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"Turkish-Russian Relations: Implications for Eurasia's Geopolitics"

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  • "Turkish-Russian Relations: Implications for Eurasia's Geopolitics"

    "Turkish-Russian Relations: Implications for Eurasia's Geopolitics"

    PINR The Power and Interest News Report
    Feb 9 2005


    As a result of its geography, Turkey maintains a multi-dimensional
    and dynamic foreign policy. Turkish foreign policymakers are
    carefully analyzing their foreign policy options in light of the 9/11
    attacks and the war in Iraq. Within this set of complex links,
    Turkish-Russian relations appear rather perplexing. Historically,
    there have been many wars between these two states up until the end
    of WWI. Both countries have imperial legacies and have experienced a
    post-imperial traumatic loneliness. Great imperial legacies and the
    feelings of isolation after the collapse of the previous empires are
    important factors that shape the national memory of these countries.

    After Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Turkey in December
    of last year, Turkey's prime minister paid a one day official visit
    to Russia on January 10, 2005. It is relevant to analyze current
    factors that determine the relations between these two states.
    Domestic politics in Russia is often the result of competing views of
    Westerners, anti-Westerners, Eurasianists, ultra-nationalists and
    nostalgic communists. Russian foreign policy is generally determined
    along the line of domestic political preferences. There is a symbolic
    pendulum in Russian foreign policy that vacillates between Europe and
    Asia depending on the political balances currently at play. Russian
    foreign policy is today more critical of the West and follows a more
    Eurasian-oriented path.

    For Moscow, the existence of such national memory and geopolitical
    orientation makes it difficult to determine a fixed and
    well-functioning foreign policy towards Turkey. Like Russia, Turkey
    has Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern and European identities and
    different interests at stake in all of these regions. Another
    significant factor is that both countries are going through dynamic
    domestic and economic transformations. The change in the early four
    years of the current decade is surely dramatic at both societal and
    state levels.

    Issues at Stake

    More specifically, the future of Turkish-Russian relations will be a
    product of bilateral, regional and international developments.
    High-level mutual visits in the recent period underline a number of
    important issues between the two states. Although observers seem to
    have an optimistic perception of the relations both in Moscow and
    Ankara, there are issues of contention between the two states.

    The issues of bilateral relations will be trade, investments by
    Turkish and Russian businessmen, tourism, natural gas purchases,
    Russian oil tankers transiting the straits, future pipeline projects
    that may pass through the Trace or Anatolia, the Chechen question,
    Russian arms sales, and the actions of Kurdish separatists on Russian
    soil. A major recent development is the Russian leader's statement
    that the Turkish society in Northern Cyprus deserves better treatment
    from the international community, since the Turkish Cypriots voted in
    favor of the U.N. plan designed to put an end to the division of the
    island.

    Although there is much talk about the convergence of interests
    between Turkey and Russia, one should also point out the conflicting
    ones. Both countries favor improving their current relations and
    adopting a more pragmatic stance on the international arena.
    Officials on both sides signed a number of agreements, which will
    surely facilitate the establishment of constructive relations.

    The volume of bilateral trade reached $10 billion in 2004, and both
    sides aim to increase this volume to $25 billion by 2007. Turkey's
    construction sector is active in Moscow and is increasing its market
    share in Russia. Russian businessmen closely follow Turkey's
    privatization process and want to take part in energy projects in
    Turkey. Another major cooperation area is Russian arms sales to
    Turkey. Considering the Iraq crisis and potential instability in Iran
    and Syria, Ankara pays serious attention to military modernization
    projects and has an interest in Russian arms supplies. Finally,
    Russian tourists increasingly prefer Turkey's Mediterranean coast for
    their vacations.

