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Moscow alienating its near abroad
By Molly Corso
Asia Times Online, Hong Kong
Feb 7 2005
Russia has seen its influence in the Caucasus - and the rest of the
former Soviet Union - wane significantly since the November 2003 Rose
Revolution in Georgia. Although economics play a part in the drive
to become closer to the United States and the European Union, Moscow
largely blames post-revolution Georgia for the Orange Revolution in
the Ukraine and its perceived loss of influence there.
While Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and Ukrainian President
Viktor Yushchenko were in Strasburg for a Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin
made no secret of meeting separatist leaders in Moscow, including
the newly elected president of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, and the
defeated Ukrainian presidential candidate Victor Yanukovych. Russian
policies have become increasingly anti-Georgian since Saakashvili
came to power, which regional experts feel is Moscow's response to
Saakashvili's decidedly Western bent. But its decision to punish
Georgia and other opposition leaders in the former republics may be
working against long-term Russian interests.
Abkhazia
The first major blow to Russia's influence in its own background
was not the election in the Ukraine but the October elections in
Abkhazia. Abkhazia is officially a part of Georgia, but gained de facto
independence from Tbilisi after Georgia lost control of the republic
following a war in the mid 1990s, a fact that is largely credited to
Russian interference. The ruling regime in Abkhazia is supported by
Russia. Russian peacekeepers monitor its borders with Georgia, the
Russian ruble is the local currency and any economic development is
limited to Russian investors. Moscow also pays Abkhaz pensions and
has widely issued Russian passports throughout the Abkhaz population.
Candidate Raul Khajimba actively campaigned on a pro-Russian platform,
promising an increase in investments from Russia and stronger
relations with Moscow. Sergei Bagapsh, known in the Russian media
as the opposition candidate, also pledged to foster greater ties
with Russia. Neither candidate spoke favorably of Georgia or the
possibility of improving Abkhaz-Georgian relations. Tbilisi distanced
itself from the whole election; only Russia recognizes Abkhazian
independence and, therefore, the election. The Russian media were
the only source of international coverage. Despite support from the
Kremlin and other Russian politicians, Khajimba officially lost the
election on October 3, an event that nearly resulted in civil war
when he refused to accept the Central Election Committees final count
in favor of Bagapsh. Events came to a head in December, when Bagapsh
refused to give up plans for his inauguration.
In response to the unexpected turmoil in a republic fully dependent
on Russian support, Russia closed its borders and cut off trade
with Abkhazia, in effect squashing the main source of income for
most Abkhaz, the citrus trade. While that show of strength helped
convince Bagapsh to bow to Russian pressures, it also underscored
what analysts say caused his victory in the first place. The only real
difference between the two candidates was Bagapsh's calls for a truly
independent Abkhazia, recognized by the international community. In its
current state, both Tbilisi and Sukhumi refuse to have relations and
Georgia refuses to allow any trade to Abkhazia to cross its borders,
even to the extent that Saakashvili ordered Turkish boats heading to
Abkhazia bombed over the summer. That limits Sukhumi to relations with
Moscow. While it is unlikely that any country in the international
community will recognize Abkhazian independence, Bagapsh's strong
stance in that direction was perceived as a threat to the current
status quo.
Thanks to the immediate embargo on Abkhazian goods, Moscow was able
to convenience Bagapsh to accept a compromise between the two former
rivals. Days before the planned inauguration, Bagapsh agreed to a
revote and ran with Khajimba as his vice presidential candidate.
Under the current agreement, Khajimba wields an unusually large
amount of power, including a reported 40%of the state budget. Since
his election on January 12, Bagapsh has stepped up rhetoric against
Georgia and made open overtures to strengthen Abkhaz-Russian ties.
Moscow was able to reel the wayside republic back in, but it took a
last ditch show of strength to do it.
The Orange Revolution
Despite a much stronger Russian effort during the Ukrainian election
in November, the Russian-backed candidate Viktor Yanukovych could
not defeat opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko. Analysts have debated
on what Yushchenko's victory will really mean for Ukrainian-Russian
relations, but regardless of Yushchenko's Western-looking policies,
Ukraine remains a major Russian trading partner. Historically,
religiously and ethnically Russia and Ukraine have close ties. The
new president's first international trip was to Moscow, albeit quickly
followed by the address at Strasburg.
