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THE KURDISH FACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST EQUATION ANWAR AL-BUNNI EXPLAINS HOW THE KURDISH QUESTION IS BECOMING MORE PROMINENT IN THE ENTIRE REGION
The Daily Star
Friday, August 26, 2005
Interview
Editor's note: The following interview with Anwar al-Bunni, the head
of the Free Political Prisoners Committee and Syria's leading human
rights lawyer, was conducted earlier this month by Joe Pace of Harvard
University in Damascus. It first appeared on http://Syriacomment.com,
and is reprinted by permission.
Pace: Could you provide some background on the relationship between
the Kurdish and Arab opposition? Why is the relationship so tenuous
and is it improving or deteriorating?
Bunni: The Syrian authorities have always created barriers between
the Kurdish and Arab oppositions. It planted the fear within the Arab
opposition that the Kurds wanted to slice off a piece of Syria and
forge a separate state. And it scared the Kurds into believing that the
Arab opposition was incapable of delivering what the authorities could
deliver, and it convinced them that direct negotiation with the regime
would be more fruitful than coordination with the Arab opposition.
They also used the Kurds during Saddam's rule to influence the internal
situation in Iraq.
Some of the barriers between the two oppositions have come down and
this is a frightening prospect for the regime. They began meeting
and engaging in dialogue, so obviously they began to understand each
other better. The Arab opposition began to realize that not all Kurds
want a Kurdish state and the Kurdish opposition began to realize
that the call for democracy could solve their problems - culturally,
economically, and nationally.
They have begun to engage in serious dialogue, despite the fact that
differences remain between them. They have participated in several
demonstrations and sit-ins together. Still, there lingers some mutual
fear that the parties' official stances are not their true stances.
Q: What inspired the dialogue?
A: There were three basic factors. The first was the political opening
that allowed the birth of political movements. The second factor was
the pressure on Iraq and the Kurdish role there. It gave weight ... a
role ... a new importance to Kurdish parties in Syria. So people began
to address the Kurdish issue with newfound interest, especially the
Arab opposition. The third factor was the new openness on the part
of the Kurdish parties toward the Arab opposition, something which
resulted from the loss of faith that the Syrian authorities would grant
them their rights or relieve the economic and political pressure on
the Kurdish communities. So they began looking for an alternative,
in other words, better relations with the Arab opposition in Syria.
Q: We hear a lot that the Iraq war empowered Syrian Kurds, but in
what way? How did events in Iraq enhance their influence?
A: The Kurds began playing a larger political role in Iraq, something
which led the Arab opposition and the Syrian authorities alike to
pay closer attention to the desires of the Kurds.
Prior to the Iraq war, the Kurds did not play a political role in
Syrian politics. Their role was limited to demands placed upon the
authority - they didn't engage in dialogue with the rest of Syrian
political society. But after the events in Iraq, the Syrian Arabs
began to feel that maybe the Kurds would assume a larger political
role in Syria, as they did in Iraq. So they had to pay attention to
their demands in order to contain them.
Q: But how does a larger role for the Kurds in Iraq translate into
greater influence for Syria's Kurds?
A: It was first and foremost a psychological effect because they began
to feel as though there was protection; that they could depend at the
very least on moral and emotional support from the Kurds in Iraq. This
sort of support is of crucial importance, the mere face that someone is
asking about them - what they're suffering from, what they're saying,
etc. This is more important than military or financial support.
Now they have a shelter. Before, if a Kurd needed to flee there was
nowhere to go. He certainly couldn't go to Iraq or Turkey. Here they
were attacking them, there they were attacking them. ... But now they
have a shelter and it has emboldened them. If something happens to
someone here they can flee to Iraq.
Q: So what did the regime do in order to contain this new Kurdish
problem?
A: They tried to contain the Kurds by manipulating some of the Kurdish
parties, and by promising them nationality in order to keep the
parties in a relationship with the regime. They created the problems
in Qamashli in 2004 to weaken the Kurdish-Arab relationship and foster
divisions between them. They tried to get the two sides to distance
themselves from each other; of course, it didn't work because people
realized that the government was playing them.
Q: So has this newfound influence emboldened the Kurds to issue more
demands for an independent or federalized state?
A: The world was previously oblivious to the Kurdish issue. And the
government was contending that the Kurds wanted an independent state.
