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Caucaz.com, Georgia
Aug 18 2005
Is there a place for Islam in Michael Saakashvili's Christian Georgia?
[2/3] [INVESTIGATION]
By Bayram BALCI in Tbilisi, Batumi, Marneuli, Pankisi
On 18/08/2005
(Translated by Geraldine RING and Victoria BRYAN)
Second part: Georgian Azeris adopt a policy of openness towards Iran
There are 300,000 Georgian Azeris. Mainly living in Kvemo
Kartli, particularly in the towns of Bolnisi, Marneuli and
Dmanisi, they inhabit what is a highly strategic region on the
Armenian-Azerbaijan border. Situated today at the crossroads
of important hydrocarbon transportation axes on the Caspian Sea,
especially the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Kvemo Kartli has already
forgotten its peaceful existence during the Soviet era. In 1992-93,
it even witnessed several clashes between Armenians and Azeris,
as part of the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
© Bayram Balci (Marneuli)
The leaders of the community remain firm that the Azeri minority in
Georgia today has to face up to the new nationalistic policy adopted
by Tbilisi towards the non-Georgian population. In reality, Tbilisi
authorities, who were traumatised by the conflicts that broke out
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly those in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are inclined to consider the minorities
as an obstacle to national construction.
Georgian cultural policy in general suffers from the host/guest
dialectic. In reality, the government considers the Azeri minority as
guests being received by their Georgian hosts, and because of this
they are expected to conform to the way of living followed by the
Georgian majority.
This has the result that Georgian Azeris feel strongly marginalised
when in fact they aren't, especially with regard to the privatisation
of land, a process about which Azeris feel wronged.
Yet, because these Azeris live in the border zones, the land they
inhabit has not been privatised as Tbilisi authorities fear that
its occupation by a 'foreign minority' encourages this minority to
undertake separatist actions that pose a threat to the entire country.
Lack of religious guidance
This region, which for many years was part of the Iranian Safavid
Empire, was under the direct influence of Shiite Islam Imamism, the
official religion of the empire since the reign of Shah Esma'il. The
expansion of Safavid territory in the Caucasian region, under Shah
Abbas in the 17th century, led to the spread of Shiitism in the
region. Under the Safavid Empire, Islam had a strict hierarchy and
the clergy was closely linked to the government.
However, from 1828 onwards, when Russia took over the entire Caucasian
region and defined its border with Iran on the border of the Arax,
this resulted in Shiite Islam in modern day Azerbaijan and Georgia
being cut off from the important Shiite theological centres in Iran
and Iraq. Soviet domination accentuated this rupture between the
Shiite Islam in the Caucasian region and that in Iran, especially
by making the borders with the Soviet Union totally impermeable,
thus making pilgrimages to the Shiite towns of Karbala, Mashad,
Najaf and Qom impossible.
On the eve of Azerbaijan's and Georgia's independence, Islam was in a
weak position. Poorly structured and badly organised, it had little
control over those who had been strongly affected by the secularism
imposed by the Soviets. This includes Islam tradition, which did
nevertheless exist in the region but was wiped out by the Soviet's
policy of atheism.
In 1991, it could be seen to what point local Islam suffered from a
lack of guidance and theologians that were capable of giving sense
to the religious preoccupations of the people. This lack of religious
guidance and the idealistic and organisational weakness of Islam were
nevertheless rapidly made up for by the reestablishment of links with
Muslim countries near the Caucasian region.
As for Shiite Muslims in Georgia, as was the case for their brothers
in Azerbaijan, the first and most important influence came from Iran;
quite expectedly one could say, given the community of past and faith
that exists on either side of the Arax.
Towards a reconquest of souls
In concrete terms, the Iranian missionaries landed in the Caucasian
region at the end of the Soviet Union to "re-Islamise" the Shiite
population, who had been subjected to decades of atheist propaganda.
Very quickly mosques were reopened, new informal madrasas (religious
schools) were opened and an abundant body of literature was translated
from Persian into Azeri and spread throughout all the Azeri-speaking
regions of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Moreover, there was a rapid rise in
the number of pilgrimages to the holy Shiite towns of Karbala and Najaf
(before the US invasion of Iraq) and also to Qom and Mashad in Iran.
Moreover, while throughout the Soviet era, Islam was studied in the
Soviet madrasas of Tashkent or Bukara, from 1991 young Caucasians
began to study in universities in the Arab world, Iran and Turkey.
As for the Shiites of Azerbaijan and Georgia, hundreds of young people
took the initiative by going to Qom and Mashdad, and, to a lesser
extent, to Tehran and Qazwin, to study theology. In the hawza of Qom,
a type of Islamic campus, two madrasas, Imam al Khomeiny and Madrasatul
Hujja welcomed some dozen Azeri Shiite students from Georgia.
This reestablishment of links allowed Shiites in the Caucasian region
to gradually see themselves being reintegrated into the international
Shiite community.
Religious Iranians in Tbilisi
Very few people within the Shiite community in Georgia (and in
Azerbaijan) were aware of this Shiite reality before 1991.
But, as of 1992, the main mujtahid and marja'i taqlid, religious
scholars capable of teaching and interpreting sacred texts, started
to appear in Caucasian territories to such as extent that today
in Georgia it is possible to come across vekil, representatives of
several of the top-level Shiite personalities.
In Tbilisi, in the street where the sole mosque can be found in the
Georgian capital, a district where the majority of the 10,000 Azeris
in the town live, the Iman Foundation (FOI) is situated. This is run
by an Iranian monk and his assistant, an Azeri from Georgia. With its
completely legal status, the foundation offers followers religious
lessons, a small library mostly containing Shiite literature translated
from the Persian and a small conference room where religious debates
often take place.
As all believing and practising Shiites, the person in charge of the
foundation follows the instructions of a mujtahid. In this case, the
instructions of Mohammed Khamenei, the leader of the revolution in
the Islamic republic of Iran. This is therefore an institution that
has undergone influence from the Iranian state and which, through its
embassies in Azerbaijan and Georgia, does not hesitate in controlling
Islamic cooperation with its neighbours.
In Marneuli, one of the most prestigious mujtahid in the Shiite world
In the town of Marneuli, where the population is mainly Azeri, there
is another, similar foundation that is named 'Ahli Beyt', an Arabic
term meaning the family of the prophet and his direct descendants.
Better structured and more popular than the Iman foundation because
its is found in an Azeri-Shiite town, the foundation is fairly
active. Aside from Arabic lessons and Shiite theology, it offers
lessons in English, IT and Georgian in order to help young people to
integrate into independent Georgia.
This foundation is run by another mujtahid (also a marja'i taqlid,
in order to imitate the other foundation), who is without doubt, the
most prestigious mujtahid in the Shiite world today. We're talking
here of Sistani, whose works, translated from Arabic into Azeri, can
be easily found in the market or in the town mosque, not to mention
the foundation's own library, of course.
One of the responsibilities of the marja'i taqlid is to collect the
khamsa, the Shiite tax. This is equivalent to one-fifth of what the
follower has left once they have covered their clothing and food
requirements.
Difficult to put in place as the theological debate surrounding it is
so complex, this tax is not collected by the vekil, the representatives
of the marja'i taqlid. In actual fact, in contradiction to the
(secular) laws of this country and taking into consideration the fact
that the local population finds itself in a very difficult economic
situation, it's impossible to conceive that taxes could be demanded
from the Shiites of Azerbaijan and Georgia.
The Caucasian influence of Lenkerani, the Qom religious leader
Without either vekil or offices in the Shiite towns of Georgia,
another marja'i taqlid, Fazil Lenkerani, seems to have gained much
authority amongst the Shiites of Marneuli, Bolnisi, Dmanisi and
Tbilisi. Well-respected in Azerbaijan, this scholar, who is over
75 years old, gains his prestige and reputation from the fact that
he descends from an Azeri family originally from Lenkeran and which
immigrated to Iran in the 1920s.
Placed among the most prominent religious leaders in the hawza of
Qom in Iran, Lenkerani has a group of followers in Azerbaijan and
Georgia thanks to hundreds of students from the Caucasus who came,
and who continue to come each year, to Qom for theology studies.
On-the-spot research carried out in Qom shows the extent of his
influence on young students, who, after their studies in Qom, spread
his ideas in the Shiite regions of the Caucasus.
Baku fails to retain control over Islam in Georgia
All the mosques and religious associations in the Azeri towns
of Georgia are, in theory, under the control of the Department
of Spiritual Affairs in Baku which is headed by Sheikh ul Islam
Allahshukur Pachazadeh. It is up to him to name the young akhund in
Tbilisi, who is responsible for Islam in Georgia. In reality, however,
Baku's control of local Islam is relative.
Not all of the mosques and religious associations, although they
are required to be, are registered with the Department of Spiritual
Affairs in Baku. Local initiatives, sometimes supported by foreign
aid are set up by mosques without first seeking the opinion of Baku.
The theoretical supervision that Baku carries out over Islam in
Georgia comes from the good relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan,
but its control is far from being complete, especially concerning
Islam in Ajaria, which is geographically and religiously distanced
from Azeri Islam.
Next week: Ajaria, a new land of preaching for Turkish missionaries
[3/3]
--Boundary_(ID_CR5TGw2cqUu8FYwJ+844Vg)--
Aug 18 2005
Is there a place for Islam in Michael Saakashvili's Christian Georgia?
