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"WHO SEEKS FOR ARMED SETTLEMENT OF NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT?"
Azg/arm
21 Jan 05
Kazimirov Believes Armenian Forces Can Leave Karabakh Only with Local
Armenian Residents
Vladimir Kazimirov, former mediator at the Nagorno Karabakh settlement
process, has published an article in which he pointed out all the
cases of breaking the ceasefire during the war one after another. In
the course of 1992-94, Russia or the OSCE Minsk group tried to stop
the military actions for many times, but each time one of the sides
would break the ceasefire.
The Azeri authorities (both in the times of Elchibey and Aliyev)
counted on the armed settlement of the conflict, instead of the
negotiations. Baku wasthe first to break the four formulae of the UN
Security Council for many times. Baku never carried out any of the
commitments envisaged in the UN formulae adopted in the course of the
military actions in April-November of 1993.
"The Armenians were either smart or constructive. They have broken the
mutual agreements only twice, in July, 1992 and April, 1994,"
Kazimirov writes and adds that the ceasefire signed in the July of
1992 was caused by the Azeris misfortune in the military actions. "The
main reasons of the Azeris misfortune were their maximalism (peculiar
to the Armenians, as well). The Azeris obviously overestimated their
diplomatic and political capacities, notwithstanding a number of weak
points in their actions. Baku would stop their military actions only
for gaining some time to relocate their forces," he writes and reminds
that Baku once more stopped the military actions to hold presidential
elections on October 3, 1993.
Kazimirov writes that if the sides really seek for peaceful
settlement, it is high time to stop yelling, "Nagorno Karabakh is
mine. It is mine". "They (Baku and Yerevan) have to begin sober
negotiations and accept calmly Nagorno Karabakh both as an object and
as a subject for dispute. In fact, the wholeworld admits that
already. They accept it, but not the sides in conflict. That (if the
sides accepted Karabakh as a side in conflict) would be the first step
directed to the civilized settlement of the issue."
Kazimirov emphasizes that the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from
Karabakh is possible only in case the native Armenian residents of the
region leave it too, i.e. without the presence of the Armenian forces
the native Armenian population of Karabakh will be evicted. Kazimirov
emphasizes the importanceof Karabakh's participation in the
negotiation process by another viewpoint, too. When the Armenian
forces begin to leave the Azeri regions, it is obvious that they will
not be able to retreat up to the former borders of NKAR. "They will
have to clear out where the border line is, to find a new one and this
can't be done without Stepanakert's participation," he writes.
In the appendix to the article, Kazimirov represents the chronological
list of the cases when the ceasefire was broken in the course of the
military actions in 1992-1994. It shows that Armenia and Nagorno
Karabakh broke the ceasefire preliminarily achieved by the mediation
of Russia and the OSCE Minsk group only twice. In the rest of the
cases, Azerbaijan resumed the military actions for about 20
times. Let's bring some examples:
On March 1, 1993, the Russian and the Turkish foreign ministers
decided to visit the hotbed and achieve the ceasefire at the
spot. But, having visited Baku, the Turkish foreign minister said that
he will visit the hotbed, if the Armenians leave Shushi and Lachin. In
almost a month after that, the Karabakh forces "conquered Qelbajar."
On July 2, 1993, as a result of Russia's efforts, the Karabakh
sideagreed to stop the military actions in Aghdam and Martakert, as
well as in Fizuli and Hadruth, but Azeris didn't send any response to
Moscow. After the mid July the military actions resumed, while on July
23, the Karabakh forces took the control over Aghdam.
As in his previous article, this time too, Kazimirov draws attention
to the period laid between October and December in 1993, when Baku
unfolded wide spread military actions and was bitterly beaten, losing
the "South-Western parts" of the republic one after another.
By Tatoul Hakobian
Azg/arm
21 Jan 05
Kazimirov Believes Armenian Forces Can Leave Karabakh Only with Local
Armenian Residents
Vladimir Kazimirov, former mediator at the Nagorno Karabakh settlement
process, has published an article in which he pointed out all the
cases of breaking the ceasefire during the war one after another. In
the course of 1992-94, Russia or the OSCE Minsk group tried to stop
the military actions for many times, but each time one of the sides
would break the ceasefire.
The Azeri authorities (both in the times of Elchibey and Aliyev)
counted on the armed settlement of the conflict, instead of the
negotiations. Baku wasthe first to break the four formulae of the UN
Security Council for many times. Baku never carried out any of the
commitments envisaged in the UN formulae adopted in the course of the
military actions in April-November of 1993.
"The Armenians were either smart or constructive. They have broken the
mutual agreements only twice, in July, 1992 and April, 1994,"
Kazimirov writes and adds that the ceasefire signed in the July of
1992 was caused by the Azeris misfortune in the military actions. "The
main reasons of the Azeris misfortune were their maximalism (peculiar
to the Armenians, as well). The Azeris obviously overestimated their
diplomatic and political capacities, notwithstanding a number of weak
points in their actions. Baku would stop their military actions only
for gaining some time to relocate their forces," he writes and reminds
that Baku once more stopped the military actions to hold presidential
elections on October 3, 1993.
Kazimirov writes that if the sides really seek for peaceful
settlement, it is high time to stop yelling, "Nagorno Karabakh is
mine. It is mine". "They (Baku and Yerevan) have to begin sober
negotiations and accept calmly Nagorno Karabakh both as an object and
as a subject for dispute. In fact, the wholeworld admits that
already. They accept it, but not the sides in conflict. That (if the
sides accepted Karabakh as a side in conflict) would be the first step
directed to the civilized settlement of the issue."
Kazimirov emphasizes that the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from
Karabakh is possible only in case the native Armenian residents of the
region leave it too, i.e. without the presence of the Armenian forces
the native Armenian population of Karabakh will be evicted. Kazimirov
emphasizes the importanceof Karabakh's participation in the
negotiation process by another viewpoint, too. When the Armenian
forces begin to leave the Azeri regions, it is obvious that they will
not be able to retreat up to the former borders of NKAR. "They will
have to clear out where the border line is, to find a new one and this
can't be done without Stepanakert's participation," he writes.
In the appendix to the article, Kazimirov represents the chronological
list of the cases when the ceasefire was broken in the course of the
military actions in 1992-1994. It shows that Armenia and Nagorno
Karabakh broke the ceasefire preliminarily achieved by the mediation
of Russia and the OSCE Minsk group only twice. In the rest of the
cases, Azerbaijan resumed the military actions for about 20
times. Let's bring some examples:
On March 1, 1993, the Russian and the Turkish foreign ministers
decided to visit the hotbed and achieve the ceasefire at the
spot. But, having visited Baku, the Turkish foreign minister said that
he will visit the hotbed, if the Armenians leave Shushi and Lachin. In
almost a month after that, the Karabakh forces "conquered Qelbajar."
On July 2, 1993, as a result of Russia's efforts, the Karabakh
sideagreed to stop the military actions in Aghdam and Martakert, as
well as in Fizuli and Hadruth, but Azeris didn't send any response to
Moscow. After the mid July the military actions resumed, while on July
23, the Karabakh forces took the control over Aghdam.
As in his previous article, this time too, Kazimirov draws attention
to the period laid between October and December in 1993, when Baku
unfolded wide spread military actions and was bitterly beaten, losing
the "South-Western parts" of the republic one after another.
By Tatoul Hakobian