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Eurasianet Organization
Jan 5 2005
CHANGES IN THE CIS: WHAT TO EXPECT IN 2005
Stephen Blank 1/05/05
A EurasiaNet Commentary
Ukraine's Orange Revolution and the European Union's decision to
begin membership negotiations with Turkey will have far-reaching
repercussions for members of the Commonwealth of Independent States
in 2005. Both of these events will lead to a greater engagement by
both the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. Sharper East-West rivalry may be the
result, but this engagement will also ensure that the struggle for
democratic change will not abate.
Though it received less press attention than the uprising in Kyiv,
the starting point for this process begins with the EU's December 17
decision to start membership talks with Ankara. The move came more
than one year after Georgia's 2004 Rose Revolution - an event that
considerably increased the EU's interest in the region.
After Russia vetoed prolonging the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe's border monitoring mission in Georgia, for
instance, the EU offered, on December 30, to send in its own
monitors. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's reform drive
triggered an outpouring of millions in humanitarian and financial aid
from the organization, contradicting earlier observations that the EU
has no interest in the South Caucasus.
Talks with Turkey could play a key role in furthering this
engagement. It is likely that Ankara will attempt to raise awareness
in Brussels about the potential security threats to Europe that stem
from the Caucasus' unresolved conflicts. [For additional information
see the Eurasia Insight archive]. With the opening of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline scheduled to occur in 2005, Europe's
incentive for clearing up territorial disputes will only increase.
Turkey could use this situation to emphasize its own possibilities as
a peace broker.
That, in turn, could make the reforms enacted by Turkey since 2002 in
its bid for EU membership a model for the region. When countries in
the Caucasus look at Turkey, they will see a country that has
democratized its political process, instituted greater civilian
control over the military and undergone a robust economic revival.
But Turkey is not the only example for the Caucasus. The recent
pro-democracy uprising in Kyiv can only further the cause of reform.
[For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Already, a
connection between Ukraine and the Caucasus has been made with the
partnership on display between President-elect Viktor Yushchenko and
Saakashvili.
Unlike Turkey, however, the Ukrainian democratic reform drive will
encounter harsh resistance from Russia. Yushchenko's government will
try to enhance Ukraine's ability to meet the requirements for closer
ties with both NATO and the EU -- associations that could completely
rework security and diplomatic relationships across the CIS.
Russia, already rebuffed in Georgia and Ukraine, will put up a strong
resistance against any such transformation. Moscow's criticism of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's human and civil
rights monitoring activities is already one tactic put to use in this
battle - and one that secured the prompt support of certain CIS
member states. Additional examples of such maneuvers should be
expected in 2005.
But as Russia attempts to play its hand to greater effect in the
Caucasus and Central Asia, the calls for democratic reform will only
increase - first in the Caucasus, then, to a lesser extent, in
Central Asia. An upsurge in domestic tensions in Azerbaijan and
Armenia, where examples of misgovernment are rife, is plausible,
while in Georgia, greater expectations will be placed on the
Saakashvili government to deliver on its promises for reform.
Paradoxically, though, the increased rivalry between East and West
for influence will come with enhanced opportunities for conflict
resolution. The status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia appeared durable as long as there was no external pressure.
As competition between Russia and the West potentially heats up, such
conflicts could be used by both sides to demonstrate their usefulness
as peace brokers, and, thereby, solidify their influence in the
region.
Editor's Note: Stephen Blank is a professor at the US Army War
College. The views expressed this article do not in any way represent
the views of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Jan 5 2005
CHANGES IN THE CIS: WHAT TO EXPECT IN 2005
Stephen Blank 1/05/05
A EurasiaNet Commentary
Ukraine's Orange Revolution and the European Union's decision to
begin membership negotiations with Turkey will have far-reaching
repercussions for members of the Commonwealth of Independent States
in 2005. Both of these events will lead to a greater engagement by
both the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. Sharper East-West rivalry may be the
result, but this engagement will also ensure that the struggle for
democratic change will not abate.
Though it received less press attention than the uprising in Kyiv,
the starting point for this process begins with the EU's December 17
decision to start membership talks with Ankara. The move came more
than one year after Georgia's 2004 Rose Revolution - an event that
considerably increased the EU's interest in the region.
After Russia vetoed prolonging the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe's border monitoring mission in Georgia, for
instance, the EU offered, on December 30, to send in its own
monitors. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's reform drive
triggered an outpouring of millions in humanitarian and financial aid
from the organization, contradicting earlier observations that the EU
has no interest in the South Caucasus.
Talks with Turkey could play a key role in furthering this
engagement. It is likely that Ankara will attempt to raise awareness
in Brussels about the potential security threats to Europe that stem
from the Caucasus' unresolved conflicts. [For additional information
see the Eurasia Insight archive]. With the opening of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline scheduled to occur in 2005, Europe's
incentive for clearing up territorial disputes will only increase.
Turkey could use this situation to emphasize its own possibilities as
a peace broker.
That, in turn, could make the reforms enacted by Turkey since 2002 in
its bid for EU membership a model for the region. When countries in
the Caucasus look at Turkey, they will see a country that has
democratized its political process, instituted greater civilian
control over the military and undergone a robust economic revival.
But Turkey is not the only example for the Caucasus. The recent
pro-democracy uprising in Kyiv can only further the cause of reform.
[For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Already, a
connection between Ukraine and the Caucasus has been made with the
partnership on display between President-elect Viktor Yushchenko and
Saakashvili.
Unlike Turkey, however, the Ukrainian democratic reform drive will
encounter harsh resistance from Russia. Yushchenko's government will
try to enhance Ukraine's ability to meet the requirements for closer
ties with both NATO and the EU -- associations that could completely
rework security and diplomatic relationships across the CIS.
Russia, already rebuffed in Georgia and Ukraine, will put up a strong
resistance against any such transformation. Moscow's criticism of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's human and civil
rights monitoring activities is already one tactic put to use in this
battle - and one that secured the prompt support of certain CIS
member states. Additional examples of such maneuvers should be
expected in 2005.
But as Russia attempts to play its hand to greater effect in the
Caucasus and Central Asia, the calls for democratic reform will only
increase - first in the Caucasus, then, to a lesser extent, in
Central Asia. An upsurge in domestic tensions in Azerbaijan and
Armenia, where examples of misgovernment are rife, is plausible,
while in Georgia, greater expectations will be placed on the
Saakashvili government to deliver on its promises for reform.
Paradoxically, though, the increased rivalry between East and West
for influence will come with enhanced opportunities for conflict
resolution. The status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia appeared durable as long as there was no external pressure.
As competition between Russia and the West potentially heats up, such
conflicts could be used by both sides to demonstrate their usefulness
as peace brokers, and, thereby, solidify their influence in the
region.
Editor's Note: Stephen Blank is a professor at the US Army War
College. The views expressed this article do not in any way represent
the views of the US Army, Defense Department or the US Government.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress