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  • The New Battleground: Central Asia and the Caucasus

    The New Battleground: Central Asia and the Caucasus
    By Ilan Berman

    The Washington Quarterly
    Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter 2004-05), pp. 59-69.

    Following his first meeting with President Vladimir Putin in June 2001,
    President George W. Bush heaped praise on his Russian counterpart,
    hailing a new era in relations between the two countries and claiming
    he had gained a sense of the Russian leader's soul. Just three and a
    half years later, however, the strategic partnership forged between
    the two leaders in the wake of the September 11 attacks faces a new
    obstacle. Recent geopolitical developments, combined with expanding
    strategic agendas in Moscow and Washington, are ushering in a new
    era of competition in Russia's near abroad of Central Asia and the
    Caucasus.

    At least three factors are fueling the unfolding tug of war between
    Moscow and Washington. The first is the new strategic emphasis the
    United States has placed on Central Asia and the Caucasus as part of
    the global war against terrorism. This focus has propelled Washington
    to expand its military and strategic foothold in both regions. The
    second is Russia's domestic economic priorities, which have prompted
    Moscow to intensify its focus on acquiring a critical energy mass
    among the fragile former Soviet republics. The third factor is Putin's
    assumption of sweeping policymaking authority and the concomitant
    rise of an increasingly assertive, neo-imperial foreign policy in
    the Kremlin.

    For most of the last century, the Soviet Union dominated the political
    landscape of what is today Central Asia and the Caucasus. The end
    of the Cold War did little to alter this state of affairs. Although
    prompting the Kremlin to disengage from much of the Middle East and
    Latin America, it did not dim Moscow's involvement in the newly
    sovereign states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
    Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Nor did
    the end of the Cold War extinguish the imperial aspirations of
    many Russians, who continue to dream of a return of their country's
    former holdings. Yet, this wish has been called into question since
    September 11. The global campaign against terrorism launched by
    the United States following the attacks on New York and Washington
    has expanded the U.S. military presence in Russia's near abroad to
    unprecedented proportions.

    Moscow has watched these moves with growing trepidation. Putin
    supported Washington's initial plans, breaking with many in Moscow
    to endorse a U.S. military presence in his country's backyard. The
    steady expansion of this presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
    however, has lent credence to Russian fears that, despite assurances
    that the United States will withdraw its forces once Afghanistan is
    "stabilized," Washington, in fact, plans a regional deployment of
    indefinite duration. Over time, such perceptions, accompanied by a
    fear of waning Russian influence, have sparked a series of geopolitical
    contests in the countries that make up the post-Soviet space.


    WASHINGTON LOOKS EAST

    The current U.S. presence in the region is a relatively new
    phenomenon. Throughout the 1990s, policymakers in Washington paid
    only sporadic attention to Central Asia and the Caucasus. Notable
    exceptions included the Clinton administration's support for regional
    energy projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and the
    U.S. military's 1997 designation of Central Asia as an "area of
    responsibility" under the purview of the U.S. Central Command. The
    U.S. government's interest in this part of the world, however,
    has changed since September 11. Beginning in late 2001, as part of
    its campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States
    codified military basing agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,
    hammered out a deal with Kazakhstan for overflight rights and materiel
    transshipments, and acquired contingency use of the national airport
    in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.[1] The Bush administration also dramatically
    broadened economic assistance to the region, nearly tripling aid
    to Uzbekistan alone (to some $300 million) since October 2001.[2] By
    the official end of combat operations in Afghanistan on May 1, 2003,
    the United States had established forward bases housing a combined
    total of close to 3,000 troops in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and had
    begun close cooperation on tactical and intelligence matters with
    all Central Asian states except Turkmenistan.[3]

    If Afghanistan prompted Washington's initial interest in Central
    Asia and the Caucasus, the Pentagon's strategic transformation has
    preserved its attention. Under the guidance of Defense Secretary
    Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. military has commenced a sweeping overhaul
    of strategic priorities. For much of the 1990s, the collapse of the
    Soviet Union had by and large not been reflected in the strategic
    posture of the United States, which chose simply to substitute the
    Russian Federation for the USSR as its principal potential adversary,
    albeit a smaller and poorer one. By contrast, the Bush administration,
    drawing on the recommendations of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review,
    shifted the government's attention to developing capabilities designed
    to assure allies; dissuade adversaries; deter aggression; and, if
    necessary, decisively defeat undeterred enemies.[4]

