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Turkey-Russia Relations Dynamics
By Asim Oku, AIA Turkish section.
Axis Information and Analysis
12.05.2005
The 90s: from "image of enemy" to "feeble partner"
After collapse of the USSR, Moscow continued perceiving Turkey as NATO
sentinel and a traditional rival in the area of the vital Russian
interests: the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Central Asia and the Middle
East. Kremlin considered Ankara as a leading sponsor of Islamic and
separatist movements in the Caucasus. Russian leadership was afraid that
Turkey, appealing to "pan -Turkism" and wide common cultural grounds
with the peoples of the Central Asia, is trying to expand its influence
upon them.
Turkish government was irritated by Russian counteracts against lining
of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. Both countries accused each other in
supporting separatists: the Chechen - in Russia, the Kurdish - in
Turkey. Revision by both states of previously developed stereotypes
begins at the end of the '90s. Ankara and Moscow start to perceive each
other not as a threat, but rather as a weak and, consequently not very
dangerous competitors, colliding with the same external challenges and
problems.
"The Default" in Russia, its military failures in the war with the
Chechen resistance, its inability to defend interests of Serbia in the
Balkans, reduced the fear of "Russian Bear" in Ankara. Correspondingly,
political and economic crisis in Turkey at the beginning of 2001 was
perceived in Moscow as a sign of weakness and instability. It lowers the
level of concern about the possibility of Turkish expansion in the
Central Asia and the Caucasus. Both countries aspire to benefit from
mutual relations - both on political and economic level. Simultaneously,
the rising of the US influence in the Caucasus leads to a rapprochement
of the former adversaries.
Economic Factor
Visit of the Russian Prime Minister Victor Tchernomyrdin to Ankara in
December 1997 (first visit in the rank of prime minister after the
collapse of the USSR) opens a new page in Russian-Turkish relations. It
was followed by a reciprocal visit of Bulent Ecevit to Moscow in
November 1999, during which the parties came out with joint declaration
on fighting terrorism. Prime Minister Mikchail Kasyanov's visit to
Turkey in October 2000 strengthened the ties that were previously
attained. The apogee of partnership was the arrival of Vladimir Putin to
Ankara in December 2004, and the visit of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Moscow
on January 10, 2005. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and leading Russian
businessmen accompanied Putin during this visit. Erdogan was accompanied
by 600 Turkish businessmen in his visit to Moscow. Economic cooperation
became the foremost basis of rapprochement. The volume of trade reached
10 billion dollars in 2004, and is growing 15-20% annually. Russia
became Turkey's second most important trade partner after Germany. The
"Blue stream" gas pipeline turned Russia into main supplier of natural
gas to Turkey. Projects of Russian and Kazakh oil delivery via Turkey to
the West were developed, reducing tension around Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
Pipeline issue. Figures of the Russian tourism to Turkey grow rapidly.
Military cooperation is also on the rise. From the end of the '90s
Turkey started to receive the Russian military equipment, including
helicopters and armored troop carriers.
Pain Points
Despite the intensive process of rapprochement there are still several
controversial issues. They include the Chechen and the Kurdish
separatism, the Nagorny Karabakh problem, the Cyprian question, the
Russian military bases in the Caucasus, the intervention of Turkey in
Georgia's and Azerbaijan's policies.
Turkey strives to attain replacement of the Russian peace-making
contingent in Aphasia, as well as in the other "hot spots" in the
Caucasus, with the international forces. Moscow in its turn is
discontented with the deliveries of Turkish military equipment to
Georgia, as well as with the participation of Turkey in modernization of
the Air Force base near Tbilisi. At the same time parties aspire to
soften existing disagreements. Turkish leaders constantly repeat, that
"the Chechen question is Russia's interior problem". Russia has limited
the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) activity in the country, but Ankara
insists on the announcement of this group as a "terrorist organization".