But recently, people have begun to speak out and they are starting
to realize that the Kurds have a legitimate complaint. But at the
same time, Kurdish extremism is unacceptable. They aren't going to
overcome these old suspicions with ease. There is this ingrained
suspicion that the Kurds want an independent state and what happened
in Iraq scared the Arabs even more.
The authorities have relied on qawmiyya (Arab nationalism) and
its grandiose slogans to legitimate its existence. And they have
endeavored to conceal Kurdish features from sight. They tried to
Arabize them; they took Kurdish land, Arabized the names of Kurdish
villages, deprived them of their citizenship, denied them access to
government jobs. Of course, there are Kurds in places like Damascus
who lead normal lives without any of those problems. The problem is
primarily in the northern regions.
These tactics caused a backlash: people began to cling to their culture
more, staking out more extremist positions. This is to be expected -
if you close the door of participation in front of someone, they'll
find another partner to cooperate and communicate with. But among
all of the Kurdish parties, not one advocates seceding from Syria.
There is also the issue of ethnic nationalism - it is finished. It
failed. People now realize that they are never going to establish
countries on the basis of a single ethnicity, whether that be Arab,
Kurdish or Armenian. Even in Europe, no one proposes that Germany
be only for the ethnic Germans or France for the ethnic French. The
concept of an ethnically based nation-state is no longer valid. Of
course, an independent nation-state remains a dream among the Kurds,
but it remains just that - a dream. No one expects that it will ever
be realized. They realize that state is impossible so the advocacy
of such has begun to recede from their party platforms.
There are still a few extremists who maintain the dream or try to
realize it, and this is natural. But the rest see that the solution
resides in democracy, in a system that respects the dignity of every
human being and not under the flag of a country based on qawmiyya.
People see that qawmiyya brings them nothing but poverty, theft,
pillaging, and oppression. It hasn't achieved economic growth, dignity,
or glory - it hasn't brought them anything.
Hundreds of thousands of Kurds in Europe and elsewhere live with
citizenship and full rights and none of them are clamoring to leave
their country and move to Kurdistan. The idea of a Kurdish state is
a dream - nothing more, nothing less. But reality will not permit
its realization.
Q: What about federalism in lieu of a separate state?
A: Federalism or state unity is something to be determined after
we reach democracy. But federalism is a just another political
arrangement; it doesn't mean fundamentally changing the state entity.
Switzerland has 32 cantons. How has that impacted on the strength
of Switzerland? It's still one of the stronger powers in the world.
America has 52 states, each with its own legislature, its own laws,
and its own constitution. How has that lessened the power of America?
On the contrary, this structure has enhanced its power. My thinking
isn't, let's create a federated state even if it means that the state
will be weak. My dream is to make my country stronger.
Q: What sort of reaction to this revival have you seen among the Arabs?
A: Extremism from one side always results in extremism from the
other. With the exception of the events in Qamashli there haven't
been very many explicit manifestations of the extremism. Some serious
tensions have developed among the Arab tribes who reject this Kurdish
revival - some understand the issue, but others have responded with
their own brand of extremism. Even some of the cultured elite had a
negative reaction to the events in Qamashli.
The problem is the absence of a natural environment. If the
environment is diseased, it is going to produce more social diseases
in all circumstances. An environment characterized by oppression and
domination is not going to produce healthy thought - it's going to
produce extremism.
That's what we've been saying: a democratic environment will push
people to be more proper and more rational and it will stunt extremism.
Q: So what are the major differences between the Kurdish and Arab
oppositions?
A: The most fundamental difference is that the Kurds think - and
this is their right - that there is a uniquely Kurdish problem. The
Syrian opposition views it as an issue of just another group deprived
of its rights, but not a Kurdish problem in the sense that the Kurds
constitute a nation. And this basic difference ramifies into multiple
points of disagreement about the details of their predicament. But the
fundamental point of contention is whether the Kurds are a separate
nation or just normal Syrian individuals deprived of some of their
rights.
It's not a problem if the Syrian Arabs say: "We are Syrian Arabs
who are part of the Arab nation." But it's not permitted for the
Syrian Kurds to say "We are Syrian Kurds who are part of the Kurdish
nation." So there's a contradiction.
Q: Most of the Kurds support America's project of remaking the Middle
East. They call U.S. President George W. Bush "Father of Freedom,"
which I cannot imagine goes over too well with a lot Arabs. How does
the Arab opposition react to this?
A: No, in Syria you'll find Arabs who say let Bush come here as well.
