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Turkish Daily News
Jan 16 2005
Erdoğan's diplomatic landing in the Kremlin
Yüksel Söylemez
In relation to President Vladimir Putin's historic state visit to
the Presidential Palace in Cankaya the words of William Shakespeare,
"Within a month, yet within a month,' are I feel apposite in the
context of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan losing no time and
hurriedly embarking upon a quick-fix businesslike return visit to the
Kremlin.
Why was he in such a great hurry? Setting aside the hair-trigger
timing "a la Erdogan" as the fastest Turkish leader of the decade not
wanting to lose momentum, the apparent pretext may have been the
long-delayed opening of the Turkish Center in Moscow built by the
Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodities Exchanges (TOBB) that took
seven troublesome years to complete.
Erdogan's declared aim was better and bigger business with the
Russians and to increase the volume of trade from last year's $10
billion to $25 billion, or at least Putin's more modest target of $15
billion, or $50 billion annually in 10 year's time.
But how do they propose to achieve this? Russia, after all, is
already Turkey's second largest trading partner after Germany.
Turkey is dependent on Russian natural gas for 60 percent of its
energy requirements. Energy by other means, coal for example, is
becoming less and less preferred in Turkey as natural gas is cleaner
and comparatively cheaper, although the Blue Stream natural gas
prices that Turkey has to pay are higher than those for other
customers of Russia. Moreover, under the agreed contract Turkey has
to pay for even what it cannot use, however, these are the same
conditions Iran once imposed upon Turkey. Putin, however, offered to
sell electricity cheaply to Turkey from under the Black Sea and a
study group will now be established towards this end.
The Russian private sector will be participating in international
bids concerning the distribution of natural gas in Turkey, as well as
building depots for storing gas underground, thus evening out winter
and summer prices. Russia wants to sell its oil and natural gas to
Israel by an extension of the Samsun-Ankara pipeline. Russia also
now wants to export Russian oil to Europe through Turkey using the
Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline that they were previously against. Russian
interest may not stop here in matters of energy, but go over and
beyond Turkey's prospective nuclear power plants, rumored to cost
about $20 billion of more, Chernobyl or no Chernobyl notwithstanding.
This three-day visit to the Kremlin came with a clear message from
Erdogan to Putin. To paraphrase, "Russia will continue to be
Turkey's trading partner on an even greater scale, with or without
Turkey's European Union membership. Contrary to the serious concern
you expressed in Ankara in December, Russia is not going to lose
Turkey or say "farewell" to it as a trading partner. Quite the
opposite as our trade and cooperation will increase by leaps and
bounds. Remember, Turkey's customs union with the EU did not
diminish our bilateral trade, but did, in fact, increase it to a
greater extent. We are here in Moscow for business, friendship and
strategic a partnership."
Never before has Prime Minister Erdogan been accompanied by an army
of 500 plus businessmen in four planeloads, as well as four
ministers, 50 members of Parliament and 90 media members underlining
his message. Some 20 prominent businessmen were among the chosen few
personally introduced to President Putin, probably for their
investment in Russia that is expected to increase from $2.5 billion
or more.
Erdogan proposed joint ventures with Russia in Iraq. Turkey and
Russia are also to cooperate in military procurement and hardware,
such as the Erdogan's helicopter and aircraft deal which has yet to
be decided, perhaps as a give-and-take in return for reducing natural
gas prices -- also to be paid in kind rather than in cash on an
offset basis. The Turkish and Russian navies are now scheduled to
make joint naval exercises against maritime terrorism in the Black
Sea, where Russia is concerned about the presence of non-coastal
navies and the Marmara and Aegean Seas, all of which are on the route
of Russian oil tankers.
Erdogan, including his delegation and entourage, was given an
extraordinary welcome in Moscow. To underline this auspicious
welcome, he and Emine Erdogan were entertained in Putin's home in
Novo Ogareva as a sign of exceptional courtesy to show genuine
Russian hospitality reserved for only a select few. Putin's, "I
trust Erdogan because he keeps his word," shows that there is a
strong personal chemistry between the two leaders with a clear
political will to cooperate, truly and sincerely, in order to replace
centuries of mistrust and enmity, especially after the lost decades
of the USSR to communism when it was considered by Turkey to be
national threat number one. In fact, what is happening now is the
revival of the Turkish-Russian rapprochement era of the National
Liberation War of Mustafa Kemal and the first 10 years of
Turkish-Russian friendship in the 1920s and early `30s.