Eurasian ideas
Russia and Turkey today share much deeper understanding of geopolitical
issues. After the intrusion of the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the
increase of the American military presence in the Eastern and Southern
Europe, both states demonstrate obvious anti-American shift in their
policy. Turkey aspires to enter the EU with its aversion to "US
Hegemony", while Russia tries to strengthen ties with France and Germany
- the principal conductors of the anti-American policy in Europe. Russia
is extremely concerned about the loss of influence in Ukraine and
Georgia, and Turkey is worried by the attempts to restrain its presence
in the Balkans. Both countries emphasize their "Eurasian nature" (this
phrase belongs to the ambassador of Russia in Turkey Alexander Lebedev),
are dissatisfied with their minor role in the world, and look for the
new allies in Asia, approaching Iran, China and India. Relations between
Ankara and Damascus improved to a great extent after the Turkish Justice
and Development Party came to power
Kremlin also revives its "special relations" with the Syrian regime in
economic and military sphere. Both Turkey and Russia refused to support
the US military operation in Iraq in 2003. Growing concurrence of
interests between Turkey and Russia leads to the signing, in 2001 in New
York, of the "Eurasian cooperation agreement".
Ankara in a pointed manner stays out of the US and NATO attempts to
"entrench" on the Russian borders. In return Russia supports Turkish
position on Cyprus. Frank anti-American moods dominate in the
intellectual and political elite of both countries ("Edinaya Rossiya" -
United Russia and Turkish Justice and Development Party). Both countries
gradually chill off the cooperation with Israel - the main US ally in
the Middle East, while simultaneously building partnership with Israel's
sworn enemy - Syria. Both Ankara and Moscow indefatigably repeat that
they "aspire only to defend their national interests". In the ''real
politic'' it is expressed by the attempts to regain influence, which
both countries possessed throughout the blossoming era of the empires:
the Russian - the Soviet and the Ottoman.
With regard of the aforesaid, there is a tendency between the parties to
coordinate the opposition to Washington and to create the Eurasian
alignment to ''counterbalance'' the American "Atlantism".
Milestones in Russian - Turkish Mutual Relations During the Post-Soviet
Period
1992 - Suleyman Demirel, the Prime Minister of Turkey visited Moscow.
Signing of the "Principles of bilateral relations between the Turkish
Republic and the Russian Federation". In June the president of Russia
Boris Yeltsin came to Istanbul to the summit of leaders of "Organization
on economic cooperation on the Black Sea" states.
1993 - Tansu Ciller, the Prime Minister of Turkey visited Moscow. The
agreement on creation of a Joint committee and Working group in the
sphere of telecommunications, energy, industry and hi-tech was signed.
1995 - Tansu Ciller participated in May 9th celebrations of the 50th
anniversary of victory over the fascist Germany. Ciller and the head of
the Russian government Victor Tchernomyrdin discussed the future of
mutual relations.
1996 - Suleyman Demirel, ex-Prime Minister of Turkey participated in
Moscow summit of leaders of "Organization on economic cooperation on the
Black Sea" states. Parliaments of two countries signed the Protocol on
cooperation and the Memorandum of cooperation in fighting terrorism.
Construction of Turkish Trade center started in Moscow.
1997 - Victor Tchernomyrdin came with an official visit to Ankara in
December. It was the first visit of the Russian Prime Minister to Turkey
after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The parties agreed on a
long-term program on cooperation in economic, commercial and scientific
sphere.
1999 - The Prime Ministers Bulent Ecevit and Vladimir Putin signed in
Moscow the Joint declaration on fighting terrorism and the Report on
creation of the Incorporated economic committee, which lays a foundation
for further economic cooperation.
2000 - the Prime Minister of Russia Michael Kasyanov visited Turkey. The
parties signed the agreement on creation of Joint committee on
cooperation in the field of military industry.
2001 - Igor Ivanov`s, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, visit to
Turkey laid down a basis for the bilateral cultural cooperation.
Representatives of both countries signed in New York the "Eurasian
cooperation agreement".
2002 - General Anatoly Kvashnin, commander of the Joint Staff of the
Russian Federation, visited Ankara in January. The parties signed the
frame cooperation agreement in military sphere and the Cooperation
agreement in preparation of the military personnel. General Hussein
Kivrikoglu, Turkish Chief of Staff visited Russia in June. The Joint
bilateral Committee on military and technical cooperation met in Ankara
in September. The "Blue stream" gas pipeline was activated.
2004 - Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdalla Gul came to Moscow to
discuss with his Russian counterpart the issue of the Chechen and the
Kurdish separatism, and the situation in Nagorny Karabakh and in Cyprus.
Official visit to Turkey of the Russian President Vladimir Putin took
place in December. The parties signed several documents, including the
Joint declaration of friendship and multi-plane cooperation strengthening.
2005 - Official visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister of Turkey Recep
Tayyip Erdogan took place in January. The visit was dated for the
opening of Turkish Trade center in Moscow.