Q: But it's a rarer sentiment among the Arabs than the Kurds?
A: No, it's not rare among the Arabs. That's what happens when
you block all other avenues for change. The Kurds may get the most
publicity because in some of their demonstrations they were praising
Bush. But even in Qadmus, where the ethnic conflicts erupted,
some of the Ismailis were calling for Bush to come. The same thing
happened in Misyaf three months ago. So you shouldn't think of it as
a Kurdish predilection - it's the natural result of closing the doors
in front of the citizenry. I heard an old man saying the other day:
"Let Israel come and rescue us from this state." Israel! And he was
speaking in a loud voice in the middle of the street. These sentiments
are the byproduct of oppression.
Q: OK, then what about oppositional parties in general that differ
on the role of American intervention?
A: Of course, it's a point of contention. But, in general, its one of
many points of contention. It's a primary point that the nationalist
Arab opposition clings to. There is a segment that cannot comprehend
the concept of external powers playing a role in internal reform.
We used to lambaste America for supporting those dictators. But now
America is saying that it supports democratic leadership. And they
still criticize. What do they want? What do they want America to do?
When America supported despots they criticized her. Now America
has admitted to making mistakes and says it supports freedom and
democracy. So what do they want the Americans to do? What do they
want the position of the largest country in the world to be? Should
America be silent on everything?
Q: Then why do you think they continue to stand against America?
A: For two reasons. First, they have been raised to dislike America,
and especially because of its past mistakes, it has no credibility.
No one believes that America has the people in its interests. The
second reason is its position on the Israeli-Arab conflict. It has
yet to usher a solution to the conflict and that's an extremely
sensitive point for Arabs. Then there is the Iraq war which left
some 400,000 people dead. And then what? They expect that America
will then withdraw and leave the people to die.
The only thing they are certain of is that America is looking to
protect its own interests. Defending human rights and democracy
consists of pressuring the regimes in order to secure their own
interests - it is not done in the defense of the people. So no one
has faith that they can rely on America.
I won't rely on America but I am going to exploit American pressure
to realize my goals. Don't be part of the American project, but you
should still position yourself to benefit from it. Allow America to
put pressure on the regime and reap the benefits. Don't participate
in America's project, but don't fight it. They don't understand
this equation.
Q: You say that the opposition benefits from foreign pressure. How?
Hypothetically, what would happen if foreign pressure came to a halt?
A: We'd all be imprisoned. It's that simple.
The European Union has more credibility in the region and it's taken
a more reasonable stance toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So
people are willing to rely on them more than America. And I made
this point to Ambassador Scobey before she returned to Washington:
America is in dire need of credibility in the realm of democracy and
human rights. How am I supposed to believe that America supports
democracy and human rights when they are supporting Hosni Mubarak
for his fifth term or Zaideddine Ibn Ali for his third term when
he is oppressing people in his country? There's no balance in the
policy. They need to be promoting human rights everywhere, not just
in Syria, but then disregarding human rights violations elsewhere. It
has lost its credibility. But the more credibility the U.S. gains,
the larger its potential role becomes.
Q: The opposition is clearly divided over the role of American
influence. But to what extent does that constitute a major cleavage
that interferes with cooperation and unity?
A: This is an ostensible source of problems, but it's not the
fundamental reason for lack of unity within the opposition. The real
reason for disagreements is that the opposition hasn't managed to
reach the people. It speaks for its own interests and the interests
of opposition personalities rather than speaking for the interests
of the people. The people are absence from this opposition.
No opposition element has a complete program for action. I disagree
with someone because my platform doesn't [connect] with his - but
here, no one has a real platform. And the people can't evaluate the
platforms and decide which one is better. So where is there room for
disagreement? They disagree on personal issues.
There are some substantive manifestations of these disagreements: the
issue of Arab nationalism, the role of America, the role of Europe,
the position toward the regime. Is the regime capable of reform, can we
[have a] dialogue with it or not? Those are the apparent differences,
but the real reason is that there is no carrier for the message. They
don't represent people, they represent themselves.
Q: So how do you solve this problem? Is this opposition salvageable?
A: In my opinion, this opposition exists only to oppose the regime.
It will collapse with the collapse of the regime. There are small
gatherings - and this hasn't yet been widely noticed - of normal
people who didn't previously have any relation to politics. And
these new groups have begun to organize their thoughts and produce
a new leadership. We have to rely on those people, not the current
opposition figures.
