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The Jamestown Foundation
Thursday, December 2 -- Volume 1, Issue 138
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Moscow slaps economic sanctions on Abkhazia
*Will Ukraine crisis make Moscow tighten its grasp on Central Asia?
*Kazakh election monitors found no problems with Ukrainian vote
*Baku asks UN to rule on Armenian settlements in Karabakh
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RUSSIA BLOCKADING ABKHAZIA TO OVERTURN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
On December 1, Russia's government introduced a set of blockade
measures against Abkhazia for the declared purpose of preventing the
inauguration of president-elect Sergei Bagapsh, victor over the
Moscow-backed candidate Raul Khajimba in Abkhazia's October 3
presidential election. Gennady Bukayev, an aide to Russian Prime
Minister Mikhail Fradkov, announced the sanctions at a news briefing
in Moscow.
The measures, mainly economic but also apparently entailing some
military aspects, include: cutting off the railway connection between
Abkhazia and Russia; severely restricting cross-border passage for
Abkhaz residents and transport at checkpoints manned by Russian border
troops on the so-called "Russian-Abkhaz border" (legally a section of
the Russia-Georgia border); quarantining the transport of Abkhaz-grown
citrus fruit to Russia at that border; placing Russia's coastal navy
on alert along that border's maritime sector; and preparing for a
complete blockade, "If further unlawful actions by Bagapsh result in a
further deterioration of the situation in Abkhazia."
Bukayev was explicit about the sanctions' political purpose: "The
Russian leadership supports the legitimate Abkhaz president Vladislav
Ardzinba's decision to stage a new election for Abkhazia's
presidency. Bagapsh and the criminal organizations that back him are
trying to seize power by force of arms. The Russian leadership has
made its earnest decision in order to prevent the escalation of
violence and ensure the safety of Russia's citizens. These measures
are not directed at the people of Abkhazia and will be lifted as soon
as the situation stabilizes" (Interfax, NTV Mir, December 1).
It was apparently on November 25 that the Kremlin decided to step in
forcefully and reverse the momentum in Abkhazia toward recognition of
Bagapsh as winner and his scheduled inauguration on December
6. Consequently, and characteristically, Moscow's rhetoric is now
"criminalizing" the president-elect, notwithstanding the fact that he
has been declared winner by Abkhazia's electoral commission,
legislature, high court, and other bodies that Moscow itself had all
along touted as Abkhazia's lawful bodies. The invocation of "Russia's
citizens" is key to the above-referenced statement. Having conferred
its citizenship en masse to Abkhazia's residents, Russia has until now
used this fait accompli to claim rights of protection over them. Now,
however, Moscow uses the same argument in claiming a right to impose
sanctions on "its" citizens. In sum, Russia reserves the right to deal
with "its" citizens as it sees fit. The message to Abkhazia is that
"stabilizing the situation" means overturning the election of Bagapsh
as a condition for lifting the Russian sanctions.
The sanctions' impact could be devastating. Employment in Russia
(often in the shadow economy) and cross-border shuttle trading are
survival matters for Abkhazia's residents. In winter, citrus fruit
exports to Russia are the main source of revenue. The "temporary"
sanctions are timed precisely to the citrus harvest in Abkhazia and
the pre-Christmas peak of Abkhaz citrus sales in Russian cities.
Governor Alexander Tkachov of Krasnodar Krai (adjacent to Abkhazia)
had called for the imposition of sanctions on November 22-23, publicly
urging that the border be closed in response to the political
situation in Abkhazia. He added a call for stopping the payment of
pensions to Abkhazia's freshly baked Russian citizens, unless Bagapsh
yields ahead of December 6 (Itar-Tass, Interfax, November
22-23). Tkachov's statements often seem out of line because he belongs
to the establishment's ultra-nationalist fringe. However, it sometimes
turns out that he heralds government decisions shortly before these
are officially announced. For example, in August 2003 he urged the
construction of the dam in the Kerch Strait toward Tuzla Island,
encroaching on Ukraine's territory -- a move that soon turned out to
be Russian government policy. In June 2004, Tkachov threatened that
Cossack and other "volunteers" would be sent to South Ossetia against
Georgia; they were indeed sent and advertised by Russia's authorities
shortly afterward.
The economic sanctions are clearly designed to pressure Bagapsh's
supporters into withdrawing their support and accepting Ardzinba's
decision to stage a new presidential election. But even the Russian
government functionary Nodar Khashba, a native Abkhaz recently
installed as prime minister in Sukhumi to support Ardzinba and
Khajimba, opposes the sanctions. Within hours of the Russian
government's announcement, Khashba told Russian media, "Ordinary
inhabitants, an overwhelming majority of whom are Russia's citizens,
must not be made to suffer." Khashba announced that he would appeal to
the Russian government to rescind the sanctions, implying at the same
time that Moscow's political demands should be met (Itar-Tass,
December 1).
