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Iran to Deliver a Missile Blow to Azerbaijan
By Asim Oku, AIA Turkish and Caucasian section
Axis Information and Analysis
29.06.2005
In case of Baku's consent to the accommodation of American military
bases in the republic, Iran plans to deliver a preventive missile
strike on the territory of Azerbaijan, Jelal Muhammedi, a confidant
of the new Iranian leader, said in his interview to the Azerbaijan
newspaper, Mirror. Muhammedi, being an ethnic Azerbaijanian, in the
past held the post of editor-in-chief of the Iranian periodical,
"Misag" (Tabriz), and is known for his close connections with
authorities. During the elections, he actively supported Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. The new president of Iran worked in the local authorities
of Iranian Azerbaijan in the 1990s. At that time he got acquainted
with one of the most outstanding journalists of this region,
Muhammedi. Jelal, at that time played and today continues to play
a rather active role in the formation of Iranian policy concerning
Azerbaijan. Especially, he has proved himself adept at secret relations
between Tehran and the representatives of the intellectual elite of
Baku, and, primarily, with journalists.
It is highly probable that after Ahmadinejad's election, Muhammedi
may become one of the key figures in formulating Tehran's policy
towards Azerbaijan. Muhammedi claims that a sharp deterioration of
Iran-Azerbaijan attitudes may occur in the near future for two reasons:
accommodation of the US military bases in Azerbaijan and support by
Baku of separatist moods in Iranian Azerbaijan.
Muhammedi emphasized that in both cases Tehran is capable of taking
not only adequate reciprocal measures, but also may be drawn to
actions of a preventive character.
En Route to Baku
What might be the Iranian reaction to Ilham Aliev's consent
to place a US military contingent in the republic was mentioned
above. Speaking about the destructive consequences of a missile blow,
Muhammedi suggested imagining "how Baku will look after two missiles
strike the area". He has no doubt that the missiles will reach their
target in case of the conflict, and such confidence is not baseless
at all. Tehran's military is much stronger then Baku's on each and
every parameter. An extensive missile arsenal and several hundreds
of warplanes allow Iran to deal a blazing air blow on the large cities
of Azerbaijan.
A common border, and the complete lack of any efficient system of
antimissile and antiaircraft defense of the Azerbaijan army eases
this task substantially. Moreover, judging by the equipment, staff,
and level of preparation, the Air Forces of the Azeri republic are
incapable of withstanding the Iranians. The common 611 km long border,
allows Iran to subject the southern areas of Azerbaijan to massive
artillery bombardments.
In case of escalation of the conflict up to ground forces collisions,
Baku also has no chance to resist. By the numbers, the Iranian Army
and Pasdaran (not even counting the National Guard - Basij Resistance
Forces) considerably surpass the Azerbaijanian armed forces (more
than 900 thousand Iranian soldiers against 72 thousand Azeri). Also,
Iranians are equipped much better technically then Azerbaijanians. The
supreme command structure of the Iranian Army and Pasdaran has
a rich operative experience acquired in the war with Iraq. As for
Azerbaijanian officers, they proved themselves inadequate during the
conflict with Armenia at the beginning of the nineties.
The strategic arrangement of forces in the Southern Caucasus and around
the Caspian Sea also is adverse for Baku. Aliev has no close ally with
appreciable military potential in the region. But Tehran holds close
relations with Armenia. In case the conflict breaks out, Tehran can
be expected to grip Azerbaijan in a "vise " from the Southeastern,
Southwestern and Western directions. Yerevan does not have to conduct
any military actions; it is enough to increase the concentration of
its armies on the Azerbaijan border.
Counting upon the above listed strategic factors, experts on the
Caucasus consider that given several days, the Iranians would manage
not only to suppress the resistance of the Azerbaijan army completely,
but also reach the capital of the republic. However, any such scenarios
are purely theoretical. Baku, certainly, concedes to Tehran on every
issue and parameter, but is protected by Ankara and Washington. Even
if Iran would decide to strike Azerbaijan (which is improbable) the
Americans would instantly interfere in the course of events. Though
the leadership of the Azeri republic constantly increases its military
expenditure (by the official data from about $74 million in 1997 up to
$300 million in 2005) the true and only guarantor of Baku's security
and safety is the United States. Accordingly, any "preventive measures"
by Tehran may only provoke the Iranian-American conflict, which in
turn is fraught with the most unpredictable consequences, not only
for its participants, but also for the countries of the Caucasus,
Central Asia and the Middle East.