The real question remains what this growing trend of peaceful
uprisings will mean for the remaining Russian-supported presidents
in other former republics. However insulting Yushchenko's victory
is for Moscow, in the long run it will only truly adversely affect
Russian-Ukrainian affairs if Putin decides to punish Yushchenko like he
is currently castigating Georgian president Saakashvili. The Ukrainian
vote for Yushchenko was more a vote against rampant corruption and the
questionable election than a vote against Russia. Yushchenko has gone
out of his way to pacify Russians in the eastern part of the country,
even defending the role of the Russian language in Ukraine. His drive
toward the West is less a statement of anti-Russian sentiment than
as an accepted desire to improve conditions in his country. But that
can change if Russia is not willing to actively work with Yushchenko.
Yushchenko has roughly a year to prove to his divided country that
Ukraine will benefit from better relations with Western states. If
Russia tries to openly sabotage his effects - like it is in Abkhazia
and Georgia - Putin risks a much more serious backlash during the
upcoming parliamentary elections. By supporting Yushchenko, Russia
can help strengthen Ukraine, which will result in a deeper alliance
between the two countries and increase stability in the region. Any
effort by Moscow to further antagonize the country, especially the
western half, could have the opposite effect.
New ethnic discord will only weaken Russia's chance to increase
its influence in the region as both current leaders and opposition
forces throughout the former Soviet Union are watching Ukrainian
developments closely. If it becomes apparent that Moscow will not
tolerate any action perceived to weaken its influence in the region,
economic and military aid from the West will seem more desirable.
While existing leaders might welcome Russia's brand of friendship,
the opposition will work more strongly to free their respective
countries from Moscow's influence if it becomes evident Russia sees
them not as sovereign states but as internal problems.
Special relationship with Georgia
Moscow's continued interference with ethnic problems within Georgia
has not strengthened its role in the Caucasus. Even before the Rose
Revolution, Russia's efforts to destabilize the region and bring
it into submission with military force backfired. In 2002, Moscow
accused Tbilisi of harboring terrorists in the lawless Pankisi Gorge
that borders Chechnya. Instead of resulting in an increase of Russian
military personnel to Georgia, the accusations led to stronger ties
between Georgia and the US and the US-led "train and equip" program
for the Georgian army. Since Saakashvili came to power, Georgia has
made every effort to strengthen ties with the US and Europe.
Russia's continued support for separatist leaders in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia is meant to deter stability - and therefore foreign investment
- in Georgia. However, in reality Russia's obvious interference
has helped the Georgian leadership turn to the West for support and
resolution. During his speech in Strasburg, Saakashvili clearly stated
that Russia is not capable of leading Georgia to a peaceful resolution
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Venetian Commission's decision to
actively participate in the development of a peace settlement even
further decreases Russia's influence in its own near abroad.
Moscow's newest tactic - vetoing the continuation of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) border patrol on the
Chechen, Ingushetia and Dagestani borders - has been more successful.
Under its current policy, Russia will guarantee no international
observers will be monitoring the borders by late spring. When the
snow melts, Chechen rebels will have easy passage into Georgia and -
according to Russia - Moscow will have ample cause to bomb the Pankisi
Gorge, or force Georgia into accepting more Russian peacekeepers inside
the Georgian border. Those troops would be in addition to the soldiers
already in place along the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
as well as the two Russian army bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki.
But this could also backfire. Saakashvili and his administration
have actively been searching for willing replacements to the OSCE
monitoring group and the EU has tentatively expressed interest. While
the EU's monitors are far from certain at this point, any move to
place independent international monitors would work against Russia.
Under the OSCE, Russia had a say and a role in the monitoring. If it
becomes the duty of the EU - or a mixture of observers from various
countries - Moscow's say would be diminished and its claims that the
Georgian government is not strong enough to protect its own borders
would be disproved.
Tbilisi and its allies are also becoming more adamant about the
remaining two Russian army bases in Georgia. In January, Saakashvili
attacked the role of Russian peacekeepers inside Georgian territory.
Georgia has proposed creating joint anti-terrorist centers with
Russia on the current army bases. So far Russia has shown no real
interest, but if it continues alienating itself from the international
community with coercive tactics, Georgia will gain more support from
the international community and could garner the necessary support
to force Russian troops out of the country all together.
Problems in Armenia
Another potential defeat for Russian influence is waiting in Armenia.
In the past, Armenia has been a bastion of Russian support in
the Caucasus. Russia has long supported the country militarily
and economically - for example, Armenia receives all of its gas
from Russia. While only an estimated 20% of Armenia's exports are
purchased in Russia, a reported 2 million Armenians live there and
their families at home depend on the financial support they send.
Russia supported Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with
Azerbaijan and still stands firmly behind Yerevan during peace talks
about the contested territories. During the civil unrest in Georgia
leading up to the Rose Revolution in 2003, both Russia and Armenia
made public statements about their mutually strong and beneficial
relationship. Russia strengthened its already strong military presence
in Armenia, increased arms sales and even moved some soldiers from
bases in Georgia to Armenia during the protests in Tbilisi.
