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Europe Must Not Lose Sight of the Frozen Conflicts
by VLADIMIR SOCOR
June 3-5, 2005
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy is one of the
major casualties of the voter backlash against the EU's constitutional
treaty. To be sure, some of the constitutional treaty's leading
advocates -- such as French President Jacques Chirac and German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder -- had themselves weakened the CFSP for
years by blocking key initiatives or working at cross purposes with
the policy and absurdly trying to distance the EU from NATO. But, in
the final analysis, it is up to the European Council and Commission to
offer voters an inspiring strategic vision on EU policy. This should
pursue together with NATO the common economic and security interests
in the new Euro-Atlantic neighborhood to the east.
At this stage, those interests converge on the greater Black Sea
region. From Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria to Georgia and on
to Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea, this region functions as a vital
two-way corrridor of strategic access: For allied anti-terror forces
to operations areas in Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Middle East,
and for Caspian oil and gas to consumer countries in Europe. Thus, some
of the EU's most pressing challenges and requirements -- anti-terrorism
efforts, energy supply, institutional consolidation and enlargement --
are to be met in the Black Sea region.
Strategically for Europe, this area must be recognized as the new
pivot of history.
This region's countries are Western-friendly. The European idea and
the EU itself continue to exert their magnetic force here. However,
the region suffers from Soviet-legacy problems, the most painful of
which are the unresolved separatist conflicts: Transnistria, a Russian
military exclave in Moldova and a thorn in the side to both Ukraine and
Romania; Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both carved out of Georgia; and
Karabakh at the heart of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Commonly referred to as "the frozen conflicts," they are actually
smoldering, maintained in that form by Russia's military presence and
its divide-and-rule policy. What is frozen is the political processes
and diplomatic formats that Moscow designed more than a decade ago
so as to maintain influence on all sides involved in these conflicts
and complicate the security situation of neighboring countries as well.
Broadly speaking, Western interests and those of the states and
peoples in the Black Sea region are facets of one and the same
set of interests: security, democratic development, Euro-Atlantic
integration as the path to prosperity. Settling the unresolved
conflicts in accordance with that set of interests must become the
starting premise of European and U.S. diplomacy in the region.
Along with establishing that premise, it is urgently necessary to
bring the entire region under the purview of international law. Ever
since the 1991 Soviet collapse, Russian policy has practically
abolished international law in parts of this region. Moscow and
its local proteges have shifted or erased borders, or erected new
borders de facto, in conflict areas; created unlawful armed forces;
turned hundreds of thousands of local residents into Russian citizens
so as to assert rights of protection over them; underwritten ethnic
cleansing and thwarted repatriation proposals; and kept Russian troops
and bases in the region, with or without host-country consent. Thus,
political settlement of the conflicts must begin with a recommitment
to upholding international law throughout the region.
Democracy is a sine qua non to conflict resolution, and there must be
no exemption tailored for Soviet-legacy authorities in secessionist
areas. Most of these have over the years become mini-scale
reproductions of a Russian model of governance, characterized
by a fusion of shadowy business networks with the administrative
apparatus and security services under authoritarian political leaders
appointed from Moscow. The ultimate status of these areas must not
be predetermined by negotiations with the incumbent secessionist
leaderships. This approach can lead to antidemocratic solutions and
a continuing "freeze." Political settlements have to be preceded by a
transitional period of democratization and civil society building in
the secessionist enclaves, enabling the populations to make an informed
choice for a European future, instead of post-Soviet stagnation.
The secessionist enclaves are over-militarized. They host Russian and
local military forces and internal security troops, "peacekeping"
contingents without international mandates, and large arsenals of
arms and ammunition (notably, unaccounted-for heavy weaponry that
should have been eliminated under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in
Europe). These are out of bounds to international inspection. Before
a viable political settlement can be reached, these regions must
be demilitarized. Peacekeeping -- a Russian monopoly for more than
a decade in this region -- should be internationalized and largely
civilianized. In 2003, the EU briefly considered an international
peacekeeping operation for Transnistria, involving predominantly
civilian components, with a small military element.
Now is the time to return to that proposal.
The existing formats for conflict-settlement negotiations are stacked
to ensure Moscow's control over the process and minimize or exclude
a Western say on the region's security. Those negotiating formats
date back to the early 1990s, a truly distant past from today's
perspective. Hardly anyone then would have predicted the EU's and
NATO's enlargement, the high importance of Caspian energy resources
to Europe, or the antiterrorism operations requiring direct access
from Europe eastward. By now, therefore, Euro-Atlantic interests
in this region have far outgrown those old negotiating formats. The
EU can take the lead in bypassing those discredited formats, using
its political appeal in the region, the incentive of post-conflict
reconstruction aid, and CFSP instruments for conflict-resolution and
regional stabilization.
Russia has acted in most cases as an initiator of, a participant in,
and at the same time as official mediator in these conflicts, openly
favoring the secessionist side. In sum, Russia is the problem, not
the solution, in most of these cases. To be sure, Moscow's interests
should be taken into account insofar as they are consistent with
European democratic values. Russia must have a voice in the debate;
but should not have a veto on the outcome, let alone a double veto
through its local satraps.
Western interests in the region require stable, secure, reform-capable
partner states, free to exercise their Euro-Atlantic choice and to
focus on meeting the integration standards. Resolution of frozen
conflicts, and regional security generally from the Black Sea to the
Caspian, must be based on the vision of a Euro-Atlantic future, not
on bureaucratically-driven accomodation with the sequels and relics
of the Soviet past. Here is the EU' s chance to validate the CFSP and
demonstrate strategic vision to increasingly disaffected publics in
the EU's core countries.