The current opposition figures dream that one day they will have
the power. But it's a dream - it will never be realized. At best,
they may be part of a transition stage while the people determine
their stances and goals and the desired leadership.
People are becoming more aware. Because of [satellite technology]
and the Internet, they are beginning to realize how politics affects
them. We can't determine how much power they will have right now, but
I imagine that in the near future their power will begin to manifest
itself. And they will not march to the tune of the current opposition.
Q: If the opposition doesn't represent anyone, does the regime consider
even a united opposition a threat?
A: Of course, a united opposition would be a threat. Sheikh Khaznawi
[a prominent Kurdish Sheikh who was recently assassinated] became
a threat because of his good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood.
It's not so much the Muslim Brotherhood that has weight in society as
much as the new Islamist trends which have been gaining steam as a
result of repression. I don't think they're worried that the Muslim
Brotherhood has a large, organized, explicit base in Syria. But the
meeting between a Kurd and the Muslim Brotherhood sends a signal to the
Islamists more than it entails the formation of an organized alliance.
But right now, the regime does not have anything to fear from inside
of Syria. The only time the regime fears the internal opposition is
when it coordinates or receives support from foreign powers. In short,
the regime fears foreign - not internal - pressure because the internal
opposition cannot influence the regime.
Q: What about the claim among many opposition figures that endorsing
foreign pressure or accepting foreign support would cost them
credibility on the street?
A: There has not been a revolution in ages that was purely internal -
they are always influenced by other powers. So that kind of talk is
a lie. There is no such thing as purely internal change.
Q: You spoke earlier about a new group of people that you think will
become the new opposition. What are the conditions for this inchoate,
popular opposition to succeed?
A: The international community needs to continue pressuring the regime
in order to protect civil society and human rights activists so that
they can take their message to the people. People began to speak
out, but the arrests resumed and people were intimidated and stop
discussing politics. The most important thing is the protection of
activists from arrest and murder. That would enable people to agitate
more for change. We need pressure for the government to pass laws
that protect civil society. That would create the conditions under
which a new opposition could emerge.
I hear a lot from average Syrians that there are two evils: the
greater evil which is the occupation of Palestine and Iraq, and the
lesser evil which is the government.
That's regime propaganda. When did the Syrian regime ever do anything
to help solve the issue of Palestine and Iraq? Nothing. I can't
say that there is a big evil and a small evil because the two are
interrelated.
Let's assume for a second that we have two enemies: the regime and
America. If the two of them fight each other, I have one less enemy
to worry about. Both of them aim to oppress me. Now they are fighting
each other. Let them fight! If one of them is vanquished then I have
one less enemy.
But there are people who are unwilling as a matter of principle to
accept an American victory. How do you convince them that American
pressure is in their interests?
Those people are one element of many. There is no entity that wants
to see an end to American interference more than the Syrian regime
itself. But like I said, we need to exploit American pressure, not for
the sake of American interests, but for the sake of achieving our own
goals. And this is what the current opposition doesn't understand. It
doesn't understand how to play the game. Even regarding people like
Farid Ghadry - we have an expression in Syria: "Better the dog bark
with you than at you." Let Farid bark with you. Don't degrade him. The
opposition has no conception of how it is going to bring about these
grand political changes.
Q: This is why I say they will collapse with the regime. They have
no program; they have no role outside of opposing the regime's
existence. Who are they going to oppose after the regime's collapse?
A: The regime's political strategy depends on planting land mines
throughout society. But the mine doesn't explode if you place your
leg on it - it explodes when you remove your leg from it. The regime
planted the land mines then placed their legs on them so that if the
regime goes, the society will explode. We can expect the same thing
that happened in Lebanon to happen here. We suffer from the same
problems of competing nationalisms, sectarianism, and extremism. So we
are held hostage by a regime that says to us" "If I leave, the world
will end. You'll suffer through civil war. Best leave me in place."
We need to mobilize the people to build a new society and minimize
the potential for this explosion. But nothing is free. No country
can progress without paying a price, be it blood or civil war. Even
America had to undergo civil war before it could become a great power -
[thousands] of people had to die. Europe had to suffer through World
War II to become what it is today. Big changes require big prices. But
we need to work to minimize the price we will have to pay for progress.
This is the role for foreign pressures - to enable people to
mobilize and build a new society that will not explode as soon as the
totalitarian boot is lifted. To allow people to build a society that
will neutralize that landmine.