    At another level, the mutual agenda is set around Russia's energy
    geopolitics, its near abroad policies, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
    (B.T.C.) oil pipeline, ethnic secessionist movements in the Caucasus,
    the reduction of Russian military forces in the region in accordance
    with international agreements, and the problems emerging after the
    Iraq war. Russia dislikes the B.T.C. pipeline, which is expected to
    transit Azeri and Kazak oil to the West. Moscow regards this pipeline
    as a challenge to its status in the Caspian basin and an obstacle to
    its oil trade. Although the major conflict surrounding the B.T.C.
    pipeline was between Russia and a number of former Soviet states, it
    indirectly influenced Turkish-Russian relations. However, the Blue
    Stream project -- a natural gas pipeline that runs from Russia to
    Turkey via the Black Sea -- and several other Turkish-Russian oil
    pipeline projects have led to the emergence of a "low profile" policy
    concerning oil politics on the part of Russia. Although it is
    speculative at the moment, the head of British Petroleum Company in
    Azerbaijan recently floated the possibility of carrying Russian oil
    through the B.T.C.

    According to the official Turkish policy line, the Chechen question
    is a Russian internal problem. Turkish officials frequently declare
    that Russian security measures should not violate human rights in
    Chechnya. However, a large Chechen diaspora in Turkey follows a
    different line and tries its best to assist Chechen guerrillas,
    creating significant tensions between the Turkish and Russian
    governments. In return, Turkish officials have expressed discontent
    about the Kurdistan Workers Party's -- a separatist Kurdish armed
    movement -- activities in Russian territories. For the time being,
    both sides extend considerable vigor in order not to sever their
    relations on account of trans-boundary ethnic problems.

    Toward a New Geopolitics

    Russia has a regional profile and is sensitive about losing its
    influence in ex-Soviet territories. Since 1991, Turkey has emerged as
    a significant regional player, pursuing a special relationship with
    the E.U. and paying serious attention to building good relations in
    the Caucasus and Central Asia. How closer Turkish-Russian relations
    will be interpreted in Brussels and Washington is another important
    question.

    The U.S. military deployment in different parts of Eurasia, the
    pro-Western change in domestic landscapes of Georgia and Ukraine, the
    U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are, among others, the developments
    that have paved the way for the emergence of a new geopolitics in
    Eurasia. The European and U.S. expansion into former Soviet
    territories influences Russian policymakers to seek new alliances in
    Asia. Russian rapprochement with Iran, China and India are examples
    of this new policy. In this sense, the new developments in the
    aftermath of the 9/11 attacks are bringing together the policies of
    not only Russia and other major Asian powers, but also some critical
    European states like France and Germany.

    After receiving a negotiation date for E.U. membership, Turkey is
    emerging as a European actor in the region. However, Turkey's new
    orientation was tested during the subsequent domestic transformations
    of Georgia and Ukraine. Turkey adopted a low profile attitude toward
    the Russian policies vis-à-vis Ukraine and Georgia, and sensitively
    displayed a constructive outlook by pointing to the relevant
    international norms and agreements as the way to resolve the crises.
    Ankara tries to avoid taking sides in any "Russia versus the West"
    struggles, while developing its own relations with Moscow.

    One other important area of contention is Turkish-Armenian relations,
    which are held hostage to historical enmities and Turkey's
    pro-Azerbaijan policies in the Caucasus. Currently, Russia is the
    main ally of Armenia, and possible Russian mediation between Turkey
    and Armenia on a number of issues can be expected. Following recent
    positive developments on this front, there may be Russian-Turkish
    joint attempts to solve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.

    Conclusion

    By looking at the current developments, it can be concluded that
    Turkish-Russian relations will improve in the political, economic and
    security realms. However, the relations are not free from a number of
    serious problems that could threaten to derail these growing ties;
    both countries have converging and conflicting interests in
    neighboring regions, and this status makes Turkish-Russian relations
    promising yet difficult. Turkey and Russia are two influential actors
    in the Eurasian geopolitics and their relations have implications for
    the whole Eurasian region. Because of this, internal and external
    players in Eurasian geopolitical gambling will keep an eye on this
    growing relationship.

    Report Drafted By:
    Dr. Bulent Aras



    The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent
    organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide
    conflict analysis services in the context of international relations.
    PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests
    involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may
    not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written
    permission of [email protected]. All comments should be directed to
    [email protected].


    --Boundary_(ID_EjscDefBJQr1PpCUd7SCdQ)--
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