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IF THE CONFLICT IS ETHNIC AND POLITICAL
Azat Artsakh - Nagorno Karabakh Republic [NKR]
25 July 05
When considering the ethnic and political conflicts, such as the Nagorno
Karabakh, Georgian ` Abkhazian, Georgian ` Osian conflicts, we often
forget about the human factor, which is inevitably one of the main
elements of both the outbreak of the conflict and its regulation. I will
bring examples from my own experience. I lived one third of my life in
Baku as a representative of an ethnic minority. Then I moved to Yerevan
and at once became member of the ethnic majority. And with the
proclamation of Nagorno Karabakh Republic I got an indefinite status
along with my citizenship. In one word, I have experienced the
inconveniences of the ethnic minority and the advantages of the ethnic
majority, as well as the vagueness of the status of a citizen of an
unrecognized country. Nevertheless, I dare say, as an individual I did
not change myself when I changed the places. However, the attitude of
the people around me changed from friendly to openly hostile, depending
on where I lived. That is to say, I myself remained the same but the
attitude of the people towards me varied, depending on the ethnic
feature. This very factor which results from the ethnic policy of the
government of the ethnic majority presents one of the most important
elements of ethnic and political conflicts. We can therefore say that in
the post-Soviet space it is the controversy between the ethnic minority
and the ethnic majority and not the confrontation between them as
certain political scientists and statesmen think mistakenly that gives a
start to the majority of conflicts. This perfectly refers to the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict. There is no direct conflict between the Armenian and
Azerbaijani peoples. If this were so, the conflict would spread in
neighbouring Georgia as well where about half a million Armenians and
just as many Azerbaijanis live side by side. The conflict of Nagorno
Karabakh is a conflict which arose between the former Armenian
sovereignty within Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani government rather than
the Azerbaijani people. Neglecting or misunderstanding the latter fact
may result in unwanted results for the parties. Therefore when looking
for ways of resolution it is extremely dangerous and irresponsible to
scatter terms like `separatism', `terror', etc. I think that the term
`separatism' is not suitable for the unrecognized states of the
post-Soviet states. These unrecognized states used to be sovereign
within the former republics of the Soviet Union, and acting against the
dissolution of the USSR were in a way `unionists' rather. Whereas it is
the former Soviet republics that should be considered `separatists'
because they were overtly for the dissolution of the USSR and they
achieved their aim. What is more, the model of the conflict between
ethnic minority and the government of the ethnic majority can be applied
to the republics of the Union. For example, the declaration of the
independence of Azerbaijan and then its recognition by the international
community can be considered the resolution of the conflict between the
Azerbaijani ethnic minority of the `Russian empire' called the Soviet
Union and the government of this `empire' in favour of the former. After
the dissolution of the Soviet Union the roles changed, and now the
government of the recognized states of the post-Soviet space began to
stick labels of `separatist' and `terrorist' to the autonomies which had
declared themselves independent. What is more, they did this in
accordance with the USSR law on the procedure of settlement of issues
related to secession of republics from the USSR, passed on April 3,
1990. The starting point was the natural right of the peoples for
self-determination, the right of the sovereign peoples for raising the
matters of their political and legal status. And this is natural for the
issues related to the dissolution of the USSR could not refer to some
post-Soviet peoples and pass by others. Thus, the declarations of
independence by several former Soviet sovereignties are but the
continuation of the process of dissolution of the USSR already in the
framework of the post-Soviet republics. And if we ignore these facts
(like the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Russia did in
relation to Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Osia and Chechnya
respectively), we shall inevitably face with unforeseeable consequences.
It is not accidental that bloodshed is successfully avoided when the
`separatists' achieve their goal. This was the case with the Soviet
republics, as well as Czechoslovakia. There is also the precedent of
`Peaceful Divorce' in a sovereignty of the USSR, the Autonomous Republic
of Chechnya and Ingushetia. And on the contrary, when the government of
the ethnic minority imposes the principle of territorial integrity on
the seceding ethnic minority, the bloodshed is inevitable. The examples
are many: Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Osia, Transdniestr, Cosovo,
the Serbian-Croatian conflict, etc. The cause for this is that the right
of the nations for self-determination is natural and it therefore makes
part of the human factor, whereas the principle of territorial integrity
is artificial and has nothing to do with the concept of human rights.
And the fact that the parties of the Karabakh conflict seek to find the
resolution of the issue on the basis of these two controversial
principles may mean that another way of resolution should be sought for,
which must necessarily be based on natural principles. The degree of
democracy of this or that state could become such a touchstone. In other
words, it is possible to enable Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan to
compete within the frame of the international mediation in building
democracy because both countries have shouted loud about their
aspiration to join the European family. But what picture do we have now?