Nevertheless, Armenia's support for Russian influence is not as strong
as it was a year ago. While the opposition was emboldened due to the
success of the Rose Revolution, another important negative development
for Russia came in September 2004, following the terrorist attacks
at Beslan. When Russia closed its borders with Georgia following
the attack, hundreds of Armenian trucks and buses were stranded for
a month, unable to go to either Russia or back to Armenia. While
there are no concrete figures for how much Armenian businesses
lost during that month, Armenians felt slighted by their ally and
insulted at Russia's reaction to punish them along with the rest of
the Caucasus. That added to dissatisfaction with Russia's continued
support of President Robert Kocharian, whose victory in 2003 is widely
disputed by opposition parties and the public.
Russian diplomats were slow to react to the situation, and statements
from Moscow largely consisted in recommending different routes
into Russia. The US, however, was not slow to act. Since the Rose
Revolution, Washington has been paying more attention to Armenia.
Sensing a weakness in Russian-Armenian relations over the past year,
America has picked up the pace. A new consulate is planned for Yerevan
which reportedly will be the biggest in the region. In addition,
American-driven aid projects have been on the rise.
A third party could further weaken Russian influence in Armenia.
Yerevan and Iran have held intense talks about a proposed gas
pipeline. While there are no investors yet, the pipeline has the
potential to free Armenia from its current state of dependence on
Russian gas.
Conclusion
Due to shortsighted policies, Russia has already lost considerable
influence in Georgia. Moscow's erroneous politics in Abkhazia and
Ukraine resulted in embarrassment and more strained relationships
within Russia's sphere of influence. If Putin does not reverse this
trend, Russia could lose support during the next Armenian elections
and further encourage the currently weak opposition parties in
Central Asia. Although opposition presidents are well aware of the
importance of good relations with Putin, political games force them
to increasingly turn to Europe and the US for aid and support in an
effort to balance more evenly between Russia and the West. If Moscow
does not start realizing that coercive tactics in its near abroad are
causing a loss of support from these states, it will continue to see
its interests in the region weaken.
Published with permission of the Power and Interest News Report, an
analysis-based publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. All
comments should be directed to [email protected]
By Molly Corso
Asia Times Online, Hong Kong
Feb 7 2005
Russia has seen its influence in the Caucasus - and the rest of the
former Soviet Union - wane significantly since the November 2003 Rose
Revolution in Georgia. Although economics play a part in the drive
to become closer to the United States and the European Union, Moscow
largely blames post-revolution Georgia for the Orange Revolution in
the Ukraine and its perceived loss of influence there.
While Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and Ukrainian President
Viktor Yushchenko were in Strasburg for a Council of Europe
Parliamentary Assembly meeting, Russian President Vladimir Putin
made no secret of meeting separatist leaders in Moscow, including
the newly elected president of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, and the
defeated Ukrainian presidential candidate Victor Yanukovych. Russian
policies have become increasingly anti-Georgian since Saakashvili
came to power, which regional experts feel is Moscow's response to
Saakashvili's decidedly Western bent. But its decision to punish
Georgia and other opposition leaders in the former republics may be
working against long-term Russian interests.
Abkhazia
The first major blow to Russia's influence in its own background
was not the election in the Ukraine but the October elections in
Abkhazia. Abkhazia is officially a part of Georgia, but gained de facto
independence from Tbilisi after Georgia lost control of the republic
following a war in the mid 1990s, a fact that is largely credited to
Russian interference. The ruling regime in Abkhazia is supported by
Russia. Russian peacekeepers monitor its borders with Georgia, the
Russian ruble is the local currency and any economic development is
limited to Russian investors. Moscow also pays Abkhaz pensions and
has widely issued Russian passports throughout the Abkhaz population.
Candidate Raul Khajimba actively campaigned on a pro-Russian platform,
promising an increase in investments from Russia and stronger
relations with Moscow. Sergei Bagapsh, known in the Russian media
as the opposition candidate, also pledged to foster greater ties
with Russia. Neither candidate spoke favorably of Georgia or the
possibility of improving Abkhaz-Georgian relations. Tbilisi distanced
itself from the whole election; only Russia recognizes Abkhazian
independence and, therefore, the election. The Russian media were
the only source of international coverage. Despite support from the
Kremlin and other Russian politicians, Khajimba officially lost the
election on October 3, an event that nearly resulted in civil war
when he refused to accept the Central Election Committees final count
in favor of Bagapsh. Events came to a head in December, when Bagapsh
refused to give up plans for his inauguration.