[2/3] [INVESTIGATION]
By Bayram BALCI in Tbilisi, Batumi, Marneuli, Pankisi
On 18/08/2005
(Translated by Geraldine RING and Victoria BRYAN)
Second part: Georgian Azeris adopt a policy of openness towards Iran
There are 300,000 Georgian Azeris. Mainly living in Kvemo
Kartli, particularly in the towns of Bolnisi, Marneuli and
Dmanisi, they inhabit what is a highly strategic region on the
Armenian-Azerbaijan border. Situated today at the crossroads
of important hydrocarbon transportation axes on the Caspian Sea,
especially the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, Kvemo Kartli has already
forgotten its peaceful existence during the Soviet era. In 1992-93,
it even witnessed several clashes between Armenians and Azeris,
as part of the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
© Bayram Balci (Marneuli)
The leaders of the community remain firm that the Azeri minority in
Georgia today has to face up to the new nationalistic policy adopted
by Tbilisi towards the non-Georgian population. In reality, Tbilisi
authorities, who were traumatised by the conflicts that broke out
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, particularly those in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are inclined to consider the minorities
as an obstacle to national construction.
Georgian cultural policy in general suffers from the host/guest
dialectic. In reality, the government considers the Azeri minority as
guests being received by their Georgian hosts, and because of this
they are expected to conform to the way of living followed by the
Georgian majority.
This has the result that Georgian Azeris feel strongly marginalised
when in fact they aren't, especially with regard to the privatisation
of land, a process about which Azeris feel wronged.
Yet, because these Azeris live in the border zones, the land they
inhabit has not been privatised as Tbilisi authorities fear that
its occupation by a 'foreign minority' encourages this minority to
undertake separatist actions that pose a threat to the entire country.
Lack of religious guidance
This region, which for many years was part of the Iranian Safavid
Empire, was under the direct influence of Shiite Islam Imamism, the
official religion of the empire since the reign of Shah Esma'il. The
expansion of Safavid territory in the Caucasian region, under Shah
Abbas in the 17th century, led to the spread of Shiitism in the
region. Under the Safavid Empire, Islam had a strict hierarchy and
the clergy was closely linked to the government.
However, from 1828 onwards, when Russia took over the entire Caucasian
region and defined its border with Iran on the border of the Arax,
this resulted in Shiite Islam in modern day Azerbaijan and Georgia
being cut off from the important Shiite theological centres in Iran
and Iraq. Soviet domination accentuated this rupture between the
Shiite Islam in the Caucasian region and that in Iran, especially
by making the borders with the Soviet Union totally impermeable,
thus making pilgrimages to the Shiite towns of Karbala, Mashad,
Najaf and Qom impossible.
On the eve of Azerbaijan's and Georgia's independence, Islam was in a
weak position. Poorly structured and badly organised, it had little
control over those who had been strongly affected by the secularism
imposed by the Soviets. This includes Islam tradition, which did
nevertheless exist in the region but was wiped out by the Soviet's
policy of atheism.
In 1991, it could be seen to what point local Islam suffered from a
lack of guidance and theologians that were capable of giving sense
to the religious preoccupations of the people. This lack of religious
guidance and the idealistic and organisational weakness of Islam were
nevertheless rapidly made up for by the reestablishment of links with
Muslim countries near the Caucasian region.
As for Shiite Muslims in Georgia, as was the case for their brothers
in Azerbaijan, the first and most important influence came from Iran;
quite expectedly one could say, given the community of past and faith
that exists on either side of the Arax.
Towards a reconquest of souls
In concrete terms, the Iranian missionaries landed in the Caucasian
region at the end of the Soviet Union to "re-Islamise" the Shiite
population, who had been subjected to decades of atheist propaganda.
Very quickly mosques were reopened, new informal madrasas (religious
schools) were opened and an abundant body of literature was translated
from Persian into Azeri and spread throughout all the Azeri-speaking
regions of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Moreover, there was a rapid rise in
the number of pilgrimages to the holy Shiite towns of Karbala and Najaf
(before the US invasion of Iraq) and also to Qom and Mashad in Iran.
Moreover, while throughout the Soviet era, Islam was studied in the
Soviet madrasas of Tashkent or Bukara, from 1991 young Caucasians
began to study in universities in the Arab world, Iran and Turkey.
As for the Shiites of Azerbaijan and Georgia, hundreds of young people
took the initiative by going to Qom and Mashdad, and, to a lesser
extent, to Tehran and Qazwin, to study theology. In the hawza of Qom,
a type of Islamic campus, two madrasas, Imam al Khomeiny and Madrasatul
Hujja welcomed some dozen Azeri Shiite students from Georgia.