In Sukhumi, the outgoing and deeply ailing president Ardzinba -- or
those acting in his name -- and hard-line pro-Moscow groups are using
the argument that a Bagapsh presidency would irreparably damage
Abkhazia's relations with Russia (the sanctions are cited as evidence)
and conversely, overturning the election result and staging a new
election are prerequisites to restoring relations with
Russia. Ardzinba's November 29 proclamation, and an accompanying
statement by paramilitary groups supporting him, vows to stop Bagapsh
supporters from duplicating in Abkhazia the current events in Ukraine
or the earlier ones in Tbilisi, Ajaria, and Serbia that led to regime
change (Apsnypress, November 29).
--Vladimir Socor
RUSSIA'S SECURITY INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA INCREASES AS UKRAINE
CRISIS UNFOLDS
Central Asian political leaders are watching events in Kyiv closely,
as the Ukrainian crisis may affect the future foreign policy choices
they make between the West and Russia. Meetings of the CIS Defense
Ministers Council, at the Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation
in Moscow on November 25, indicated a strong desire for further
strengthening the existing CSTO security mechanisms within Central
Asia. Indeed, these meetings, partly under the umbrella of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), appear to pave the way
for the future expansion of the CSTO Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF),
to as much as 10,000 personnel (Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 26).
Nikolai Bordyuzha, Secretary-General of the CSTO, confirmed the
interest in enhanced levels of CSTO military cooperation, as member
states examined a model concept for forming a joint group of troops in
the Central Asian region. In his words, the document approved at the
meeting provides for creating a large joint group of troops including
formations from the armed forces of CSTO states (Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). This potentially numbers a total of
10,000 personnel. The group could therefore become up to four times
the current strength of the CRDF, currently tasked with operating in
Central Asia during a security crisis. Moscow's foothold in this
mechanism is secure, since it has guaranteed the main striking force
of the group will be elements drawn from the Russian military base in
Tajikistan and its air force base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.
Of course, attempts to strengthen Russia's security influence within
Central Asia are not new, and have been a recurring theme in the
region since the deployment of U.S. and Western military forces into
the region in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. But
recent developments within Central Asian capitals seem to present a
window of opportunity for Moscow to reclaim lost ground in the region.
Kazakhstan has been the only Central Asian member of the CSTO that has
espoused clearly autonomous and pro-Western military cooperation
policies. While the others have more readily accepted
collective-security arrangements with Russia as the linchpin in this
system, Kazakhstan, for instance, has advanced its plans to forge
ahead with reforming and building its Navy in the Caspian Sea by 2007
with U.S. support. However, as the situation in Ukraine is played out,
there will be clear lessons for those pursuing pro-Western policies in
Kazakhstan, which may favor Moscow's efforts to stem the westward
drift of the former Soviet republics along its borders.
On November 25 in Moscow, a protocol was finally ratified that creates
the legal basis for increasing and offering supplies of military
hardware to CSTO countries at preferential financial rates. Valery
Loshchinin, Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister, believes that the
agreement will facilitate further military integration among CSTO
member states and compel greater levels of security cooperation.
Kazakhstan's military reform priorities, announced on November 26,
included a commitment to raise the level of defense spending from one
percent of GDP to 1.2 percent by 2007. The Kazakhstani Ministry of
Defense also defined a set of priority investment projects, which will
be implemented in the next three years. These include constructing
housing in Astana, military facilities in the country's south and
west, improving the facilities of military airfields, and building a
national defense university, as well as developing modernized
communications systems. All these plans, from the Caspian-orientated
military facilities in Kazakhstan's western region to procurement of
communications equipment, demand closer cooperation with the United
States and Western countries in order to be effective.
Kozy-Korpesh Dzhanburchin, Deputy Defense Minister for Economy and
Finance, commented that Kazakhstan is determined to tailor its
military development to its security needs: "In accordance with
national security priorities, close attention is currently being paid
to the southern and western directions, where military and other
facilities are planned to be built actively as well,"
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, November 25).
The uncertain political situation in Ukraine, a key state for the
future transportation of Central Asian energy into European markets,
has raised fears among the governing elites in Central Asia
considering overtly pursuing close relations with the United
States. The impetus towards democracy, notoriously slow in these
states, is a risk that each has weighed carefully in recent years,
while recognizing that similar pressures do not attend close relations
with Moscow. Elections looming in Uzbekistan later in December and
those in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, coupled with the recent bombings of Otan
offices in Almaty, (see EDM, November 30) magnify still further the
concerns in the regions' capitals. For the Soviet-bred autocrats
running these states, democracy may be coming too close to the
region. In security terms at least, Moscow has prepared the ground for
improved levels of security integration, should its uncertain allies
in Central Asia choose this option.