    These new priorities, in turn, have directed the military posture of
    the United States away from the static, adversary-based model that
    dominated much of the previous century toward a strategy designed to
    achieve assurance, dissuasion, deterrence, and defense against any
    potential adversary in any environment. This fundamental change was
    enshrined in the National Security Strategy released by the White
    House in September 2002, which boldly declared that "[a] military
    structured to deter massive Cold War-era armies must be transformed
    to focus more on how an adversary might fight rather than where or
    when a war might occur."[5]

    The post-Soviet space has become a principal front for this
    transformation. In his 2002 report to the president and Congress,
    Rumsfeld pointed out that, "[a]long a broad arc of instability that
    stretches from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, there exists a
    volatile mix of rising and declining regional powers."[6] In response,
    the Pentagon has launched a global realignment of its defense posture
    designed to gain strategic control of this arc through an expanded
    military presence in those theaters.[7]

    This shift in focus has prompted a broad U.S. diplomatic and military
    initiative in Central Asia. In Uzbekistan, Washington's primary ally
    in Central Asia, a sweeping grant of authority for military operations
    has solidified the Pentagon's strategic presence, which now consists
    of an estimated 1,500 U.S. troops, cooperation with the Uzbek military
    on antiterrorism efforts and border security, and substantial joint
    initiatives on counterproliferation.

    Washington also has opened discussions regarding more permanent
    basing arrangements and deeper military-to-military cooperation with
    Kyrgyzstan, where the Pentagon currently houses some 1,300 service
    members supporting ongoing operations in Afghanistan.[8] In addition,
    the United States committed millions of dollars for equipment purchases
    and training for Kazakhstan's military and, since the summer of 2003,
    has financed the construction of a cooperative military base in the
    Caspian port city of Atyrau.[9]

    These efforts have been mirrored in the Caucasus. The United States
    has assumed a central military role in Georgia, launching the $64
    million Georgia Train and Equip Program in May 2002 as a means to
    enhance the antiterrorism capabilities of Georgia's military and
    alleviate tensions between Moscow and Tbilisi over the sporadic Chechen
    presence in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. Pentagon officials have also made
    overtures to Georgia's new president, Mikheil Saakashvili, related
    to his country's pro-Western political direction, a move that has
    already spurred the start of significant military reforms in Tbilisi.

    Similarly, Washington has pledged some $10 million to Azerbaijan
    to strengthen its border security, improve its communications
    infrastructure, and help its government carry out security operations
    aimed at countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction.[10]
    The Bush administration also initiated a series of joint military
    exercises in the Caspian Sea designed to train Azerbaijan's naval
    fleet to protect the oil-rich nation's offshore drilling platforms.[11]
    At the same time, Pentagon planners have opened talks with Baku about
    establishing a major, cooperative military-training program and raised
    the possibility of basing U.S. forces in the country.[12]

    The United States has even made inroads with Russia's closest partner
    in the Caucasus-Armenia. In April 2004, the Bush administration
    codified an agreement on enhanced military cooperation with Yerevan,
    and U.S. government officials subsequently opened preliminary
    discussions about joint military exercises between the United States
    and Armenia, to be held in the near future.[13]


    THE ENERGY IMPERATIVE

    The Pentagon's push east, meanwhile, has been matched in Moscow by a
    new economic necessity. Russia has become a bona fide energy superpower
    rather suddenly, surpassing Saudi Arabia as the world's leading oil
    producer in February 2002. Since then, the Kremlin has translated
    its newfound energy clout into an ambitious foreign agenda, pledging
    to provide the United States with 10 percent of its oil imports by
    the end of the decade[14] and putting Russia on track to become the
    fifth-largest oil supplier to the United States, after Canada, Saudi
    Arabia, Mexico, and Venezuela.

    An unlikely source has called such hopes into question. Since it
    began in the summer of 2003, the very public clampdown by the Kremlin
    on Russia's second-largest oil company, Yukos, and its billionaire
    former chief executive officer, Mikhail Khodorkovskii, has rocked
    the foundations of Putin's economic plans. Domestic political
    considerations may have been the primary motive for the Kremlin's
    offensive (Khodorkovskii had bankrolled two Duma party factions before
    the December 2003 parliamentary elections and even intimated that he
    himself might eventually run for president), but the economic impact
    has been far-reaching.

    First, the campaign against Yukos has succeeded in rattling investor
    confidence. Given the unpopularity of Russia's oligarchs, as well
    as the growing boldness of Putin's authoritarian domestic policies,
    many fear that the Yukos affair could merely be a prelude to a larger
    government offensive designed to eliminate political opposition
    and consolidate the Kremlin's control over vital Russian economic
    sectors. In turn, investors have signaled their unease: from a net
    inflow of some $4.6 billion in the first half of 2003, investment in
    Russia has seen a dramatic reversal, with capital flight topping $5
    billion in the first half of 2004.[15]

    Second, the Yukos case has shed light on Moscow's lack of commitment
    to economic integration with the West. The crackdown coincided with
    serious bids both from ChevronTexaco and ExxonMobil to acquire major
    stakes - 25 percent and 50 percent, respectively - in the Russian oil
    giant. All this suggests that the Kremlin's efforts were, at least in
    part, timed to head off the expansion of a Western foothold in the
    Russian energy sector. Russian officials' subsequent talk of vastly
    increased governmental control over the country's energy sector has
    only reinforced such speculation.

    In turn, as funding for energy exploration and infrastructure
    development has dried up, Russian officials have begun to recognize the
    limits of their energy potential. According to German Gref, Russia's
    economic development and trade minister, Russian oil production has
    now basically plateaued, and it is expected to rise less than 5 percent
    annually for the next four years or more.[16] For Russia's president,
    whose 2004 State of the Federation address pledged double-digit
    increases in the nation's gross domestic product by the end of the
    decade, this reality only adds impetus to expanding control over
    Russia's energy-rich former holdings as a way of making up the deficit.


    RUSSIA'S IMPERIAL IMPULSE RETURNS

    Moscow's reemergence in the post-Soviet space has also been driven
    by the revival of an old idea: Russia as empire. This concept has
    been present in Russian political life for centuries, and the end of
    the Cold War did little tomute Russia's historically expansionist
    tendencies. In fact, calls for a Greater Russia, championed by
    advocates such as Nobel laureate Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and by
    political thinkers including the controversial geopolitician and
    Eurasia Movement founder Aleksandr Dugin, reemerged shortly after
    the Soviet Union collapsed. Under Putin, however, these impulses are
    beginning to be put into practice.

    Domestically, the expansion of executive power has made Russia's
    imperial resurgence possible. Through a variety of legislative
    and administrative measures, Putin has succeeded in virtually
    monopolizing policymaking authority. The outcome of the December 2003
    elections effectively eliminated legislative checks on his executive
    authority. The pro-Kremlin United Russia Party was the runaway victor
    in the parliamentary race, garnering roughly half of all 447 seats in
    the Russian lower house (Duma). As a result, the party has assumed
    direction of all Duma committees dealing with foreign affairs and
    defense, transforming much of the Russian legislature into an enabler
    of the Kremlin's policies.

    Simultaneously, key appointments to government posts and periodic
    institutional purges have enabled Putin to create a vibrant subculture
    of former KGB officers within the Kremlin bureaucracy. These so-called
    siloviki today occupy upward of 60 percent of the key decisionmaking
    positions within the Russian government and constitute an important
    bloc of political support for official presidential policies.[17]
    Together, these dynamics have given Putin a sweeping mandate to pursue
    his neo-imperial aspirations.

    The mechanism for pursuing such policies can be found in the draft
    military concept that the Russian Defense Ministry unveiled in October
    2003.[18] The so-called Ivanov Doctrine, named after its chief
    architect, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, constitutes a dramatic
    overhaul of Russian strategic priorities and military practice. Among
    the primary threats to Russian security, the document identifies
    "the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of
    the military security of the Russian Federation or its allies" and
    "the introduction of foreign troops (without the agreement of the
    Russian Federation and the authorization of the UN Security Council)
    onto the territories of states, which are adjacent to and friendly
    toward the Russian Federation." Clearly, both dangers are thinly
    veiled references to the recent strategic inroads made by Washington.

    In response, the doctrine embraces the use of preemptive military force
    as a means not only to address military threats but also to maintain
    access to regions of vital economic or financial importance. As such,
    it represents a blue-print for the post-September 11 preservation of
    Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, a policy that the Kremlin
    has wholeheartedly endorsed.