From: Baghdasarian
The Daily Star
Friday, August 26, 2005
Interview
Editor's note: The following interview with Anwar al-Bunni, the head
of the Free Political Prisoners Committee and Syria's leading human
rights lawyer, was conducted earlier this month by Joe Pace of Harvard
University in Damascus. It first appeared on http://Syriacomment.com,
and is reprinted by permission.
Pace: Could you provide some background on the relationship between
the Kurdish and Arab opposition? Why is the relationship so tenuous
and is it improving or deteriorating?
Bunni: The Syrian authorities have always created barriers between
the Kurdish and Arab oppositions. It planted the fear within the Arab
opposition that the Kurds wanted to slice off a piece of Syria and
forge a separate state. And it scared the Kurds into believing that the
Arab opposition was incapable of delivering what the authorities could
deliver, and it convinced them that direct negotiation with the regime
would be more fruitful than coordination with the Arab opposition.
They also used the Kurds during Saddam's rule to influence the internal
situation in Iraq.
Some of the barriers between the two oppositions have come down and
this is a frightening prospect for the regime. They began meeting
and engaging in dialogue, so obviously they began to understand each
other better. The Arab opposition began to realize that not all Kurds
want a Kurdish state and the Kurdish opposition began to realize
that the call for democracy could solve their problems - culturally,
economically, and nationally.
They have begun to engage in serious dialogue, despite the fact that
differences remain between them. They have participated in several
demonstrations and sit-ins together. Still, there lingers some mutual
fear that the parties' official stances are not their true stances.
Q: What inspired the dialogue?
A: There were three basic factors. The first was the political opening
that allowed the birth of political movements. The second factor was
the pressure on Iraq and the Kurdish role there. It gave weight ... a
role ... a new importance to Kurdish parties in Syria. So people began
to address the Kurdish issue with newfound interest, especially the
Arab opposition. The third factor was the new openness on the part
of the Kurdish parties toward the Arab opposition, something which
resulted from the loss of faith that the Syrian authorities would grant
them their rights or relieve the economic and political pressure on
the Kurdish communities. So they began looking for an alternative,
in other words, better relations with the Arab opposition in Syria.
Q: We hear a lot that the Iraq war empowered Syrian Kurds, but in
what way? How did events in Iraq enhance their influence?
A: The Kurds began playing a larger political role in Iraq, something
which led the Arab opposition and the Syrian authorities alike to
pay closer attention to the desires of the Kurds.
Prior to the Iraq war, the Kurds did not play a political role in
Syrian politics. Their role was limited to demands placed upon the
authority - they didn't engage in dialogue with the rest of Syrian
political society. But after the events in Iraq, the Syrian Arabs
began to feel that maybe the Kurds would assume a larger political
role in Syria, as they did in Iraq. So they had to pay attention to
their demands in order to contain them.
Q: But how does a larger role for the Kurds in Iraq translate into
greater influence for Syria's Kurds?
A: It was first and foremost a psychological effect because they began
to feel as though there was protection; that they could depend at the
very least on moral and emotional support from the Kurds in Iraq. This
sort of support is of crucial importance, the mere face that someone is
asking about them - what they're suffering from, what they're saying,
etc. This is more important than military or financial support.
Now they have a shelter. Before, if a Kurd needed to flee there was
nowhere to go. He certainly couldn't go to Iraq or Turkey. Here they
were attacking them, there they were attacking them. ... But now they
have a shelter and it has emboldened them. If something happens to
someone here they can flee to Iraq.
Q: So what did the regime do in order to contain this new Kurdish
problem?
A: They tried to contain the Kurds by manipulating some of the Kurdish
parties, and by promising them nationality in order to keep the
parties in a relationship with the regime. They created the problems
in Qamashli in 2004 to weaken the Kurdish-Arab relationship and foster
divisions between them. They tried to get the two sides to distance
themselves from each other; of course, it didn't work because people
realized that the government was playing them.
Q: So has this newfound influence emboldened the Kurds to issue more
demands for an independent or federalized state?
A: The world was previously oblivious to the Kurdish issue. And the
government was contending that the Kurds wanted an independent state.
But recently, people have begun to speak out and they are starting
to realize that the Kurds have a legitimate complaint. But at the
same time, Kurdish extremism is unacceptable. They aren't going to
overcome these old suspicions with ease. There is this ingrained
suspicion that the Kurds want an independent state and what happened
in Iraq scared the Arabs even more.