The political elite of Azerbaijan, which does not wish to negotiate with
Karabakh leaders and conducts a policy of isolating NK from the world,
actually torpedoes the democratic reforms in Nagorno Karabakh.
Nevertheless, the democratization of the social and political life in
NKR proceeds successfully despite the martial law imposed de jure on the
republic. As it is known, one of the basic indices of the degree of
democratization of a state is the presidential, parliamentary and local
elections. In the meantime, not only the recognized conflict parties but
also the international democratic community in the face of various
organizations such as the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the
European Union, NATO, etc., is against holding elections in the states
which are not recognized. The result is a paradoxical situation when the
establishment of democracy and humanitarian principles in unrecognized
countries is blocked by those recognized states which are guided by the
same principles in their social and political life. Is this the
manifestation of democracy and humanism? Whereas, both in the recognized
and unrecognized countries people live, but the latter are constantly
refused guarantees for protection of human rights. They are even refused
foreign humanitarian aid. Thus, the international community, going in
for the principle of territorial integrity of recognized states in the
settlement of conflicts, completely forgets about the human factor.
Certainly, no one denies the importance of building bridges of trust
between the conflict parties if, in fact, there is no trust between
them. But as it was mentioned above, the peoples have nothing to do here
because it is the governments of the ethnic minority and the ethnic
majority that confront. We must therefore speak about bridges of trust
between the governments of the ethnic minority and the ethnic majority.
In the case of Nagorno Karabakh conflict the bridges of trust should be
built between the legitimately elected government of Nagorno Karabakh
and official Baku, which may be achieved only through direct
relationships. And if the Azerbaijani side does not agree to such
relationships, it means Azerbaijan is reluctant for the resolution of
the conflict but pretends to be willing to achieve its settlement. In
order to change the situation with the consideration of the human factor
it is necessary to replace the dictate of the international community,
which will be justified in this case. To sum up I want to emphasize that
in solving the ethnic conflicts it is necessary to put the stress on one
of the principles of the international law, which completely takes into
consideration the interests of those ethnic minorities the violation of
the rights of which caused the conflict.
AA.
25-07-2005
Azat Artsakh - Nagorno Karabakh Republic [NKR]
25 July 05
When considering the ethnic and political conflicts, such as the Nagorno
Karabakh, Georgian ` Abkhazian, Georgian ` Osian conflicts, we often
forget about the human factor, which is inevitably one of the main
elements of both the outbreak of the conflict and its regulation. I will
bring examples from my own experience. I lived one third of my life in
Baku as a representative of an ethnic minority. Then I moved to Yerevan
and at once became member of the ethnic majority. And with the
proclamation of Nagorno Karabakh Republic I got an indefinite status
along with my citizenship. In one word, I have experienced the
inconveniences of the ethnic minority and the advantages of the ethnic
majority, as well as the vagueness of the status of a citizen of an
unrecognized country. Nevertheless, I dare say, as an individual I did
not change myself when I changed the places. However, the attitude of
the people around me changed from friendly to openly hostile, depending
on where I lived. That is to say, I myself remained the same but the
attitude of the people towards me varied, depending on the ethnic
feature. This very factor which results from the ethnic policy of the
government of the ethnic majority presents one of the most important
elements of ethnic and political conflicts. We can therefore say that in
the post-Soviet space it is the controversy between the ethnic minority
and the ethnic majority and not the confrontation between them as
certain political scientists and statesmen think mistakenly that gives a
start to the majority of conflicts. This perfectly refers to the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict. There is no direct conflict between the Armenian and
Azerbaijani peoples. If this were so, the conflict would spread in
neighbouring Georgia as well where about half a million Armenians and
just as many Azerbaijanis live side by side. The conflict of Nagorno
Karabakh is a conflict which arose between the former Armenian
sovereignty within Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani government rather than
the Azerbaijani people. Neglecting or misunderstanding the latter fact
may result in unwanted results for the parties. Therefore when looking
for ways of resolution it is extremely dangerous and irresponsible to
scatter terms like `separatism', `terror', etc. I think that the term
`separatism' is not suitable for the unrecognized states of the
post-Soviet states. These unrecognized states used to be sovereign
within the former republics of the Soviet Union, and acting against the
dissolution of the USSR were in a way `unionists' rather. Whereas it is
the former Soviet republics that should be considered `separatists'
because they were overtly for the dissolution of the USSR and they
achieved their aim. What is more, the model of the conflict between
ethnic minority and the government of the ethnic majority can be applied
to the republics of the Union. For example, the declaration of the
independence of Azerbaijan and then its recognition by the international
community can be considered the resolution of the conflict between the
Azerbaijani ethnic minority of the `Russian empire' called the Soviet
Union and the government of this `empire' in favour of the former. After
the dissolution of the Soviet Union the roles changed, and now the
government of the recognized states of the post-Soviet space began to
stick labels of `separatist' and `terrorist' to the autonomies which had
declared themselves independent. What is more, they did this in
accordance with the USSR law on the procedure of settlement of issues
related to secession of republics from the USSR, passed on April 3,
1990. The starting point was the natural right of the peoples for
self-determination, the right of the sovereign peoples for raising the
matters of their political and legal status. And this is natural for the
issues related to the dissolution of the USSR could not refer to some
post-Soviet peoples and pass by others. Thus, the declarations of
independence by several former Soviet sovereignties are but the
continuation of the process of dissolution of the USSR already in the
framework of the post-Soviet republics. And if we ignore these facts
(like the governments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Russia did in
relation to Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Osia and Chechnya
respectively), we shall inevitably face with unforeseeable consequences.