--Roger N. McDermott
KAZAKHSTAN'S OPPOSITION TAKING NOTES ON YUSHCHENKO'S STRATEGY
With their own presidential election drawing nearer, officials in
Astana might prefer to turn off all television channels broadcasting
the contentious presidential election events in Ukraine. Instead,
state-run media in Kazakhstan have done little more than re-broadcast
a few images of the street demonstrations in Kyiv every day.
In contrast to the seeming indifference of state officials toward the
Ukrainian elections, a group of opposition leaders flew to Kyiv to
observe the November 21 runoff. On returning home, one observer,
Marzhan Aspandiyarova, a leader of Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan
(DCK), said that she was impressed by the transparency of election
procedures at the polling stations she visited in Ukraine. She said
there were fewer cases of vote stealing and fraud than in
Kazakhstan. Unlike Kazakhs, Aspandiyarova speculated that Ukrainians
did not tolerate any pressure from the authorities. She also admitted
that the opposition movement in Kazakhstan failed to rally people for
mass protests after the September parliamentary elections, which the
opposition declared to be unfair and illegitimate. According to
Aspandiyarova, the roots of the Kazakh opposition's weakness lie in
the fact that many of its leaders come from government or business
circles (navi.kz, December 1).
Indeed, the popular support enjoyed by the opposition after the
creation of Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan has waned since the
September elections. One explanation for that appears to be the
relative social and economic stability and much-publicized government
programs to reduce the rate of unemployment, solve housing problems,
and raise pensions. These steps, however belated, are helping the
state to disarm the opposition ahead of the 2006 presidential
elections. However, Tolen Tokhtasynov, a member of the Coordinating
Council of Opposition Forces in Kazakhstan who also observed the
Ukrainian elections, believes that the main reason for the dwindling
popularity of the opposition in Kazakhstan is the inability of its
ambitious leaders to work out a common strategy. Nevertheless, he is
convinced that in the upcoming elections, the main opposition groups
-- the DCK, the pro-democratic Ak Zhol party, and the Communist Party
of Kazakhstan -- will join forces and put up a single candidate for
the presidency. Paradoxically, Tokhtasynov, a prominent opposition
figure and irreconcilable critic of the regime, thinks that Dariga
Nazarbayeva, the daughter of President Nursultan Nazarbayev would be
the best choice for this position (navi.kz, December 1).
The assertions that the opposition in Kazakhstan is not as active as
it is in Ukraine or Georgia may be only partly true. Protests over the
controversial September parliamentary elections are ongoing. The
co-chairman of Ak Zhol, Alikhan Baimenov won a seat on the party-list
ballot but has refused to work in the newly elected parliament,
alleging that the elections were undemocratic and unfair and that it
is unethical to be part of the "illegitimate" parliament. But such
isolated protests go almost unnoticed by the general public, which was
greatly influenced by the observers who overwhelmingly recognized the
parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan as democratic and free of
serious violations. In this situation, the opposition is largely seen
as a power-hungry political force without any clearly defined and
socially important objectives. "Our opposition would like to pose as
staunch fighters like the Ukrainian ranks. But three major political
organizations [international observers] could not convincingly show
the world the shortcomings of the parliamentary elections in
Kazakhstan. The Ukrainian elections revealed how immature and weak are
our democratic groups, which are incapable of consistently defending
the interests of the people who follow them," writes the independent
weekly Altyn Orda (Altyn Orda, November 26).
It is hard to imagine the Ukrainian scenario playing out in
Kazakhstan's presidential elections, although the alignment of
political forces and the authoritarian system inherited from the
totalitarian Soviet system display some similarity. Political analyst
Dos Koshim, an observer in Ukraine, argues that Ukrainian-style
standoffs between the opposition and the ruling elite cannot take
place in Kazakhstan, where the society is split into Kazakh- and
Russian- speaking populations, rather than united for a common
political goal. Any political action not supported by Kazakhs is
doomed to failure. But if the state does not make an effort to improve
the current course of social and political development, it may lead to
a crisis of Ukrainian proportions in the next decade (Ak Zhol
Kazakhstan, November 26).
Some analysts hold the view that the outcome of the Ukrainian election
crisis may have palpable geopolitical consequences for Kazakhstan,
rather than an impact on its internal policy. If Russia loses Ukraine,
then it will probably strengthen its military and political presence
in Kazakhstan, using such instruments as the Eurasian Economic
Community. The director of the Kazakh Institute of Socio-Economic
Analysis and Forecasting, Sabit Zusupov, warns that by openly
interfering with the election process in Ukraine, Russia revealed its
geopolitical intentions and resorted to a hard-line policy reminiscent
of the Cold War era (Epoha, November 26). Official sources in
Kazakhstan, unlike opposition media and independent analysts, are too
circumspect to express their views on the Ukrainian elections. Perhaps
this wait-and-see attitude is the best policy for the Nazarbayev
regime in this unpredictable and precarious situation.