The authorities have relied on qawmiyya (Arab nationalism) and
its grandiose slogans to legitimate its existence. And they have
endeavored to conceal Kurdish features from sight. They tried to
Arabize them; they took Kurdish land, Arabized the names of Kurdish
villages, deprived them of their citizenship, denied them access to
government jobs. Of course, there are Kurds in places like Damascus
who lead normal lives without any of those problems. The problem is
primarily in the northern regions.
These tactics caused a backlash: people began to cling to their culture
more, staking out more extremist positions. This is to be expected -
if you close the door of participation in front of someone, they'll
find another partner to cooperate and communicate with. But among
all of the Kurdish parties, not one advocates seceding from Syria.
There is also the issue of ethnic nationalism - it is finished. It
failed. People now realize that they are never going to establish
countries on the basis of a single ethnicity, whether that be Arab,
Kurdish or Armenian. Even in Europe, no one proposes that Germany
be only for the ethnic Germans or France for the ethnic French. The
concept of an ethnically based nation-state is no longer valid. Of
course, an independent nation-state remains a dream among the Kurds,
but it remains just that - a dream. No one expects that it will ever
be realized. They realize that state is impossible so the advocacy
of such has begun to recede from their party platforms.
There are still a few extremists who maintain the dream or try to
realize it, and this is natural. But the rest see that the solution
resides in democracy, in a system that respects the dignity of every
human being and not under the flag of a country based on qawmiyya.
People see that qawmiyya brings them nothing but poverty, theft,
pillaging, and oppression. It hasn't achieved economic growth, dignity,
or glory - it hasn't brought them anything.
Hundreds of thousands of Kurds in Europe and elsewhere live with
citizenship and full rights and none of them are clamoring to leave
their country and move to Kurdistan. The idea of a Kurdish state is
a dream - nothing more, nothing less. But reality will not permit
its realization.
Q: What about federalism in lieu of a separate state?
A: Federalism or state unity is something to be determined after
we reach democracy. But federalism is a just another political
arrangement; it doesn't mean fundamentally changing the state entity.
Switzerland has 32 cantons. How has that impacted on the strength
of Switzerland? It's still one of the stronger powers in the world.
America has 52 states, each with its own legislature, its own laws,
and its own constitution. How has that lessened the power of America?
On the contrary, this structure has enhanced its power. My thinking
isn't, let's create a federated state even if it means that the state
will be weak. My dream is to make my country stronger.
Q: What sort of reaction to this revival have you seen among the Arabs?
A: Extremism from one side always results in extremism from the
other. With the exception of the events in Qamashli there haven't
been very many explicit manifestations of the extremism. Some serious
tensions have developed among the Arab tribes who reject this Kurdish
revival - some understand the issue, but others have responded with
their own brand of extremism. Even some of the cultured elite had a
negative reaction to the events in Qamashli.
The problem is the absence of a natural environment. If the
environment is diseased, it is going to produce more social diseases
in all circumstances. An environment characterized by oppression and
domination is not going to produce healthy thought - it's going to
produce extremism.
That's what we've been saying: a democratic environment will push
people to be more proper and more rational and it will stunt extremism.
Q: So what are the major differences between the Kurdish and Arab
oppositions?
A: The most fundamental difference is that the Kurds think - and
this is their right - that there is a uniquely Kurdish problem. The
Syrian opposition views it as an issue of just another group deprived
of its rights, but not a Kurdish problem in the sense that the Kurds
constitute a nation. And this basic difference ramifies into multiple
points of disagreement about the details of their predicament. But the
fundamental point of contention is whether the Kurds are a separate
nation or just normal Syrian individuals deprived of some of their
rights.
It's not a problem if the Syrian Arabs say: "We are Syrian Arabs
who are part of the Arab nation." But it's not permitted for the
Syrian Kurds to say "We are Syrian Kurds who are part of the Kurdish
nation." So there's a contradiction.
Q: Most of the Kurds support America's project of remaking the Middle
East. They call U.S. President George W. Bush "Father of Freedom,"
which I cannot imagine goes over too well with a lot Arabs. How does
the Arab opposition react to this?
A: No, in Syria you'll find Arabs who say let Bush come here as well.
Q: But it's a rarer sentiment among the Arabs than the Kurds?
A: No, it's not rare among the Arabs. That's what happens when
you block all other avenues for change. The Kurds may get the most
publicity because in some of their demonstrations they were praising
Bush. But even in Qadmus, where the ethnic conflicts erupted,
some of the Ismailis were calling for Bush to come. The same thing
happened in Misyaf three months ago. So you shouldn't think of it as
a Kurdish predilection - it's the natural result of closing the doors
in front of the citizenry. I heard an old man saying the other day:
"Let Israel come and rescue us from this state." Israel! And he was
speaking in a loud voice in the middle of the street. These sentiments
are the byproduct of oppression.
Q: OK, then what about oppositional parties in general that differ
on the role of American intervention?
A: Of course, it's a point of contention. But, in general, its one of
many points of contention. It's a primary point that the nationalist
Arab opposition clings to. There is a segment that cannot comprehend
the concept of external powers playing a role in internal reform.
We used to lambaste America for supporting those dictators. But now
America is saying that it supports democratic leadership. And they
still criticize. What do they want? What do they want America to do?
When America supported despots they criticized her. Now America
has admitted to making mistakes and says it supports freedom and
democracy. So what do they want the Americans to do? What do they
want the position of the largest country in the world to be? Should
America be silent on everything?
Q: Then why do you think they continue to stand against America?
A: For two reasons. First, they have been raised to dislike America,
and especially because of its past mistakes, it has no credibility.
No one believes that America has the people in its interests. The
second reason is its position on the Israeli-Arab conflict. It has
yet to usher a solution to the conflict and that's an extremely
sensitive point for Arabs. Then there is the Iraq war which left
some 400,000 people dead. And then what? They expect that America
will then withdraw and leave the people to die.
The only thing they are certain of is that America is looking to
protect its own interests. Defending human rights and democracy
consists of pressuring the regimes in order to secure their own
interests - it is not done in the defense of the people. So no one
has faith that they can rely on America.
I won't rely on America but I am going to exploit American pressure
to realize my goals. Don't be part of the American project, but you
should still position yourself to benefit from it. Allow America to
put pressure on the regime and reap the benefits. Don't participate
in America's project, but don't fight it. They don't understand
this equation.
Q: You say that the opposition benefits from foreign pressure. How?
Hypothetically, what would happen if foreign pressure came to a halt?
A: We'd all be imprisoned. It's that simple.
The European Union has more credibility in the region and it's taken
a more reasonable stance toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So
people are willing to rely on them more than America. And I made
this point to Ambassador Scobey before she returned to Washington:
America is in dire need of credibility in the realm of democracy and
human rights. How am I supposed to believe that America supports
democracy and human rights when they are supporting Hosni Mubarak
for his fifth term or Zaideddine Ibn Ali for his third term when
he is oppressing people in his country? There's no balance in the
policy. They need to be promoting human rights everywhere, not just
in Syria, but then disregarding human rights violations elsewhere. It
has lost its credibility. But the more credibility the U.S. gains,
the larger its potential role becomes.
Q: The opposition is clearly divided over the role of American
influence. But to what extent does that constitute a major cleavage
that interferes with cooperation and unity?
A: This is an ostensible source of problems, but it's not the
fundamental reason for lack of unity within the opposition. The real
reason for disagreements is that the opposition hasn't managed to
reach the people. It speaks for its own interests and the interests
of opposition personalities rather than speaking for the interests
of the people. The people are absence from this opposition.
No opposition element has a complete program for action. I disagree
with someone because my platform doesn't [connect] with his - but
here, no one has a real platform. And the people can't evaluate the
platforms and decide which one is better. So where is there room for
disagreement? They disagree on personal issues.
There are some substantive manifestations of these disagreements: the
issue of Arab nationalism, the role of America, the role of Europe,
the position toward the regime. Is the regime capable of reform, can we
[have a] dialogue with it or not? Those are the apparent differences,
but the real reason is that there is no carrier for the message. They
don't represent people, they represent themselves.
Q: So how do you solve this problem? Is this opposition salvageable?
A: In my opinion, this opposition exists only to oppose the regime.
It will collapse with the collapse of the regime. There are small
gatherings - and this hasn't yet been widely noticed - of normal
people who didn't previously have any relation to politics. And
these new groups have begun to organize their thoughts and produce
a new leadership. We have to rely on those people, not the current
opposition figures.
