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DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
July 29, 2005, Friday
THE CSTO AND NATO: ALLIES OR ENEMIES?
SOURCE: Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, No. 27, July 2005, p. 2
by Gennady Pulin
A year ago, a document on the main areas of cooperation between the
CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and NATO was
adopted at a meeting of the CSTO collective security council in
Astana. That document outlined directions and mechanisms for
cooperation between the two organizations in regional and
international security. For example, it spoke about taking joint
measures in combating terrorism, drug trafficking and WMD
proliferation.
Recently Nikolai Bordyuzha announced, "They (NATO) have simply
ignored us (CSTO)." The General Secretary of CSTO added, "I am
convinced that this has been a deliberate step and it is not
beneficial for them to cooperate in the format "organization with
organization."
Bordyuzha also stressed that the CSTO frequently proposed cooperation
to NATO but did not receive a response to its proposals. According to
him, NATO recently announced its interests in Central Asia and in the
East. He also said, "In such format it is easier for them to
counteract to certain integration in the framework of the CSTO."
We see that the General Secretary of the CSTO takes NATO as a rival
on one geopolitical field. What do the leaders of NATO think about a
possibility of military and military political cooperation with the
CSTO?
In June 2005, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer met with
Vladimir Putin in Moscow and announced that the parties agreed to
strengthen interaction including interaction of NATO and CSTO.
Military attache of France in Tajikistan Stefan Samaran considers the
opposition of NATO to the CSTO wrong from the very start. According
to him, "It is not necessary to take NATO as an enemy of the member
states of the CSTO." The French diplomat believes that these notions
are relics of the past inherited since the time of the "cold war."
At any rate, these are mere words. What about the deeds? Alexander
Nikitin, Director of the Russian Center for Political and
International Studies, says that in the near future it is impossible
to expect that NATO will make a political "package" decision on
cooperation with the CSTO. Nonetheless, the expert believes that the
fact that NATO does not try to demonstrate its alienation from the
CSTO too obviously is positive.
Nikitin said, "This is confirmed by the agreement of the headquarters
of NATO to organize a presentation briefing of the CSTO in Moscow for
100 senior NATO officers from 26 countries in June."
He added, "Although there is no decision of Brussels 'to make
friends' with the CSTO, the policy of involvement of NATO into the
practical projects joint with the CSTO like visiting of the exercises
and coordination of the border issues regarding the Tajik-Afghan
border where the zones of responsibility of both organizations touch
each other is a correct way."
Nobody doubts that this is a correct way. However, Russia and CSTO
believe that certain deeds and results are also important for them in
friendship with NATO and there are no such deeds and results. For
four years the numerous coalition forces of NATO have been trying to
enforce order and "sow" democracy in Afghanistan: the government has
been elected and parliamentary elections are upcoming. It would seem
that peace is enforced there with assistance of NATO but along with
this the drug flow from Afghanistan to the CIS countries and Europe
has grown tremendously. There are facts showing that
terrorists-citizens of Afghanistan have participated in the events in
Adnizhan.
The CSTO proposed NATO to control and to cooperate in combating of
drug trafficking but received silence in response. Meanwhile, NATO
plans to increase its military contingent in Afghanistan to 10,000
servicemen to ensure security of elections in the country. What about
terrorists and drug trafficking? Who will do this?
Meanwhile, US and NATO officials do not hide their plans regarding
Central Asia. On his visit to Kabul, General Richard Mayers from the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that decision of the US to deploy
full-sized bases in Afghanistan "is partially caused by the wish to
hinder Iran and to monitor its military forces." It was also
partially caused by the intention to create as many military objects
as possible in the vicinity of the Middle East being very important
for the US because of the huge oil reserves of the region. The US and
NATO have similar goals in the Central Asian republics of the CIS.
Thus, probably it is not worth while for the CSTO to try to make
friends with NATO but it is necessary to build its own security
system proceeding from interests of the countries-allies of Russia?
Answering this question, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, Vice
President of the Geopolitical Academy and former chief of the main
international military cooperation department of the Defense
Ministry, said that it is necessary to maintain contacts with NATO.
He added, "Cooperation between the organizations is quite possible.
But this should not be cooperation for the sake of cooperation. There
should be cooperation for the sake of achievement of some goals in
the issues of security and protection of our interests." Ivashov also
points out how the CSTO should act to strengthen its positions in the
CIS and around the world.
Ivashov proposed, "It seems to me that first of all it is necessary
to organize interaction with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
It is necessary to build zones of collective security, for example,
with Iran in the South Caucasus or in the Caucasus-Caspian region
(CSTO-Iran). Now the CSTO can establish contacts with Turkey and this
will be more productive than interaction with such large organization
as NATO which will never have consensus towards the CSTO. On the
contrary, in such bilateral or multilateral form it is possible. "
According to Ivashov, "It is necessary to declare our certain goals
pursued by the organization and to avoid this empty rhetoric imposed
on us by the West. It imposed on us combating of terrorism,
migration, drug trafficking and WMD non-proliferation. This is not
what is needed because the organization is not capable of this. Let
the relevant structures do this."
Incidentally, the CSTO itself outlined these very tasks in the
document adopted a year ago. Probably it is really necessary to
revise the integration goals and tasks outlined there? How? Ivashov
answers this question too, "The main thing is that it is necessary to
announce that in accordance with article 4 of the treaty of May 15,
1992, the main task of the CSTO is joint collective defense of our
countries from aggression of other countries, protection of our
political space from outside interference and so on. It is necessary
to state this clearly and harshly to make them understand for what
our organization is striving. In this case direction of possible
cooperation will be determined."
Many military experts agree with the opinion of Leonid Ivashov. Along
with this, they also say that there is no need to create a problem
because NATO is not going to maintain active contacts with the CSTO.
Colonel Vladimir Popov from the Military Sciences Academy said,
"Russia is the leader in the post-Soviet zone. That is why it should
determine its long-term strategy with regard to interaction not with
NATO but primarily with the allies in the CIS. Policy should be clear
and understandable at this point. How can we counteract to challenges
and threats in cooperation? Which joint forces we need to have there?
- These questions should be the main issues for us."
Lieutenant General Yury Netkachev, veteran of the "hot spots" of the
CIS, commented, "Joint military capacities of the CSTO are only just
being created. In the South it is represented by the military group
in Armenia, in the West by the united defense space of Russia and
Belarus and collective rapid response forces operate in Central Asia.
If all this potential is compared on the scale of the Eurasian
continent with the potential of NATO, the inferiority is obvious.
NATO has almost three times as many tanks, armored personnel carriers
and artillery than CSTO member states, and about twice as many
airplanes and helicopters. However, this is no reason to crawl to
NATO. Russia together with allies maintains operational and strategic
superiority over NATO in all vitally important regions of the
post-Soviet space. The task is to build up these groups and to do our
best to prevent similar attempts by NATO. Then the interests of
Russia and the CSTO will be protected."
Thus, it is becoming quite obvious that cooperation between the CSTO
and NATO is not a priority for Russia and its allies. Along with
this, creation of collective defense in the CIS requires much effort
and resources. In any case, CSTO member states will need to undertake
the spending required to ensure security and to counter possible
threats (overt and covert), including those emanating from NATO.
Translated by Pavel Pushkin
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
July 29, 2005, Friday
THE CSTO AND NATO: ALLIES OR ENEMIES?
SOURCE: Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, No. 27, July 2005, p. 2
by Gennady Pulin
A year ago, a document on the main areas of cooperation between the
CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and NATO was
adopted at a meeting of the CSTO collective security council in
Astana. That document outlined directions and mechanisms for
cooperation between the two organizations in regional and
international security. For example, it spoke about taking joint
measures in combating terrorism, drug trafficking and WMD
proliferation.
Recently Nikolai Bordyuzha announced, "They (NATO) have simply
ignored us (CSTO)." The General Secretary of CSTO added, "I am
convinced that this has been a deliberate step and it is not
beneficial for them to cooperate in the format "organization with
organization."
Bordyuzha also stressed that the CSTO frequently proposed cooperation
to NATO but did not receive a response to its proposals. According to
him, NATO recently announced its interests in Central Asia and in the
East. He also said, "In such format it is easier for them to
counteract to certain integration in the framework of the CSTO."
We see that the General Secretary of the CSTO takes NATO as a rival
on one geopolitical field. What do the leaders of NATO think about a
possibility of military and military political cooperation with the
CSTO?
In June 2005, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer met with
Vladimir Putin in Moscow and announced that the parties agreed to
strengthen interaction including interaction of NATO and CSTO.
Military attache of France in Tajikistan Stefan Samaran considers the
opposition of NATO to the CSTO wrong from the very start. According
to him, "It is not necessary to take NATO as an enemy of the member
states of the CSTO." The French diplomat believes that these notions
are relics of the past inherited since the time of the "cold war."
At any rate, these are mere words. What about the deeds? Alexander
Nikitin, Director of the Russian Center for Political and
International Studies, says that in the near future it is impossible
to expect that NATO will make a political "package" decision on
cooperation with the CSTO. Nonetheless, the expert believes that the
fact that NATO does not try to demonstrate its alienation from the
CSTO too obviously is positive.
Nikitin said, "This is confirmed by the agreement of the headquarters
of NATO to organize a presentation briefing of the CSTO in Moscow for
100 senior NATO officers from 26 countries in June."
He added, "Although there is no decision of Brussels 'to make
friends' with the CSTO, the policy of involvement of NATO into the
practical projects joint with the CSTO like visiting of the exercises
and coordination of the border issues regarding the Tajik-Afghan
border where the zones of responsibility of both organizations touch
each other is a correct way."
