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"THOUGHTS ON THE 90TH ANNIVERSARY ACTIVITIES"
ARAVOT DAILY'S INTERVIEW WITH JIRAIR LIBARIDIAN
Aravot Daily (Yerevan)
June 28, 2005
QUESTION: The 90th Anniversary of the Genocide was marked by a number of
activities in Armenia and in the Diaspora. You participated or observed
many of them. Do you have any thoughts about these activities?
ANSWER: This certainly was a special year. I think we can talk about it
more openly now that the main activities are over.
It is heartening of course to see our people and our young generations
continuing to respect the memory of the victims of the Genocide in an
increasingly organized and unified way.
I do have questions in my mind, nonetheless, regarding some aspects of
this process.
The silent march to Tzitzerkaberd, the main event in my view, has been
one of the most solemn, dignified and moving experiences any person
could live through since the monument was erected in 1967. It is a
collective spiritual experience, a form of communion with the victims.
Some of that solemnity and dignity was lost this year, it seems to me;
with banners and slogans, at times it seemed as if it was a political
demonstration. I think there are more appropriate places for that. The
show of respect for the memory of the victims, which is the purpose of
the march, and the contemplative nature of the monument require a more
serene presence.
I am not sure also that billboards marking the anniversary in the main
streets of Yerevan were appropriate. Billboards advertise or sell
things. Do we need to advertise or sell the Genocide?
More generally, we have to think of the direction in which we in Armenia
and the Diaspora are going as far as our relations with the
international community are concerned. Is the Genocide our only concern
in our relations with our neighbors, with other countries? If that is
the case, then why not demand that countries like Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, and Russia recognize first their responsibility in
creating the conditions for a genocide before they recognize that of the
Ottoman Empire?
Furthermore, is a country "pro-Armenian" if it recognizes the Genocide?
The current atmosphere lends to that view. What if France, for example,
recognized the Genocide but pressured Armenia to make concessions on
Karabakh that Armenia cannot make on its own? What will we tell France?
That it is not pro-Armenian? Is it possible that this single issue may
blind us to what else is going with regard to a number of others we have
to settle with the international community.
There is also the danger that the Genocide issue may be used by other
powers-just as the "Armenian Question" was historically-to settle their
own accounts with Turkey, accounts that have little to do with the
Genocide, thus reducing the memory of our victims to an element in their
games, an element that would be used and abused, picked up and dropped
at their will, not ours? Doesn't that make us vulnerable to dangerous
manipulations? Doesn't that mean turning over the key to our policy
making -to our sense of success and failure, in fact our agenda-to
others who have no compunction manipulating us?
At the end, the question is: Is the "victim" psychology and the
political program that ensues from it the way we as a state and as
Diaspora want to relate to the world? However righteous and even
comfortable that may make us feel, we must at least ask the question.
The world may or may not owe us something. But it certainly will not
give us everything we want. Historically, it has given little.
QUESTION: Is there an alternative strategy?
ANSWER: I think we have come a long way since independence in
Turkish-Armenian relations. Changes in Turkey on the societal level and
even failed attempts at establishing dialog have contributed to an
atmosphere within which increased dialog with Turkish citizens may be
equally, if not more productive. We have to recognize that ultimately it
is the people of Turkey we have to address on this issue. It is their
historians and scientists, their teachers and journalists, and their
young generations who we must help to come to terms with their history.
In the long run, it is the more effective way. It is not the easiest
task. But if we are serious, it is the people of Turkey that must
understand and assess their history. That would be true recognition.
That requires an understanding on our part as to why it is that not only
successive governments of Turkey that have denied the Genocide, but also
Turkish society by and large. That requires recognizing changes in
Turkish society that have been opening opportunities for us in the last
two decades or so. That requires recognition of the value of the
policies of independent Armenia's first administration that did not
define Turkey as an enemy and created an environment for a critical view
of Turkish history and political structures from within. That requires
recognition of the efforts of a number of Armenian scholars who have
been in a dialog with their Turkish scholars for a number of years now.
But I am not sure this is convenient to many on our side. I am certain
that we have much to gain by framing the issue of Genocide recognition
as a problem for Turkish society and democracy and little to gain by
making it a European or Western issue.
The most recent events in Turkey testify to the validity of such a
strategy. Over thirty scholars supported by three universities, one of
them a state university, took it upon themselves to organize a
conference on the Armenian Question. Some in the government intervened
and made it difficult for the scholars to meet. Nonetheless, we must
recognize that we have entered a new phase in our relations with Turkey
since independence and that new phase has also coincided with changes in
Turkey. We must adjust our direction.