    Moscow has not wasted any time translating these principles into policy
    in other ways as well. In Uzbekistan, Kremlin officials have managed
    to conclude a series of new deals related to arms and the defense
    industry, substantially strengthening military ties between Moscow and
    Tashkent. Russia has also codified a framework accord that effectively
    puts Moscow at the helm of a large portion of Tashkent's military
    policy. Similarly, in October 2003, in a sign of the Kremlin's new
    forward presence in the region, the Russian military opened its first
    foreign base since the fall of the Soviet Union in Kant, Kyrgyzstan,
    only 20 minutes from that country's capital.[19]

    Russia has also commenced an intense diplomatic offensive toward
    Kazakhstan, with Putin's January 2004 visit resulting in a significant
    strengthening of strategic ties between the Kremlin and its former
    satellite.[20] Just one month later, Russia and Kazakhstan inaugurated
    a joint action plan for security cooperation, which defined bilateral
    cooperation between the two countries as well as their respective
    roles in regional security structures such as the Shanghai Cooperation
    Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.[21]
    Russia has even reinforced its presence in Tajikistan, announcing in
    July 2004 that its vaunted 201st Motorized Infantry Division will soon
    have a permanent base in the Central Asian state.[22] Additionally,
    in early 2004, in a clear coup for the Kremlin, the government of
    Tajik president Imomali Rakhmonov granted Moscow military basing
    rights in his country "on a free of charge and open-ended basis."[23]

    In the Caucasus, Moscow has embarked on a campaign designed to undercut
    Georgia's emerging role in the region. As part of this effort, the
    Kremlin has fomented separatist tendencies within Georgia's autonomous
    regions (most recently in South Ossetia) and is even rumored to be
    behind covert efforts to sabotage the emerging Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
    energy pipeline. In late 2003, for example, a leading British paper
    charged that Russia's military intelligence organ, the Glavnoye
    Razvedovatelnoye Upravlenie (GRU), was allocating funds to bankroll
    eco-terrorists or Chechen rebels in attacks on the energy conduit.[24]

    Russia's approach to Azerbaijan has been more subtle. Through a variety
    of diplomatic carrots and sticks, ranging from offers of military aid
    to the abrupt cessation of gas supplies, Moscow has attempted to woo
    Baku away from its West-ward trajectory.

    At the same time, Defense Minister Ivanov has taken pains to stress
    Moscow's commitment to a long-term presence in Armenia. These efforts
    include signing a new accord on military cooperation between Moscow
    and Yerevan in November 2003, giving Russia the use of military
    bases in the Caucasus republic, and announcing the Kremlin's plans
    to modernize Armenia's military forces by expanding training programs
    and weapons transfers.[25]

    Russia is also broadening its regional presence by other means. It has
    outlined plans to increase its armed forces in the Caspian Sea region
    and, in a throwback to the gunboat diplomacy of Soviet times, has
    launched a series of regional maneuvers of its Caspian fleet.[26] In
    early June 2004, Russia also commenced large-scale military exercises,
    dubbed "Mobility 2004," in a clear signal to the countries in its
    near abroad that Moscow possesses both the will and the firepower to
    project force. Even though the maneuvers took place in the Russian
    Far East, the Russian Foreign Ministry made clear that the exercises
    were actually intended to demonstrate to neighboring states and to
    the United States that "any place is within our reach."[27]

    Moscow's moves are about much more than simply rolling back
    U.S. influence. Russian officials, in the words of Putin himself,
    are at least in part "now working to restore what was lost with the
    fall of the Soviet Union, but are doing it on a new, modern basis."[28]


    THE CONFLICT TO COME

    The friction resulting from all of these developments has brought
    Central Asia and the Caucasus to center stage on the Russian and
    U.S. strategic agendas. As Putin told an extraordinary session
    of the country's Security Council in July 2004, "We are facing an
    alternative - either we'll achieve a qualitative strengthening of
    the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and create on its basis
    an effectively functioning and influential regional organization, or
    else we'll inevitably see the erosion of this geopolitical space." The
    latter, Putin made clear, "should not be allowed to happen."[29]