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=71
By Asim Oku, AIA Turkish section.
Axis Information and Analysis
12.05.2005
The 90s: from "image of enemy" to "feeble partner"
After collapse of the USSR, Moscow continued perceiving Turkey as NATO
sentinel and a traditional rival in the area of the vital Russian
interests: the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Central Asia and the Middle
East. Kremlin considered Ankara as a leading sponsor of Islamic and
separatist movements in the Caucasus. Russian leadership was afraid that
Turkey, appealing to "pan -Turkism" and wide common cultural grounds
with the peoples of the Central Asia, is trying to expand its influence
upon them.
Turkish government was irritated by Russian counteracts against lining
of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. Both countries accused each other in
supporting separatists: the Chechen - in Russia, the Kurdish - in
Turkey. Revision by both states of previously developed stereotypes
begins at the end of the '90s. Ankara and Moscow start to perceive each
other not as a threat, but rather as a weak and, consequently not very
dangerous competitors, colliding with the same external challenges and
problems.
"The Default" in Russia, its military failures in the war with the
Chechen resistance, its inability to defend interests of Serbia in the
Balkans, reduced the fear of "Russian Bear" in Ankara. Correspondingly,
political and economic crisis in Turkey at the beginning of 2001 was
perceived in Moscow as a sign of weakness and instability. It lowers the
level of concern about the possibility of Turkish expansion in the
Central Asia and the Caucasus. Both countries aspire to benefit from
mutual relations - both on political and economic level. Simultaneously,
the rising of the US influence in the Caucasus leads to a rapprochement
of the former adversaries.
Economic Factor
Visit of the Russian Prime Minister Victor Tchernomyrdin to Ankara in
December 1997 (first visit in the rank of prime minister after the
collapse of the USSR) opens a new page in Russian-Turkish relations. It
was followed by a reciprocal visit of Bulent Ecevit to Moscow in
November 1999, during which the parties came out with joint declaration
on fighting terrorism. Prime Minister Mikchail Kasyanov's visit to
Turkey in October 2000 strengthened the ties that were previously
attained. The apogee of partnership was the arrival of Vladimir Putin to
Ankara in December 2004, and the visit of Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Moscow
on January 10, 2005. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and leading Russian
businessmen accompanied Putin during this visit. Erdogan was accompanied
by 600 Turkish businessmen in his visit to Moscow. Economic cooperation
became the foremost basis of rapprochement. The volume of trade reached
10 billion dollars in 2004, and is growing 15-20% annually. Russia
became Turkey's second most important trade partner after Germany. The
"Blue stream" gas pipeline turned Russia into main supplier of natural
gas to Turkey. Projects of Russian and Kazakh oil delivery via Turkey to
the West were developed, reducing tension around Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
Pipeline issue. Figures of the Russian tourism to Turkey grow rapidly.
Military cooperation is also on the rise. From the end of the '90s
Turkey started to receive the Russian military equipment, including
helicopters and armored troop carriers.
Pain Points
Despite the intensive process of rapprochement there are still several
controversial issues. They include the Chechen and the Kurdish
separatism, the Nagorny Karabakh problem, the Cyprian question, the
Russian military bases in the Caucasus, the intervention of Turkey in
Georgia's and Azerbaijan's policies.
Turkey strives to attain replacement of the Russian peace-making
contingent in Aphasia, as well as in the other "hot spots" in the
Caucasus, with the international forces. Moscow in its turn is
discontented with the deliveries of Turkish military equipment to
Georgia, as well as with the participation of Turkey in modernization of
the Air Force base near Tbilisi. At the same time parties aspire to
soften existing disagreements. Turkish leaders constantly repeat, that
"the Chechen question is Russia's interior problem". Russia has limited
the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) activity in the country, but Ankara
insists on the announcement of this group as a "terrorist organization".