QUESTION: The 90th Anniversary activities included an International
Conference in Yerevan in which you participated. Any comments on the
Conference?
ANSWER: Yes, I participated in the deliberations on the second day,
since I had to attend a workshop on Security and Democracy in
Tzaghkadzor the first day, a workshop that had been decided upon before
I received the invitation. I was asked to chair the last session, on the
Turkish-Armenian relations.
From what I could observe that day, the conference had a large number
of high quality, international participation with many dignified
presentations, particularly touching upon the international dimensions
and the legal aspects of the question of Genocide. A number of questions
were raised and hopefully will become subject to public debate.
The conference did have some problem areas. The participants included
high level international figures with their concerns, as well as
academic, public and political figures with theirs. Combined with a very
large audience, it was impossible to pursue lines of thought and sustain
debate in a manner that satisfied the participants or the audience.
Nonetheless, it was commendable that the issues were framed beyond the
confines of the Armenian case. The participation of international figure
such as former President Lech Walesa of Poland and Juan Mendez, Special
Advisor to the UN Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide, and
of internationally recognized scholars, especially legal experts, gave
much weight to the Conference.
QUESTION: There were a number of issues raised during the session you
chaired which were not properly explored. Professor Richard Hovannisian,
for example prefaced his presentation with a statement that recent
events vindicated the position of Armenia's first Foreign Minister-- his
son Raffi Hovannisian--with regard to Turkey. Professor Rouben
Safrastyan argued that the policies of President Ter-Petrossian were
misconceived since Turkey's policy toward Armenia being of a "coercive"
nature. Do you agree?
ANSWER: First, I find Professor Hovanisian's personalized comments
inappropriate for an international conference on the Genocide, as I made
clear at the end of the session. Raffi is a person with many qualities,
continues to contribute to Armenia's political life and he will continue
to do so. He is not the issue in question.
On a technical level, with regard to Raffi's tenure as Foreign Minister,
it is clear that if a Minister disagrees with a President, who is the
elected official constitutionally responsible for foreign policy and has
the right to define policy, then for a minister to conduct policy
contrary to that defined by the president is unacceptable in any
government. I ascribe that incident to youthful enthusiasm.
As for Professor Safrastyan, it is not clear to me when he started
thinking in the direction he stated. Rouben was part of my analysis
group; he was the senior expert on Turkey. He fully participated in the
discussions we had, contributed to policy making and even accompanied me
twice I believe when I went to Ankara for negotiations. I do not
remember him having any reservations or raising any objections regarding
the policy that was decided and conducted. If he had any objections he
could have raised them then and may be we would have benefited from his
expertise. It is possible, of course, to revise one's views; but in that
case it would have been better for him to acknowledge his role in the
policies he is now criticizing. If a person is in a position where he
can make a difference and does not do so, one would have to question his
behavior. I have difficulty evaluating his later criticism and question
his reasons for his earlier silence or his criticism today.
More importantly, the assessment of the first administration's policies
toward Turkey-by Professors Hovannisian and Safrastyan or by
others-requires a more serious and responsible analysis than was offered
by any of the participants.
Armenia's policy then and in its essentials now is based on the
principle that the ultimate security and prosperity of a country,
especially one with Armenia's characteristics, depends on normal
relations with all of its neighbors. I think that the history of this
republic proves that. Neighbors provide the most likely threats or the
most likely opportunities. The purpose of foreign policy is to minimize
the first and reach out to the second. All else ensues from this
principle, all else is a matter of tactics.
Simple principles guiding foreign policy have practical consequences.
One does not only have enemies but also makes them. This implies that we
must take responsibility for our actions and inactions, for our words
and for our silences. For our policies. If our policies don't make a
difference because Turkey will be an enemy eternally or because the only
fact that counts is that its predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire,
committed genocide, then we should not think about policy, then freedom
to think and to elect and independence become irrelevant. That is an
escape from responsibility. What would that have meant for an Armenia
whose economy had collapsed with the USSR, an Armenia in an energy
crisis, under a full blockade from Azerbaijan and involved in the
Karabakh war?
Now let us assume for a moment that we had based our policy on a
completely different principle. Let us assume that we had brought
Genocide recognition to the forefront of our policy and treated Turkey
as the eternal enemy because it had not recognized the Genocide; and
that we poured all our energies into that battle. What would have been
the result?
It is true that we were unable to achieve our ultimate goal, relations
were not normalized as a result of our policy. Under the circumstances,
it was not to be easy. Yet, we must also take responsibility for that;
it is not all Turkey's fault. Our occupation of Azerbaijani territory,
especially beginning with Kelbajar was the major factor in that failure.