This reestablishment of links allowed Shiites in the Caucasian region
to gradually see themselves being reintegrated into the international
Shiite community.
Religious Iranians in Tbilisi
Very few people within the Shiite community in Georgia (and in
Azerbaijan) were aware of this Shiite reality before 1991.
But, as of 1992, the main mujtahid and marja'i taqlid, religious
scholars capable of teaching and interpreting sacred texts, started
to appear in Caucasian territories to such as extent that today
in Georgia it is possible to come across vekil, representatives of
several of the top-level Shiite personalities.
In Tbilisi, in the street where the sole mosque can be found in the
Georgian capital, a district where the majority of the 10,000 Azeris
in the town live, the Iman Foundation (FOI) is situated. This is run
by an Iranian monk and his assistant, an Azeri from Georgia. With its
completely legal status, the foundation offers followers religious
lessons, a small library mostly containing Shiite literature translated
from the Persian and a small conference room where religious debates
often take place.
As all believing and practising Shiites, the person in charge of the
foundation follows the instructions of a mujtahid. In this case, the
instructions of Mohammed Khamenei, the leader of the revolution in
the Islamic republic of Iran. This is therefore an institution that
has undergone influence from the Iranian state and which, through its
embassies in Azerbaijan and Georgia, does not hesitate in controlling
Islamic cooperation with its neighbours.
In Marneuli, one of the most prestigious mujtahid in the Shiite world
In the town of Marneuli, where the population is mainly Azeri, there
is another, similar foundation that is named 'Ahli Beyt', an Arabic
term meaning the family of the prophet and his direct descendants.
Better structured and more popular than the Iman foundation because
its is found in an Azeri-Shiite town, the foundation is fairly
active. Aside from Arabic lessons and Shiite theology, it offers
lessons in English, IT and Georgian in order to help young people to
integrate into independent Georgia.
This foundation is run by another mujtahid (also a marja'i taqlid,
in order to imitate the other foundation), who is without doubt, the
most prestigious mujtahid in the Shiite world today. We're talking
here of Sistani, whose works, translated from Arabic into Azeri, can
be easily found in the market or in the town mosque, not to mention
the foundation's own library, of course.
One of the responsibilities of the marja'i taqlid is to collect the
khamsa, the Shiite tax. This is equivalent to one-fifth of what the
follower has left once they have covered their clothing and food
requirements.
Difficult to put in place as the theological debate surrounding it is
so complex, this tax is not collected by the vekil, the representatives
of the marja'i taqlid. In actual fact, in contradiction to the
(secular) laws of this country and taking into consideration the fact
that the local population finds itself in a very difficult economic
situation, it's impossible to conceive that taxes could be demanded
from the Shiites of Azerbaijan and Georgia.
The Caucasian influence of Lenkerani, the Qom religious leader
Without either vekil or offices in the Shiite towns of Georgia,
another marja'i taqlid, Fazil Lenkerani, seems to have gained much
authority amongst the Shiites of Marneuli, Bolnisi, Dmanisi and
Tbilisi. Well-respected in Azerbaijan, this scholar, who is over
75 years old, gains his prestige and reputation from the fact that
he descends from an Azeri family originally from Lenkeran and which
immigrated to Iran in the 1920s.
Placed among the most prominent religious leaders in the hawza of
Qom in Iran, Lenkerani has a group of followers in Azerbaijan and
Georgia thanks to hundreds of students from the Caucasus who came,
and who continue to come each year, to Qom for theology studies.
On-the-spot research carried out in Qom shows the extent of his
influence on young students, who, after their studies in Qom, spread
his ideas in the Shiite regions of the Caucasus.
Baku fails to retain control over Islam in Georgia
All the mosques and religious associations in the Azeri towns
of Georgia are, in theory, under the control of the Department
of Spiritual Affairs in Baku which is headed by Sheikh ul Islam
Allahshukur Pachazadeh. It is up to him to name the young akhund in
Tbilisi, who is responsible for Islam in Georgia. In reality, however,
Baku's control of local Islam is relative.
Not all of the mosques and religious associations, although they
are required to be, are registered with the Department of Spiritual
Affairs in Baku. Local initiatives, sometimes supported by foreign
aid are set up by mosques without first seeking the opinion of Baku.
The theoretical supervision that Baku carries out over Islam in
Georgia comes from the good relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan,
but its control is far from being complete, especially concerning
Islam in Ajaria, which is geographically and religiously distanced
from Azeri Islam.
Next week: Ajaria, a new land of preaching for Turkish missionaries
[3/3]
--Boundary_(ID_CR5TGw2cqUu8FYwJ+844Vg)--