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The Moscow Times, Russia
June 7 2005
A Social Explosion in the Pipeline
By Tim Wall
The opening of the new oil pipeline from Azerbaijan, through Georgia,
to Ceyhan in Turkey represents a triumph for U.S. imperial policy
over Russian ambitions in the southern Caucasus -- and the
culmination of a 13-year campaign to open up the Caspian region to
Western oil multinationals.
It allows Anglo-American oil giant BP to pump as much as 1 million
barrels of oil per day -- roughly 1 percent of global output --
direct to the United States and Western Europe without having to
cross one kilometer of Russian soil or use any pipeline controlled by
Moscow. It would also allow significant amounts of oil from
Kazakhstan to travel the same route, after being shipped across the
Caspian to Baku, giving the United States geopolitical leverage in
Kazakhstan, a key country in the battle for Central Asian energy
reserves.
Speaking at the May 25 ceremony to open the Azeri section of the
pipeline, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili -- U.S. President
George W. Bush's poster boy for neo-liberalism in Eurasia -- said the
pipeline would "make the whole region, including Georgia, fully
energy independent." What he meant but did not say, of course, was
independent of Russia -- and dependent on a largely American-run oil
industry, backed by a growing U.S. military presence in the region.
Perhaps even more clearly than Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan
represents the fundamental contradiction in U.S. policy in the
region. On the one hand, Bush's administration ostensibly claims to
be supporting "democratic" change, while on the other, it is allied
to a corrupt regime that owes its fortunes to oil.
In October 2003, one month before Georgia's Rose Revolution, Ilham
Aliyev succeeded his seriously ill father, Heydar Aliyev, in an
election that was hardly free or fair.
But unlike in Georgia or Ukraine, the United States did not ride to
the rescue of Azeri democracy. A range of observers pointed out the
election's unfair conditions: blanket pro-government media coverage,
restrictions on opposition rallies, and ballot-rigging by
Aliyev-dominated election commissions, not to mention the systematic,
decade-long persecution of the opposition. And even as thousands of
frustrated opposition protesters were clubbed by riot police on
Baku's Freedom Square, the White House was phoning in its
congratulations to Ilham Aliyev within hours of the polls closing.
Since then, Aliyev has been careful to follow his father's policy of
wooing Washington and the Western oil majors and promising to keep
the oil flowing in return for support of his clan's hold on power.
But this support, which even a few months ago looked rock solid, may
be starting to erode as protests by an emboldened opposition grow
against the regime.
The White House and the oil companies likely fear that a real
revolution is brewing, one that may not be to their liking. If Aliyev
cannot deliver oil and stability, they may try their hand at a
"watermelon" revolution and replace him with someone equally
pro-Western but less likely to provoke the social upheaval that could
threaten their oil interests.
Four days before the pipeline ceremony, Azerbaijan's main nationalist
opposition parties and youth groups -- all professing pro-pipeline
and pro-American sentiments, as they auditioned for the part of the
West's "democratic" model opposition -- held a rally in Baku calling
for free and fair elections to parliament this November. The protest
was banned and police waded in, beating and arresting hundreds of
protesters.
The regime's brutal response even worried BP's top manager in the
country, who described the violence as "unfortunate." Aliyev's chief
of staff Ramiz Mekhtiyev was quick to reprimand him: "Foreign
companies should get on with their business and not interfere in
politics," he said.
Yet under Western pressure, the regime caved in last Saturday and
refrained from smashing up the next opposition demonstration. It was
the first to be allowed to go ahead peacefully since Aliyev came to
power.
To get an idea of how dependent Aliyev's regime is on the oil
industry, it is sufficient to look at the figures: Oil revenues are
set to grow rapidly over the next five to seven years, bringing in $5
billion to $6 billion per year -- up to three times the state budget.
GDP in Azerbaijan is expected to grow at a rate of 13 percent this
year and 14 percent next year, the highest growth rates in the CIS.
But the boom will be completely fueled by oil, and starting next year
by gas, when a parallel gas pipeline is due to open from Baku to
Turkey.
