Tweet
Turkish Daily News
Feb 22 2005
Gündüz Aktan: The KKTC in the wake of the elections
In the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC), the first victor
of the recent elections was the Republican Turks' Party (CTP) and the
second victor the government; that is, the ruling CTP-Democratic
Party (DP) coalition. Therefore, it may be assumed that the
government is to stay on. The Turkish Cypriot people have shown that
they support the `peace approach' of the Mehmet Ali Talat-Serdar
Denktas duo.
The statements they have made indicate that both Talat and Denktas
will give priority to the task of finding a solution to the Cyprus
problem by Oct. 3, focusing for this purpose on the issue of
negotiating the proposed changes the Greek Cypriots seek in the Annan
plan for reunification of Cyprus. To be able to analyze the potential
results of this approach one should first look at the Greek Cypriot
attitude.
The original Annan plan did not favor the Turkish Cypriots. In
fact, after the Greek Cypriots rejected his plan in the April 24
referendum, Kofi Annan issued a statement in which he explained
item-by-item exactly how the Annan plan favored the Greek Cypriots.
For Papadopoulos these had not been enough. He aimed to gain
advantages beyond what the Annan plan would provide - by exploiting
the fact that the Greek side would have the right to veto a European
Union decision to start accession talks with Turkey. In this context
he demanded that Turkey recognize the Greek Cypriot administration as
the `Republic of Cyprus' and withdraw its troops from the island.
Obviously he hoped that this way the Turkish Cypriots could be
reduced to the level of a minority group and that the de-facto
situation created on the island as a fait accompli in the aftermath
of 1963 would be legitimized via Turkey's `acceptance' of it.
There is no reason to expect that, if the plan were now to be
presented anew for reconsideration, the concessions the Greek Cypriot
side would seek would be anything less than the concessions they had
expected to gain as a result of a potential Turkish recognition of
the Greek Cypriot administration as the 'Republic of Cyprus.'
Furthermore, seeing Annan's `good offices' mission as a kind of
`arbitration' and rejecting it, Papadopoulos insisted that there
should be no timetable for the negotiations.
Also, he insists on negotiating with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan
and not with KKTC Prime Minister Talat. His aim is to pave the way
for a Cyprus negotiating process that would run parallel to the
EU-Turkey accession talks. This would be an effort to shift the
Cyprus negotiations away from the United Nations and into the EU
framework. Meanwhile, he maintains his efforts to gain recognition
from Turkey via certain articles inserted into the text of the annex
protocol of the Ankara Agreement at his instigation.
Under the circumstances, it is not even clear whether the new KKTC
government would opt for a resumption of the `inter-communal
negotiations.' In a situation where Rauf Denktas is withdrawing from
the position of KKTC president, Papadopoulos would continue imposing
his own conditions on the KKTC government, which he considers to be
eager to find an urgent solution to the Cyprus issue.
Assuming that the Cyprus negotiations would begin, the Turkish side
would have to fulfill Papadopoulos's extreme demands to be able to
bring the negotiations to a conclusion by Oct. 3. Otherwise the Greek
Cypriots would postpone the `resolution of the Cyprus problem' to a
date later than Oct. 3. Then, after the start of the EU-Turkey
accession talks, they could test the effectiveness of their veto.
Let us assume the Cyprus negotiations begin, and the Greek Cypriots
surprise everybody by seeking only modest changes in the Annan plan,
and the problem is resolved by Oct. 3. The Turkish Cypriots would,
via reunification with the Greek Cypriots, take their place in the
EU. However, that would happen at a time when Turkey's EU membership
drive would be in a much more indefinite stage compared to the past
occasions when the initial five versions of the Annan plan had been
drafted. If Turkey cannot become a member of the EU, then not only
would a situation contrary to the (Cyprus) Guarantee Agreement be
created in Cyprus, but Turkey would also have lost virtually all its
guarantor rights and powers.
If the Cyprus case were to be lost in this way, a sharp
polarization would take place in the Turkish section, a polarization
that would carry the seeds of a potential clash. Also, such a
development would set a highly unfortunate precedent on other issues
such as the Aegean problems, the "Armenian genocide' claims and
`ethnic minority' issues.
This grave situation has come into being partly because of the fact
that the EU and the United States have failed to lift the embargo on
the KKTC despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriots voted `yes' on
the Annan plan in the referendum.
Also, the fact that the National Unity Party (UBP) has failed to
renew itself further weakens the hand of a Turkish side that was
negotiating with the Greek Cypriots from a not-too-strong position in
the first place. The political parties in the KKTC suffer from the
same malaise as their counterparts in Turkey: they have a leadership
problem. Unless the required changes take place in that party by the
next presidential election, then the UBP will continue to go downhill
and will stop playing a meaningful role from the standpoint of
defending Turkish Cypriots.
That will leave Mr. Talat as the only source of hope. In
psychology, the defeat of an old leader by a young challenger is
referred to as the ritual of `slaying the father.' The `son' who once
held exactly the opposite of the `father's' views, reverts back to
the views of the `father' once he gains power. We witnessed that
phenomenon in the Ismet Pasha-Bulent Ecevit race.
Let us wait and see whether Talat's behavior will reaffirm this
rule.
Feb 22 2005
Gündüz Aktan: The KKTC in the wake of the elections
In the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC), the first victor
of the recent elections was the Republican Turks' Party (CTP) and the
second victor the government; that is, the ruling CTP-Democratic
Party (DP) coalition. Therefore, it may be assumed that the
government is to stay on. The Turkish Cypriot people have shown that
they support the `peace approach' of the Mehmet Ali Talat-Serdar
Denktas duo.
The statements they have made indicate that both Talat and Denktas
will give priority to the task of finding a solution to the Cyprus
problem by Oct. 3, focusing for this purpose on the issue of
negotiating the proposed changes the Greek Cypriots seek in the Annan
plan for reunification of Cyprus. To be able to analyze the potential
results of this approach one should first look at the Greek Cypriot
attitude.
The original Annan plan did not favor the Turkish Cypriots. In
fact, after the Greek Cypriots rejected his plan in the April 24
referendum, Kofi Annan issued a statement in which he explained
item-by-item exactly how the Annan plan favored the Greek Cypriots.
For Papadopoulos these had not been enough. He aimed to gain
advantages beyond what the Annan plan would provide - by exploiting
the fact that the Greek side would have the right to veto a European
Union decision to start accession talks with Turkey. In this context
he demanded that Turkey recognize the Greek Cypriot administration as
the `Republic of Cyprus' and withdraw its troops from the island.
Obviously he hoped that this way the Turkish Cypriots could be
reduced to the level of a minority group and that the de-facto
situation created on the island as a fait accompli in the aftermath
of 1963 would be legitimized via Turkey's `acceptance' of it.
There is no reason to expect that, if the plan were now to be
presented anew for reconsideration, the concessions the Greek Cypriot
side would seek would be anything less than the concessions they had
expected to gain as a result of a potential Turkish recognition of
the Greek Cypriot administration as the 'Republic of Cyprus.'
Furthermore, seeing Annan's `good offices' mission as a kind of
`arbitration' and rejecting it, Papadopoulos insisted that there
should be no timetable for the negotiations.
Also, he insists on negotiating with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan
and not with KKTC Prime Minister Talat. His aim is to pave the way
for a Cyprus negotiating process that would run parallel to the
EU-Turkey accession talks. This would be an effort to shift the
Cyprus negotiations away from the United Nations and into the EU
framework. Meanwhile, he maintains his efforts to gain recognition
from Turkey via certain articles inserted into the text of the annex
protocol of the Ankara Agreement at his instigation.
Under the circumstances, it is not even clear whether the new KKTC
government would opt for a resumption of the `inter-communal
negotiations.' In a situation where Rauf Denktas is withdrawing from
the position of KKTC president, Papadopoulos would continue imposing
his own conditions on the KKTC government, which he considers to be
eager to find an urgent solution to the Cyprus issue.
Assuming that the Cyprus negotiations would begin, the Turkish side
would have to fulfill Papadopoulos's extreme demands to be able to
bring the negotiations to a conclusion by Oct. 3. Otherwise the Greek
Cypriots would postpone the `resolution of the Cyprus problem' to a
date later than Oct. 3. Then, after the start of the EU-Turkey
accession talks, they could test the effectiveness of their veto.
Let us assume the Cyprus negotiations begin, and the Greek Cypriots
surprise everybody by seeking only modest changes in the Annan plan,
and the problem is resolved by Oct. 3. The Turkish Cypriots would,
via reunification with the Greek Cypriots, take their place in the
EU. However, that would happen at a time when Turkey's EU membership
drive would be in a much more indefinite stage compared to the past
occasions when the initial five versions of the Annan plan had been
drafted. If Turkey cannot become a member of the EU, then not only
would a situation contrary to the (Cyprus) Guarantee Agreement be
created in Cyprus, but Turkey would also have lost virtually all its
guarantor rights and powers.
If the Cyprus case were to be lost in this way, a sharp
polarization would take place in the Turkish section, a polarization
that would carry the seeds of a potential clash. Also, such a
development would set a highly unfortunate precedent on other issues
such as the Aegean problems, the "Armenian genocide' claims and
`ethnic minority' issues.
This grave situation has come into being partly because of the fact
that the EU and the United States have failed to lift the embargo on
the KKTC despite the fact that the Turkish Cypriots voted `yes' on
the Annan plan in the referendum.
Also, the fact that the National Unity Party (UBP) has failed to
renew itself further weakens the hand of a Turkish side that was
negotiating with the Greek Cypriots from a not-too-strong position in
the first place. The political parties in the KKTC suffer from the
same malaise as their counterparts in Turkey: they have a leadership
problem. Unless the required changes take place in that party by the
next presidential election, then the UBP will continue to go downhill
and will stop playing a meaningful role from the standpoint of
defending Turkish Cypriots.
That will leave Mr. Talat as the only source of hope. In
psychology, the defeat of an old leader by a young challenger is
referred to as the ritual of `slaying the father.' The `son' who once
held exactly the opposite of the `father's' views, reverts back to
the views of the `father' once he gains power. We witnessed that
phenomenon in the Ismet Pasha-Bulent Ecevit race.
Let us wait and see whether Talat's behavior will reaffirm this
rule.