--Marat Yermukanov
AZERBAIJAN TAKES KARABAKH CASE TO THE UN: A STEP BACK OR FORWARD?
Perhaps for the first time in the past ten years, Azerbaijan has
departed from the traditional path of peace negotiation on the
Karabakh conflict and taken its case to the UN General Assembly. On
November 23, the plenary meeting of the 59th session of the General
Assembly began discussing an Azerbaijan-sponsored resolution entitled,
"The Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan." Since 1993
the Karabakh peace process has been under the patronage of the OSCE's
Minsk group, co-chaired by Russia, the United States, and France. This
latest action taken by Azerbaijan's political leadership shows Baku's
desire to seek alternative ways to break the deadlocked process.
Speaking at the session, Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister, Elmar
Mammadyarov, noted that for the past ten years Azerbaijan had remained
committed to the 1994 cease-fire, which indicated the country's desire
to solve the conflict through negotiation. At the same time,
Mammadyarov expressed Azerbaijan's concern over Armenia's growing
settlement programs in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. "While
the negotiations are being held, the Armenian side is conducting a
mass settlement of the occupied territories . . . This program is
implemented by the Department of Refugees and IDPs [internally
displaced persons] of the Armenian government and is called 'Return to
Karabakh.' It is financed by a special fund in Armenia in violation of
UN General Assembly resolutions, international humanitarian law, and
the Geneva Convention of 1949," he noted (Turan Info, November 24).
The Azerbaijani side claims that thousands of Armenian families have
been settled in Lachin, Kelbadjar, and other occupied regions of
Azerbaijan, with the aim of increasing the Armenian population in
Karabakh to 300,000 by 2010. Armenia vigorously denies this. Armen
Martirosyan, Armenia's representative to the UN, has noted that the
Armenian government was not supporting this process and that there was
no need for the UN to interfere in this issue, the Azerbaijani daily
Zerkalo reported on November 25. "Nagorno-Karabakh has never been and
will never become part of Azerbaijan," Martirosyan added.
Meanwhile, Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian warned that
discussing the Karabakh conflict at the UN General Assembly could put
an end to the ongoing "Prague talks" between the foreign ministers of
Armenia and Azerbaijan. "Should Azerbaijan choose the latter approach
[taking the issue to other venues, seeking separate solutions], the
Azerbaijani authorities will have to negotiate with the
Nagorno-Karabakh leadership" (RFE/RL Newsline, November
10). Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev, while attending the 55th
anniversary of the "Oil Rocks" city on the Caspian Sea on November 22,
said that these statements cause him only a "smile," and he noted that
it was Armenia who is behind the occupation of the Azerbaijani
territories, not Karabakh (Turan Info, November 22).
Interestingly enough, the Azerbaijani government initiative has
sparked opposition even among the co-chairs of the Minsk group.
Speaking on behalf of the three co-chairs, U.S. representative Susan
Moore noted that Azerbaijani concerns could have been addressed by the
OSCE and that she supported the idea of a fact-finding mission within
the framework of the Minsk group (Echo, November 24). The three
co-chairs have asked the UN General Assembly not to take any action
that could negatively affect their efforts.
The Azerbaijani leadership has tried to convince the interested
parties that their initiative with the UN is not an effort to derail
the existing Minsk process. "Azerbaijan does not put the solution of
the conflict within the UN as a goal" said Deputy Foreign Minister
Araz Azimov (525-ci Gazet, November 27). Yet, perceiving the draft
resolution as Azerbaijan's attempt to seek alternative ways to solve
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia and the co-chairs of the Minsk
group became fearful of opening Pandora's box. Armenian Diaspora
groups in the United States have launched a broad campaign against the
draft resolution. A press release from the Armenian National Committee
of America reported that Congressman Frank Pallone (D-NJ), known for
his strong support of Armenia, was urging U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell and U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Danforth to vote "no"
on the "destructive resolution" (www.anca.org, November 23).
Azerbaijan, meanwhile, sees no concrete results from the ten years of
activity by the Minsk group and therefore feels pressured to knock on
other doors. Recently, the Council of Europe's political committee
began discussing a report on the Karabakh conflict prepared by British
deputies David Atkinson and Terry Davis.
--Fariz Ismailzade
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Copyright (c) 1983-2004 The Jamestown Foundation.