    The addition of a new regional player has only reinforced Russia's
    sense of siege. With the most recent round of accession in the spring
    of 2004, NATO has dramatically widened its scope and reach in Russia's
    near abroad. This expansion has been matched by a rising activism
    in the Caspian and Black Sea regions. The Atlantic Alliance is now
    angling to become a guarantor of security for countries in Central
    Asia and the Caucasus, a fact that NATO formally articulated at its
    June 2004 summit in Istanbul with the announcement of plans to put a
    "special focus" on engagement in both regions.[30]

    It is not surprising that the situation has fanned Russian fears of
    Western encroachment. Russian policymakers have begun to worry, with
    some justification, that NATO's new reach might in the future make it
    possible for the West to meddle in areas of the Russian Federation
    that were previously off limits. The Kremlin is actively moving to
    formulate a strategic response. As Yuri Baluyevsky, the new chief
    of the Russian General Staff, has written, "A powerful military
    stationed at our borders with no declared objective poses a threat
    to any non-NATO country.... Sensible leaders would realize this and
    prepare to counter the threat."[31] For its part, the United States
    has only strengthened its commitment to engagement with Central Asia
    and the Caucasus as part of its plans to realign its global military
    posture to address post-Cold War threats more effectively.[32]

    The ultimate outcome of the emerging geopolitical tug of war between
    Moscow and Washington is still far from certain. Russia and the United
    States may yet be able to establish a modus vivendi of sorts in the
    post-Soviet space, based on a mutual interest in neutralizing the
    threat posed by regional terrorist groups. Indeed, this objective
    has been given new urgency in the aftermath of the bloody massacre
    of schoolchildren in Beslan, Russia, in early September 2004.

    Nevertheless, the recent events in Beslan can just as easily serve as
    the harbinger of far greater friction between Russia and the United
    States. Russian officials have since unveiled a new counterterrorism
    strategy that internalizes the principle of military preemption and
    have expressed their right to "eliminate terrorist bases in any region
    of the world."[33] More ominously, Putin has used the tragedy as an
    excuse to further centralize government power by altering the process
    for the selection of Russia's 89 regional governors. There is little
    doubt either in Washington or in Moscow that such measures are likely
    to contribute to a more aggressive Russian presence in the Caucasus
    and Central Asia.

    Remedial measures, such as a cooperative counterterrorism strategy for
    the region or direct U.S. investment designed to revitalize Russia's
    ailing energy infrastructure, could certainly diffuse some of the
    pressure at least temporarily, but policymakers in Washington would do
    well to recognize the long-term incompatibility of U.S. and Russian
    regional priorities. For the Kremlin, remaining the dominant player
    in the post-Soviet space is not simply a matter of political prestige;
    this role has increasingly become an economic necessity. For the White
    House, meanwhile, the continued independence of the fragile regional
    republics, not to mention their pro-Western political orientation,
    remains critical to the long-term success of the global war against
    terrorism.

    The dueling strategies of the Russian and U.S. governments will do
    more than simply determine the political evolution of Central Asia
    and the Caucasus. Given the stakes, they are likely to test the very
    limits of the strategic partnership between Moscow and Washington.


    Ilan Berman is vice president for policy at the American Foreign
    Policy Council in Washington, D.C., where he directs research and
    analysis on Central Asia and the Middle East.


    NOTES:

    1. Elizabeth Wishnick, Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War:
    U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed (Carlisle, Pa.:
    U.S. Army War College, May 2004), pp. 2-4.

    2. Council on Foreign Relations,
    "Terrorism: Questions & Answers-Uzbekistan," 2004,
    http://www.terrorismanswers.org/coalition/uzbekistan.html (accessed
    October 14, 2004).

    3. Wishnick, Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War, p. 2.

    4. "Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts]," December 31, 2001,
    http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm (accessed
    October 14, 2004).

    5. National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
    September 2002, p. 29, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed
    October 14, 2004).

    6. U.S. Department of Defense, "2002 Annual Report to
    the President and the Congress," Washington, D.C., 2002,
    http://www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/index.htm (accessed October
    14, 2004).

    7. Douglas J. Feith, "Transforming the Global Defense Posture,"
    remarks before CSIS, Washington, D.C., December 3, 2003.

    8. "Kyrgyz President Meets With U.S. Centcom Commander," Radio Free
    Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) Newsline, July 29, 2004.

    9. "Kazakhstan Building Military Base on Caspian With U.S. Help,"
    RFE/RL Newsline, October 8, 2003.

    10. "United States Signs Agreement With Azerbaijan to Help Ex-Soviet
    Republic Strengthen Its Borders," Associated Press, January 3, 2004;
    "Azerbaijan, U.S. Sign Agreement on WMD," RFE/RL Newsline, January
    6, 2004.

    11. Sevindzh Abdullayeva and Victor Shulman, "U.S., Azerbaijan Begin
    10-Day Naval Exercises," Itar-TASS News Service, January 26, 2004.

    12. "Azerbaijan, U.S. Discuss Military Cooperation," RFE/RL Newsline,
    November 24, 2003.

    13. "Armenia, U.S. Discuss Military Cooperation," RFE/RL Newsline,
    April 27, 2004.

    14. "Putin Says Russian Oil to Make Up 10% of U.S. Imports in 5-7
    Yrs.," Prime TASS News Service, September 26, 2003.

    15. Carola Hoyos and Arkady Ostrovsky, "Russia Fears Dollars 13bn
    Capital Flight After Yukos," Financial Times (London), November 8,
    2003; "$5.5Bln Left Russia in First Half of Year," Moscow Times,
    July 5, 2004.

    16. "Russia Unable to Increase Oil Production Quickly-Gref," Interfax,
    June 17, 2004.

    17. Arkady Ostrovsky, "Putin Oversees Big Rise in Influence of
    Security Apparatus," Financial Times (London), October 31, 2003
    (citing Olga Kryshtanovskaia).

    18. Russian Ministry of Defense, "Urgent Tasks of the Development
    of the Russian Federation Armed Force," reprinted by the Russian
    Information Agency (RIA) Novosti News Service, October 3, 2003.

    19. "Russian Base in Kyrgyzstan Seen as Part of 'Tougher' Military
    Posture," Nezavisimaia Gazeta, October 25, 2003.

    20. Viktoria Sokolova, "Putin Visits Kazakhstan-Round-Up," Itar-TASS
    News Service, January 9, 2004; Charles Carlson, "Kazakhstan: Putin
    Visit to Focus on Baikonur, CIS, Oil Resources," RFE/RL, January
    9, 2004.

    21. "Kazakh, Russian Security Services Sign Cooperation Accord for
    2004," Interfax-Kazakhstan News Service, February 10, 2004.

    22. "Russia to Set Up Military Base in Tajikistan in Autumn," Itar-TASS
    News Service, July 12, 2004; "Russia to Get Tajik Base in Fall,"
    RFE/RL Newsline, July 13, 2004.

    23. Valery Zhukov, "Russian Military Base in Tajikistan Big
    Achievement-Armitage," Itar-TASS News Service, July 17, 2004.

    24. Nick Patton Walsh, "Russia Accused of Plot to Sabotage Georgian
    Oil Pipeline," Guardian (London), December 1, 2003.

    25. "Russia to Rearm Armenia Base, Defence Minister Says," RIA Novosti
    News Service, November 11, 2003.

    26. "Military Balance Needed in Caspian-Kalyuzhny," Interfax News
    Service, April 30, 2004; "Russia Ends Naval Drills in Caspian Sea,
    Plans Large-Scale Drills for Summer," Center TV (Moscow), May 3, 2004.

    27. Pavel Baev, "Kremlin Launches Military Exercises in Russian Far
    East," Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 28 (June 10, 2004).

    28. "Putin Say CIS Seeks to 'Restore What Was Lost' With Soviet
    Collapse," RFE/RL Newsline, June 18, 2004.

    29. Igor Torbakov, "Putin Urges Shift in Russia's CIS Policies,"
    Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 60 (July 27, 2004).

    30. "Istanbul Summit Communiqu?," Istanbul, June 28, 2004,
    http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm (accessed October 14,
    2004).

    31. Yuri Baluyevsky, "Cooperation Is Only Path: West Must Finally
    Bury Cold War Mindset," Defense News, June 14, 2004.

    32. Pamela Hess, "U.S. Plans Major Global Troop Realignment," United
    Press International, November 25, 2004.

    33. Peter Baker, "Russia Says Siege Leader Brutally Killed 3
    Followers," Washington Post, September 9, 2004 (quoting Col. Gen. Yuri
    Baluyevsky).

    [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
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