Whatever our reasons for doing so, the fact remains that we took such
action which was seen as deeply suspicious and reprehensible from
Turkey's point of view. And should our policy be assessed only by the
standard of full success, i.e., the establishment of normal relations?
Isn't it important that under the circumstances Turkey showed much
restraint during the war when its ethnic cousins were losing the war
with dire consequences for hundreds of thousands of their citizens?
Perhaps more important is the example of the wheat supply situation in
Armenian in the fall of 1992, when the Abkhaz war interrupted the only
open rail link that brought wheat to Armenia. At that time Armenia
produced only 40% of the wheat it consumed annually; and even that was
endangered because of the economic disruptions. Turkey could have
refused our request to open the Kars-Gyumri rail line to bring in the
100,000 tons of wheat the European Union had pledged to Armenia. Turkey
did not refuse our request and the border was opened for that purpose.
It became possible to pass the horrible 1992-1993 winter without famine
in Armenia. Would that have been possible if our policy had been
different? Is famine what the victims of the Genocide would have wanted
us to condemn our people to with the possible loss of Karabakh as a
consequence?
The unfortunate fact is that such views are being expressed by
historians who should know the history of the First Republic and who
should be able to situate policies and actions in the context of history
and not in the abstract world of wishful thinking.
No, I do not agree with my colleagues. As deeply as the issue of
Genocide recognition touches us all deeply and angers us, the existence
of the state of Armenia and the survival, security and prosperity of the
living-especially those living in that state and Karabakh-- remain the
highest value. I don't think the victims of the Genocide would have
wanted it differently. New martyrdom is not the only or even best way to
respect the memory of those who perished.
QUESTION: One other issue came up during that last session which you
chaired. The secretary of the HH Dashnaktsutyune, Kiro Manoyan, thought
this conference was an improvement over the one you had organized ten
years ago on the 80th Anniversary, since his party was absent then and
was represented now.
ANSWER: That was more amusing than serious, I thought, since his comment
raised more questions than it answered. Ten years ago, when we had
initiated the idea of an international conference on the 80th
Anniversary and organized it, there were no parties represented in the
conference, since we did not see the Genocide as a party issue. On the
other hand, no party other than his was invited to this one. I do not
have an answer to this one.
ARAVOT DAILY'S INTERVIEW WITH JIRAIR LIBARIDIAN
Aravot Daily (Yerevan)
June 28, 2005
QUESTION: The 90th Anniversary of the Genocide was marked by a number of
activities in Armenia and in the Diaspora. You participated or observed
many of them. Do you have any thoughts about these activities?
ANSWER: This certainly was a special year. I think we can talk about it
more openly now that the main activities are over.
It is heartening of course to see our people and our young generations
continuing to respect the memory of the victims of the Genocide in an
increasingly organized and unified way.
I do have questions in my mind, nonetheless, regarding some aspects of
this process.
The silent march to Tzitzerkaberd, the main event in my view, has been
one of the most solemn, dignified and moving experiences any person
could live through since the monument was erected in 1967. It is a
collective spiritual experience, a form of communion with the victims.
Some of that solemnity and dignity was lost this year, it seems to me;
with banners and slogans, at times it seemed as if it was a political
demonstration. I think there are more appropriate places for that. The
show of respect for the memory of the victims, which is the purpose of
the march, and the contemplative nature of the monument require a more
serene presence.
I am not sure also that billboards marking the anniversary in the main
streets of Yerevan were appropriate. Billboards advertise or sell
things. Do we need to advertise or sell the Genocide?
More generally, we have to think of the direction in which we in Armenia
and the Diaspora are going as far as our relations with the
international community are concerned. Is the Genocide our only concern
in our relations with our neighbors, with other countries? If that is
the case, then why not demand that countries like Germany, France, the
United Kingdom, and Russia recognize first their responsibility in
creating the conditions for a genocide before they recognize that of the
Ottoman Empire?
Furthermore, is a country "pro-Armenian" if it recognizes the Genocide?
The current atmosphere lends to that view. What if France, for example,
recognized the Genocide but pressured Armenia to make concessions on
Karabakh that Armenia cannot make on its own? What will we tell France?
That it is not pro-Armenian? Is it possible that this single issue may
blind us to what else is going with regard to a number of others we have
to settle with the international community.