Thursday, December 2 -- Volume 1, Issue 138
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Moscow slaps economic sanctions on Abkhazia
*Will Ukraine crisis make Moscow tighten its grasp on Central Asia?
*Kazakh election monitors found no problems with Ukrainian vote
*Baku asks UN to rule on Armenian settlements in Karabakh
------------------------------------------------------------------------
RUSSIA BLOCKADING ABKHAZIA TO OVERTURN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
On December 1, Russia's government introduced a set of blockade
measures against Abkhazia for the declared purpose of preventing the
inauguration of president-elect Sergei Bagapsh, victor over the
Moscow-backed candidate Raul Khajimba in Abkhazia's October 3
presidential election. Gennady Bukayev, an aide to Russian Prime
Minister Mikhail Fradkov, announced the sanctions at a news briefing
in Moscow.
The measures, mainly economic but also apparently entailing some
military aspects, include: cutting off the railway connection between
Abkhazia and Russia; severely restricting cross-border passage for
Abkhaz residents and transport at checkpoints manned by Russian border
troops on the so-called "Russian-Abkhaz border" (legally a section of
the Russia-Georgia border); quarantining the transport of Abkhaz-grown
citrus fruit to Russia at that border; placing Russia's coastal navy
on alert along that border's maritime sector; and preparing for a
complete blockade, "If further unlawful actions by Bagapsh result in a
further deterioration of the situation in Abkhazia."
Bukayev was explicit about the sanctions' political purpose: "The
Russian leadership supports the legitimate Abkhaz president Vladislav
Ardzinba's decision to stage a new election for Abkhazia's
presidency. Bagapsh and the criminal organizations that back him are
trying to seize power by force of arms. The Russian leadership has
made its earnest decision in order to prevent the escalation of
violence and ensure the safety of Russia's citizens. These measures
are not directed at the people of Abkhazia and will be lifted as soon
as the situation stabilizes" (Interfax, NTV Mir, December 1).
It was apparently on November 25 that the Kremlin decided to step in
forcefully and reverse the momentum in Abkhazia toward recognition of
Bagapsh as winner and his scheduled inauguration on December
6. Consequently, and characteristically, Moscow's rhetoric is now
"criminalizing" the president-elect, notwithstanding the fact that he
has been declared winner by Abkhazia's electoral commission,
legislature, high court, and other bodies that Moscow itself had all
along touted as Abkhazia's lawful bodies. The invocation of "Russia's
citizens" is key to the above-referenced statement. Having conferred
its citizenship en masse to Abkhazia's residents, Russia has until now
used this fait accompli to claim rights of protection over them. Now,
however, Moscow uses the same argument in claiming a right to impose
sanctions on "its" citizens. In sum, Russia reserves the right to deal
with "its" citizens as it sees fit. The message to Abkhazia is that
"stabilizing the situation" means overturning the election of Bagapsh
as a condition for lifting the Russian sanctions.
The sanctions' impact could be devastating. Employment in Russia
(often in the shadow economy) and cross-border shuttle trading are
survival matters for Abkhazia's residents. In winter, citrus fruit
exports to Russia are the main source of revenue. The "temporary"
sanctions are timed precisely to the citrus harvest in Abkhazia and
the pre-Christmas peak of Abkhaz citrus sales in Russian cities.
Governor Alexander Tkachov of Krasnodar Krai (adjacent to Abkhazia)
had called for the imposition of sanctions on November 22-23, publicly
urging that the border be closed in response to the political
situation in Abkhazia. He added a call for stopping the payment of
pensions to Abkhazia's freshly baked Russian citizens, unless Bagapsh
yields ahead of December 6 (Itar-Tass, Interfax, November
22-23). Tkachov's statements often seem out of line because he belongs
to the establishment's ultra-nationalist fringe. However, it sometimes
turns out that he heralds government decisions shortly before these
are officially announced. For example, in August 2003 he urged the
construction of the dam in the Kerch Strait toward Tuzla Island,
encroaching on Ukraine's territory -- a move that soon turned out to
be Russian government policy. In June 2004, Tkachov threatened that
Cossack and other "volunteers" would be sent to South Ossetia against
Georgia; they were indeed sent and advertised by Russia's authorities
shortly afterward.
The economic sanctions are clearly designed to pressure Bagapsh's
supporters into withdrawing their support and accepting Ardzinba's
decision to stage a new presidential election. But even the Russian
government functionary Nodar Khashba, a native Abkhaz recently
installed as prime minister in Sukhumi to support Ardzinba and
Khajimba, opposes the sanctions. Within hours of the Russian
government's announcement, Khashba told Russian media, "Ordinary
inhabitants, an overwhelming majority of whom are Russia's citizens,
must not be made to suffer." Khashba announced that he would appeal to
the Russian government to rescind the sanctions, implying at the same
time that Moscow's political demands should be met (Itar-Tass,
December 1).