This visit confirmed that the dialogue started by Putin in Ankara
would continue. This visit, to say the least, confirms the
normalization of bilateral relations and underlines that Turkey is a
regional power, alongside its EU prospects. It definitely brings new
volume to the bilateral relations of two important countries
belonging to the region encompassing Iraq to the Caucasus and to the
problems of that region, of which, broadly speaking, they share
similar views.
In his tete-a-tete with Putin in Novo Ogareva during dinner with
the normal protocol sampling three kinds of exceptionally delicious
caviar, probably wetted with quality water rather than the best
Russian vodka, `Tayyip' may have asked ''Vladimir' whether Russia
could be more flexible over the Cyprus problem; and who knows whether
in a light-hearted moment `Vladimir' did not try to persuade `Tayyip'
in return for such a favor to change his drinking habits and toast
him with Stolichnaya?
It is a two-way street after all, and now that Putin made a
surprise call to the U.N. Secretary-General to say that Russia will
now support his efforts to solve the Cyprus question, Russia is in
the picture to exert pressure on Greek Cypriot leader Tassos
Papadopoulos for a peaceful and equitable settlement that will be in
the best interests of Russia as well. Erdogan presenting the
Chairman of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (KKTC) Chamber
of Commerce Salih Tumar to Putin heralded a volte-face in Russian
traditional policies that hitherto historically favored their Greek
Orthodox brothers as Russian investments abound in Greek Cyprus.
Putin said, "The economic isolation of the KKTC is not fair and
should be ended." This concession is an outright meeting of Turkish
sensitivities and a quid pro quo for Russia's large investments in
Turkey.
On Armenia, Putin offered to act as a go-between, but Erdogan's
condition for establishing relations requires Armenia to recognize
the 1923 Kars Agreement fixing Turkey's eastern borders that may be
hope against hope.
As Erdogan runs from success to success with his foreign policies,
this visit to Moscow was realized quicker than in the wildest dreams
of all Russian watchers -- to say the least. There seems to have
been a sea change in Russia's traditional policies with much more
understanding shown to Turkey. Now we have to watch that things
agreed take concrete shape and translate into reality. As they say,
`the proof of the pudding is in the eating.'
Jan 16 2005
Erdoğan's diplomatic landing in the Kremlin
Yüksel Söylemez
In relation to President Vladimir Putin's historic state visit to
the Presidential Palace in Cankaya the words of William Shakespeare,
"Within a month, yet within a month,' are I feel apposite in the
context of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan losing no time and
hurriedly embarking upon a quick-fix businesslike return visit to the
Kremlin.
Why was he in such a great hurry? Setting aside the hair-trigger
timing "a la Erdogan" as the fastest Turkish leader of the decade not
wanting to lose momentum, the apparent pretext may have been the
long-delayed opening of the Turkish Center in Moscow built by the
Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodities Exchanges (TOBB) that took
seven troublesome years to complete.
Erdogan's declared aim was better and bigger business with the
Russians and to increase the volume of trade from last year's $10
billion to $25 billion, or at least Putin's more modest target of $15
billion, or $50 billion annually in 10 year's time.
But how do they propose to achieve this? Russia, after all, is
already Turkey's second largest trading partner after Germany.
Turkey is dependent on Russian natural gas for 60 percent of its
energy requirements. Energy by other means, coal for example, is
becoming less and less preferred in Turkey as natural gas is cleaner
and comparatively cheaper, although the Blue Stream natural gas
prices that Turkey has to pay are higher than those for other
customers of Russia. Moreover, under the agreed contract Turkey has
to pay for even what it cannot use, however, these are the same
conditions Iran once imposed upon Turkey. Putin, however, offered to
sell electricity cheaply to Turkey from under the Black Sea and a
study group will now be established towards this end.
The Russian private sector will be participating in international
bids concerning the distribution of natural gas in Turkey, as well as
building depots for storing gas underground, thus evening out winter
and summer prices. Russia wants to sell its oil and natural gas to
Israel by an extension of the Samsun-Ankara pipeline. Russia also
now wants to export Russian oil to Europe through Turkey using the
Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline that they were previously against. Russian
interest may not stop here in matters of energy, but go over and
beyond Turkey's prospective nuclear power plants, rumored to cost
about $20 billion of more, Chernobyl or no Chernobyl notwithstanding.