Nobody doubts that this is a correct way. However, Russia and CSTO
believe that certain deeds and results are also important for them in
friendship with NATO and there are no such deeds and results. For
four years the numerous coalition forces of NATO have been trying to
enforce order and "sow" democracy in Afghanistan: the government has
been elected and parliamentary elections are upcoming. It would seem
that peace is enforced there with assistance of NATO but along with
this the drug flow from Afghanistan to the CIS countries and Europe
has grown tremendously. There are facts showing that
terrorists-citizens of Afghanistan have participated in the events in
Adnizhan.
The CSTO proposed NATO to control and to cooperate in combating of
drug trafficking but received silence in response. Meanwhile, NATO
plans to increase its military contingent in Afghanistan to 10,000
servicemen to ensure security of elections in the country. What about
terrorists and drug trafficking? Who will do this?
Meanwhile, US and NATO officials do not hide their plans regarding
Central Asia. On his visit to Kabul, General Richard Mayers from the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that decision of the US to deploy
full-sized bases in Afghanistan "is partially caused by the wish to
hinder Iran and to monitor its military forces." It was also
partially caused by the intention to create as many military objects
as possible in the vicinity of the Middle East being very important
for the US because of the huge oil reserves of the region. The US and
NATO have similar goals in the Central Asian republics of the CIS.
Thus, probably it is not worth while for the CSTO to try to make
friends with NATO but it is necessary to build its own security
system proceeding from interests of the countries-allies of Russia?
Answering this question, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, Vice
President of the Geopolitical Academy and former chief of the main
international military cooperation department of the Defense
Ministry, said that it is necessary to maintain contacts with NATO.
He added, "Cooperation between the organizations is quite possible.
But this should not be cooperation for the sake of cooperation. There
should be cooperation for the sake of achievement of some goals in
the issues of security and protection of our interests." Ivashov also
points out how the CSTO should act to strengthen its positions in the
CIS and around the world.
Ivashov proposed, "It seems to me that first of all it is necessary
to organize interaction with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
It is necessary to build zones of collective security, for example,
with Iran in the South Caucasus or in the Caucasus-Caspian region
(CSTO-Iran). Now the CSTO can establish contacts with Turkey and this
will be more productive than interaction with such large organization
as NATO which will never have consensus towards the CSTO. On the
contrary, in such bilateral or multilateral form it is possible. "
According to Ivashov, "It is necessary to declare our certain goals
pursued by the organization and to avoid this empty rhetoric imposed
on us by the West. It imposed on us combating of terrorism,
migration, drug trafficking and WMD non-proliferation. This is not
what is needed because the organization is not capable of this. Let
the relevant structures do this."
Incidentally, the CSTO itself outlined these very tasks in the
document adopted a year ago. Probably it is really necessary to
revise the integration goals and tasks outlined there? How? Ivashov
answers this question too, "The main thing is that it is necessary to
announce that in accordance with article 4 of the treaty of May 15,
1992, the main task of the CSTO is joint collective defense of our
countries from aggression of other countries, protection of our
political space from outside interference and so on. It is necessary
to state this clearly and harshly to make them understand for what
our organization is striving. In this case direction of possible
cooperation will be determined."
Many military experts agree with the opinion of Leonid Ivashov. Along
with this, they also say that there is no need to create a problem
because NATO is not going to maintain active contacts with the CSTO.
Colonel Vladimir Popov from the Military Sciences Academy said,
"Russia is the leader in the post-Soviet zone. That is why it should
determine its long-term strategy with regard to interaction not with
NATO but primarily with the allies in the CIS. Policy should be clear
and understandable at this point. How can we counteract to challenges
and threats in cooperation? Which joint forces we need to have there?
- These questions should be the main issues for us."
Lieutenant General Yury Netkachev, veteran of the "hot spots" of the
CIS, commented, "Joint military capacities of the CSTO are only just
being created. In the South it is represented by the military group
in Armenia, in the West by the united defense space of Russia and
Belarus and collective rapid response forces operate in Central Asia.
If all this potential is compared on the scale of the Eurasian
continent with the potential of NATO, the inferiority is obvious.
NATO has almost three times as many tanks, armored personnel carriers
and artillery than CSTO member states, and about twice as many
airplanes and helicopters. However, this is no reason to crawl to
NATO. Russia together with allies maintains operational and strategic
superiority over NATO in all vitally important regions of the
post-Soviet space. The task is to build up these groups and to do our
best to prevent similar attempts by NATO. Then the interests of
Russia and the CSTO will be protected."
Thus, it is becoming quite obvious that cooperation between the CSTO
and NATO is not a priority for Russia and its allies. Along with
this, creation of collective defense in the CIS requires much effort
and resources. In any case, CSTO member states will need to undertake
the spending required to ensure security and to counter possible
threats (overt and covert), including those emanating from NATO.
Translated by Pavel Pushkin