In Sukhumi, the outgoing and deeply ailing president Ardzinba -- or
those acting in his name -- and hard-line pro-Moscow groups are using
the argument that a Bagapsh presidency would irreparably damage
Abkhazia's relations with Russia (the sanctions are cited as evidence)
and conversely, overturning the election result and staging a new
election are prerequisites to restoring relations with
Russia. Ardzinba's November 29 proclamation, and an accompanying
statement by paramilitary groups supporting him, vows to stop Bagapsh
supporters from duplicating in Abkhazia the current events in Ukraine
or the earlier ones in Tbilisi, Ajaria, and Serbia that led to regime
change (Apsnypress, November 29).
--Vladimir Socor
RUSSIA'S SECURITY INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA INCREASES AS UKRAINE
CRISIS UNFOLDS
Central Asian political leaders are watching events in Kyiv closely,
as the Ukrainian crisis may affect the future foreign policy choices
they make between the West and Russia. Meetings of the CIS Defense
Ministers Council, at the Staff for Coordinating Military Cooperation
in Moscow on November 25, indicated a strong desire for further
strengthening the existing CSTO security mechanisms within Central
Asia. Indeed, these meetings, partly under the umbrella of the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), appear to pave the way
for the future expansion of the CSTO Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF),
to as much as 10,000 personnel (Nezavisimaya gazeta, November 26).
Nikolai Bordyuzha, Secretary-General of the CSTO, confirmed the
interest in enhanced levels of CSTO military cooperation, as member
states examined a model concept for forming a joint group of troops in
the Central Asian region. In his words, the document approved at the
meeting provides for creating a large joint group of troops including
formations from the armed forces of CSTO states (Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). This potentially numbers a total of
10,000 personnel. The group could therefore become up to four times
the current strength of the CRDF, currently tasked with operating in
Central Asia during a security crisis. Moscow's foothold in this
mechanism is secure, since it has guaranteed the main striking force
of the group will be elements drawn from the Russian military base in
Tajikistan and its air force base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan.
Of course, attempts to strengthen Russia's security influence within
Central Asia are not new, and have been a recurring theme in the
region since the deployment of U.S. and Western military forces into
the region in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. But
recent developments within Central Asian capitals seem to present a
window of opportunity for Moscow to reclaim lost ground in the region.
Kazakhstan has been the only Central Asian member of the CSTO that has
espoused clearly autonomous and pro-Western military cooperation
policies. While the others have more readily accepted
collective-security arrangements with Russia as the linchpin in this
system, Kazakhstan, for instance, has advanced its plans to forge
ahead with reforming and building its Navy in the Caspian Sea by 2007
with U.S. support. However, as the situation in Ukraine is played out,
there will be clear lessons for those pursuing pro-Western policies in
Kazakhstan, which may favor Moscow's efforts to stem the westward
drift of the former Soviet republics along its borders.
On November 25 in Moscow, a protocol was finally ratified that creates
the legal basis for increasing and offering supplies of military
hardware to CSTO countries at preferential financial rates. Valery
Loshchinin, Russia's First Deputy Foreign Minister, believes that the
agreement will facilitate further military integration among CSTO
member states and compel greater levels of security cooperation.
Kazakhstan's military reform priorities, announced on November 26,
included a commitment to raise the level of defense spending from one
percent of GDP to 1.2 percent by 2007. The Kazakhstani Ministry of
Defense also defined a set of priority investment projects, which will
be implemented in the next three years. These include constructing
housing in Astana, military facilities in the country's south and
west, improving the facilities of military airfields, and building a
national defense university, as well as developing modernized
communications systems. All these plans, from the Caspian-orientated
military facilities in Kazakhstan's western region to procurement of
communications equipment, demand closer cooperation with the United
States and Western countries in order to be effective.
Kozy-Korpesh Dzhanburchin, Deputy Defense Minister for Economy and
Finance, commented that Kazakhstan is determined to tailor its
military development to its security needs: "In accordance with
national security priorities, close attention is currently being paid
to the southern and western directions, where military and other
facilities are planned to be built actively as well,"
(Interfax-Kazakhstan, November 25).
The uncertain political situation in Ukraine, a key state for the
future transportation of Central Asian energy into European markets,
has raised fears among the governing elites in Central Asia
considering overtly pursuing close relations with the United
States. The impetus towards democracy, notoriously slow in these
states, is a risk that each has weighed carefully in recent years,
while recognizing that similar pressures do not attend close relations
with Moscow. Elections looming in Uzbekistan later in December and
those in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, coupled with the recent bombings of Otan
offices in Almaty, (see EDM, November 30) magnify still further the
concerns in the regions' capitals. For the Soviet-bred autocrats
running these states, democracy may be coming too close to the
region. In security terms at least, Moscow has prepared the ground for
improved levels of security integration, should its uncertain allies
in Central Asia choose this option.