It is not accidental that bloodshed is successfully avoided when the
`separatists' achieve their goal. This was the case with the Soviet
republics, as well as Czechoslovakia. There is also the precedent of
`Peaceful Divorce' in a sovereignty of the USSR, the Autonomous Republic
of Chechnya and Ingushetia. And on the contrary, when the government of
the ethnic minority imposes the principle of territorial integrity on
the seceding ethnic minority, the bloodshed is inevitable. The examples
are many: Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Osia, Transdniestr, Cosovo,
the Serbian-Croatian conflict, etc. The cause for this is that the right
of the nations for self-determination is natural and it therefore makes
part of the human factor, whereas the principle of territorial integrity
is artificial and has nothing to do with the concept of human rights.
And the fact that the parties of the Karabakh conflict seek to find the
resolution of the issue on the basis of these two controversial
principles may mean that another way of resolution should be sought for,
which must necessarily be based on natural principles. The degree of
democracy of this or that state could become such a touchstone. In other
words, it is possible to enable Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan to
compete within the frame of the international mediation in building
democracy because both countries have shouted loud about their
aspiration to join the European family. But what picture do we have now?
The political elite of Azerbaijan, which does not wish to negotiate with
Karabakh leaders and conducts a policy of isolating NK from the world,
actually torpedoes the democratic reforms in Nagorno Karabakh.
Nevertheless, the democratization of the social and political life in
NKR proceeds successfully despite the martial law imposed de jure on the
republic. As it is known, one of the basic indices of the degree of
democratization of a state is the presidential, parliamentary and local
elections. In the meantime, not only the recognized conflict parties but
also the international democratic community in the face of various
organizations such as the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the
European Union, NATO, etc., is against holding elections in the states
which are not recognized. The result is a paradoxical situation when the
establishment of democracy and humanitarian principles in unrecognized
countries is blocked by those recognized states which are guided by the
same principles in their social and political life. Is this the
manifestation of democracy and humanism? Whereas, both in the recognized
and unrecognized countries people live, but the latter are constantly
refused guarantees for protection of human rights. They are even refused
foreign humanitarian aid. Thus, the international community, going in
for the principle of territorial integrity of recognized states in the
settlement of conflicts, completely forgets about the human factor.
Certainly, no one denies the importance of building bridges of trust
between the conflict parties if, in fact, there is no trust between
them. But as it was mentioned above, the peoples have nothing to do here
because it is the governments of the ethnic minority and the ethnic
majority that confront. We must therefore speak about bridges of trust
between the governments of the ethnic minority and the ethnic majority.
In the case of Nagorno Karabakh conflict the bridges of trust should be
built between the legitimately elected government of Nagorno Karabakh
and official Baku, which may be achieved only through direct
relationships. And if the Azerbaijani side does not agree to such
relationships, it means Azerbaijan is reluctant for the resolution of
the conflict but pretends to be willing to achieve its settlement. In
order to change the situation with the consideration of the human factor
it is necessary to replace the dictate of the international community,
which will be justified in this case. To sum up I want to emphasize that
in solving the ethnic conflicts it is necessary to put the stress on one
of the principles of the international law, which completely takes into
consideration the interests of those ethnic minorities the violation of
the rights of which caused the conflict.
AA.
25-07-2005