (two divisions are
returning from Germany, leaving only one brigade; three brigades are
returning from South Korea, and probably about 70-90,000 personnel
will withdraw from the Middle East by the end of 2006).
The era of the stabilizing influence of large numbers of US forces
stationed around the world is probably over. The USA is retrenching
and providing its main support to what it deems "reliable/democratic"
allies. And that would be Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
India and Israel. Otherwise, it is trying to reach out to nations
that wish to assist in anti-terrorist and stabilization efforts on
their own behalf. Turkey does not appear to be in either group.
Also, the US thinks certain places must be protected one way or another
without fail. These are the critical geopolitical pressure points:
that would be Egypt, the Malacca Strait, Panama, the Horn of Africa,
South Africa, US territorial waters and approaches.
Access to Middle Eastern oil is extremely important, but not as
important as one might expect. If it comes to priorities, says one
US expert, and it soon will, West Africa, Mexico, the North Sea,
Trinidad, Canada, Australia, and Japan are more important than what
the United States is doing in the Middle East today.
"Now," the expert says, "if we had reliable allies in Europe and
Turkey, things would look differently. That is not the case. So,
at some point, the problem will belong to Europe and Turkey without
major US participation. If you want oil and stability, you go get it."
He continues, "Frankly, with oil at $90-150 a barrel and even more,
Kurdish Iraq, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and the Azeris may be more important
than Turkey.
In a world of extremely high-priced oil and diminishing supplies,
who knows, even Turkey might find that its eastern provinces are a
bigger liability than they are worth."
All that should ring alarm bells in Ankara. It may, soon. But there
is little Turkey can do in an emerging energy map of the world and
US intentions to shape it - especially at a time when the Americans
think Turkey has been cast adrift by US policy.