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Azerbaijan aims at Turkish support through closer ties with Cyprus - daily
Zerkalo, Baku
19 Jul 05
Excerpt from K. Quluzada report by Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo on
19 July headlined "Azerbaijan de-facto recognized the Turkish Cyprus"
and subheaded "In response, the Greeks are threatening Baku with
supporting Nagornyy Karabakh".
The latest moves by Baku mean a de-facto recognition of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan said prior to his visit to Russia.
[Passage omitted: TRNC president says Azerbaijan's moves will help
them out of international isolation; details of Erdogan's visit to
Baku in June]
Baku's position provoked a sharp reaction in Greece, the Greek part
of Cyprus and Armenia. Calls started to be voiced at different levels
in these countries in response to official Baku's plans to recognize
the independence of the "Nagornyy Karabakh Republic" (NKR). Besides,
the Greek community of Cyprus made a "threat" to open direct flights
to Nagornyy Karabakh.
We should note that there is quite a lot of resemblance between the
Karabakh and Cyprus problems. Despite its strategic alliance with
Turkey, Azerbaijan has so far avoided openly supporting the TRNC
as this may create a precedent for the international recognition of
"unrecognized republics", one of which is the "NKR".
Taking into consideration the existence of the Karabakh problem, the
position of Greece on the Cyprus issue should be closer to that of
Azerbaijan, rather than that of Turkey. What is more, a reverse effect
is also at work here. From a logical point of view, it would be more
advantageous to Ankara to obtain international recognition [for TRNC]
from any separatist formation, including Nagornyy Karabakh, because
in such a case, a chance arises to legitimize the TRNC. However,
due to the mutual aversion that has formed historically between the
two alliances - Azerbaijan-Turkey and Armenia-Greece, Baku supports
Ankara and Ankara supports Baku.
What has happened now, after all? Why did [Azerbaijani President]
Ilham Aliyev decide to change the policy towards the TRNC that was
previously conducted by [the late President] Heydar Aliyev? Will this
lead to the "NKR" getting out of international isolation?
The thing is that during the referendum held in Cyprus, the Greek
community refused to join the EU together with the Turkish community,
while the majority of the northern community accepted this plan of
settlement. After this, a new international atmosphere formed around
the Cyprus problem. The USA, the EU and even Russia (the details will
follow later) favoured taking the TRNC out of it's isolation. The
Turkish Cypriots started to be regarded as being more ready for
compromise than the Greek Cypriots. This, in principle, could serve as
a reason for Baku to give Ankara more active and more visual support.
Besides, the intention to lift the TRNC's international isolation
is possibly a signal from the Azerbaijani authorities to the public
of the country about the possibility of the Karabakh settlement
developing in the same way. Besides, it cannot be ruled out that
the Azerbaijani authorities are trying towards not so much the
international recognition of the TRNC as towards finding additional
markets in order to invest surplus funds available in the country.
True, with this, Azerbaijan's policy on compiling "a black list"
of companies operating in the "NKR" becomes quite scrupulous. The
aspiration of the Azerbaijani authorities to obtain additional
support from Ankara in the run-up to the parliamentary election
can be considered as another factor. The supposed reasons for the
change in Azerbaijan's foreign policy priorities are very diverse,
but they do not exclude each other. One thing is clear: Ilham Aliyev
is conducting a more active policy with regard to the TRNC than the
authorities in the 10 years before him. To all appearances, the most
important factor here is precisely the change in the international
atmosphere around the Cyprus problem.
[Passage omitted: details of the meeting between the Russian president
and Turkish premier in Sochi]
Zerkalo, Baku
19 Jul 05
Excerpt from K. Quluzada report by Azerbaijani newspaper Zerkalo on
19 July headlined "Azerbaijan de-facto recognized the Turkish Cyprus"
and subheaded "In response, the Greeks are threatening Baku with
supporting Nagornyy Karabakh".
The latest moves by Baku mean a de-facto recognition of the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan said prior to his visit to Russia.
[Passage omitted: TRNC president says Azerbaijan's moves will help
them out of international isolation; details of Erdogan's visit to
Baku in June]
Baku's position provoked a sharp reaction in Greece, the Greek part
of Cyprus and Armenia. Calls started to be voiced at different levels
in these countries in response to official Baku's plans to recognize
the independence of the "Nagornyy Karabakh Republic" (NKR). Besides,
the Greek community of Cyprus made a "threat" to open direct flights
to Nagornyy Karabakh.
We should note that there is quite a lot of resemblance between the
Karabakh and Cyprus problems. Despite its strategic alliance with
Turkey, Azerbaijan has so far avoided openly supporting the TRNC
as this may create a precedent for the international recognition of
"unrecognized republics", one of which is the "NKR".
Taking into consideration the existence of the Karabakh problem, the
position of Greece on the Cyprus issue should be closer to that of
Azerbaijan, rather than that of Turkey. What is more, a reverse effect
is also at work here. From a logical point of view, it would be more
advantageous to Ankara to obtain international recognition [for TRNC]
from any separatist formation, including Nagornyy Karabakh, because
in such a case, a chance arises to legitimize the TRNC. However,
due to the mutual aversion that has formed historically between the
two alliances - Azerbaijan-Turkey and Armenia-Greece, Baku supports
Ankara and Ankara supports Baku.
What has happened now, after all? Why did [Azerbaijani President]
Ilham Aliyev decide to change the policy towards the TRNC that was
previously conducted by [the late President] Heydar Aliyev? Will this
lead to the "NKR" getting out of international isolation?
The thing is that during the referendum held in Cyprus, the Greek
community refused to join the EU together with the Turkish community,
while the majority of the northern community accepted this plan of
settlement. After this, a new international atmosphere formed around
the Cyprus problem. The USA, the EU and even Russia (the details will
follow later) favoured taking the TRNC out of it's isolation. The
Turkish Cypriots started to be regarded as being more ready for
compromise than the Greek Cypriots. This, in principle, could serve as
a reason for Baku to give Ankara more active and more visual support.
Besides, the intention to lift the TRNC's international isolation
is possibly a signal from the Azerbaijani authorities to the public
of the country about the possibility of the Karabakh settlement
developing in the same way. Besides, it cannot be ruled out that
the Azerbaijani authorities are trying towards not so much the
international recognition of the TRNC as towards finding additional
markets in order to invest surplus funds available in the country.
True, with this, Azerbaijan's policy on compiling "a black list"
of companies operating in the "NKR" becomes quite scrupulous. The
aspiration of the Azerbaijani authorities to obtain additional
support from Ankara in the run-up to the parliamentary election
can be considered as another factor. The supposed reasons for the
change in Azerbaijan's foreign policy priorities are very diverse,
but they do not exclude each other. One thing is clear: Ilham Aliyev
is conducting a more active policy with regard to the TRNC than the
authorities in the 10 years before him. To all appearances, the most
important factor here is precisely the change in the international
atmosphere around the Cyprus problem.
[Passage omitted: details of the meeting between the Russian president
and Turkish premier in Sochi]