This three-day visit to the Kremlin came with a clear message from
Erdogan to Putin. To paraphrase, "Russia will continue to be
Turkey's trading partner on an even greater scale, with or without
Turkey's European Union membership. Contrary to the serious concern
you expressed in Ankara in December, Russia is not going to lose
Turkey or say "farewell" to it as a trading partner. Quite the
opposite as our trade and cooperation will increase by leaps and
bounds. Remember, Turkey's customs union with the EU did not
diminish our bilateral trade, but did, in fact, increase it to a
greater extent. We are here in Moscow for business, friendship and
strategic a partnership."
Never before has Prime Minister Erdogan been accompanied by an army
of 500 plus businessmen in four planeloads, as well as four
ministers, 50 members of Parliament and 90 media members underlining
his message. Some 20 prominent businessmen were among the chosen few
personally introduced to President Putin, probably for their
investment in Russia that is expected to increase from $2.5 billion
or more.
Erdogan proposed joint ventures with Russia in Iraq. Turkey and
Russia are also to cooperate in military procurement and hardware,
such as the Erdogan's helicopter and aircraft deal which has yet to
be decided, perhaps as a give-and-take in return for reducing natural
gas prices -- also to be paid in kind rather than in cash on an
offset basis. The Turkish and Russian navies are now scheduled to
make joint naval exercises against maritime terrorism in the Black
Sea, where Russia is concerned about the presence of non-coastal
navies and the Marmara and Aegean Seas, all of which are on the route
of Russian oil tankers.
Erdogan, including his delegation and entourage, was given an
extraordinary welcome in Moscow. To underline this auspicious
welcome, he and Emine Erdogan were entertained in Putin's home in
Novo Ogareva as a sign of exceptional courtesy to show genuine
Russian hospitality reserved for only a select few. Putin's, "I
trust Erdogan because he keeps his word," shows that there is a
strong personal chemistry between the two leaders with a clear
political will to cooperate, truly and sincerely, in order to replace
centuries of mistrust and enmity, especially after the lost decades
of the USSR to communism when it was considered by Turkey to be
national threat number one. In fact, what is happening now is the
revival of the Turkish-Russian rapprochement era of the National
Liberation War of Mustafa Kemal and the first 10 years of
Turkish-Russian friendship in the 1920s and early `30s.
This visit confirmed that the dialogue started by Putin in Ankara
would continue. This visit, to say the least, confirms the
normalization of bilateral relations and underlines that Turkey is a
regional power, alongside its EU prospects. It definitely brings new
volume to the bilateral relations of two important countries
belonging to the region encompassing Iraq to the Caucasus and to the
problems of that region, of which, broadly speaking, they share
similar views.
In his tete-a-tete with Putin in Novo Ogareva during dinner with
the normal protocol sampling three kinds of exceptionally delicious
caviar, probably wetted with quality water rather than the best
Russian vodka, `Tayyip' may have asked ''Vladimir' whether Russia
could be more flexible over the Cyprus problem; and who knows whether
in a light-hearted moment `Vladimir' did not try to persuade `Tayyip'
in return for such a favor to change his drinking habits and toast
him with Stolichnaya?
It is a two-way street after all, and now that Putin made a
surprise call to the U.N. Secretary-General to say that Russia will
now support his efforts to solve the Cyprus question, Russia is in
the picture to exert pressure on Greek Cypriot leader Tassos
Papadopoulos for a peaceful and equitable settlement that will be in
the best interests of Russia as well. Erdogan presenting the
Chairman of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (KKTC) Chamber
of Commerce Salih Tumar to Putin heralded a volte-face in Russian
traditional policies that hitherto historically favored their Greek
Orthodox brothers as Russian investments abound in Greek Cyprus.
Putin said, "The economic isolation of the KKTC is not fair and
should be ended." This concession is an outright meeting of Turkish
sensitivities and a quid pro quo for Russia's large investments in
Turkey.
On Armenia, Putin offered to act as a go-between, but Erdogan's
condition for establishing relations requires Armenia to recognize
the 1923 Kars Agreement fixing Turkey's eastern borders that may be
hope against hope.
As Erdogan runs from success to success with his foreign policies,
this visit to Moscow was realized quicker than in the wildest dreams
of all Russian watchers -- to say the least. There seems to have
been a sea change in Russia's traditional policies with much more
understanding shown to Turkey. Now we have to watch that things
agreed take concrete shape and translate into reality. As they say,
`the proof of the pudding is in the eating.'