In response to the unexpected turmoil in a republic fully dependent
on Russian support, Russia closed its borders and cut off trade
with Abkhazia, in effect squashing the main source of income for
most Abkhaz, the citrus trade. While that show of strength helped
convince Bagapsh to bow to Russian pressures, it also underscored
what analysts say caused his victory in the first place. The only real
difference between the two candidates was Bagapsh's calls for a truly
independent Abkhazia, recognized by the international community. In its
current state, both Tbilisi and Sukhumi refuse to have relations and
Georgia refuses to allow any trade to Abkhazia to cross its borders,
even to the extent that Saakashvili ordered Turkish boats heading to
Abkhazia bombed over the summer. That limits Sukhumi to relations with
Moscow. While it is unlikely that any country in the international
community will recognize Abkhazian independence, Bagapsh's strong
stance in that direction was perceived as a threat to the current
status quo.
Thanks to the immediate embargo on Abkhazian goods, Moscow was able
to convenience Bagapsh to accept a compromise between the two former
rivals. Days before the planned inauguration, Bagapsh agreed to a
revote and ran with Khajimba as his vice presidential candidate.
Under the current agreement, Khajimba wields an unusually large
amount of power, including a reported 40%of the state budget. Since
his election on January 12, Bagapsh has stepped up rhetoric against
Georgia and made open overtures to strengthen Abkhaz-Russian ties.
Moscow was able to reel the wayside republic back in, but it took a
last ditch show of strength to do it.
The Orange Revolution
Despite a much stronger Russian effort during the Ukrainian election
in November, the Russian-backed candidate Viktor Yanukovych could
not defeat opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko. Analysts have debated
on what Yushchenko's victory will really mean for Ukrainian-Russian
relations, but regardless of Yushchenko's Western-looking policies,
Ukraine remains a major Russian trading partner. Historically,
religiously and ethnically Russia and Ukraine have close ties. The
new president's first international trip was to Moscow, albeit quickly
followed by the address at Strasburg.
The real question remains what this growing trend of peaceful
uprisings will mean for the remaining Russian-supported presidents
in other former republics. However insulting Yushchenko's victory
is for Moscow, in the long run it will only truly adversely affect
Russian-Ukrainian affairs if Putin decides to punish Yushchenko like he
is currently castigating Georgian president Saakashvili. The Ukrainian
vote for Yushchenko was more a vote against rampant corruption and the
questionable election than a vote against Russia. Yushchenko has gone
out of his way to pacify Russians in the eastern part of the country,
even defending the role of the Russian language in Ukraine. His drive
toward the West is less a statement of anti-Russian sentiment than
as an accepted desire to improve conditions in his country. But that
can change if Russia is not willing to actively work with Yushchenko.
Yushchenko has roughly a year to prove to his divided country that
Ukraine will benefit from better relations with Western states. If
Russia tries to openly sabotage his effects - like it is in Abkhazia
and Georgia - Putin risks a much more serious backlash during the
upcoming parliamentary elections. By supporting Yushchenko, Russia
can help strengthen Ukraine, which will result in a deeper alliance
between the two countries and increase stability in the region. Any
effort by Moscow to further antagonize the country, especially the
western half, could have the opposite effect.
New ethnic discord will only weaken Russia's chance to increase
its influence in the region as both current leaders and opposition
forces throughout the former Soviet Union are watching Ukrainian
developments closely. If it becomes apparent that Moscow will not
tolerate any action perceived to weaken its influence in the region,
economic and military aid from the West will seem more desirable.
While existing leaders might welcome Russia's brand of friendship,
the opposition will work more strongly to free their respective
countries from Moscow's influence if it becomes evident Russia sees
them not as sovereign states but as internal problems.
Special relationship with Georgia
Moscow's continued interference with ethnic problems within Georgia
has not strengthened its role in the Caucasus. Even before the Rose
Revolution, Russia's efforts to destabilize the region and bring
it into submission with military force backfired. In 2002, Moscow
accused Tbilisi of harboring terrorists in the lawless Pankisi Gorge
that borders Chechnya. Instead of resulting in an increase of Russian
military personnel to Georgia, the accusations led to stronger ties
between Georgia and the US and the US-led "train and equip" program
for the Georgian army. Since Saakashvili came to power, Georgia has
made every effort to strengthen ties with the US and Europe.
Russia's continued support for separatist leaders in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia is meant to deter stability - and therefore foreign investment
- in Georgia. However, in reality Russia's obvious interference
has helped the Georgian leadership turn to the West for support and
resolution. During his speech in Strasburg, Saakashvili clearly stated
that Russia is not capable of leading Georgia to a peaceful resolution
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Venetian Commission's decision to
actively participate in the development of a peace settlement even
further decreases Russia's influence in its own near abroad.