Eurasian ideas
Russia and Turkey today share much deeper understanding of geopolitical
issues. After the intrusion of the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the
increase of the American military presence in the Eastern and Southern
Europe, both states demonstrate obvious anti-American shift in their
policy. Turkey aspires to enter the EU with its aversion to "US
Hegemony", while Russia tries to strengthen ties with France and Germany
- the principal conductors of the anti-American policy in Europe. Russia
is extremely concerned about the loss of influence in Ukraine and
Georgia, and Turkey is worried by the attempts to restrain its presence
in the Balkans. Both countries emphasize their "Eurasian nature" (this
phrase belongs to the ambassador of Russia in Turkey Alexander Lebedev),
are dissatisfied with their minor role in the world, and look for the
new allies in Asia, approaching Iran, China and India. Relations between
Ankara and Damascus improved to a great extent after the Turkish Justice
and Development Party came to power
Kremlin also revives its "special relations" with the Syrian regime in
economic and military sphere. Both Turkey and Russia refused to support
the US military operation in Iraq in 2003. Growing concurrence of
interests between Turkey and Russia leads to the signing, in 2001 in New
York, of the "Eurasian cooperation agreement".
Ankara in a pointed manner stays out of the US and NATO attempts to
"entrench" on the Russian borders. In return Russia supports Turkish
position on Cyprus. Frank anti-American moods dominate in the
intellectual and political elite of both countries ("Edinaya Rossiya" -
United Russia and Turkish Justice and Development Party). Both countries
gradually chill off the cooperation with Israel - the main US ally in
the Middle East, while simultaneously building partnership with Israel's
sworn enemy - Syria. Both Ankara and Moscow indefatigably repeat that
they "aspire only to defend their national interests". In the ''real
politic'' it is expressed by the attempts to regain influence, which
both countries possessed throughout the blossoming era of the empires:
the Russian - the Soviet and the Ottoman.
With regard of the aforesaid, there is a tendency between the parties to
coordinate the opposition to Washington and to create the Eurasian
alignment to ''counterbalance'' the American "Atlantism".
Milestones in Russian - Turkish Mutual Relations During the Post-Soviet
Period
1992 - Suleyman Demirel, the Prime Minister of Turkey visited Moscow.
Signing of the "Principles of bilateral relations between the Turkish
Republic and the Russian Federation". In June the president of Russia
Boris Yeltsin came to Istanbul to the summit of leaders of "Organization
on economic cooperation on the Black Sea" states.
1993 - Tansu Ciller, the Prime Minister of Turkey visited Moscow. The
agreement on creation of a Joint committee and Working group in the
sphere of telecommunications, energy, industry and hi-tech was signed.
1995 - Tansu Ciller participated in May 9th celebrations of the 50th
anniversary of victory over the fascist Germany. Ciller and the head of
the Russian government Victor Tchernomyrdin discussed the future of
mutual relations.
1996 - Suleyman Demirel, ex-Prime Minister of Turkey participated in
Moscow summit of leaders of "Organization on economic cooperation on the
Black Sea" states. Parliaments of two countries signed the Protocol on
cooperation and the Memorandum of cooperation in fighting terrorism.
Construction of Turkish Trade center started in Moscow.
1997 - Victor Tchernomyrdin came with an official visit to Ankara in
December. It was the first visit of the Russian Prime Minister to Turkey
after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The parties agreed on a
long-term program on cooperation in economic, commercial and scientific
sphere.
1999 - The Prime Ministers Bulent Ecevit and Vladimir Putin signed in
Moscow the Joint declaration on fighting terrorism and the Report on
creation of the Incorporated economic committee, which lays a foundation
for further economic cooperation.
2000 - the Prime Minister of Russia Michael Kasyanov visited Turkey. The
parties signed the agreement on creation of Joint committee on
cooperation in the field of military industry.
2001 - Igor Ivanov`s, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, visit to
Turkey laid down a basis for the bilateral cultural cooperation.
Representatives of both countries signed in New York the "Eurasian
cooperation agreement".
2002 - General Anatoly Kvashnin, commander of the Joint Staff of the
Russian Federation, visited Ankara in January. The parties signed the
frame cooperation agreement in military sphere and the Cooperation
agreement in preparation of the military personnel. General Hussein
Kivrikoglu, Turkish Chief of Staff visited Russia in June. The Joint
bilateral Committee on military and technical cooperation met in Ankara
in September. The "Blue stream" gas pipeline was activated.
2004 - Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdalla Gul came to Moscow to
discuss with his Russian counterpart the issue of the Chechen and the
Kurdish separatism, and the situation in Nagorny Karabakh and in Cyprus.
Official visit to Turkey of the Russian President Vladimir Putin took
place in December. The parties signed several documents, including the
Joint declaration of friendship and multi-plane cooperation strengthening.
2005 - Official visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister of Turkey Recep
Tayyip Erdogan took place in January. The visit was dated for the
opening of Turkish Trade center in Moscow.
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=71