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The Economist
June 4, 2005
U.S. Edition
Reason to worry; Turkey and the EU
ankara
Fallout for Turkey from the no votes in France and the Netherlands
The country with most to lose from the EU referendums may be Turkey
WHAT do the French and Dutch rejections of the European Union
constitution imply for Turkey's hopes of joining? If one believes the
country's political leaders, nothing. "This result has nothing to do
with Turkey's candidacy, we will continue on our path with the same
enthusiasm," the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, told
parliament this week. His rhetoric was echoed by EU officials. And in
theory they are right.
The constitution makes no reference to Turkey's membership. In France
(as in some other anti-Turkey countries, notably Austria) voters have
been promised the chance to stop Turkey joining in a separate
referendum on further enlargement, when the time comes. Moreover,
last December's decision by EU leaders to promise Turkey the start of
membership talks on October 3rd was a political one that can be
changed only by consensus of all 25 EU members. Some optimists even
venture to suggest that the defeat of the constitution could pave the
way for a looser EU that it would be easier for Turkey to fit into.
Yet the reality is more worrying for Turkey. The French and Dutch
noes may be "the EU's internal problem", as Mr Erdogan claims. But
they also reflect growing hostility around Europe to further
enlargement of the EU-and, specifically, to the idea of taking in
poor, big and Muslim Turkey. There is also a good chance that
Germany's opposition Christian Democrats (CDU) will win the election
expected in September. The CDU leader, Angela Merkel, is firmly
opposed to Turkey's membership and has lobbied instead for a
"privileged partnership" that has been roundly rejected by the Turks.
Her hostility to full membership for Turkey is shared by France's
Nicolas Sarkozy, a would-be presidential candidate in 2007.
Against this gloomy background, the wisest course for Turkey,
according to the EU ambassador to Ankara, Hansjorg Kretschmer, is to
ignore the ructions in Europe and focus on implementing the sweeping
reforms that earned it the precious October date for talks. In one
hopeful sign, Mr Erdogan last week appointed Ali Babacan, his young
and pragmatic economy minister, to head the EU negotiations. Turkey
is also about to sign a protocol extending its customs union with the
EU to the ten new members that joined last year, including Cyprus.
This week a long-delayed new penal code came into effect. But despite
such radical provisions as making marital rape a crime, the code also
contains several controversial articles-for example one that allows
long prison terms for journalists who attack the Turkish military
presence in northern Cyprus or describe as "genocide" the mass
slaughter of Armenians during the first world war.
There are, indeed, disturbing signs that Mr Erdogan may be pandering
to a recent upsurge in nationalism that is being fanned both by
anti-Turkish sentiment in Europe and by the country's hawkish
generals, whose power may be eroded by EU reforms. Besides continued
police harassment of Christians and other minorities, last month an
appeal court in Ankara upheld the banning of Turkey's biggest
teachers' union because it had said that the country's 14m Kurds
should be able to educate their children in their mother tongue.
Turkish academics had to cancel a conference to debate the Armenian
tragedy after the justice minister, Cemil Cicek, accused them of
"knifing Turkey in the back".
Mr Cicek's outburst, concluded one senior EU diplomat, was
"confirmation that the government no longer believes in the EU
process." That view may be exaggerated, but there is disillusion with
the EU among Mr Erdogan's conservative base. One example is perceived
European indifference to restrictions on the Islamic headscarf. It
was surely with his conservative base in mind that Mr Erdogan last
week introduced legislation to reduce penalties for those who run
underground courses to teach the Koran. The move brought renewed
charges from Turkey's fierce secularists that Mr Erdogan's real
intention is to move the country closer to an Islamic theocracy, and
not to the EU. Turkey's many enemies in Europe would surely take
pleasure in that.
GRAPHIC: Euro-anxiety in the markets?
June 4, 2005
U.S. Edition
Reason to worry; Turkey and the EU
ankara
Fallout for Turkey from the no votes in France and the Netherlands
The country with most to lose from the EU referendums may be Turkey
WHAT do the French and Dutch rejections of the European Union
constitution imply for Turkey's hopes of joining? If one believes the
country's political leaders, nothing. "This result has nothing to do
with Turkey's candidacy, we will continue on our path with the same
enthusiasm," the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, told
parliament this week. His rhetoric was echoed by EU officials. And in
theory they are right.
The constitution makes no reference to Turkey's membership. In France
(as in some other anti-Turkey countries, notably Austria) voters have
been promised the chance to stop Turkey joining in a separate
referendum on further enlargement, when the time comes. Moreover,
last December's decision by EU leaders to promise Turkey the start of
membership talks on October 3rd was a political one that can be
changed only by consensus of all 25 EU members. Some optimists even
venture to suggest that the defeat of the constitution could pave the
way for a looser EU that it would be easier for Turkey to fit into.
Yet the reality is more worrying for Turkey. The French and Dutch
noes may be "the EU's internal problem", as Mr Erdogan claims. But
they also reflect growing hostility around Europe to further
enlargement of the EU-and, specifically, to the idea of taking in
poor, big and Muslim Turkey. There is also a good chance that
Germany's opposition Christian Democrats (CDU) will win the election
expected in September. The CDU leader, Angela Merkel, is firmly
opposed to Turkey's membership and has lobbied instead for a
"privileged partnership" that has been roundly rejected by the Turks.
Her hostility to full membership for Turkey is shared by France's
Nicolas Sarkozy, a would-be presidential candidate in 2007.
Against this gloomy background, the wisest course for Turkey,
according to the EU ambassador to Ankara, Hansjorg Kretschmer, is to
ignore the ructions in Europe and focus on implementing the sweeping
reforms that earned it the precious October date for talks. In one
hopeful sign, Mr Erdogan last week appointed Ali Babacan, his young
and pragmatic economy minister, to head the EU negotiations. Turkey
is also about to sign a protocol extending its customs union with the
EU to the ten new members that joined last year, including Cyprus.
This week a long-delayed new penal code came into effect. But despite
such radical provisions as making marital rape a crime, the code also
contains several controversial articles-for example one that allows
long prison terms for journalists who attack the Turkish military
presence in northern Cyprus or describe as "genocide" the mass
slaughter of Armenians during the first world war.
There are, indeed, disturbing signs that Mr Erdogan may be pandering
to a recent upsurge in nationalism that is being fanned both by
anti-Turkish sentiment in Europe and by the country's hawkish
generals, whose power may be eroded by EU reforms. Besides continued
police harassment of Christians and other minorities, last month an
appeal court in Ankara upheld the banning of Turkey's biggest
teachers' union because it had said that the country's 14m Kurds
should be able to educate their children in their mother tongue.
Turkish academics had to cancel a conference to debate the Armenian
tragedy after the justice minister, Cemil Cicek, accused them of
"knifing Turkey in the back".
Mr Cicek's outburst, concluded one senior EU diplomat, was
"confirmation that the government no longer believes in the EU
process." That view may be exaggerated, but there is disillusion with
the EU among Mr Erdogan's conservative base. One example is perceived
European indifference to restrictions on the Islamic headscarf. It
was surely with his conservative base in mind that Mr Erdogan last
week introduced legislation to reduce penalties for those who run
underground courses to teach the Koran. The move brought renewed
charges from Turkey's fierce secularists that Mr Erdogan's real
intention is to move the country closer to an Islamic theocracy, and
not to the EU. Turkey's many enemies in Europe would surely take
pleasure in that.
GRAPHIC: Euro-anxiety in the markets?