--Roger N. McDermott
KAZAKHSTAN'S OPPOSITION TAKING NOTES ON YUSHCHENKO'S STRATEGY
With their own presidential election drawing nearer, officials in
Astana might prefer to turn off all television channels broadcasting
the contentious presidential election events in Ukraine. Instead,
state-run media in Kazakhstan have done little more than re-broadcast
a few images of the street demonstrations in Kyiv every day.
In contrast to the seeming indifference of state officials toward the
Ukrainian elections, a group of opposition leaders flew to Kyiv to
observe the November 21 runoff. On returning home, one observer,
Marzhan Aspandiyarova, a leader of Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan
(DCK), said that she was impressed by the transparency of election
procedures at the polling stations she visited in Ukraine. She said
there were fewer cases of vote stealing and fraud than in
Kazakhstan. Unlike Kazakhs, Aspandiyarova speculated that Ukrainians
did not tolerate any pressure from the authorities. She also admitted
that the opposition movement in Kazakhstan failed to rally people for
mass protests after the September parliamentary elections, which the
opposition declared to be unfair and illegitimate. According to
Aspandiyarova, the roots of the Kazakh opposition's weakness lie in
the fact that many of its leaders come from government or business
circles (navi.kz, December 1).
Indeed, the popular support enjoyed by the opposition after the
creation of Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan has waned since the
September elections. One explanation for that appears to be the
relative social and economic stability and much-publicized government
programs to reduce the rate of unemployment, solve housing problems,
and raise pensions. These steps, however belated, are helping the
state to disarm the opposition ahead of the 2006 presidential
elections. However, Tolen Tokhtasynov, a member of the Coordinating
Council of Opposition Forces in Kazakhstan who also observed the
Ukrainian elections, believes that the main reason for the dwindling
popularity of the opposition in Kazakhstan is the inability of its
ambitious leaders to work out a common strategy. Nevertheless, he is
convinced that in the upcoming elections, the main opposition groups
-- the DCK, the pro-democratic Ak Zhol party, and the Communist Party
of Kazakhstan -- will join forces and put up a single candidate for
the presidency. Paradoxically, Tokhtasynov, a prominent opposition
figure and irreconcilable critic of the regime, thinks that Dariga
Nazarbayeva, the daughter of President Nursultan Nazarbayev would be
the best choice for this position (navi.kz, December 1).
The assertions that the opposition in Kazakhstan is not as active as
it is in Ukraine or Georgia may be only partly true. Protests over the
controversial September parliamentary elections are ongoing. The
co-chairman of Ak Zhol, Alikhan Baimenov won a seat on the party-list
ballot but has refused to work in the newly elected parliament,
alleging that the elections were undemocratic and unfair and that it
is unethical to be part of the "illegitimate" parliament. But such
isolated protests go almost unnoticed by the general public, which was
greatly influenced by the observers who overwhelmingly recognized the
parliamentary elections in Kazakhstan as democratic and free of
serious violations. In this situation, the opposition is largely seen
as a power-hungry political force without any clearly defined and
socially important objectives. "Our opposition would like to pose as
staunch fighters like the Ukrainian ranks. But three major political
organizations [international observers] could not convincingly show
the world the shortcomings of the parliamentary elections in
Kazakhstan. The Ukrainian elections revealed how immature and weak are
our democratic groups, which are incapable of consistently defending
the interests of the people who follow them," writes the independent
weekly Altyn Orda (Altyn Orda, November 26).
It is hard to imagine the Ukrainian scenario playing out in
Kazakhstan's presidential elections, although the alignment of
political forces and the authoritarian system inherited from the
totalitarian Soviet system display some similarity. Political analyst
Dos Koshim, an observer in Ukraine, argues that Ukrainian-style
standoffs between the opposition and the ruling elite cannot take
place in Kazakhstan, where the society is split into Kazakh- and
Russian- speaking populations, rather than united for a common
political goal. Any political action not supported by Kazakhs is
doomed to failure. But if the state does not make an effort to improve
the current course of social and political development, it may lead to
a crisis of Ukrainian proportions in the next decade (Ak Zhol
Kazakhstan, November 26).
Some analysts hold the view that the outcome of the Ukrainian election
crisis may have palpable geopolitical consequences for Kazakhstan,
rather than an impact on its internal policy. If Russia loses Ukraine,
then it will probably strengthen its military and political presence
in Kazakhstan, using such instruments as the Eurasian Economic
Community. The director of the Kazakh Institute of Socio-Economic
Analysis and Forecasting, Sabit Zusupov, warns that by openly
interfering with the election process in Ukraine, Russia revealed its
geopolitical intentions and resorted to a hard-line policy reminiscent
of the Cold War era (Epoha, November 26). Official sources in
Kazakhstan, unlike opposition media and independent analysts, are too
circumspect to express their views on the Ukrainian elections. Perhaps
this wait-and-see attitude is the best policy for the Nazarbayev
regime in this unpredictable and precarious situation.
--Marat Yermukanov
AZERBAIJAN TAKES KARABAKH CASE TO THE UN: A STEP BACK OR FORWARD?
Perhaps for the first time in the past ten years, Azerbaijan has
departed from the traditional path of peace negotiation on the
Karabakh conflict and taken its case to the UN General Assembly. On
November 23, the plenary meeting of the 59th session of the General
Assembly began discussing an Azerbaijan-sponsored resolution entitled,
"The Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan." Since 1993
the Karabakh peace process has been under the patronage of the OSCE's
Minsk group, co-chaired by Russia, the United States, and France. This
latest action taken by Azerbaijan's political leadership shows Baku's
desire to seek alternative ways to break the deadlocked process.
Speaking at the session, Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister, Elmar
Mammadyarov, noted that for the past ten years Azerbaijan had remained
committed to the 1994 cease-fire, which indicated the country's desire
to solve the conflict through negotiation. At the same time,
Mammadyarov expressed Azerbaijan's concern over Armenia's growing
settlement programs in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. "While
the negotiations are being held, the Armenian side is conducting a
mass settlement of the occupied territories . . . This program is
implemented by the Department of Refugees and IDPs [internally
displaced persons] of the Armenian government and is called 'Return to
Karabakh.' It is financed by a special fund in Armenia in violation of
UN General Assembly resolutions, international humanitarian law, and
the Geneva Convention of 1949," he noted (Turan Info, November 24).
The Azerbaijani side claims that thousands of Armenian families have
been settled in Lachin, Kelbadjar, and other occupied regions of
Azerbaijan, with the aim of increasing the Armenian population in
Karabakh to 300,000 by 2010. Armenia vigorously denies this. Armen
Martirosyan, Armenia's representative to the UN, has noted that the
Armenian government was not supporting this process and that there was
no need for the UN to interfere in this issue, the Azerbaijani daily
Zerkalo reported on November 25. "Nagorno-Karabakh has never been and
will never become part of Azerbaijan," Martirosyan added.
Meanwhile, Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian warned that
discussing the Karabakh conflict at the UN General Assembly could put
an end to the ongoing "Prague talks" between the foreign ministers of
Armenia and Azerbaijan. "Should Azerbaijan choose the latter approach
[taking the issue to other venues, seeking separate solutions], the
Azerbaijani authorities will have to negotiate with the
Nagorno-Karabakh leadership" (RFE/RL Newsline, November
10). Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev, while attending the 55th
anniversary of the "Oil Rocks" city on the Caspian Sea on November 22,
said that these statements cause him only a "smile," and he noted that
it was Armenia who is behind the occupation of the Azerbaijani
territories, not Karabakh (Turan Info, November 22).
Interestingly enough, the Azerbaijani government initiative has
sparked opposition even among the co-chairs of the Minsk group.
Speaking on behalf of the three co-chairs, U.S. representative Susan
Moore noted that Azerbaijani concerns could have been addressed by the
OSCE and that she supported the idea of a fact-finding mission within
the framework of the Minsk group (Echo, November 24). The three
co-chairs have asked the UN General Assembly not to take any action
that could negatively affect their efforts.
The Azerbaijani leadership has tried to convince the interested
parties that their initiative with the UN is not an effort to derail
the existing Minsk process. "Azerbaijan does not put the solution of
the conflict within the UN as a goal" said Deputy Foreign Minister
Araz Azimov (525-ci Gazet, November 27). Yet, perceiving the draft
resolution as Azerbaijan's attempt to seek alternative ways to solve
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia and the co-chairs of the Minsk
group became fearful of opening Pandora's box. Armenian Diaspora
groups in the United States have launched a broad campaign against the
draft resolution. A press release from the Armenian National Committee
of America reported that Congressman Frank Pallone (D-NJ), known for
his strong support of Armenia, was urging U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell and U.S. Ambassador to the UN John Danforth to vote "no"
on the "destructive resolution" (www.anca.org, November 23).
Azerbaijan, meanwhile, sees no concrete results from the ten years of
activity by the Minsk group and therefore feels pressured to knock on
other doors. Recently, the Council of Europe's political committee
began discussing a report on the Karabakh conflict prepared by British
deputies David Atkinson and Terry Davis.
--Fariz Ismailzade
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