Moscow's newest tactic - vetoing the continuation of the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) border patrol on the
Chechen, Ingushetia and Dagestani borders - has been more successful.
Under its current policy, Russia will guarantee no international
observers will be monitoring the borders by late spring. When the
snow melts, Chechen rebels will have easy passage into Georgia and -
according to Russia - Moscow will have ample cause to bomb the Pankisi
Gorge, or force Georgia into accepting more Russian peacekeepers inside
the Georgian border. Those troops would be in addition to the soldiers
already in place along the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
as well as the two Russian army bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki.
But this could also backfire. Saakashvili and his administration
have actively been searching for willing replacements to the OSCE
monitoring group and the EU has tentatively expressed interest. While
the EU's monitors are far from certain at this point, any move to
place independent international monitors would work against Russia.
Under the OSCE, Russia had a say and a role in the monitoring. If it
becomes the duty of the EU - or a mixture of observers from various
countries - Moscow's say would be diminished and its claims that the
Georgian government is not strong enough to protect its own borders
would be disproved.
Tbilisi and its allies are also becoming more adamant about the
remaining two Russian army bases in Georgia. In January, Saakashvili
attacked the role of Russian peacekeepers inside Georgian territory.
Georgia has proposed creating joint anti-terrorist centers with
Russia on the current army bases. So far Russia has shown no real
interest, but if it continues alienating itself from the international
community with coercive tactics, Georgia will gain more support from
the international community and could garner the necessary support
to force Russian troops out of the country all together.
Problems in Armenia
Another potential defeat for Russian influence is waiting in Armenia.
In the past, Armenia has been a bastion of Russian support in
the Caucasus. Russia has long supported the country militarily
and economically - for example, Armenia receives all of its gas
from Russia. While only an estimated 20% of Armenia's exports are
purchased in Russia, a reported 2 million Armenians live there and
their families at home depend on the financial support they send.
Russia supported Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with
Azerbaijan and still stands firmly behind Yerevan during peace talks
about the contested territories. During the civil unrest in Georgia
leading up to the Rose Revolution in 2003, both Russia and Armenia
made public statements about their mutually strong and beneficial
relationship. Russia strengthened its already strong military presence
in Armenia, increased arms sales and even moved some soldiers from
bases in Georgia to Armenia during the protests in Tbilisi.
Nevertheless, Armenia's support for Russian influence is not as strong
as it was a year ago. While the opposition was emboldened due to the
success of the Rose Revolution, another important negative development
for Russia came in September 2004, following the terrorist attacks
at Beslan. When Russia closed its borders with Georgia following
the attack, hundreds of Armenian trucks and buses were stranded for
a month, unable to go to either Russia or back to Armenia. While
there are no concrete figures for how much Armenian businesses
lost during that month, Armenians felt slighted by their ally and
insulted at Russia's reaction to punish them along with the rest of
the Caucasus. That added to dissatisfaction with Russia's continued
support of President Robert Kocharian, whose victory in 2003 is widely
disputed by opposition parties and the public.
Russian diplomats were slow to react to the situation, and statements
from Moscow largely consisted in recommending different routes
into Russia. The US, however, was not slow to act. Since the Rose
Revolution, Washington has been paying more attention to Armenia.
Sensing a weakness in Russian-Armenian relations over the past year,
America has picked up the pace. A new consulate is planned for Yerevan
which reportedly will be the biggest in the region. In addition,
American-driven aid projects have been on the rise.
A third party could further weaken Russian influence in Armenia.
Yerevan and Iran have held intense talks about a proposed gas
pipeline. While there are no investors yet, the pipeline has the
potential to free Armenia from its current state of dependence on
Russian gas.
Conclusion
Due to shortsighted policies, Russia has already lost considerable
influence in Georgia. Moscow's erroneous politics in Abkhazia and
Ukraine resulted in embarrassment and more strained relationships
within Russia's sphere of influence. If Putin does not reverse this
trend, Russia could lose support during the next Armenian elections
and further encourage the currently weak opposition parties in
Central Asia. Although opposition presidents are well aware of the
importance of good relations with Putin, political games force them
to increasingly turn to Europe and the US for aid and support in an
effort to balance more evenly between Russia and the West. If Moscow
does not start realizing that coercive tactics in its near abroad are
causing a loss of support from these states, it will continue to see
its interests in the region weaken.
Published with permission of the Power and Interest News Report, an
analysis-based publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. All
comments should be directed to [email protected]