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Reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the key to Caucasus stability
18:04
RIA Novosti, Russia
June 1 2005
MOSCOW (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) - Nagorno-Karabakh was the
first ethnic conflict that shook the foundations of the political
power "vertical" of the Soviet Union and became the detonator that
exploded it.
It enriched our active political vocabulary with such terms as
"ethnic cleansing" and "cleansing of the territory." As a result of
the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Karabakh, about 500,000 Armenians
had to leave Azerbaijan, and about 200,000 Azerbaijanis had to leave
Armenia. Both states (particularly Armenia) have essentially become
homogenous mono-ethnic entities. During the armed clashes over
Karabakh, Azerbaijan lost 13% of its original territory.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was not simply the largest regional
conflict to affect the former Soviet Union. First, it became
an example for Georgians, Ossetians, Abkhasians, Moldavians and
residents of the Dnestr region (Russians and Ukrainians). Secondly,
it caused the "karabakhization" of the political life in Armenia and
Azerbaijan. The Karabakh problem became a reference point for both
Caucasus republics. Any event in the political life of both states
is tested by the Karabakh factor.
However, the Karabakh problem is also a problem for Russia. This
thesis is not a tribute to nostalgia for the former Soviet Union
or to imperial ambitions. Russia has the world's largest Armenian
diaspora. Data recorded as part of the 2002 Russia census, suggest that
1,130,000 Armenians live in Russia, while various expert estimates put
the current figure at about 2 million people. The Armenian migration
to Russia increased largely due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
In 2002, the official Azerbaijani population of Russia numbered 621,500
people (the 13th place among ethnic groups in Russia). The Azerbaijanis
reside in 55 Federation members, with the Azeri communities in
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Volgograd, and the Tver region. The diaspora
is an important economic factor for the development of Azerbaijan
itself. According to R.S. Grinberg, the head of the Institute for
International Economic and Political Studies of the Russian Academy
of Sciences, money transfers alone to Azerbaijan are worth $1.8-2.4
billion.
These Caucasian diasporas are two of the ten largest in Russia,
which means "karabakhization" became a factor in Russian as well.
Russia is a Caucasus power. The territory of its Caucasus subjects
is twice as large as the three independent countries in the Southern
Caucasus put together. In addition, the border, which passes over
mountain ridges, makes the four neighboring countries a system of
"communicating vessels."
Russia's role in any future resolution of the conflict should be based
on the potential of the diasporas and the ties between Armenian and
Azerbaijani residents of Russia and their native lands. Initially,
Russia should attempt to establish interaction between the two ethnic
groups, which regard one another cautiously, if not with animosity.
At present, it would be sensible to avoid two problems in the
settlement for the time being, as the sides cannot find acceptable
compromises. Azerbaijan demands the "liberation" of the regions
allegedly occupied by the Armenians and the return of Azerbaijani
refugees. Armenia (Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh) demands a solution
to the problem of the political and legal status of Nagorny Karabakh.
It is obvious that the situation demands compromises, which would at
least point to some progress in the conflict's resolution.
Russian diplomacy could certainly provide such solutions. "The
liberation" of seven districts occupied by Armenian forces could be
separated from the issue of returning refugees, which the Armenians
regard as a security threat. It would eliminate both the "Armenian
occupation" (a political trauma for Azerbaijan) and the security
threat, which is a complicated issue for Armenia. International
peacekeeping forces (led by Russia) could be deployed in the seven
districts that would become a buffer zone between the conflicting
sides, and the Azerbaijani refugees could receive serious material
compensation from global financial structures for the loss of
property and moral damages. Real progress toward a compromise and
signs of certain positive developments in the process (even if they
are palliative) could evidently be beneficial both for Russia and
for the conflict's resolution, even though the final solution is a
long way off.
Russia needs Armenia, a traditional ally, and Azerbaijan, which
aside from its geopolitical importance is notable for its public's
pro-Russian views. Success in the process of reconciliation between
Armenia and Azerbaijan would mean there was no alternative to
Russian-Georgian dialogue. Therefore, the key to stability in the
entire Caucasus region is the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement with
proactive support from Russia, if it demonstrates the political will.
Sergei Markedonov is the head of the ethnic relations department at
the Institute for Political and Military Analysis
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
18:04
RIA Novosti, Russia
June 1 2005
MOSCOW (Sergei Markedonov for RIA Novosti) - Nagorno-Karabakh was the
first ethnic conflict that shook the foundations of the political
power "vertical" of the Soviet Union and became the detonator that
exploded it.
It enriched our active political vocabulary with such terms as
"ethnic cleansing" and "cleansing of the territory." As a result of
the Armenian-Azeri conflict over Karabakh, about 500,000 Armenians
had to leave Azerbaijan, and about 200,000 Azerbaijanis had to leave
Armenia. Both states (particularly Armenia) have essentially become
homogenous mono-ethnic entities. During the armed clashes over
Karabakh, Azerbaijan lost 13% of its original territory.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was not simply the largest regional
conflict to affect the former Soviet Union. First, it became
an example for Georgians, Ossetians, Abkhasians, Moldavians and
residents of the Dnestr region (Russians and Ukrainians). Secondly,
it caused the "karabakhization" of the political life in Armenia and
Azerbaijan. The Karabakh problem became a reference point for both
Caucasus republics. Any event in the political life of both states
is tested by the Karabakh factor.
However, the Karabakh problem is also a problem for Russia. This
thesis is not a tribute to nostalgia for the former Soviet Union
or to imperial ambitions. Russia has the world's largest Armenian
diaspora. Data recorded as part of the 2002 Russia census, suggest that
1,130,000 Armenians live in Russia, while various expert estimates put
the current figure at about 2 million people. The Armenian migration
to Russia increased largely due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
In 2002, the official Azerbaijani population of Russia numbered 621,500
people (the 13th place among ethnic groups in Russia). The Azerbaijanis
reside in 55 Federation members, with the Azeri communities in
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Volgograd, and the Tver region. The diaspora
is an important economic factor for the development of Azerbaijan
itself. According to R.S. Grinberg, the head of the Institute for
International Economic and Political Studies of the Russian Academy
of Sciences, money transfers alone to Azerbaijan are worth $1.8-2.4
billion.
These Caucasian diasporas are two of the ten largest in Russia,
which means "karabakhization" became a factor in Russian as well.
Russia is a Caucasus power. The territory of its Caucasus subjects
is twice as large as the three independent countries in the Southern
Caucasus put together. In addition, the border, which passes over
mountain ridges, makes the four neighboring countries a system of
"communicating vessels."
Russia's role in any future resolution of the conflict should be based
on the potential of the diasporas and the ties between Armenian and
Azerbaijani residents of Russia and their native lands. Initially,
Russia should attempt to establish interaction between the two ethnic
groups, which regard one another cautiously, if not with animosity.
At present, it would be sensible to avoid two problems in the
settlement for the time being, as the sides cannot find acceptable
compromises. Azerbaijan demands the "liberation" of the regions
allegedly occupied by the Armenians and the return of Azerbaijani
refugees. Armenia (Armenia and Nagorny Karabakh) demands a solution
to the problem of the political and legal status of Nagorny Karabakh.
It is obvious that the situation demands compromises, which would at
least point to some progress in the conflict's resolution.
Russian diplomacy could certainly provide such solutions. "The
liberation" of seven districts occupied by Armenian forces could be
separated from the issue of returning refugees, which the Armenians
regard as a security threat. It would eliminate both the "Armenian
occupation" (a political trauma for Azerbaijan) and the security
threat, which is a complicated issue for Armenia. International
peacekeeping forces (led by Russia) could be deployed in the seven
districts that would become a buffer zone between the conflicting
sides, and the Azerbaijani refugees could receive serious material
compensation from global financial structures for the loss of
property and moral damages. Real progress toward a compromise and
signs of certain positive developments in the process (even if they
are palliative) could evidently be beneficial both for Russia and
for the conflict's resolution, even though the final solution is a
long way off.
Russia needs Armenia, a traditional ally, and Azerbaijan, which
aside from its geopolitical importance is notable for its public's
pro-Russian views. Success in the process of reconciliation between
Armenia and Azerbaijan would mean there was no alternative to
Russian-Georgian dialogue. Therefore, the key to stability in the
entire Caucasus region is the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement with
proactive support from Russia, if it demonstrates the political will.
Sergei Markedonov is the head of the ethnic relations department at
the Institute for Political and Military Analysis
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and
may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.