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=199
By Asim Oku, AIA Turkish and Caucasian section
Axis Information and Analysis
29.06.2005
In case of Baku's consent to the accommodation of American military
bases in the republic, Iran plans to deliver a preventive missile
strike on the territory of Azerbaijan, Jelal Muhammedi, a confidant
of the new Iranian leader, said in his interview to the Azerbaijan
newspaper, Mirror. Muhammedi, being an ethnic Azerbaijanian, in the
past held the post of editor-in-chief of the Iranian periodical,
"Misag" (Tabriz), and is known for his close connections with
authorities. During the elections, he actively supported Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. The new president of Iran worked in the local authorities
of Iranian Azerbaijan in the 1990s. At that time he got acquainted
with one of the most outstanding journalists of this region,
Muhammedi. Jelal, at that time played and today continues to play
a rather active role in the formation of Iranian policy concerning
Azerbaijan. Especially, he has proved himself adept at secret relations
between Tehran and the representatives of the intellectual elite of
Baku, and, primarily, with journalists.
It is highly probable that after Ahmadinejad's election, Muhammedi
may become one of the key figures in formulating Tehran's policy
towards Azerbaijan. Muhammedi claims that a sharp deterioration of
Iran-Azerbaijan attitudes may occur in the near future for two reasons:
accommodation of the US military bases in Azerbaijan and support by
Baku of separatist moods in Iranian Azerbaijan.
Muhammedi emphasized that in both cases Tehran is capable of taking
not only adequate reciprocal measures, but also may be drawn to
actions of a preventive character.
En Route to Baku
What might be the Iranian reaction to Ilham Aliev's consent
to place a US military contingent in the republic was mentioned
above. Speaking about the destructive consequences of a missile blow,
Muhammedi suggested imagining "how Baku will look after two missiles
strike the area". He has no doubt that the missiles will reach their
target in case of the conflict, and such confidence is not baseless
at all. Tehran's military is much stronger then Baku's on each and
every parameter. An extensive missile arsenal and several hundreds
of warplanes allow Iran to deal a blazing air blow on the large cities
of Azerbaijan.
A common border, and the complete lack of any efficient system of
antimissile and antiaircraft defense of the Azerbaijan army eases
this task substantially. Moreover, judging by the equipment, staff,
and level of preparation, the Air Forces of the Azeri republic are
incapable of withstanding the Iranians. The common 611 km long border,
allows Iran to subject the southern areas of Azerbaijan to massive
artillery bombardments.
In case of escalation of the conflict up to ground forces collisions,
Baku also has no chance to resist. By the numbers, the Iranian Army
and Pasdaran (not even counting the National Guard - Basij Resistance
Forces) considerably surpass the Azerbaijanian armed forces (more
than 900 thousand Iranian soldiers against 72 thousand Azeri). Also,
Iranians are equipped much better technically then Azerbaijanians. The
supreme command structure of the Iranian Army and Pasdaran has
a rich operative experience acquired in the war with Iraq. As for
Azerbaijanian officers, they proved themselves inadequate during the
conflict with Armenia at the beginning of the nineties.
The strategic arrangement of forces in the Southern Caucasus and around
the Caspian Sea also is adverse for Baku. Aliev has no close ally with
appreciable military potential in the region. But Tehran holds close
relations with Armenia. In case the conflict breaks out, Tehran can
be expected to grip Azerbaijan in a "vise " from the Southeastern,
Southwestern and Western directions. Yerevan does not have to conduct
any military actions; it is enough to increase the concentration of
its armies on the Azerbaijan border.
Counting upon the above listed strategic factors, experts on the
Caucasus consider that given several days, the Iranians would manage
not only to suppress the resistance of the Azerbaijan army completely,
but also reach the capital of the republic. However, any such scenarios
are purely theoretical. Baku, certainly, concedes to Tehran on every
issue and parameter, but is protected by Ankara and Washington. Even
if Iran would decide to strike Azerbaijan (which is improbable) the
Americans would instantly interfere in the course of events. Though
the leadership of the Azeri republic constantly increases its military
expenditure (by the official data from about $74 million in 1997 up to
$300 million in 2005) the true and only guarantor of Baku's security
and safety is the United States. Accordingly, any "preventive measures"
by Tehran may only provoke the Iranian-American conflict, which in
turn is fraught with the most unpredictable consequences, not only
for its participants, but also for the countries of the Caucasus,
Central Asia and the Middle East.
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=199