The current opposition figures dream that one day they will have
the power. But it's a dream - it will never be realized. At best,
they may be part of a transition stage while the people determine
their stances and goals and the desired leadership.
People are becoming more aware. Because of [satellite technology]
and the Internet, they are beginning to realize how politics affects
them. We can't determine how much power they will have right now, but
I imagine that in the near future their power will begin to manifest
itself. And they will not march to the tune of the current opposition.
Q: If the opposition doesn't represent anyone, does the regime consider
even a united opposition a threat?
A: Of course, a united opposition would be a threat. Sheikh Khaznawi
[a prominent Kurdish Sheikh who was recently assassinated] became
a threat because of his good relations with the Muslim Brotherhood.
It's not so much the Muslim Brotherhood that has weight in society as
much as the new Islamist trends which have been gaining steam as a
result of repression. I don't think they're worried that the Muslim
Brotherhood has a large, organized, explicit base in Syria. But the
meeting between a Kurd and the Muslim Brotherhood sends a signal to the
Islamists more than it entails the formation of an organized alliance.
But right now, the regime does not have anything to fear from inside
of Syria. The only time the regime fears the internal opposition is
when it coordinates or receives support from foreign powers. In short,
the regime fears foreign - not internal - pressure because the internal
opposition cannot influence the regime.
Q: What about the claim among many opposition figures that endorsing
foreign pressure or accepting foreign support would cost them
credibility on the street?
A: There has not been a revolution in ages that was purely internal -
they are always influenced by other powers. So that kind of talk is
a lie. There is no such thing as purely internal change.
Q: You spoke earlier about a new group of people that you think will
become the new opposition. What are the conditions for this inchoate,
popular opposition to succeed?
A: The international community needs to continue pressuring the regime
in order to protect civil society and human rights activists so that
they can take their message to the people. People began to speak
out, but the arrests resumed and people were intimidated and stop
discussing politics. The most important thing is the protection of
activists from arrest and murder. That would enable people to agitate
more for change. We need pressure for the government to pass laws
that protect civil society. That would create the conditions under
which a new opposition could emerge.
I hear a lot from average Syrians that there are two evils: the
greater evil which is the occupation of Palestine and Iraq, and the
lesser evil which is the government.
That's regime propaganda. When did the Syrian regime ever do anything
to help solve the issue of Palestine and Iraq? Nothing. I can't
say that there is a big evil and a small evil because the two are
interrelated.
Let's assume for a second that we have two enemies: the regime and
America. If the two of them fight each other, I have one less enemy
to worry about. Both of them aim to oppress me. Now they are fighting
each other. Let them fight! If one of them is vanquished then I have
one less enemy.
But there are people who are unwilling as a matter of principle to
accept an American victory. How do you convince them that American
pressure is in their interests?
Those people are one element of many. There is no entity that wants
to see an end to American interference more than the Syrian regime
itself. But like I said, we need to exploit American pressure, not for
the sake of American interests, but for the sake of achieving our own
goals. And this is what the current opposition doesn't understand. It
doesn't understand how to play the game. Even regarding people like
Farid Ghadry - we have an expression in Syria: "Better the dog bark
with you than at you." Let Farid bark with you. Don't degrade him. The
opposition has no conception of how it is going to bring about these
grand political changes.
Q: This is why I say they will collapse with the regime. They have
no program; they have no role outside of opposing the regime's
existence. Who are they going to oppose after the regime's collapse?
A: The regime's political strategy depends on planting land mines
throughout society. But the mine doesn't explode if you place your
leg on it - it explodes when you remove your leg from it. The regime
planted the land mines then placed their legs on them so that if the
regime goes, the society will explode. We can expect the same thing
that happened in Lebanon to happen here. We suffer from the same
problems of competing nationalisms, sectarianism, and extremism. So we
are held hostage by a regime that says to us" "If I leave, the world
will end. You'll suffer through civil war. Best leave me in place."
We need to mobilize the people to build a new society and minimize
the potential for this explosion. But nothing is free. No country
can progress without paying a price, be it blood or civil war. Even
America had to undergo civil war before it could become a great power -
[thousands] of people had to die. Europe had to suffer through World
War II to become what it is today. Big changes require big prices. But
we need to work to minimize the price we will have to pay for progress.
This is the role for foreign pressures - to enable people to
mobilize and build a new society that will not explode as soon as the
totalitarian boot is lifted. To allow people to build a society that
will neutralize that landmine.
From: Baghdasarian