There is also the danger that the Genocide issue may be used by other
powers-just as the "Armenian Question" was historically-to settle their
own accounts with Turkey, accounts that have little to do with the
Genocide, thus reducing the memory of our victims to an element in their
games, an element that would be used and abused, picked up and dropped
at their will, not ours? Doesn't that make us vulnerable to dangerous
manipulations? Doesn't that mean turning over the key to our policy
making -to our sense of success and failure, in fact our agenda-to
others who have no compunction manipulating us?
At the end, the question is: Is the "victim" psychology and the
political program that ensues from it the way we as a state and as
Diaspora want to relate to the world? However righteous and even
comfortable that may make us feel, we must at least ask the question.
The world may or may not owe us something. But it certainly will not
give us everything we want. Historically, it has given little.
QUESTION: Is there an alternative strategy?
ANSWER: I think we have come a long way since independence in
Turkish-Armenian relations. Changes in Turkey on the societal level and
even failed attempts at establishing dialog have contributed to an
atmosphere within which increased dialog with Turkish citizens may be
equally, if not more productive. We have to recognize that ultimately it
is the people of Turkey we have to address on this issue. It is their
historians and scientists, their teachers and journalists, and their
young generations who we must help to come to terms with their history.
In the long run, it is the more effective way. It is not the easiest
task. But if we are serious, it is the people of Turkey that must
understand and assess their history. That would be true recognition.
That requires an understanding on our part as to why it is that not only
successive governments of Turkey that have denied the Genocide, but also
Turkish society by and large. That requires recognizing changes in
Turkish society that have been opening opportunities for us in the last
two decades or so. That requires recognition of the value of the
policies of independent Armenia's first administration that did not
define Turkey as an enemy and created an environment for a critical view
of Turkish history and political structures from within. That requires
recognition of the efforts of a number of Armenian scholars who have
been in a dialog with their Turkish scholars for a number of years now.
But I am not sure this is convenient to many on our side. I am certain
that we have much to gain by framing the issue of Genocide recognition
as a problem for Turkish society and democracy and little to gain by
making it a European or Western issue.
The most recent events in Turkey testify to the validity of such a
strategy. Over thirty scholars supported by three universities, one of
them a state university, took it upon themselves to organize a
conference on the Armenian Question. Some in the government intervened
and made it difficult for the scholars to meet. Nonetheless, we must
recognize that we have entered a new phase in our relations with Turkey
since independence and that new phase has also coincided with changes in
Turkey. We must adjust our direction.
QUESTION: The 90th Anniversary activities included an International
Conference in Yerevan in which you participated. Any comments on the
Conference?
ANSWER: Yes, I participated in the deliberations on the second day,
since I had to attend a workshop on Security and Democracy in
Tzaghkadzor the first day, a workshop that had been decided upon before
I received the invitation. I was asked to chair the last session, on the
Turkish-Armenian relations.
From what I could observe that day, the conference had a large number
of high quality, international participation with many dignified
presentations, particularly touching upon the international dimensions
and the legal aspects of the question of Genocide. A number of questions
were raised and hopefully will become subject to public debate.
The conference did have some problem areas. The participants included
high level international figures with their concerns, as well as
academic, public and political figures with theirs. Combined with a very
large audience, it was impossible to pursue lines of thought and sustain
debate in a manner that satisfied the participants or the audience.
Nonetheless, it was commendable that the issues were framed beyond the
confines of the Armenian case. The participation of international figure
such as former President Lech Walesa of Poland and Juan Mendez, Special
Advisor to the UN Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide, and
of internationally recognized scholars, especially legal experts, gave
much weight to the Conference.
QUESTION: There were a number of issues raised during the session you
chaired which were not properly explored. Professor Richard Hovannisian,
for example prefaced his presentation with a statement that recent
events vindicated the position of Armenia's first Foreign Minister-- his
son Raffi Hovannisian--with regard to Turkey. Professor Rouben
Safrastyan argued that the policies of President Ter-Petrossian were
misconceived since Turkey's policy toward Armenia being of a "coercive"
nature. Do you agree?
ANSWER: First, I find Professor Hovanisian's personalized comments
inappropriate for an international conference on the Genocide, as I made
clear at the end of the session. Raffi is a person with many qualities,
continues to contribute to Armenia's political life and he will continue
to do so. He is not the issue in question.
On a technical level, with regard to Raffi's tenure as Foreign Minister,
it is clear that if a Minister disagrees with a President, who is the
elected official constitutionally responsible for foreign policy and has
the right to define policy, then for a minister to conduct policy
contrary to that defined by the president is unacceptable in any
government. I ascribe that incident to youthful enthusiasm.
As for Professor Safrastyan, it is not clear to me when he started
thinking in the direction he stated. Rouben was part of my analysis
group; he was the senior expert on Turkey. He fully participated in the
discussions we had, contributed to policy making and even accompanied me
twice I believe when I went to Ankara for negotiations. I do not
remember him having any reservations or raising any objections regarding
the policy that was decided and conducted. If he had any objections he
could have raised them then and may be we would have benefited from his
expertise. It is possible, of course, to revise one's views; but in that
case it would have been better for him to acknowledge his role in the
policies he is now criticizing. If a person is in a position where he
can make a difference and does not do so, one would have to question his
behavior. I have difficulty evaluating his later criticism and question
his reasons for his earlier silence or his criticism today.
More importantly, the assessment of the first administration's policies
toward Turkey-by Professors Hovannisian and Safrastyan or by
others-requires a more serious and responsible analysis than was offered
by any of the participants.
Armenia's policy then and in its essentials now is based on the
principle that the ultimate security and prosperity of a country,
especially one with Armenia's characteristics, depends on normal
relations with all of its neighbors. I think that the history of this
republic proves that. Neighbors provide the most likely threats or the
most likely opportunities. The purpose of foreign policy is to minimize
the first and reach out to the second. All else ensues from this
principle, all else is a matter of tactics.
Simple principles guiding foreign policy have practical consequences.
One does not only have enemies but also makes them. This implies that we
must take responsibility for our actions and inactions, for our words
and for our silences. For our policies. If our policies don't make a
difference because Turkey will be an enemy eternally or because the only
fact that counts is that its predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire,
committed genocide, then we should not think about policy, then freedom
to think and to elect and independence become irrelevant. That is an
escape from responsibility. What would that have meant for an Armenia
whose economy had collapsed with the USSR, an Armenia in an energy
crisis, under a full blockade from Azerbaijan and involved in the
Karabakh war?
Now let us assume for a moment that we had based our policy on a
completely different principle. Let us assume that we had brought
Genocide recognition to the forefront of our policy and treated Turkey
as the eternal enemy because it had not recognized the Genocide; and
that we poured all our energies into that battle. What would have been
the result?
It is true that we were unable to achieve our ultimate goal, relations
were not normalized as a result of our policy. Under the circumstances,
it was not to be easy. Yet, we must also take responsibility for that;
it is not all Turkey's fault. Our occupation of Azerbaijani territory,
especially beginning with Kelbajar was the major factor in that failure.
Whatever our reasons for doing so, the fact remains that we took such
action which was seen as deeply suspicious and reprehensible from
Turkey's point of view. And should our policy be assessed only by the
standard of full success, i.e., the establishment of normal relations?
Isn't it important that under the circumstances Turkey showed much
restraint during the war when its ethnic cousins were losing the war
with dire consequences for hundreds of thousands of their citizens?
Perhaps more important is the example of the wheat supply situation in
Armenian in the fall of 1992, when the Abkhaz war interrupted the only
open rail link that brought wheat to Armenia. At that time Armenia
produced only 40% of the wheat it consumed annually; and even that was
endangered because of the economic disruptions. Turkey could have
refused our request to open the Kars-Gyumri rail line to bring in the
100,000 tons of wheat the European Union had pledged to Armenia. Turkey
did not refuse our request and the border was opened for that purpose.
It became possible to pass the horrible 1992-1993 winter without famine
in Armenia. Would that have been possible if our policy had been
different? Is famine what the victims of the Genocide would have wanted
us to condemn our people to with the possible loss of Karabakh as a
consequence?
The unfortunate fact is that such views are being expressed by
historians who should know the history of the First Republic and who
should be able to situate policies and actions in the context of history
and not in the abstract world of wishful thinking.
No, I do not agree with my colleagues. As deeply as the issue of
Genocide recognition touches us all deeply and angers us, the existence
of the state of Armenia and the survival, security and prosperity of the
living-especially those living in that state and Karabakh-- remain the
highest value. I don't think the victims of the Genocide would have
wanted it differently. New martyrdom is not the only or even best way to
respect the memory of those who perished.
QUESTION: One other issue came up during that last session which you
chaired. The secretary of the HH Dashnaktsutyune, Kiro Manoyan, thought
this conference was an improvement over the one you had organized ten
years ago on the 80th Anniversary, since his party was absent then and
was represented now.
ANSWER: That was more amusing than serious, I thought, since his comment
raised more questions than it answered. Ten years ago, when we had
initiated the idea of an international conference on the 80th
Anniversary and organized it, there were no parties represented in the
conference, since we did not see the Genocide as a party issue. On the
other hand, no party other than his was invited to this one. I do not
have an answer to this one.