Mr. Socor is a senior fellow of the Washington-based Jamestown
Foundation, publishers of the Eurasia Daily Monitor.
by VLADIMIR SOCOR
June 3-5, 2005
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL EUROPE
The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy is one of the
major casualties of the voter backlash against the EU's constitutional
treaty. To be sure, some of the constitutional treaty's leading
advocates -- such as French President Jacques Chirac and German
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder -- had themselves weakened the CFSP for
years by blocking key initiatives or working at cross purposes with
the policy and absurdly trying to distance the EU from NATO. But, in
the final analysis, it is up to the European Council and Commission to
offer voters an inspiring strategic vision on EU policy. This should
pursue together with NATO the common economic and security interests
in the new Euro-Atlantic neighborhood to the east.
At this stage, those interests converge on the greater Black Sea
region. From Ukraine, Romania, and Bulgaria to Georgia and on
to Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea, this region functions as a vital
two-way corrridor of strategic access: For allied anti-terror forces
to operations areas in Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Middle East,
and for Caspian oil and gas to consumer countries in Europe. Thus, some
of the EU's most pressing challenges and requirements -- anti-terrorism
efforts, energy supply, institutional consolidation and enlargement --
are to be met in the Black Sea region.
Strategically for Europe, this area must be recognized as the new
pivot of history.
This region's countries are Western-friendly. The European idea and
the EU itself continue to exert their magnetic force here. However,
the region suffers from Soviet-legacy problems, the most painful of
which are the unresolved separatist conflicts: Transnistria, a Russian
military exclave in Moldova and a thorn in the side to both Ukraine and
Romania; Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both carved out of Georgia; and
Karabakh at the heart of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Commonly referred to as "the frozen conflicts," they are actually
smoldering, maintained in that form by Russia's military presence and
its divide-and-rule policy. What is frozen is the political processes
and diplomatic formats that Moscow designed more than a decade ago
so as to maintain influence on all sides involved in these conflicts
and complicate the security situation of neighboring countries as well.
Broadly speaking, Western interests and those of the states and
peoples in the Black Sea region are facets of one and the same
set of interests: security, democratic development, Euro-Atlantic
integration as the path to prosperity. Settling the unresolved
conflicts in accordance with that set of interests must become the
starting premise of European and U.S. diplomacy in the region.
Along with establishing that premise, it is urgently necessary to
bring the entire region under the purview of international law. Ever
since the 1991 Soviet collapse, Russian policy has practically
abolished international law in parts of this region. Moscow and
its local proteges have shifted or erased borders, or erected new
borders de facto, in conflict areas; created unlawful armed forces;
turned hundreds of thousands of local residents into Russian citizens
so as to assert rights of protection over them; underwritten ethnic
cleansing and thwarted repatriation proposals; and kept Russian troops
and bases in the region, with or without host-country consent. Thus,
political settlement of the conflicts must begin with a recommitment
to upholding international law throughout the region.
Democracy is a sine qua non to conflict resolution, and there must be
no exemption tailored for Soviet-legacy authorities in secessionist
areas. Most of these have over the years become mini-scale
reproductions of a Russian model of governance, characterized
by a fusion of shadowy business networks with the administrative
apparatus and security services under authoritarian political leaders
appointed from Moscow. The ultimate status of these areas must not
be predetermined by negotiations with the incumbent secessionist
leaderships. This approach can lead to antidemocratic solutions and
a continuing "freeze." Political settlements have to be preceded by a
transitional period of democratization and civil society building in
the secessionist enclaves, enabling the populations to make an informed
choice for a European future, instead of post-Soviet stagnation.
The secessionist enclaves are over-militarized. They host Russian and
local military forces and internal security troops, "peacekeping"
contingents without international mandates, and large arsenals of
arms and ammunition (notably, unaccounted-for heavy weaponry that
should have been eliminated under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in
Europe). These are out of bounds to international inspection. Before
a viable political settlement can be reached, these regions must
be demilitarized. Peacekeeping -- a Russian monopoly for more than
a decade in this region -- should be internationalized and largely
civilianized. In 2003, the EU briefly considered an international
peacekeeping operation for Transnistria, involving predominantly
civilian components, with a small military element.
Now is the time to return to that proposal.
The existing formats for conflict-settlement negotiations are stacked
to ensure Moscow's control over the process and minimize or exclude
a Western say on the region's security. Those negotiating formats
date back to the early 1990s, a truly distant past from today's
perspective. Hardly anyone then would have predicted the EU's and
NATO's enlargement, the high importance of Caspian energy resources
to Europe, or the antiterrorism operations requiring direct access
from Europe eastward. By now, therefore, Euro-Atlantic interests
in this region have far outgrown those old negotiating formats. The
EU can take the lead in bypassing those discredited formats, using
its political appeal in the region, the incentive of post-conflict
reconstruction aid, and CFSP instruments for conflict-resolution and
regional stabilization.
Russia has acted in most cases as an initiator of, a participant in,
and at the same time as official mediator in these conflicts, openly
favoring the secessionist side. In sum, Russia is the problem, not
the solution, in most of these cases. To be sure, Moscow's interests
should be taken into account insofar as they are consistent with
European democratic values. Russia must have a voice in the debate;
but should not have a veto on the outcome, let alone a double veto
through its local satraps.
Western interests in the region require stable, secure, reform-capable
partner states, free to exercise their Euro-Atlantic choice and to
focus on meeting the integration standards. Resolution of frozen
conflicts, and regional security generally from the Black Sea to the
Caspian, must be based on the vision of a Euro-Atlantic future, not
on bureaucratically-driven accomodation with the sequels and relics
of the Soviet past. Here is the EU' s chance to validate the CFSP and
demonstrate strategic vision to increasingly disaffected publics in
the EU's core countries.
Mr. Socor is a senior fellow of the Washington-based Jamestown
Foundation, publishers of the Eurasia Daily Monitor.