Thus, Azerbaijan has all its eggs in one basket. As long as oil
prices remain high, the country stands to gain an estimated $50
billion over the next 20 years. The big multinationals working in the
country -- BP, which has some 40 percent of its assets in the United
States, together with U.S. oil services giants Halliburton,
McDermott's and Schlumberger -- stand to make many billions of
dollars, too.
Yet a chronic lack of investment outside the oil sector, combined
with all-pervasive corruption, means the country is likely headed for
a future closer to that of Nigeria than Norway. The country's
agricultural and industrial potential has been utterly stymied by
corruption and an obsessive focus on oil.
Aliyev's government has been unable to translate its oil wealth into
higher living standards for the vast majority of Azeris, who subsist
on an average of about $50 per month. The worst-off section of the
population is the hundreds of thousands of refugees uprooted by the
1988-94 war with Armenia over Nagorny Karabakh.
As oil money rolls into state coffers, the danger arises of
large-scale theft and misuse, whether Aliyev stays or the opposition
comes to power. Even developed industrialized countries with publicly
accountable oil funds have experienced difficulties in avoiding the
"Dutch disease," when the dominance of natural resources leads to
inflation and the atrophying of other sectors.
In the case of Azerbaijan, where investment outside the oil sector is
already negligible and democratic control of the State Oil Fund is
zero, the prospects for this wealth to be stolen, frittered away on
prestige projects or put into defense spending are frightening. And
when Azeris see few tangible benefits from the expected oil bonanza,
a social explosion cannot be long in coming. It may take the form of
a nationalist uprising, demanding that Azerbaijan restart the war
with Armenia to recover Karabakh, or an upsurge of Islamic
fundamentalism akin to the Iranian revolution. Or the revolt could be
more class-based, calling for the expropriation of the
Western-dominated oil industry.
Those who now back Aliyev's government could still switch sides in an
effort to protect their oil interests. Yet whichever horse Washington
backs, it should be ready for a bumpy ride ahead.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
June 7 2005
A Social Explosion in the Pipeline
By Tim Wall
The opening of the new oil pipeline from Azerbaijan, through Georgia,
to Ceyhan in Turkey represents a triumph for U.S. imperial policy
over Russian ambitions in the southern Caucasus -- and the
culmination of a 13-year campaign to open up the Caspian region to
Western oil multinationals.
It allows Anglo-American oil giant BP to pump as much as 1 million
barrels of oil per day -- roughly 1 percent of global output --
direct to the United States and Western Europe without having to
cross one kilometer of Russian soil or use any pipeline controlled by
Moscow. It would also allow significant amounts of oil from
Kazakhstan to travel the same route, after being shipped across the
Caspian to Baku, giving the United States geopolitical leverage in
Kazakhstan, a key country in the battle for Central Asian energy
reserves.
Speaking at the May 25 ceremony to open the Azeri section of the
pipeline, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili -- U.S. President
George W. Bush's poster boy for neo-liberalism in Eurasia -- said the
pipeline would "make the whole region, including Georgia, fully
energy independent." What he meant but did not say, of course, was
independent of Russia -- and dependent on a largely American-run oil
industry, backed by a growing U.S. military presence in the region.
Perhaps even more clearly than Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan
represents the fundamental contradiction in U.S. policy in the
region. On the one hand, Bush's administration ostensibly claims to
be supporting "democratic" change, while on the other, it is allied
to a corrupt regime that owes its fortunes to oil.
In October 2003, one month before Georgia's Rose Revolution, Ilham
Aliyev succeeded his seriously ill father, Heydar Aliyev, in an
election that was hardly free or fair.
But unlike in Georgia or Ukraine, the United States did not ride to
the rescue of Azeri democracy. A range of observers pointed out the
election's unfair conditions: blanket pro-government media coverage,
restrictions on opposition rallies, and ballot-rigging by
Aliyev-dominated election commissions, not to mention the systematic,
decade-long persecution of the opposition. And even as thousands of
frustrated opposition protesters were clubbed by riot police on
Baku's Freedom Square, the White House was phoning in its
congratulations to Ilham Aliyev within hours of the polls closing.
Since then, Aliyev has been careful to follow his father's policy of
wooing Washington and the Western oil majors and promising to keep
the oil flowing in return for support of his clan's hold on power.
But this support, which even a few months ago looked rock solid, may
be starting to erode as protests by an emboldened opposition grow
against the regime.
The White House and the oil companies likely fear that a real
revolution is brewing, one that may not be to their liking. If Aliyev
cannot deliver oil and stability, they may try their hand at a
"watermelon" revolution and replace him with someone equally
pro-Western but less likely to provoke the social upheaval that could
threaten their oil interests.
Four days before the pipeline ceremony, Azerbaijan's main nationalist
opposition parties and youth groups -- all professing pro-pipeline
and pro-American sentiments, as they auditioned for the part of the
West's "democratic" model opposition -- held a rally in Baku calling
for free and fair elections to parliament this November. The protest
was banned and police waded in, beating and arresting hundreds of
protesters.
The regime's brutal response even worried BP's top manager in the
country, who described the violence as "unfortunate." Aliyev's chief
of staff Ramiz Mekhtiyev was quick to reprimand him: "Foreign
companies should get on with their business and not interfere in
politics," he said.
Yet under Western pressure, the regime caved in last Saturday and
refrained from smashing up the next opposition demonstration. It was
the first to be allowed to go ahead peacefully since Aliyev came to
power.
To get an idea of how dependent Aliyev's regime is on the oil
industry, it is sufficient to look at the figures: Oil revenues are
set to grow rapidly over the next five to seven years, bringing in $5
billion to $6 billion per year -- up to three times the state budget.
GDP in Azerbaijan is expected to grow at a rate of 13 percent this
year and 14 percent next year, the highest growth rates in the CIS.
But the boom will be completely fueled by oil, and starting next year
by gas, when a parallel gas pipeline is due to open from Baku to
Turkey.
Thus, Azerbaijan has all its eggs in one basket. As long as oil
prices remain high, the country stands to gain an estimated $50
billion over the next 20 years. The big multinationals working in the
country -- BP, which has some 40 percent of its assets in the United
States, together with U.S. oil services giants Halliburton,
McDermott's and Schlumberger -- stand to make many billions of
dollars, too.
Yet a chronic lack of investment outside the oil sector, combined
with all-pervasive corruption, means the country is likely headed for
a future closer to that of Nigeria than Norway. The country's
agricultural and industrial potential has been utterly stymied by
corruption and an obsessive focus on oil.
Aliyev's government has been unable to translate its oil wealth into
higher living standards for the vast majority of Azeris, who subsist
on an average of about $50 per month. The worst-off section of the
population is the hundreds of thousands of refugees uprooted by the
1988-94 war with Armenia over Nagorny Karabakh.
As oil money rolls into state coffers, the danger arises of
large-scale theft and misuse, whether Aliyev stays or the opposition
comes to power. Even developed industrialized countries with publicly
accountable oil funds have experienced difficulties in avoiding the
"Dutch disease," when the dominance of natural resources leads to
inflation and the atrophying of other sectors.
In the case of Azerbaijan, where investment outside the oil sector is
already negligible and democratic control of the State Oil Fund is
zero, the prospects for this wealth to be stolen, frittered away on
prestige projects or put into defense spending are frightening. And
when Azeris see few tangible benefits from the expected oil bonanza,
a social explosion cannot be long in coming. It may take the form of
a nationalist uprising, demanding that Azerbaijan restart the war
with Armenia to recover Karabakh, or an upsurge of Islamic
fundamentalism akin to the Iranian revolution. Or the revolt could be
more class-based, calling for the expropriation of the
Western-dominated oil industry.
Those who now back Aliyev's government could still switch sides in an
effort to protect their oil interests. Yet whichever horse Washington
backs, it should be ready for a bumpy ride ahead.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress